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“Family unity” is often upheld as the principle of U.S. immigration policy, central to the 
making and self-understanding of the U.S. as a “nation of immigrants.”  However, family-based 
immigration system was only born of struggles of immigrant families against the regime of 
restriction.  As the era of open immigration ended in the U.S. in 1921, there emerged a 
fundamental tension between claims of immigrant families and the regime of immigration 
restriction.  Much of what current immigration law recognizes as family, or how it matters, 
originated in the post-1921 era, born out of struggles by immigrant families. 
This dissertation examines the period between 1921 and 1978 from two perspectives.   
One is as an era of the three-tiered regulatory system created in the 1920s that lasted until the 
1960s to the 1970s: 1) quotas restriction applied to European immigrants 2) exclusion of Asian 
immigrants, and 3) administrative regulation of immigration from Mexico without a firm ceiling.  
Another is as the formative years of contemporary immigration control that lasts today.   The 
three-tiered system marked by explicit ethno-racial hierarchization closed first in 1965 by 
abolition of the quotas system in the Eastern Hemisphere, and finally in 1978 when Congress 
placed all countries including the Western Hemisphere under a worldwide ceiling.   But the end 
of the quotas era was not a return to an era of open immigration, but an onset of alternative form 
of immigration restriction and regulation.  
With particular attention to linkage between ideas about family and ethno-racial 




and restriction of family immigration, created, reinforced, and unmade the three-tiered 
immigration restriction regime.  To date there has been no comprehensive historical study of the 
concept of the "family" in immigration law -- how it is defined, who is eligible as a family 
member and who is not, under what conditions families may be united or separated, and how 
family-based policies varied according to ethno-racial origin. This lack has resulted in a static 
and naturalized view of the family rather than a dynamic and contested concept in immigration 
law and policy.  This dissertation explains the changes in definitions of family in immigration, 
deportation, and nationality law during the quotas era, shows how they are the product of 
challenges raised by immigrant families, and how they were inherited to the era of formally 
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Introduction	  
 
On December 8, 1925, President Calvin Coolidge referred to the Immigration Act of 
1924 in his annual message, and emphasized immigration restriction as an exercise of 
sovereignty: “no alien, inhabitant of another country, has any legal rights whatever under our 
Constitution and laws.” At the same time, however, Coolidge asked whether the 1924 Act 
deprived “our own inhabitants” of “the comfort and society of those bound to them by close 
family ties.”1  As the era of open immigration to the U.S. ended with the imposition of first 
numerical ceiling on European immigration in 1921, Coolidge expressed the tension between the 
nascent regime of immigration restriction and claims of families. 
As philosopher Joseph Carens states, claims of family unification has its strength in being 
“moral claims of insiders not outsiders” and  “the state’s obligation to admit outside family 
members is derived not so much from the claims of those seeking to enter as the claims of those 
they seek to join.”2 At the same time, whether and to what extent claims for admission of one’s 
family members is recognized is a marker of who are deemed to be insiders in the polity.  
According to political scientist Daniel J. Tichenor, immigration politics has two dimensions, one 
regarding “alien admission” and “alien rights.”  However, family-based admission defies such 
clear divisions, because it involves the rights of U.S. citizens and residents regarding admission 
of foreigners.3   
                                                
 
1 Calvin Coolidge: "Third Annual Message," December 8, 1925. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29566. 
2 Joseph Carens, “Who Should Get In?: The Ethics of Immigration Admissions,” Ethics and International 
Affairs 17, no.1 (2003): 96-97, 107. 
3 According to Tichenor, “cosmopolitans” support expansion of both alien admission and rights, whereas 
“classic exclusionists” demand restriction of both.  “Free-market expansionists” insist on expansive 
admission but restrictive rights, while “nationalist egalitarians” emphasize vice versa.  Dividing Lines: 
The Politics of Immigration Control in America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 16-17, 36-
37.     
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Scholars have often described family unification in the U.S. in terms of “the routine 
mechanism of recruiting new wanted immigrants” to a “classic settler nation.”4  Yet, much of 
what current immigration law recognizes as family, or how it matters, originated in the post-1921 
era, out of struggles by immigrant families that had to face a fundamental tension between their 
claims and the regime of immigration restriction.   Looking into the period between 1921 and 
1978, at one level, this dissertation examines the place of family in relation to the three-tiered 
regulatory system created in the 1920s: 1) quotas restriction applied to European immigrants 2) 
exclusion of Asian immigrants, and 3) administrative regulation of immigration from Mexico 
without a firm ceiling.  Beginning with significant changes in definitions of “family” in 
immigration, deportation, and nationality law during the era, this dissertation will discuss how 
both selective admission and selective restriction of certain familial relation made, reinforced, 
and unmade this regime.   
At another level, this dissertation examines the 1921-1978 period as the formative period 
of contemporary immigration control.   The three-tiered system marked by explicit ethno-racial 
hierarchization closed first in 1965 by abolition of the quotas system, and finally in 1978 when 
Congress placed all countries under a worldwide ceiling.  But this was not the end of restriction.  
According to Guillermina Jasso and Mark R. Rosenzweig, immigration regulation in the U.S. 
can be divided into four eras: “Pre-restriction Era (1789-1874),” “Era of Qualitative Restrictions 
(1875-1920),” “Era of Qualitative Restrictions Plus Quantitative Restrictions on the Eastern 
Hemisphere (1921-1964), and the “Era of Both Qualitative and Quantitative Restrictions on Both 
                                                
 
4 Christian Joppke, Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany, and Great Britain 
(New York: Oxford UP, 1999) 19-20; The case of post-WWII Europe is generally explained as 
unwelcoming governments having to accept rights of long-term foreign workers.  See Rogers Brusbaker, 
Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); 
Andrew Geddes, The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe (London: Sage, 2003). 
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Hemispheres” since 1965.5   More than restriction by quotas, this periodization emphasizes 1) the 
critical divide between pre-1921 and post-1921 era, or the transition from the era of qualitative 
restriction to the era of quantitative restriction, and 2) successive tightening of immigration 
control, or continuity between 1921-1965 era and post-1965 era.    This characterization reflects 
recent reevaluation of the period after drastic reduction of European immigration by quota 
restriction imposed in the 1920s until abolition of the quotas system in the 1960s.  This 
dissertation will contribute to our understanding of this era, which was once the most neglected 
period in immigration history. 
The main reasons for relative inattention to the quotas period have been the low volume 
of total immigration, especially immigration from Europe, and the European immigrant centered 
paradigm of the field.  Compared with the pre-1920s and the post-1960s (with annual 
immigration of some one million), total immigration was small.   In fact, migration from the 
Western Hemisphere such as Mexico was large,6 but immigration from Europe, which marked 
fifteen million during the first two decades of the century, trickled down to less than six million 
in the following four decades.  Save for studies on refugees,7 the 1920s was the epilogue of many 
                                                
 
5 Guillermina Jasso and Mark R. Rosenzweig, “Characteristics of Immigrants to the United States: 1820-
2003,” in A Companion to American Immigration, ed. Reed Ueda (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 
331-337; It should be noted that description of pre-1874 era as the pre-restriction era is subject to 
contestation.  Although the Immigration Act of 1875 was the first federal immigration law, state 
governments had sought to control migration through various means including deportation.  Gerald L. 
Neuman, "The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875)," Columbia Law Review 93 
(1993): 1833-1901. 
6 Literature on Bracero Program is large. Early monographs include Ernesto Galarza, Merchants of 
Labor: The Mexican Bracero Story (Charlotte, California: McNally and Loftin, 1964), Richard B. 
Craig, The Bracero Program: Interest Groups and Foreign Policy (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1971); For a more recent work, Deborah Cohen, Braceros: Migrant Citizens and Transnational Subjects 
in the Postwar United States and Mexico (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011); On 
workers from the British West Indies, Cindy Hahamovitch, No Man’s Land: Jamaican Guestworkers in 
America and the Global History of Deportable Labor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011) 
7 David Wyman, Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis, 1938-1941 (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1968); Gil Loescher and John A. Scanlan, Calculated Kindness: Refugees and 
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historical works on European immigration.8  Another large body of scholarship concerns the 
post-1960s, as both authorized and unauthorized immigration increased, partly due to abolition 
of the quotas system, and as Latin America (8.4 million) and Asia (4.98 million) had surpassed 
Europe (4.35 million) as the origin of the foreign-born population in the U.S. by 1990.9 
Conventional scholarship described the quotas era as that of restrictionism, the end of the 
quotas era as re-opening of the gate, and moreover depicted the era as that of anomaly in the 
history or tradition of “nation of immigrants.”  As historian Mae Ngai has argued, this view 
reflected the formulation of the narrative of the U.S. as “nation of immigrants” after World War 
II as part of the struggle of Southern and Eastern European immigrants and their descendants for 
cultural and political recognition, in which the emergent field of immigration history played a 
central role.   Led by works such as Oscar Handlin’s Uprooted (1951), immigration history or 
history of immigrants became a legitimate subfield of U.S. history.  In a celebratory tone, John F. 
Kennedy’s A Nation of Immigrants (1958), and Lyndon Johnson’s designation of Ellis Island as 
national monument (1965) sent a message of recognition to immigrants from Southern and 
Eastern Europe and their descendants.10  In this context, abolition of the quotas system appeared 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
America’s Half-Open Door, 1945-Present (New York; Free Press, 1983); Richard Breitman and Alan 
Kraut, American Refugee Policy and European Jewry, 1933-1945 (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1987); More recently, Michael Gill Davis, “The Cold War, Refugees, and U.S. Immigration Policy, 
1952-1965,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1996); Carl Bon Tempo, Americans at the Gate: 
The United States and Refugees during the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008)  
8 An example is the classic 1955 work on nativism by John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of 
American Nativism, 1860-1925 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1955); For works that 
discussed absence of new immigration, integration of immigrants and the second-generation in relation to 
changing industrial and labor needs, see for example Lizbeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial 
Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 
9 David Reimers, Still the Golden Door: The Third World Comes to America (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1992); For a collection of essays on post-1965 immigration, Mary C. Waters et al. eds., 
The New Americans: A Guide to Immigration since 1965 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007). 
10 Mae Ngai, “The Unlovely Residue of Outworn Prejudices: The Hart Celler Act and the Politics of 
Immigration Reform, 1945-1965,” in Americanism: New Perspectives on the History of an Ideal eds., 
Michael Kazin et al, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 108-127; Mae Ngai, “Oscar 
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as a triumph over restrictionism based on ethno-racial hierachization. 11  Moreover, reformers of 
the 1960s depicted restriction by quotas as anomaly and divergence from the ideals of the U.S., 
and its abolition as “reaffirmation of old principles.”12 
 Family immigration was central to the formulation of this narrative.   At one level, as 
this dissertation shows, the call for family unity and demands for expansion of family-based 
admission played a significant part in eroding the quotas system, which sought to conform 
immigration to a rigid ethno-racial ratio.  At another level, as a political statement, the narrative 
that the U.S. had always valued family immigration was central to the portrayal of the U.S. as a 
settler immigrant nation and as a nation of immigrants.  Yet, powerful as it was as a political 
statement, this also left scholars of the generation engaged in the reform movement to place 
importance of the family as a matter of uncontested principle in the nation of immigrants without 
further inquiry.  For instance, Edward P. Hutchinson (1986) wrote in his comprehensive survey 
of immigration legislation through 1790 to 1965 that family unification had “never been a 
controversial or debatable issue,” reasoning that Congress always favored immigrants “with the 
intention of remaining permanently, becoming a citizen, and bringing his family or establishing 
it after arrival.”13  This discourse entirely overlooked how exclusion of families was central to 
Asian exclusion that lasted until 1952, or how prevention of permanent settlement and family 
was central to labor recruitment from Mexico and the Caribbean since World War II, or how 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
Handlin and Immigration Policy Reform in the 1950s and 1960s,” Journal of American Ethnic History 32, 
no. 3 (2013): 62-63; Oscar Handlin, The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the Great Migrations that Made the 
American People (Boston: Little Brown, 1951); John F. Kennedy, A Nation of Immigrants (New York: 
Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, 1958). 
11 This literature emphasizes World War II as a critical turning point toward dropping of the barrier. 
Roger Daniels, Guarding the Golden Door: American Immigration Policy and Immigrants since 1882 
(New York: Hill and Wang, 2004), chapter 4. 
12 John F. Kennedy, A Nation of Immigrants (New York: Harper, 2008), 50. 
13 Edward P. Hutchinson, Legislative History of American Immigration Policy, 1798-1965 (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981), 595. 
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“family separation” was a constant complaint by Southern and Eastern European immigrants 
during the quotas era.   
Recent historians have shed new light on the era between two periods of great migration.  
Studies paying attention to women migrants have examined how immigration and nationality law 
assumed economic dependence of women on their husbands and fathers, and how a husband’s 
merit as immigrant determined the immediate family’s chance of admission, exclusion, or 
deportation.14 While acknowledging the waning of explicit racial nativism, significant changes in 
idea about race and ethnicity, or transformation of immigration pattern after 1965, recent works 
have also called attention to the shaping of alternative boundaries in addition to disappearance of 
boundaries, and the continuity in gatekeeping.  For example, they have shown how 
reconfiguration of ethno-racial lines occurred among European immigrants, but how racial 
boundaries of white/non-white survived or was even reinforced.15  Whereas early studies on 
post-war immigration reform emphasized “death” of the quotas system,16 recent works have 
instead discussed the shaping of alternative ideas of immigrant selection.17  From a more long-
                                                
 
14  Candice Lewis Bredbenner, A Nationality of Her Own: Women, Marriage, and the Law of Citizenship 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Eithne Luibhéid, Entry Denied: Controlling Sexuality at 
the Border (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002); Martha Gardner, The Qualities of a 
Citizen: Women, Immigration, and Citizenship, 1870-1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
15 For a discussion of how immigration restriction reconfigured racial lines to categorize European 
immigrants as “Caucasian” or “white,” with less distinctions among European immigrants, Matthew Frye 
Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1998); Mae Ngai, “The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law: A 
Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 1924,” Journal of American History 86, no. 1 (1999): 67-92; 
Gary Gerstle, American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2001); David Roediger, Working toward Whiteness: How America’s Immigrants 
Became White (New York: Basic Books, 2005) 
16 Stephen Thomas Wagner, “The Lingering Death of the National Origins Quotas System: A Political 
History of United States Immigration Policy, 1952-1965.” (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1986); 
Betty K. Koed, “The Politics of Reform: Policymakers and the Immigration Act of 1965.” (Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara, 1999). 
17 Philip Eric Wolgin, “Beyond National Origins: The Development of Modern Immigration 
Policymaking, 1948 -1968.” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2011). 
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term perspective, scholars such as Mae Ngai, Aristide Zolberg, and Daniel Kanstroom have 
examined the post-1920s as formative years of contemporary immigration regulation, with 
attention to both admission and expulsion of immigrants as central to the regime.18  Indeed, most 
importantly, belief in numerical restriction sank deep roots, and grounds for exclusion and 
deportation expanded throughout the era along with government institutions to enforce the 
regime.  From this perspective, this dissertation examines contestations over family-based 
admission from 1921 to 1978 in relation to the making and unmaking of ethno-racial boundaries 
in the period of formal hierarchization among immigrants, and in relation to formation of 
contemporary immigration regulation that continues until today.  
Numerical restriction since 1921 no longer allowed immigrants to practice family 
immigration in diverse ways as they had previously.  Surely, during the mass migration period 
leading up to the first quota act, Congress had sought to control immigration by favoring family 
formations of certain immigrant groups over others, and favoring certain family relations over 
others.  This was especially true with regard to Asian Americans, against whom immigration 
laws and court cases increasingly narrowed admission of families and attempted to prevent 
settlement and increase of Asian population.19  The late 19th-century immigration laws based on 
Victorian norms of morality and family also expressed the idea that women were dependent on 
their husband / father as well as the idea that men had the right to have his family in the 
                                                
 
18 Mae Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2004); Aristede Zolberg, A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in 
the Fashioning of America (New York: Russell Sage, 2006); Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation 
Nation: Outsiders in American History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007); For a 
comparative work that discusses the modern passport control system, John Torpey, The 
Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999) 
19 Erika Lee, At America’s Gate: Chinese Immigration during the Exclusion Era, 1882-1943. (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), especially Chapter 3. 
  8 
household.   For instance, immigration authorities cast suspicion on single women as prostitutes, 
one of the excludable classes.20  Nevertheless, the actual rate of exclusion remained low, and 
separation by U.S. immigration acts was not as central a factor to consider in migration strategies 
for most European immigrants as it would become after 1921. 
Furthermore, U.S. immigration laws did not govern the decision of whether and when the 
following family members would or could join in the U.S.   Lack of numerical ceiling facilitated 
circular and temporary migration, since there was no fear of being barred entry upon return to the 
U.S. for lack of an annual spot.   Likewise, migrants did not necessarily send for the nuclear 
family or in the order of degree of consanguinity as modern immigration laws favor.  Immigrants 
often formed split households, where males immigrated to the U.S. first, either with or without 
the intention to settle permanently, and sent home remittances.  Such strategy involving 
“separation of men from women during migration,” as historian Donna Gabaccia argues, “proved 
not only economically feasible but in many cases more advantageous than transplantation in 
family groups,” since it reduced the risks of migration.21  22 Moreover, relations beyond the 
nuclear family, such as siblings, nephews / nieces, or cousins, played a crucial part in migration 
network extending from villages and countries of origins to the U.S.   
 Numerical restriction since 1921 limited the pattern of family immigration first by 
adopting a narrow definition of family, and second by fundamentally changing the significance 
                                                
 
20 Luibhéid, Eithne. Entry Denied: Controlling Sexuality at the Border (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2002), chapter 2. 
21 Donna Gabaccia, “When the Migrants are Men: Italy’s Women and Transnationalism as a Working 
Class Way of Life,” in Sharpe, Pamela ed.  Women, Gender, and Labour Migration: Historical and 
Global Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 2001), 195. 
22 Dino Cinel, From Italy to San Francisco: The Immigrant Experience (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1982); 
Mark Wyman, Round-Trip America: The Immigrants Return to Europe, 1880-1930 (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 
1993); Drew Keeling, Repeat Migration between Europe and the United States, 1870-1914. UC Berkeley: 
Institute of European Studies, 2009. Retrieved from: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/56g1k33h 
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of how laws defined family for immigration purpose.  For instance, when Congress imposed a 
literacy test in 1917 in order to reduce immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe, Congress 
exempted certain family members of U.S. citizens and of any “admissible alien.”  Considering 
men as labor competition, Congress applied a more rigid standard to men than to women, and 
mandated all men between the age of 16 and 55 to pass the literacy test.  Yet, once over the age 
of 55, the 1917 Act treated them as dependent on their children and grandchildren, and exempted 
fathers and grandfathers.   For women, Congress exempted wives, mothers, grandmothers, and 
daughters of any age as long as she was unmarried or widowed.23  But later immigration laws 
have never recognized relations such as grandparents and grandchildren as family for admission 
purpose.   
The importance of how immigration laws recognized families also became critically 
different.  Under qualitative restriction, even if Congress did not recognize certain family 
relations for immigration purpose, the prospective immigrant could still immigrate to the U.S. as 
long as one met all the tests such as health conditions.  Admission instead of exclusion was the 
norm, and family-specific clause mattered primarily for those who fell into one of the excludable 
categories.  This was no longer the case after 1921, when exclusion became the norm.  Post-1921 
restriction was not about qualifications in terms of health, financial conditions, literacy or any 
other conditions.  The point of numerical restriction by annual ceiling was to make otherwise 
qualifying immigrants wait until a spot became available.   Non-recognition of family relations, 
or absence of family-based exemption from numerical restriction, meant a lengthy if not 
                                                
 
23 Section 3, Immigration Act of 1917 (34 stat. 874): When the literacy test was proposed in 1896, one 
version required all immigrants above 14 to pass the test, while the other version required only male 
between 16 and 60 to pass the test. As a compromise, all immigrants over 16 were required to pass the 
test, but male immigrant’s wife, children, and aged parents were exempted. Nancy F. Cott, Public Vows: 
A History of Marriage and the Nation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 141, 155. 
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indefinite wait for admission.  The only way of circumventing the wait was unauthorized 
immigration, which would place the immigrant in the state of permanent alienage.  The concept 
of “family unification” in post-1921 immigration was developed out of contestation between 
restrictionist framework that disallowed immigrants to practice family immigration in diverse 
and expansive ways as they had previously before 1921.  The compromises that result from this 
contestation include the limited definition of family-relations in terms of admission. 
In the following sections, Part 1 looks into the emergence of the restriction regime in the 
1920s.  Chapter 1 examines the closing of era of open migration for European immigrants.   The 
question of whose and which family mattered acquired utmost importance, as post-1921 regime 
held all non-recognized relations to be prima facie inadmissible.   It argues that quotas system 
was invented as an antithesis to family-based admission, which was believed to favor Southern 
and Eastern European immigrants, and with a specific purpose of minimizing the importance of 
familial relations in immigrating to the U.S.    
Chapter 2 discusses the second pillar of post-1920s regime: racial exclusion of Asian 
immigrants as “aliens ineligible to citizenship.”  Whereas the issue for immigrants from Southern 
and Eastern Europe was to what extent rights of citizens and immigrants could be recognized, for 
Asian Americans the question in the late 1920s was whether wholesale racial exclusion trumped 
all claims of U.S. citizens to bring one’s family.  This chapter discusses the challenge of 
Chinese-Americans against the exclusion of their family members.  It examines how both 
admission and exclusion of certain family relations reinforced ideas about miscegenation, and 
discusses the racial boundary of family rights, drawn between “Caucasian /white family” and 
others. 
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  Part 2 examines the Great Depression era, and claims of immigrant families facing 
deportation.  As the third tier of post-1920s immigration regulation, the Western Hemisphere 
remained outside the quotas system.  Absence of a formal ceiling on Mexico was not grounded 
in the same idea that gave Great Britain the largest share of quotas as “origin” of the United 
States, but was seen more as a means to reserve flexible access to labor.  At its core was non-
recognition of Mexican immigrants as permanent members.  Chapter 3 discusses Mexican 
American repatriation in various localities in the West and the Midwest as a specifically family-
targeted repatriation, involving Mexican and Mexican American families.  The chapter discusses 
the effect of repatriation across generations, involving Mexican immigrants, their families 
formed in the U.S., and families formed in Mexico after repatriation, and their struggles to return 
to the U.S. 
 In contrast with deportation and repatriation drive against Mexican and Mexican 
Mexican Americans, deportation in cities with large European immigrant population invited 
sharp criticism.  Chapter 4 examines the reform movement led by immigrant aid agencies and the 
Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, and the resulting deportation system that gave certain 
recognition to familial ties of deportable immigrants.  It also shows how the movement 
ultimately failed to question the foundation of immigration restriction.  The chapter will also 
discuss how Congress withdrew this privilege specifically from Mexican immigrants after the 
war, and discusses how non-recognition of family was central to concurrent recruitment of 
“temporary” workers.  
Chapter 5 looks into the decade after the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 Often 
seen as a period without little change in the quotas system, this chapter shows how the nuclear 
family model of family-based admission was challenged, and argues that the basic framework of 
  12 
what would be considered a “family” in 1965 was determined.  With particular attention to 
Italian Americans, this chapter discusses their challenge against the nuclear family based model 
of family-based admission and the lasting change in immigration achieved by the movement.   
       Chapter 6 examines the final phase of the abolition of the national origins quotas in the 
Eastern Hemisphere, and the onset of the era of global immigration restriction including the 
Western Hemisphere.  It discusses how breaking down of explicit hierarchization of European 
nationalities created a different understanding of “national origins,” and how the national origins 
quotas and family-based admission, which were originally conceived to be exact opposites, came 
to be seen as companions.  Next, it will examine how the notion of equality, especially formal 
equality for families under the Immigration Act of 1965 and in the post-quotas regulation turned 
into a formal numerical restriction on the Western Hemisphere.  
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Part I.  Family Exemption and Family Exclusion 
 
On December 8, 1925, in his annual message, President Calvin Coolidge asked whether 
the Immigration Act of 1924 was “working a needless hardship upon our own inhabitants.”  
Coolidge upheld the act as a whole and stressed that the U.S. had the sovereign right to restrict 
immigration: “no alien, inhabitant of another country, has any legal rights whatever under our 
Constitution and laws.   It is only through treaty, or through residence here that such rights 
accrue.”  The only proposal of Coolidge was to amend the 1924 Act for families of “our own 
inhabitants.” “If it deprives them of the comfort and society of those bound to them by close 
family ties,” Coolidge suggested, “such modifications should be adopted as will afford relief.”1 
Coolidge’s message pointed to some key contested issues surrounding family 
immigration after 1924.   Chapter 1 examines the quota restrictions imposed on European 
immigrants.  The chapter first discusses how the quotas system was invented as an antithesis to 
family-based admission and with a specific purpose of minimizing the importance of familial 
relations in immigrating to the U.S.   Still, quotas restriction imposed on European immigrants 
gave certain consideration to families of U.S. citizens.  Once numerical restriction began, one of 
the key questions was whether U.S. citizenship and naturalization should be the prerequisite for 
family unification.   In speaking of family hardship, Coolidge specifically chose the term 
“inhabitant” because the issue was whether family unification was reserved exclusively for U.S. 
citizens.  Such question only had relevance for Southern and Eastern European immigrants, since 
large quotas instead of family-specific legislation ensured prompt immigration from countries 
such as Britain and Germany.   Initially, the issue was discussed strictly in relation to 
                                                
 
1 Calvin Coolidge: "Third Annual Message," December 8, 1925. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29566. 
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immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe and as a matter of little importance to Western 
and Northern European immigrants, and the chapter will examine where the national origins 
quotas and family unification converged.  
Chapter 2 looks into racial exclusion of Asian immigrants as “aliens ineligible to 
citizenship,” which involved a very different question.   Unlike in the case of European 
immigrants, the question was not whether citizenship should be a pre-requisite for family 
unification, but whether relation to a U.S. citizen mattered at all, or whether U.S. citizenship 
could trump racial exclusion.  As Coolidge referred to “treaty,” only foreign treaties protected 
families “ineligible to citizenship” from wholesale exclusion.  This chapter first discusses how 
by 1927 racial exclusion was affirmed as the foremost bar that trumped any familial connections 
to U.S. citizens, and how family-based admission was made into a racially limited right.  With 
exclusion of “aliens ineligible to citizenship” completed, the chapter next examines exclusionist 
attempt to reduce immigration from Asia targeting citizenship acquired at birth by foreign-born 
U.S. citizens of Asian descent   With particular attention to the ideas about racial discrimination 
held by advocates for Southern and Eastern European immigrants, the chapter discusses the 
racial boundary of family rights.  
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Chapter 1: Quotas versus Families, 1921-1934  
 
 The Emergency Quota Act of 1921, the first numerical restriction of European 
immigrants, marked the beginning of immigration regulation built on the premise that all 
foreigners would be subjected to numerical restriction unless explicitly exempted, a critical 
departure from previous immigration regulation established in 1882 that assumed everyone to be 
admissible unless specifically provided as excludable.  Limitation took the form of annual quotas 
varying widely in size depending on the country of birth of the immigrant.  The first quotas 
system was imposed in 1921, the second in 1924, and the national origins quotas that took effect 
in 1929 lasted until 1965.  As a corollary, the quotas system included certain consideration for 
European immigrant families in two forms: exemption from quota restriction or priority 
(preference) over others within the annual quotas of each country.   
Since quotas were not only a ceiling but a guaranteed reserve for each country, the 
importance of whether immigration law considered certain family relations varied greatly among 
countries.   For immigrants born in countries with small quotas, of utmost importance was 
exemption from quota restriction, followed by preference within the quotas.  Without either, 
there was little chance of immigrating to the U.S. without a lengthy if not indefinite wait.  Both 
in terms of absolute number and in proportion to immigration from each country, family-specific 
legislation mattered most for Southern and Eastern European immigrants.   By contrast, where 
large quotas ensured prompt admission to the U.S., family-specific legislation made little 
difference in the timing or possibility of immigration, and immigration through the formal 
channel of family-based admission was rare.     
 Scholarship on post-1924 immigration debate has most paid attention to the national 
origins quotas debate between 1927 and 1929.   The issue of family is only mentioned in passing 
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in this literature.1  However, the two debates that proceeded concurrently involved different 
interests.   The most divisive issue in the national origins quotas debate was distribution of 
quotas among countries in Northern and Western Europe, whereas family-based admission 
concerned immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe.  On the other hand, in studies on 
women’s rights and female immigrants, the relation between family-based admission and the 
quotas system, or the ethnoracial dimension of the debate has not been fully explored.2  Most 
generally, since family-based admission was small in proportion to total immigration from 
Europe, because families from favored countries chose the easier immigration path of quota visas, 
the importance of family-based admission under the quotas system had been discounted.3   
However, as this dissertation shows, it was a matter of premier importance for Southern and 
Eastern European immigrants, and their struggles was critical in the shaping of  family-based 
admission and its boundaries.  
 The two quota acts of 1921 and 1924 curtailed new admission, but immigrants already 
living in the U.S. and their families in Europe were quite another matter. The issue of family 
separation and family unification became acute immediately after the quotas were imposed.   At 
the core of family unification debates in the late 1920s were the rights of those who had 
immigrated before 1924 and their families.   This chapter particularly pays attention to the 
                                                
 
1 For example, Robert Divine, American Immigration Policy, 1924-1952 (New York: Da Capo Press, 
1972), 26-51; Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 34; Aristide R. Zolberg, A Nation by Design: Immigration 
Policy in the Fashioning of America (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006), 267; Desmond King, 
Making American: Immigration, Race, and the Origins of the Diverse Democracy (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2002), 199-229; A work that discusses both aspects is Sheldon Morris Neuringer, 
American Jewry and United States Immigration Policy, 1881-1953 (New York, Arno Press, 1971). 
2 Candice Lewis Bredbenner, A Nationality of Her Own: Women, Marriage, and the Law of Citizenship 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Martha Gardner, The Qualities of a Citizen: Women, 
Immigration, and Citizenship, 1870-1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
3 For example, Gardner, The Qualities of a Citizen, 29.   
Donna Gabaccia, From the Other Side: Women, Gender, Immigrant Life in the U.S. 1820-1990 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 38;  
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linkage of family-based admission to formal U.S. citizenship, and to families of non-citizens.    
Family rights of non-citizen immigrants have gathered less attention from historians than that of 
citizens, partly because the line between a citizen and a permanent resident is not a hard 
boundary in the U.S., where eligibility to naturalization is part of permanent residency.    But the 
question had particular importance in the 1920s, the decade of large number of naturalizations as 
well as emigration, when 11.8 million people born in Europe resided in the U.S., with as many 
noncitizens (45.8 percent / 5.4 million) as naturalized citizens (49.1 percent / 5.8 million). 4  
Moreover, what it meant to be an “immigrant” or “permanent resident” of the U.S. itself was 
influx, as the era of open immigration era came to an end. 
 
1.1 Quotas as an Antithesis to Family-based Admission 
The Emergency Act of May 29, 1921, the first law to numerically restrict European 
immigration, marked a critical turning point in U.S. immigration history.  Enforced on June 3, 
1921, it was claimed to be a stopgap measure after World War I, but numerical restriction 
become a permanent policy thereafter.  Using the most recent 1910 census, the 1921 Act limited 
annual immigration from each country in Europe to 3 percent of the number of U.S. residents 
born in the respective country, in other words the number of first-generation immigrants.  Pre-
                                                
 
4 The total foreign-born population was 13.9 million in 1920 (13.2% of total population) and 14.2 million 
in 1930 (11.6 percent of total).   European-born population was 11.7 million in 1930.  By 1930, 
naturalized citizens increased to 60.1 percent (7.0 million), while noncitizens decreased to 36.6 percent 
(4.3 million), and 3.3 percent (389,000) unknown.   United States Census Bureau, Fifteenth Census of the 
United States-1930-Population, Volume II: General Report, Statistics by Subject, (Washington D.C.: 
G.P.O, 1933), 406-407.    
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war immigration averaged one million annually, but the total quotas for Europe were reduced to 
a mere 355,000.5   
 Several aspects of the quota system have been neglected in scholarship.  First, one of the 
initial purposes of quotas was to discount family ties as criteria for deciding admission to the U.S.  
The quota system was advanced specifically as a counter-proposal to family-centered restriction 
or admission scheme.  Secondly, quotas were originally intended to be an absolute ceiling on 
annual immigration from each country.   In its final form, numerical restriction was coupled with 
a system of permitting certain family members to immigrate outside the quotas, but this was 
quite different from the original intention.  The final inclusion of non-quota family immigration 
resulted only after intense struggle from immigrant groups and their advocates. 
After the outbreak of the war in Europe, annual immigration plummeted from one million 
to an average of 235,000 between 1915 and 1919.  Despite the sharp drop, wartime anti-foreigner 
sentiment gave support for the restrictionists to finally introduce their long-desired literacy test in 
the Immigration Act of 1917, overriding the fourth Presidential veto, once by Grover Cleveland 
and Howard Taft, and twice by Woodrow Wilson.  However, a sharp rise in post-war 
immigration  --  from 430,000 in 1920 to 805,000 in 1921 -- revealed that the law did not have 
the expected effect of reducing immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe.  Previously, 
qualitative restriction such as literary test was controversial enough, but the terms of restriction 
debates shifted in the course of the war and the Red Scare to a more rigid numerical restriction.6 
                                                
 
5 Senate proposed 5 percent, but House insisted on 3 percent.  John Higham, Strangers in the Land: 
Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2001), 308-311; 
Roger Daniels, Guarding the Golden Door: American Immigration Policy and Immigrants Since 1882 
(New York: Hill and Wang, 2004), 48. 
6 Immgiration Act of February 5, 1917 (39 Stat. 874); When the literacy test was introduced, annual 
immigration had already dropped to less than 300,000 due to the war in Europe, and the effect of the 
literacy test was not clear.  Higham, Strangers in the Land, 191-193, 202-203, 312-324; Daniel J. 
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Nativists advanced two schemes of immigration restriction.  One was suspension of 
immigration, which was the idea of Representative Albert Johnson (R-Washington).   The future 
author of the Immigration Act of 1924, Johnson became the chair of the House Immigration and 
Naturalization Committee in 1919.  Johnson admired the eugenicist Madison Grant, the author of 
the Passing of the Great Race (1916), and Johnson himself was the president of the Eugenics 
Research Association.  Grant’s writing that acquired popularity in the 1920s preached that the 
human species could be “roughly divided into Negroes and Negroids, and the Mongols and 
Mongoloids,” and the “European” or Caucasian.”  His focus was on the European, which Grant 
argued could be divided into “three main European races”: “Alpine,” the “Mediterranean,” 
placing the “Nordic” on the top of the hierarchy.  Rejecting the notion of the melting pot, Grant 
argued how the “mixing” of superior “race” with others diluted the nation and insisted that “the 
Great Race” would eventually be overwhelmed.7   As historian Matthew Frye Jacobson argues, 
the literacy test at least wore a “concealing cloak of the more environmentalist” view, but “the 
starker racial argument was in ascendance” in the 1910s.8    
Insisting on the need to stop immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe, in 1919 
Johnson proposed to suspend immigration altogether until Congress discussed more long-term 
policy.  The proposal was backed by various patriotic societies and restrictionist organizations 
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including the American Federation of Labor, but there was also strong opposition that absolute 
suspension was too drastic and abrupt.   To pacify such opposition, in 1920 he next proposed to 
suspend new admission with an exception of certain families of U.S. citizens and those who had 
filed the declaration of intention to become a U.S. citizen.9 
Quotas restriction was a counter-proposal by Senator William P. Dillingham (D-
Vermont), former chair of the United States Immigration Commission (1907-1911), which 
published a 41-volume study on immigrants in the U.S.10 The central feature of quotas was that 
they were ceilings of different sizes according to the country, and Dillingham had introduced the 
idea of quotas restriction as early as 1913.11  In addition to finding suspension of immigration too 
extreme, the senator believed that Congress must achieve two ends through restrictive legislation 
but that Johnson’s scheme served neither of these purposes.  First, Dillingham insisted on the 
need to build a policy of numerical immigration restriction.  Second, the target had to be 
Southern and Eastern European immigrants with minimal adverse effect on Northern and 
Western European immigrants.    
On two levels, Johnson’s scheme was different from numerical restriction.  For one, 
numerical restriction admits only a certain number of immigrants in a given period by 
compelling otherwise qualifying immigrants to wait until a spot becomes available if ever.  But 
exclusion or immediate admission were the only two options under Johnson’s plan, with no 
mechanism to control the timing hence the volume of immigration. For another, it was 
impossible to predict the number of families that would possibly be exempted from suspension 
of immigration. Those who claimed to join their “relatives” in the U.S. accounted for 80 percent 
                                                
 
9 Johnson bill, H.R. 66-14461 (1920); Higham, Strangers in the Land, 307; Hutchinson, Legislative 
History, 174-176.  
10 King, Making Americans, 58-79. 
11 Daniels, Guarding the Golden Door, 46-47. 
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of all immigrants from 1911 to 1914 (3.3 of 4.1 million), and depending on the range, a majority 
of intending immigrants could potentially be exempted.  In fact, one reason that the literacy test 
introduced in 1917 had little effect of reducing immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe 
was because many did not have to take the test thanks to the test’s family exemption provision.12 
Another problem with absolute suspension of immigration was that it would stop 
immigration from Northern and Europe as well, and could not specifically target immigrants 
from Southern and Eastern Europe.  Most importantly, for Dillingham, even worse was the idea 
of family-based exemption, which he believed would have an entirely contrary effect that would 
“discriminate … in favor of southeastern Europe, instead of northwestern Europe.” Drawing on 
the findings of the Dillingham Commission, the Senator argued, “The people in northwestern 
Europe are not dependent upon those who have preceded them to this country.  Those who are in 
the country brought, in most cases, their families with them.  Therefore the provision admitting 
relatives is largely inapplicable to northwestern European immigration.”13  Dillingham believed 
that families of immigrants from Northern and Western Europe were already residing in the U.S. 
and therefore there was no need to make a law to allow current residents to send for their 
families.14    
The Dillingham Commission invented the term “old immigration” to refer to immigration 
from Northern and Western Europe and “new immigration” to refer to immigration from 
Southern and Eastern Europe since the late nineteenth century.  The report began with the 
premise that there were differences between the two, and despite its numerous valuable findings, 
the overall conclusion only supported the premise that “new immigration” must be different from 
                                                
 
12 Another reason was the improved literacy rate, and most who actually took the test passed.  
13 60 Cong. Rec. 3447 (1921) (Senator William Dillingham) 
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“old immigration.”15  The commission concluded that the “old immigration” was “essentially 
one of permanent settlers.”  By contrast, the commission characterized “new immigration” as 
sojourners with “no intention of permanently changing their residence.”  Among the factors that 
the commission pointed to was the return migration rate and gender ratio.  The return migration 
rate was approximately 40 percent.  The Commission also emphasized that 75 percent were men.  
“The great majority of some of these races are present in the United by single men or men whose 
wives and families are in their native country,” the Commission argued.” 16  There were regional 
differences in immigration pattern, and this was not a characteristic shared by “new immigration.   
Before numerical restriction, migrants from certain countries such as Italy and Greece surely had 
a significantly high proportion of men, both married and single.17  With regard to sex ratio, 1924 
was a turning point of immigration from Europe when women came to outnumber men.   
Previously, with the exception of 1922, men had constantly outnumbered women, although the 
gap was narrowing since World War I.18 While many returned to Europe after the war as new 
states came into being, others began to send for their families in the 1920s.   
The idea that family-centered admission or family-based exemption from restriction 
would only benefit Eastern and Southern European immigrants was consistent throughout the 
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1920s.   Hence, quota system was a counter-scheme to family-only admission policy.   Whereas 
family-based admission was considered to adversely affect Northern and Western European 
immigrants and work in favor of Southern and Eastern European immigrants, restriction by 
country quotas varying in size could specifically target Southern and Eastern European 
immigrants, depending on how the quotas were assigned.   
Furthermore, Congress originally intended the quotas as the absolute maximum number 
of immigrants admitted from each country. As one Congressman put it, “opening the gates 
without knowing how many could come in” by making exceptions to quota restrictions would 
defeat the purpose of numerical restriction.19 The statement pointed to the fundamental tension 
between the emerging regime of numerical restriction and the claims of families.  For families, 
the only way to immigrate to the U.S. when they desired and to minimize the period of 
separation was exemption from numerical restriction, which directly conflicted with the regime 
of numerical limitation that compels otherwise qualifying immigrants to wait indefinitely.    
 A brief look at the Immigration Act of 1917 shows significant narrowing of family-based 
admission.   When the 1917 Act require a literacy test of all foreigners over 16, it also exempted 
certain relatives of a U.S. citizen and those of “any admissible alien.”  In other words, if the head 
of the family passed the test, his family members did not have to.  Expressing the idea that 
women were dependent on men, Congress applied family-based exemption more broadly to 
female relatives than to male relatives.  The law exempted wife, mother, grandmother, as well as 
unmarried and widowed daughter from the literacy test.   For women, the key was marital status, 
and the 1917 Act treated women as part of the family of the male breadwinner as long as she was 
married or when she lost her husband.   Exemption for male relatives was narrower: father and 
                                                
 
19 61 Cong. Rec. 563 (1921) (Everett Sanders, IN)  
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grandfather over the age of 55, reflecting the idea that aged men no longer competed with labor 
but were dependent on their sons and daughters. 20 
 By comparison, the quotas restriction bill passed by both houses in the 66th Congress, 
pocket-vetoed by President Wilson, did not exempt any family of a citizen much less that of a 
non-citizen.   Nor did the bill reported out by immigration committees in the following 
Congress.21   It should be noted here, however, that in 1921 exclusion of wives of U.S. citizens 
was not an issue.   Under the Nationality Act of 1907, a woman automatically acquired U.S. 
citizenship upon her marriage to a U.S. citizen or upon naturalization of her husband.  Thus, 
upon arrival at the ports of entry she was treated as a U.S. citizen.  It was in 1922 when Congress 
abolished marital naturalization that wives of U.S. citizens began to arrive as a foreigner, and 
their excludability would raise an acute issue. 22  Nevertheless, family exemption from the quotas 
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was enforced, Zartarian v. Billings 204 U.S. 170 (1907) ruled that the “minor children of a naturalized 
alien who were born abroad and remain abroad until after their parent's naturalization” are “aliens, subject 
as to their entrance to the United States to the provisions of the Alien Immigration Act.”  Nationality of 
Her Own, 26, 39-40. 
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was only a last minute invention.  The House rejected by large margins several proposals to 
exempt parents, siblings, children and grandchildren of citizens (no record); parents, siblings, 
and children of citizens (17 to 97), and parents and children under eighteen of citizens (9 to 
78).23  The only exception that Congress finally agreed on was children under eighteen, with the 
maximum number expected to be approximately 30,000 to 40,000.24   
   
Exclusion under the 1921 Act      
 
             In 1921, for the first time in U.S. history, quotas availability began to determine the 
timing or possibility of immigration to the U.S.  Annual limitation overrode all other conditions 
such as financial capability of the family.  While many intending immigrants could not even 
depart from Europe, what gathered most attention in the U.S. were those who were turned away 
from the U.S. ports.   Exclusion in itself was hardly new, but exclusion of an otherwise 
qualifying immigrant simply for the reason that quotas were full was unprecedented.   Prior to 
1921, the most common reason for exclusion was “likely to become a public charge,” a nebulous 
term used for exclusion on various grounds.  But in 1924, quota oversubscription was the most 
common grounds for exclusion.25    
                                                
 
23 61 Cong. Rec. 562, 563, 570 (1921) 
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 25 For discussion of “likely to become a public charge,” Edith Abbott, “Federal Immigration Policies, 
1864-1924 II.” University Journal of  Business 2, no. 3 (1924): 347–357; Patricia Russell Evans, “‘Likely 
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dissertation, George Washington University, 1987; For the usage of LPC clause in relation to diseases and 
medical inspection, Amy L. Fairchild, Science at the Borders: Immigrant Medical Inspection and the 
Shaping of the Modern Industrial Labor Force. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); 
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 Between 1922 and 1924, the Bureau of Immigration turned away 15,400 immigrants 
arriving from Europe on grounds of quota oversubscription.   Congress provided only two weeks 
between passage and enactment of the new law, and exclusion at the ports of entry revealed that 
the immigration bureaucracy was unprepared to administer the new policy.  The visa system first 
adapted in 1917 and formalized by the Passport Act of 1918 required all foreigners to obtain a 
visa before departing for the U.S.26  Still, visas were not the primary means of numerical 
restriction until 1924. Under the 1921 Act, enforcement of numerical restriction was not the 
responsibility of the State Department, and consuls only took an approximate count of emigrants.   
A visa did not guarantee a quota slot, and passengers departed for the U.S. without knowing 
whether a spot will be available upon their arrival.  It was at the ports of entry that the Bureau of 
Immigration under the Department of Labor charged arriving passengers against the quotas.27  
 Newspapers reported sympathetically about exclusion for quotas oversubscription and 
resulting family hardship.  For instance, in September 1921, the Boston Globe reported on a 
Polish family consisting of father, mother, and seven children, who arrived in New York.   
Although they arrived on the same ship, the immigration officials only admitted the mother and 
the children, but turned away the father because the Polish quotas became full.28  Monthly quotas 
(maximum 20 percent of the annual quota) were often exhausted on the first day of the month, 
and when the clock turned midnight ships rushed in for inspection so that their passengers could 
make the monthly cut.  The competition was so intense that on one occasion, New York 
immigration officials had to decide which of the two ships from Italy that came in “neck to neck” 
                                                
 
26 John Torpey, The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship, and the State (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 117-121. 
27 Zolberg, A Nation by Design, 240-241; Admissions of Aliens in Excess of Quota for June 1921 H. Rep. 
No. 67-169 (1921); Admission of Certain Aliens in Excess of Quotas. H. Rep. No. 67- 776 (1922). 
28 “Father Sent Back, Mother and Seven Children Stay,” Boston Globe, September 13, 1921. 
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first crossed the quarantine line between Fort Wadsworth and Fort Hamilton.  Passengers on one 
ship or the other were to be turned away.  On another occasion, four ships crossed the quarantine 
line shortly before midnight, and 1,900 passengers were denied entry as they were counted 
against the full quotas of the previous month.29    
            The Cable Act of September 22, 1922 added to the turmoil at the ports of entry.   As 
historian Candice Lewis Bredbenner discusses in detail, the Cable Act created an unforeseen 
problem for the Department of Labor and the Bureau of Immigration.  In two ways, the law 
decoupled women’s nationality from marriage or that of her husband’s.  The most important 
achievement was abolition of the practice of marital expatriation, which enabled U.S. citizen 
women to retain her citizenship after marrying a foreign national.  At the same time, it also 
ended the practice of marital naturalization, which automatically accorded U.S. citizenship to a 
woman upon her marriage to a U.S. citizen or upon naturalization of her husband.    The 
abolition of marital naturalization created a new problem; wives of U.S. citizens arriving at the 
ports were no longer citizens but foreigners subject to immigration law.30  Because excludability 
of wives had not been an issue in 1921, Congress had only exempted children under eighteen 
from the quotas.   
 Rigid interpretation of the 1921 Act would have subjected citizens’ foreign wives to 
quota restrictions.  But the Department of Labor gave conflicting instructions on whether citizens’ 
wives would be excluded once quotas were exhausted, which showed the strength of the idea that 
                                                
 
29 “2 Liners Claim Victory in Race to Land Aliens,” New York Tribune, December 2, 1922; Twelve Ships 
Make a Midnight Rush with 10,000 Aliens, New York Times, July 1, 1923; “Rush at Ellis Island,” 
Interpreter 2, no. 7 (July 1923), 4-5; “Alien on 4 Ships Too Soon to Enter,” New York Times, September 
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30 Act of September 22, 1922 (42 Stat. 1021 - Cable Act); Cable Act did not affect the citizenship status 
of foreign women who had married citizens before September 22, 1922. Women who married citizens 
after that date no longer became U.S. citizens automatically but had to apply for citizenship independently.  
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it was a man’s right to have his wife and children together in the household.  The Acting 
Secretary of Labor Carl Robe White expressed the double bind of the agency, “As a matter of 
law, we may not admit her, but as a matter of fact, they all are admitted, because, thus far, no 
public officer has been found able to stand up under the everlasting hammering of hundreds of 
public officers and millions of American citizens who are shocked beyond expression at the 
thought that the wife of an American citizen should be denied admission.   They care not that the 
law prohibits it.  The truth of the matter is, cases of this kind almost wreck the machinery of the 
immigration service.”31 And in December 1923, the Department of Justice suggested that 
Congress should give the Commissioner General of Immigration discretionary power to admit 
immigrants regardless of the quotas if “the enforcement of the law requires the separation of a 
family, a result which seems to us abhorrent.”32  As the next chapter will discuss, the notion that 
it was a male citizen’s right to have one’s wife and children in the same household only applied 
to “white” European immigrants.   In the late 1920s, Congress and the Supreme Court would 
strip Asian-American families from immigrating to the U.S. regardless of whether they were 
wives and children of U.S. citizens or not. 
 
1.2  Naturalization and Family Immigration 
 Whereas the nuclear family of U.S. citizen father/husbands was given certain 
consideration both under immigration law and through administrative discretion, families of 
noncitizens faced a much harsher treatment.  In September 1921, Jacob Berman, a tailor from 
Poland, found that his 10-year-old daughter Freda was excluded at the port of New York.  He 
had immigrated to the U.S. seven years earlier, and sent for his family after the end of World 
                                                
 
31 Quoted in Bredbenner, A Nationality of Hew Own, 118-119.   
32 “Urges Amendment of Immigration Law,” New York Times, December 9, 1923. 
  29 
War I.   Freda’s mother passed away on the eve of sailing, and Freda crossed the Atlantic on her 
own.   But when she arrived in the U.S., the monthly quota for Poland was already full.  
Although the 1921 Act exempted children of citizens from quotas restriction, Jacob was yet to 
become a U.S. citizen.33   
Between 1921 and 1924, 16,500 immigrants excluded for quota oversubscription 
appealed their cases.34 The most important case concerning families of non-citizens regarded 
rabbi Solomon Gottlieb from Palestine, whose wife and four-month old son were excluded at the 
port of New York.  Having arrived in the U.S. fourteen months earlier, Rabbi Solomon Gottlieb 
had already filed his declaration of intention to naturalization, but had four more years to fulfill 
the five-year residency requirement to be able to apply for final naturalization.   Jewish 
organizations saw the case as a test case, and represented by prominent lawyers such as Louis 
Marshall, the Gottlieb family challenged the decision upon habeas corpus proceedings.35    
The issue contested in court was not the family rights of residents in general.  Appellants 
emphasized the fact that as a rabbi Simon Gottlieb himself was not subject to quota restrictions.  
The 1921 Act exempted certain professions including religious ministers from quotas 
restriction.”36  Although the law exempted a minister from quota restrictions without reference  
to his wife and children, plaintiffs argued that it was inconceivable to admit a rabbi outside the 
quotas and at the same time to exclude his wife and children.   
                                                
 
33 “Harding Takes Up Aliens’ Exclusion,” New York Times, September 13, 1921. 
34 While 6,200 immigrants lost their cases, some 10,300 were admitted with or without bond. 
Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration 1922, 122; Annual Report 1923, 137; Annual 
Report 1924, 136.  
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The lower courts ruled in favor of the family.  Both the district court and the court of 
appeals ruled that silence of immigration law on the family did not mean that they should be 
subjected to quota restrictions.  The district court ruled in March 1922 that “the separation of a 
man from his family is concededly a great hardship and dangerous to the welfare of society.”37  
The court of appeals pointed to the 1900 Supreme Court ruling United States v. Gue Lim, a case 
regarding wife of a Chinese merchant.  Although a series of Chinese exclusion laws excluded 
virtually all Chinese from entering the U.S., the Burlinghame Treaty of 1880 entitled merchant 
class Chinese to immigrate to the U.S., and the exclusion laws themselves exempted merchants, 
ministers, students and diplomats. The Supreme Court reasoned that wives of Chinese merchants 
were not subjected to the Chinese exclusion acts for two reasons.   First, the court argued that by 
virtue of her husband’s status as a merchant, she also belonged to the exempt merchant class.  
Second, the court ruled that the wife had the right “by reason of the right of the husband.”38  
Likewise, for the Gottlieb family, the appeals court reasoned that Congress could not have 
intended to “create a condition so unreasonable and absurd as to admit a minister while at the 
same time excluding the members of his family.”  The lower courts maintained that immigration 
status of a wife and child should follow that of the husband / father, regardless of whether the 
1921 Act explicitly exempted them from quotas restriction.39   
  Beyond the immediate issue of rabbi’s family, the appeals court ruling that it was 
“unreasonable and absurd as to admit a minister while at the same time excluding the members 
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of his family” had wider significance for other non-citizens including those without profession-
based non-quota status.   In December 1923, the Department of Labor ordered that the Gottlieb 
ruling would apply to families of any person accorded non-quota status under section 2d, which 
included “aliens returning from a temporary visit abroad.”   The purpose of quota restriction was 
to limit new immigration, and this clause was to prevent exclusion of U.S. residents on grounds 
of quotas oversubscription.  Under the “returning resident” rule, the Department of Labor held 
that if a resident of the U.S. made a trip to Europe and returned with the family, the 
accompanying family should also be exempted from the quotas as if they were also previous 
residents of the U.S., sharing the same status as that of their husband/father.  This opening in the 
1921 Act did not mean that immigrants were free to send for the family when ready.   Quotas 
restriction still applied if the wife and children set for the U.S. on their own, while the 
husband/father waited in the U.S.  The “returning resident and the accompanying family” path 
was only open for those who could afford a return trip to Europe to bring the family together 
with him.   Still, some 20,000 wives and minor children of U.S. residents immigrated under this 
rule.40 
  However, this opening for families of non-citizens did not last for long.   Five months 
later, both Congress and the Supreme Court drew a sharp line between U.S. citizens and 
noncitizens, and attached a high premium on naturalization, citizenship and familial relationship 
to citizens, while erecting a high wall against families of non-naturalized immigrants.  On May 
25, 1924, President Coolidge signed the Immigration Act of 1924, which did not give any 
consideration to families of non-citizens.   And the following day, the Supreme Court ruled 
against the Gottlieb family. 
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  On May 26, 1924, the Supreme Court ruled against the Gottlieb family, deciding that 
since the 1921 Act only referred to religious ministers and was silent on their families, the 
judicial branch did not have the authority to admit the latter outside the quotas: “when the plain 
words of a statute leave no room for construction, the courts must follow it, however harsh the 
consequences.”41  It was up to Congress to decide whom to admit outside the quotas, and the 
court ruled that the judiciary branch must literally follow the immigration law.   It was another 
instance where the Court deferred to the plenary power doctrine, which placed Congressional 
power to regulate immigration as a matter of sovereignty, not subject to judicial review.42    
 In fact, it was not the immediate question of whether the quotas applied to a rabbi’s 
family that bore more importance after mid-1924.  The Immigration Act passed in April and 
signed the day before the Supreme Court ruling included wives and unmarried children under 
eighteen of religious ministers among the exempted classes.43  What was more fundamental was 
the ruling that quota restriction applied to everyone unless Congress clearly stated otherwise.   
Since the appeals court ruling on Gottlieb, the immigration officials had inferred that families of 
“aliens returning from a temporary visit abroad, artists, lecturers, singers, nurses, ministers of 
any religious denomination, professors for colleges or seminaries, aliens belonging to any 
recognized profession, or aliens employed as domestic servants” should be exempted from 
quotas restriction as well, although the clause did not specifically mention their families.   But 
after the ruling, their families were all subjected to quotas.   Family immigration through 
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“returning resident and accompanying family” was no longer possible.  Moreover, the 1924 Act 
was silent on families of non-citizens.   
 A month between the Gottlieb ruling and the enforcement of the 1924 Act on July 1 
caused another family hardships.   For example, immigration officials at New York detained a 
rabbi’s wife who arrived a few days after the Supreme Court ruling.  Although she had non-
quota status under the 1924 Act scheduled to take effect a month later, the 1921 Act was still in 
effect, under which Gottlieb held rabbi’s wife to be subjected to quotas.44    Even more numerous 
were detention of families of residents who sought for admission under the “returning resident” 
rule.  Three days after the Supreme Court ruling, 800 family members mostly from Italy were 
detained on Ellis Island, with the possibility of being deported.  Their husband/fathers had 
returned to Europe to bring back the family with them, but by the time of their arrival, the 
Supreme Court ruling closed the “returning resident” path.45   With Ellis Island packed with 
immigrant families who were caught by the sudden closing of the door by the Supreme Court, 
Congress agreed to pass a relief bill for those who had set sail for the U.S. before the ruling.  
However, the expiration of the relief bill and the enforcement of the 1924 Act on July 1, 1924 
entirely closed the gate for non-citizens to send for their wives and children outside the quotas, 
limiting family-based admission to citizens.46  
 
Immigration Act of 1924     
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  Quota restriction, claimed to have been temporary in 1921, was firmly established in 
1924.  Whether immigration law specifically exempted certain relations from quota restriction 
was not an important problem as long as quotas were large enough to meet demand, but the 
Immigration Act of 1924 further cut into quotas of Southern and Eastern Europe.  Along with 
further quota reductions, the 1924 Act gave even less consideration to familial relations than the 
first quota act.   
 In 1921, nativists decided that making familial ties as the primary admission-criteria 
would disadvantage Northern and Western Europeans, and adopted the quota system instead.  
But both the proportion of quotas for Southern and Eastern Europe (45 percent) and total quotas 
of 355,000 were perceived to be still too large.  Albert Johnson, now fully committed to the 
quotas scheme, insisted on moving back the base census year, arguing that quotas based on 
recent immigration (European-born population in the most recent census) was discriminatory 
against Northern and Western Europe.   First, in order to assign higher percentage to Northern 
and Western Europe (85 percent), Johnson insisted on using the 1890 census, which entirely 
ignored “new immigration” over the past three decades.   Second, in order to halve total quotas, 
Johnson set the quotas at 2 percent of the European-born population in 1890. Significantly, the 
terms of debate in 1924 was no longer whether or not to continue numerical restriction, retention 
of the 1921 Act was the best anti-restrictionists could demand, not return to the pre-1921 
unlimited admission. 47   
Important was the justification for the usage of the 1890 census.   Johnson argued that 
quotas should be a reflection of ethno-racial make-up of the population in the United States 
including both the foreign-born and the native-born, which descended from Europe.   Allegedly, 
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only 12 percent of the 1920 population descended from Southern and Eastern Europe, and the 
European-born population in the 1890 census was claimed to be the closest to that proportion.  
Yet, beginning with the doubtful grounds of such estimate, ignoring the past three censuses of 
1900, 1910, and 1920 altogether was hard to justify.  In order to curtail quotas for Southern and 
Eastern Europe in a more justifiable way, Senator David Reed (R-Pennsylvania) proposed to 
incorporate more recent censuses but in a different manner than under the 1921 Act or Johnson’s 
proposal.  Reed agreed with Johnson that immigration under the 1921 Act was too large, and 
proposed a total quota of 150,000.  Congress assigned the census bureau with the almost 
impossible task of calculating how many people descended from the 1790 “native” population 
and from subsequent immigration from Europe: the national origins quotas concept.   If X 
percent of the 1920 population descended from country Y, then X percent of 150,000 visas were 
to be allocated to country Y.  As far as the ratio between Northern and Western Europe, and 
Southern and Eastern Europe was concerned, the 1890-census-based quotas and the national 
origins quotas were not expected to make much of a difference.48  
  Along with rooting numerical restriction more deeply, the 1924 Act created a system 
under which visa and immigration status came to determine the rights that foreigners could 
expect in the U.S. even before their arrival.  Visas now became the primary means of numerical 
restriction, as quotas were now charged by the number of visas issued instead of by actual arrival 
in the U.S.  More importantly, along with distinctions between various immigration status and 
restrictions on changing status within the U.S., visa status predetermined the rights after arrival 
in the U.S.: how long one may remain in the U.S., whether one may seek for a work, whether 
one could send for one’s families, and so on.  
                                                
 
48 Captain John Trevor, Johnson’s unofficial advisor, advised this argument. Higham, Strangers in the 
Land, 318-324; Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 25-37. 
  36 
  The 1924 Act divided all foreigners into “nonimmigrants,” “non-quota immigrants,” and 
“immigrants.”  Terms such as “nonimmigrants” and “non-quota immigrants” were entirely new 
terms under immigration law.  They pointed to the most important characteristic of post-1924 
immigration regulation: stark distinction between foreigners admitted for temporary residence 
and those admitted for permanent residence, with strict conditions imposed on changing status 
after arriving in the U.S., and numerical restriction of those seeking for permanent residence. 49   
  The 1924 Act first defined who may enter the U.S. as a “non-immigrant” (section 3).  
Most importantly, non-immigrants could only reside in the U.S. temporarily, and were barred 
from naturalization.   At the same time, quota restrictions did not apply to those who sought for 
admission as non-immigrants. 50  As chapter 4 will discuss, since a non-immigrant was admitted 
outside the quotas on the condition of temporary residence, until 1952 Congress refused to allow 
non-immigrants to acquire permanent residency, even upon marriage to a U.S. citizen, which 
created a huge problem for families.  Initially, the non-immigrant class was very limited, 
including government officials, tourists, seamen, and merchants.  But during and after World 
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War II, Congress and business interests would find the non-immigrant category as a convenient 
avenue to recruit for recruiting a large numbers of temporary workers without the rights attached 
to permanent residency. 
Before 1924, there was no such sharp line between a permanent resident, those admitted 
for temporary residence, or those who were not formally admitted at all.  For example, it was 
only in 1906 that the federal government began to keep records of the names of persons who 
were inspected at the ports of entry for permanent residence.51  Still, the original purpose of entry 
did not weigh heavily, since any number of persons could become permanent residents.  There 
was no valid reason for prohibiting a person initially admitted temporarily from becoming a 
citizen.52  
 Anyone not specifically classified as a “non-immigrant” was prima facie an “immigrant” 
and mandated to wait until a quota slot became available.  As an exception to this fundamental 
rule, the 1924 Act next defined several classes of “non-quota immigrant” (section 4), who were 
admitted for permanent residence but without being subjected to quotas restriction.53  This was 
the most valuable status, since no other status provided both 1) visa without waiting for a quota 
number and 2) permanent residence and the path to naturalization.  For families, it was of utmost 
importance that certain family relations qualified for non-quota immigrant status.  To accord 
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non-quota immigrant status to a wider range of family relations – through permanent revision of 
general immigration law or though temporary legislation – would become the central demand of 
immigrant families after 1924. 54 
  The 1924 Act inherited certain family provisions from the 1921 Act in two forms: 1) 
non-quota immigrant or 2) preference within the national quotas, but in a much narrower form 
than the first quota act.   The 1924 Act inherited family-based exemption under the 1921 Act by 
including unmarried children under the age of eighteen, who had been exempted by the 1921 Act, 
and wives of U.S. citizens, whom the immigration officials had been admitting through 
administrative discretion after the Cable Act [Section 4 (a)] (non-quota family).  Despite passage 
of the Cable Act, the 1924 Act accorded non-quota status to wives of citizens but only preference 
status within the quotas to husbands of citizens, privileging the male citizen’s right.   Otherwise, 
beginning with the fact that the quotas themselves were much smaller, the 1924 Act gave even 
less consideration for families than the 1921 Act.  Whereas the 1921 Act provided preference to 
“wives, parents, brothers, sisters, children under eighteen” of U.S. citizens, of those who had 
applied for citizenship, and World-War I veterans, the 1924 Act only recognized unmarried 
children under twenty-one, parents, and husbands of citizens.  [Section 6 (a)] 55  Whereas the 
1921 Act at least considered families of non-citizens who had applied for citizenship, the 1924 
Act only considered families of citizens.  “Returning residents” (permanent residents who left the 
U.S. temporarily) were exempted from quota restrictions as before, but since the Gottlieb ruling 
closed the “retuning resident and accompanying family” path, it was no longer possible for non-
citizen immigrants to bring their families outside the quotas by making a trip to Europe. 
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The Citizenship Premium and Varying Importance of Family-based Admission 
 
  Reserving non-quota family-based admission for U.S. citizens alone, the 1924 Act 
placed a high premium on U.S. citizenship.   Prior to the quota acts, U.S. citizenship was by no 
means a prerequisite for family immigration.  But after 1924, for those who preceded their 
families to the U.S., naturalization became crucial so that their families could be placed ahead of 
the waiting list either as non-quota or preference families. Contemporaries observed that for 
immigrants from countries with small quotas family petitioning became one of the most 
compelling motives for naturalization.56  Those with U.S. citizenship filed petitions, some 
applied for naturalization, while others took the first step to naturalization by filing a declaration 
of intention to naturalization. 
Exemption from the quotas and preference within the quotas were crucial for immigrants 
from countries with small quotas.  Table 1.3 shows the number of non-quota families admitted 
between 1924 and 1929, the first five years under the 1924 Act.   It should be noted that since the 
minimum residency requirement for naturalization was five years, only pre-1924 immigrants 
could send for their families before 1929 as naturalized U.S. citizens.   Between 1924 and 1929, 
non-quota families comprised 62.2 percent of the 63,133 immigrants from Italy, 32.5 percent of 
46,595 immigrants from Poland, and 21.4 percent of 19,202 immigrants from Czechoslovakia.  
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From Greece, with a quota of only 100, 80.7 percent of 6,782 immigrants were non-quota 
families.57     (Table 1.3: Non-quota Families from Europe, 1924-1929 on pages 75-76) 
However, family-based numerical exemption or preference mattered little for countries 
with large quotas.   Large quotas ensured admission to the U.S.   A key characteristic throughout 
the quotas era from 1924 to 1965 was the large gap between countries of origin in the number 
and percentage of immigrants who sought formal family-based admission (family visa).  
Between 1924 and 1965, out of 244,400 immigrants from Germany, with one-third of the total 
quotas, only 0.6 percent held non-quota family visas.  Britain had a slightly higher rate, but non-
quota families only accounted for 1.7 percent of 162,836, and in the case of Ireland, mere 0.2 
percent of 141,247 immigrants.  Such low figures were not because only few qualified for the 
status, but because it was more time-consuming to immigrate through the formal channel of 
family-based admission.  For example, there was no need to wait for five years until 
naturalization to send for one’s family as “non-quota family,” when there was no waiting list for 
a quota visa.  Naturalization was far from pre-requisite for family immigration.   Moreover, as 
long as quotas were available, even for qualifying families quota immigration was a more 
rational choice, because family-based admission was more time consuming and costly.  
 Application for family visas (non-quota or preference) required a distinct procedure that 
embodied the idea that family-based admission was about U.S. citizens’ rights rather than about 
the prospective immigrant.  Since 1924 until today, family-based admission has been based on 
petition by the family on behalf of the prospective immigrant (initially with the Department of 
Labor, where the Bureau of Immigration was then placed), and has not allowed direct visa 
application by the immigrant himself or herself.  This was not a matter of technicality, but as 
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Assistant Secretary of State Wilbur J. Carr explained to Albert Johnson, grounded in the idea that 
family visas were “rights gained for them [immigrants] by American citizens.” 58  For example, a 
wife of a U.S. citizen could apply for a non-family visa (quota visa) at a consulate, but for a non-
quota family visa petition of her husband was indispensable.  Petitioning involved various 
requirements such as proof of U.S. citizenship of the petitioner, proof of familial relationship, 
information on employment status, affidavits of support, and statement of two citizens who had 
known the petitioner for more than a year to vouchsafe one’s character.59  Between 1924 and 
1929, U.S. citizens filed approximately 166,000 petitions hoping for prompt admission of their 
families, but 15 percent were rejected by the immigration bureau. (Table 1-2: Family Visa 
Petitions Filed by U.S. Citizens, 1925-1940 on page 73)   Immigrants from countries with 
abundant quotas saw little point in going through the family-petitioning system, and much more 
the very question of who qualified was of little importance.   
 As discussed earlier, before the first quota act in 1921, Senator William Dillingham had 
opposed family-based admission, insisting that it would favor immigrants from Southern and 
Eastern Europe.    Dillingham’s observation was based on the pre-war migration pattern, 
including a high proportion of men with families in Europe.   The view was reinforced after 1924, 
but for another reason.   What reinforced this view after 1924 was the low usage of formal 
family-based admission system by immigrants from Northern and Western Europe, who were 
guaranteed admission by large quotas.   
One of the most restrictionist responses to post-1924 family immigration from Southern 
and Eastern Europe was the February 1925 direction of the Commissioner General of 
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Naturalization Raymond Christ.  The bureau’s annual report described immigration since the 
1890s as comprised of “immigrants undesirable in European countries,” whose eligibility to 
naturalization posed “a problem in the affairs of this country which probably has no equal.”  
According to Christ, the remaining task after 1924 was to implement the 1924 Act with a 
“selective” naturalization policy.  Christ directed naturalization examiners to prevent 
naturalization of men with families in Europe.  “An alien whose family is in Europe,” Christ 
wrote, “has never lived in the United States, no matter how many years he may have been here.”  
The bureau insisted that physical presence in the U.S. did not suffice to fulfill the five-year 
residency requirement, unless the applicant’s family was also residing in the U.S.60 This should 
not be understood as an encouragement to family unification.   The intention was to create a 
catch-22 situation for immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe, for whom citizenship 
became the de facto prerequisite to be joined by their families by filing a petition for a family 
visa.  However, this would not be possible if naturalization required the presence of family in the 
U.S. 61  Christ’s policy was widely criticized by immigrant aid organizations,62 and a federal 
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judge in Philadelphia eventually ruled that the direction had no grounding in naturalization law.63 
But the direction represented the broader restrictionist views about post-1924 family immigration.    
Soon after the new law took effect, nativists began to insist that non-quota family 
immigration was undermining the quotas restriction by piercing the ceiling.  It was not only the 
number but the ratio between Southern and Eastern European immigrants, and Northern and 
Western European immigrants, since there was very small non-quota immigration from the latter.   
Furthermore, for the most ardent nativists, immigration restriction consisted of limiting new 
admission and of inducing emigration from the U.S.   Limiting the rights to send for one’s family 
was an indirect way to induce immigrants to return to Europe instead of the families joining in 
the U.S.   In the late 1920s, rigid restrictionists frequently disposed of appeals to family 
separation as a matter of individual choice of not having immigrated together to the U.S. or of 
not returning to Europe.64    
At the same time, however, drastic reduction of new immigration by the 1924 Act had an 
effect of relaxing the anti-immigration sentiment to a certain extent.65   In addition to individual 
immigrant families struggling to send for their families, and organizations working with 
immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe, especially Jewish organizations, another strong 
line of thought saw admission of families as a way to incorporate pre-1924 immigrants into the 
American society.  For many, the question of how to incorporate the foreign-born, in the age of 
mass migration since the late nineteenth century until the early 1920s, lost its significance when 
the quota acts put an end to the age of large migration.  Yet, the question never died completely.  
Social work organizations were especially prominent in the post-1924 call for family-based 
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admission.  In August 1924, a month after the enforcement of the 1924 Act, sociologist Julius 
Draschler, the author of Democracy and Assimilation (1920), addressed the audience at the 
National Conference of Social Work:  
It is not so much the principle of restriction of numbers that is objectionable or that can 
under present conditions, be objected to; it is the method of limitation, which is 
arbitrary, mechanical and discriminatory … But the law is the law, and now nothing 
remains but to administer it effectively and humanely, until a change in public opinion 
will modify the policy underlying it … The great reduction in the volume of 
immigration offers a new opportunity to turn for a while from the problem of admission 
to the second major problem, that of incorporation.66  
 
The passage is representative of how few people questioned the principle of numerical restriction 
of immigration after 1924.   Restriction of immigration itself was there to stay, but what about 
the treatment of the foreign-born population already living in the U.S.?   According to the 1920 
Census, approximately 13.9 million U.S. residents were foreign-born (13.1% of the total 
population), and 6.6 million were noncitizens (47.6% of the foreign-born population).67  With 
five-year minimum residency requirement for naturalization, only pre-1919 immigrants were 
eligible for naturalization when the 1924 Act went into effect, and it was not until 1929 that 
those who immigrated shortly before the 1924 Act became eligible for naturalization.  In this 
context, family immigration of noncitizens had grave importance in the late 1920s.  
  
1.3 Family-Oriented Reform and the National Origins Quotas Debate 
 Calls for uniting families whose immigration was thwarted by the quotas law were voiced 
on both sides of the Atlantic. In February 1926, thirty-five immigrant aid agencies from Europe 
and the U.S. that met in Geneva for the second International Conference of Private Organizations 
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for the Protection of Migrants addressed separation of migrant families as an urgent problem.  
The organization classified family separation into several types.   Some were personal such as 
seasonal migration to send remittances, or illness that prevented continuance of migration.   
Others were beyond personal control, such as war and political persecution, and among the latter 
was “the application of legislative measure.”  The conference reported that “it is the American 
Law of 1924 which, by its characteristics, has most struck the Associations and public opinion in 
this matter.”68   
 The same month, Senator James Wadsworth and Representative Nathan Perlman, both 
Republicans from New York, introduced a bill to expand family-based admission.  First, the bill 
proposed to eliminate sexual discrimination in admission of spouse, and to put husbands on non-
quota basis.  Second, they proposed to raise the age of a non-quota child from eighteen to 
twenty-one.   Third, the bill proposed to exempt parents of U.S. citizens from quotas (only a 
preference under the 1924 Act).   In addition, they opposed limiting family-based admission to 
U.S. citizens, and suggested equal treatment to families of pre-1924 immigrants regardless of 
they were naturalized or not.69 
 Advocates for family-oriented reform often differentiated between families of pre-1924 
immigrants and post-1924 or future immigrants.   Another popular proposal was to draw a line 
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between immigrants who had declared their intention to naturalization and those who had not, 
raising the hurdle higher by attaching importance to the act of indicating the intention to settle in 
the U.S. than in entry itself.   Until 1952, naturalization was a two-step process.   The first was to 
file a declaration of intention to naturalization, also called the “first paper.”  In the era of 
numerically unlimited immigration, the first paper was a way to distinguish those who intended 
to live in the U.S. for a long time from temporary residents.    Declaration of intention could be 
filed any time after entry but had to be filed at least three years before naturalization.  Regardless 
of the total length of residence in the U.S., one did not formally embark on the path to citizenship 
until one had filed the first paper.  A first paper was not only necessarily for naturalization but 
was also required to undertake certain occupations under state laws.  While some argued that 
expansion of family-based admission was a matter of general right of citizens and immigrants, 
others argued that those who had already declared their intention before 1924, and hence already 
on the path to citizenship, should deserve more consideration.  While exactly where to draw the 
line was contested, in the debate over admission of non-citizens, pre-1924 entry or pre-1924 
filing of declaration were both common proposals in the 1920s.    
             Family-oriented criticism of the 1924 Act raised more concerns for the nativists than 
direct challenge to the law.  For instance, return to the first quotas system that allocated 45 
percent of the quotas for Southern and Eastern Europe was unlikely to gather support in 
Congress that passed the 1924 Act by a large margin (62 to 6 in the Senate and 223 to 61 in the 
House).  But appeals to family separation did not directly question the criteria of quotas.  The 
fact that Calvin Coolidge, who stated that “America must be kept American” in signing the 1924 
Act, spoke of family hardship in his 1925 State of the Union message indicated that family-
centered criticism was likely to gather sympathy.  The Allied Patriotic Society wrote in 1926: 
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“The most plausible --- while at the same time the most dangerous---are the bills to admit outside 
of the quotas, relatives of immigrants already here, or to come in the future, without numerical 
restriction [emphasis in original].”70  Restrictionists saw such amendment as a “beginning of an 
endless chain” that could “accumulate like a snowball rolling down the hill.”71   
 The two departments responsible for administration of immigration policy were divided 
over the issue.  The Labor Department’s Bureau of Immigration wholly supported restriction of 
immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe based on the 1890 census.  Yet, the bureau also 
supported amending the 1924 Act for families.  Commissioner Harry E. Hull (1925-1933) 
recommended extending non-quota status to children under 21, spouse, and parents of citizens.72 
Henry Curran, Commissioner at the Port of New York (1922 - 1926), suggested according non-
quota status to families of pre-1924 non-citizen immigrants.73   By contrast, the State Department 
believed that liberalization of the 1924 Act would reopen large immigration from Southern and 
Eastern Europe.   Whereas the Department of Labor estimated that Wadsworth-Perlman bill 
would allow 40,000 new admissions at most,74 the State Department’s Visa Division insisted that 
the bill would invite 600,000 immigrants, and the figure quickly caught newspaper headlines.75   
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 The clash also involved rivalry between new immigration bureaucracy (Department of 
State) and the old immigration bureaucracy (Department of Labor), because family-based 
admission was a field of overlapping authority; the authority to issue visas rested with the 
Department of State, while authority to approve of family petitions rested with the Department of 
Labor.     With its new role as a visa issuing agency, the Department of State carried additional 
weight in the making of immigration policy.76  Any discussion about prospective immigration 
came to rely heavily on the number of visa applications and inquiries received by consulates.  
The State Department pointed out that potential demand was much larger than the formal 
backlog, and insisted that a relaxation of immigration law would encourage even more people 
who had given up their hope to apply for a visa.77  Yet, how many visa applications involved 
families currently without any preferential status, such as families of noncitizens, to what extent 
visa applications would increase as a result of extending family-based admission was beyond 
anyone’s knowledge.            
  Despite the impossibility of an accurate count, numbers were crucial to post-1924 
immigration debates.  Above all, the contested issue before the first quota act was whether there 
should be numerical limitation at all, but post-1924 anti-restrictionism rarely questioned that 
premise.  The issue was the method of distributing the quotas, how strictly numerical restriction 
should be enforced, for instance size of the quotas or who should be exempted from the quotas.  
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Some did argue that numbers were relatively unimportant, but not to the extent to question 
numerical limitation itself.  Emanuel Celler, second-term Representative from New York and the 
future author of the Immigration Act of 1965 that abolished the quotas system, stated, “If the 
situation is a logical one, if it is logical to admit these for the purpose of uniting families, I think 
the number is really beside the point.”78  Still, Celler did not advocate for return to pre-1921 
numerically unrestricted admission.   And most immigrant advocates made a more reserved 
statement.   Louis Marshall, president of the American Jewish Congress and a prominent lawyer 
who had represented a number of immigration cases including the Gottlieb case, argued, “The 
question as to the number who will be affected is one which is secondary, and yet it should be 
considered.”79 
 A large part of support for expanding family-based admission was based on the 
assumption that a limited revision of the 1924 Act would not lead to large immigration.  Liberals 
could not entirely dispose of the number game.    For example, Senator Wadsworth, sponsor of 
the bill, was by no means a pro-immigration Congressman.  He strongly supported restriction of 
Southern and Eastern European immigrants on the 1890 census basis, stating that the U.S. “shall 
not hereafter be changed in racial or national make-up as a result of immigration.”  But he 
thought that admission of small number of families would do no harm.  The same was true of the 
Bureau of Immigration and the Department of Labor. 80  To argue that there was no knowing 
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how many might come in and furthermore that it was entirely beside the point would undermine 
the basis of support. 
Moreover, the most ardent restrictionists accused proposals to expand family-based 
admission, particularly non-quota admission, as an attempt to dismantle numerical restriction 
itself.   Soon after the enforcement of the 1924 Act, nativists began to insist that non-quota 
family admission was eroding the quotas system by piercing the quotas.   The Allied Patriotic 
Societies viewed the debate over family essentially as a “struggle between the Anglo-Saxon 
stock and the new immigration for control of our country.”81 Characteristic of such argument 
was its emphasis on the quotas rather than pre-quota immigration.   It was true that more non-
quota families arrived from Southern and Eastern Europe than from Northern and Western 
Europe, and in some cases non-quota immigration outnumbered quota immigration.  For 
example, between 1924 and 1929, 62 percent of Italian immigrants were non-quota families.  As 
a result, whereas the five-year quotas for Italy totaled 19,225, actual immigration was 63,000.  
Still, post-1924 immigration did not even come close to pre-quota acts immigration.  In 1921, a 
year before the 1921 Act was enforced, 226,000 Italians immigrated to the U.S., more than forty 
times the quota imposed by the 1924 Act.82  Drastic reduction by quotas restriction was 
undeniable, but the ardent restrictionists measured the effect of restriction not in comparison to 
the level of pre-quota immigration but in comparison to the quotas, viewing any immigration 
outside the quotas as a potential threat both to the scheme of making immigration conform to the 
desired ethnoracial ratio and moreover to the regime of numerical immigration restriction.   
Significant were the different meanings attached to non-quota admission.   The most 
important characteristic of numerical immigration restriction is that it tied time until immigration 
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and the number of visas together.  The concept of waiting is embedded in numerical restriction, 
and the wait could in fact be an indefinite wait.  Reformers framed non-quota admission as a 
matter of shortening the period that family must live apart, since exemption from quota 
restrictions was the only way to avoid lengthy wait for a visa.  By contrast, nativists framed non-
quota admission as a matter of increasing the volume of immigration, and accused demand to 
expand family-based non-quota admission as a challenge to the principle of numerical 
immigration restriction itself.   
 
National Origins Quotas Debate 
 
In early 1927, family debate became entangled with the national origins quotas 
controversy.   In 1924, Congress had agreed to adopt the national origins quotas proposed by 
Senator David Reed and to use the quotas based on the European-born population in 1890 census 
temporarily until July 1927.   In January 1927, the details of the new quotas were announced, and 
Congress had two months before adjournment to decide whether to put the new quotas into effect 
as scheduled in July 1927.  Eventually, the national origins quotas was revised twice and its 
enactment was postponed twice until July 1929.83  Thus, by early 1927, Congress had two 
agendas regarding immigrants from Europe: the national origins quotas and expansion of family-
based admission.   
           Controversy over the national origins quotas before the passage of the 1924 Act and after 
the details of the quotas were published in 1927 involved different lines of division. The central 
purpose of both 1890 census-based quotas and the national origins quotas were reduction of 
immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe.  And the debate in 1924 centered around 
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distribution of quotas between Southern and Eastern Europe, and Northern and Western Europe.  
As expected, the national origins quotas reserved over 80 percent of the 150,000 quotas for 
Northern and Western Europe, and there was not a drastic difference from 1890 census-based 
quotas as far as Southern and Eastern Europe was concerned.  What sparked the debate in 1927 
was quota distribution among countries of Northern and Western Europe.  The most 
controversial part was significant increase in the quotas for Great Britain, which was more than 
doubled from 34,007 to 73,309.  Since the national origins formula was about the ratio of 
distribution and not about the total, the gain for Britain was immediate loss of other countries.  
Quotas were more than halved for Germany (51,227 to 23,428), Irish Free State (28,567 to 
13,862), Sweden (9,561 to 3,259), Norway (6,453 to 2,267) and Denmark (2,789 to 1,044).84   
Organizations speaking for immigrants from Northern and Western Europe such as the 
Steuben Society, American Irish Republican League strongly opposed the national origins quotas 
and insisted on retaining the quotas based on the 1890 census.  The two authors of the 1924 Act 
were divided.  Johnson did not find the national origins quotas indispensable to the 1924 Act, 
because the 1890 census-based quotas served the purpose of curtailing immigration from 
Southern and Eastern Europe: “’National origins’ plan serve to divide the Nordic, practically all 
of whom are restrictionists, who should not be divided, for we need a solid front in order to 
combat the foes of restriction.”85 
  Whom Johnson called the “foes of restriction,” such as Adolph Sabath of Chicago (D) 
and Samuel Dickstein of New York (D), who would become the House Immigration and 
Naturalization Committee Chair after Johnson, strongly denounced the national origins quotas.  
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But their opposition was different from that raised by German, Irish, and Scandinavian 
organizations, for whom the purpose of blocking the national origins quotas was to retain the 
1890 census-based quota.  Anti-restrictionists such as Sabath and Dickstein did not find any 
practical difference between the two in terms of size of quotas, but were more opposed to the fact 
that both dealt a heavy blow on immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe.86  Opposition to 
the national origins quotas in the late 1920s, as historian Robert A. Divine wrote, was based on a 
“strange alliance between restrictionists from the Midwest who favored German, Irish, and 
Scandinavian immigration and antirestrictionists from the Northeast.”87 
By contrast, family-based admission was discussed strictly in relation to Southern and 
Eastern European immigrants.  Congress members speaking for immigrants from Southern and 
Eastern Europe denounced the national origins quotas and pushed for expanding family-based 
admission at the same time.   But family-based admission gathered little support from 
organizations of Northern and Western European immigrants.  Family separation was not an 
acute issue as long as large quotas were maintained.   And regardless of whether one’s position, 
all agreed that the issue had little importance for immigrants from Northern and Western Europe.  
Advocates for family-oriented reform was very clear that they were not arguing that amendment 
to the 1924 Act would benefit all immigrants but that it was about immigrants from Southern and 
Eastern Europe. 
            Reed and Johnson, despite their divide over the national origins quotas, stood united in 
opposition to expanding family-based admission.   In December 1926, the Senate agreed to 
provide a temporary relief measure for 35,000 families of pre-1924 declarants.   As originally 
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introduced, the bill had proposed equal treatment to citizens and pre-1924 immigrants, as well as 
expanding the range of families.   Congress added a ceiling since there was strong opposition to 
expanding non-quota admission without any conditions attached.   Secondly, instead of entry, 
Senate placed emphasis on the filing a declaration of intention, whether one had already taken 
the first step to become a citizen before 1924.  Senator Wadsworth reasoned that “these 
immigrants who were comparatively recent arrivals, had no warning indicating … that a much 
severer set of restrictions would be imposed,” pointing to unexpectability of the law as the reason 
for relief.88     
  Nevertheless, the restrictionist fear that the purpose of the call for expansion of family-
based admission was an attack on the quotas system in disguise ran deeply.  Reed accused the 
relief measure as an attempt to destroy the 1924 Act; “If this policy now so determinably adopted 
by the United States … is going to be broken down, it cannot be broken down by a frontal attack 
and repeal of the law but obviously by amendments designed to … relieve cases of seeming great 
hardship.”89  Johnson echoed Reed that “to admit 35,000 would be to pave the way for a call for 
a bill for another 35,000” and buried the bill in the House committee.90  According to the 
Interpreter, published by the Foreign Language Information Service, Congress was obsessed 
with “fear that even the slightest change in the existing law may have a liberalizing effect upon 
our whole immigration policy.”91   While how many immigrants may come to the U.S. under the 
immediate was surely a concern of the restrictionists, what they feared was that one amendment 
might lead to demand for another amendment, and the gradual expansion of non-quota admission. 
                                                
 
88 H.R. 5268, 68 Cong. Rec. 411 (1926); This was part of the bill that restored U.S. citizenship for U.S.-
born women who had lost their citizenship by marrying a foreigner before the 1922 Cable Act.  For 
declarant’s families, wives and children under 18 outside of the quotas 
89  68 Cong. Rec. 422 (1926). 
90  68 Cong. Rec. 5435 (1927). 
91 “Congress and Immigration,” Interpreter 8, no. 2 (February 1928): 4. 
  55 
 
1928 Amendment and Permanent Residents 
     “It is a strange price to put on American citizenship – making it the expedient for uniting 
husband and wife,” the Foreign Language Information Service criticized the 1924 Act for tying 
family-based admission to citizenship, “it is a strange preparation for citizenship … those years 
of loneliness and despair.”92  Reformers understood that there was little chance for reform 
without pacifying the concern that admission of families would lead to rapid increase of 
immigration.  At the same time, the situation needed to be publicized to gather sympathy and to 
raise support for Congressional relief.  Survey of separated families was one of such methods.   
For example, in 1926, the Y.W.C.A. gathered some 520 cases from forty branches in fourteen 
states.    The National Conference of Social Work’s Division of Immigrants conducted a nation-
wide survey of separated families, following the examples of similar survey conducted by some 
immigrant aid agencies.  The National Conference sent questionnaires to community council, 
immigrant aid societies, family welfare agencies, travelers aid societies, Red Cross chapters in 
140 cities.   They also requested the Geneva-based International Association of Organizations for 
the Protection of Migrants to report cases from the European side, gathering reports from Austria, 
Hungary, Italy, and Czechoslovakia.93             
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  After the 69th Congress closed without taking any action, reformers began to make more 
coordinated efforts to gather support for family reunification.   Representatives of organizations 
interested in immigrant welfare such as the American Jewish Committee, American Jewish 
Congress, Foreign Language Information Service, National Catholic Welfare Conference, 
National Council of Catholic Men, National Council of Catholic Women, National Council of 
Jewish Women, and the Y.W.C.A. frequently gathered to discuss a workable plan.  Without 
doubt, non-quota admission was the only means to avoid lengthy wait for a visa.  But as the fate 
of the Wadsworth-Perlman bill indicated, proposal to admit more families outside the quotas 
raised intense objections that there was no telling how many may qualify, and a more serious 
attack as an attempt to dismantle numerical restriction itself.   While there seemed to be less 
opposition to changing preferences within each country’s quota, as the Y.W.C.A. stated, 
“Preference in the quota is of practically no help to relatives of citizens whose native country has 
a small quota.” 94    
            Importantly, the compromise measure put forward in the 70th Congress ( December 
1927) included a challenge to the foundation of the country-based quota system, a concept that 
would be incorporated four decades later by the Immigration Act of 1965.   A reform bill that 
originated from the discussion by organizations gathered at the 1927 National Conference of 
Social Work proposed to change the method of distributing quotas instead of admitting more 
families outside the quotas.   For the next two years, the bill proposed distributing half of the 
total quotas for Europe “without regard to country of birth” but according to the need of families, 
while retaining the other half for country-based quotas.  Unlike proposals to expand non-quota 
admission, liberals contended that the appeal of this plan was that it would not change the total 
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number of quotas.   Hence, they hoped to refute the accusations that call for uniting families was 
an attempt to destroy numerical restriction itself.95  However, although the proposal did not 
challenge numerical restriction itself, it included a challenge to the foundation of the quota 
system, which was not simply a cap on overall immigration from Europe.  What mattered was 
not the total immigration from Europe but the country of origin, and unsurprisingly the proposal 
invited strong opposition.  Raising alarm, the Patriotic Order Sons of America compared “the 
present agitation over the national origins estimate” to a “mere zephyr,” whereas proposal to 
issue visas for families regardless of nationality was a “cyclone.”96  The issue in the national 
origins quotas debate was not the country-based quota system itself, but the criteria of 
distribution.  The premise that the country of birth should be the primary admission criteria was 
unchallenged, whereas family-based admission questioned that premise. 
 In order to ward off attention from this controversial aspect, reformers also advanced 
arguments more appealing to the nativists.    First was the idea that expansion of family-based 
admission would reduce overall immigration in the long run.  Making U.S. citizenship or 
naturalization certainly prolonged the period of family separation, at the very least for five years, 
but not necessarily the number of future immigrants. They characterized permanent residents as a 
step from citizenship, pointing out that naturalization accompanied immigration outside quotas.   
Allowing pre-naturalization immigrants to send for families within the quotas would absorb 
future non-quota immigration, reducing total immigration in the long run, they argued.97   
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Reserving quotas for families such as a wife of a permanent resident was also a way to screen out 
immigrants who may bring more families.   For instance, if a quota was issued to a man with 
wife and children in the U.S., naturalization of the former would bring more non-quota 
immigration.   But if the same quota was used by a wife or child of a permanent resident, there 
would not be additional non-quota immigration because family-based admission was confined 
within the nuclear family.    Coupled with this argument was the idea family-based admission 
would  reduce labor competition.  Reformers argued that more quota visas to dependent families 
such as children would mean fewer visas for those who were likely to compete with American 
labor.98   The appeals of reducing overall immigration in the long span and reducing labor 
competition won the support of the American Federation of Labor.     
 The resulting Act of May 29, 1928 was a mixed product.  First, it expanded non-quota 
families to include children under twenty-one of U.S. citizens, instead of previous eighteen.   
Congress also agreed to grant non-quota status to husbands of U.S. citizens but only to those 
married before May 31, 1928.  Next, within the quotas, Congress reserved all quotas for families 
of U.S. citizens or permanent residents.   It provided first preference (50 percent of the quota) to 
husbands of citizens married after May 31, 1928 and parents of citizens.  Since petitions for 
admission of parents were the most numerous, the immigration committees decided not to 
exempt parents from the quotas so as not to increase total immigration.   Next, the law provided 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
Migration Studies; “Memorandum of Relief for Separated Families: The Quota Fund Plan,” March 1928, 
folder 1, box 12, Max J. Kohler Papers. 
98 Amendments to Immigration Act of 1924, Non-quota and Preference Provisions: Hearing before the 
House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. 70th Cong 77 (1928) (Edith Terry Bremer, 
Y.W.C.A.); Amendments to Immigration Act of 1924, Non-quota and Preference Provisions: Hearing 
before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. 70th Cong 20 (1928) (Read Lewis, 
Foreign Language Information Service); “Relief for Separated Families,” Interpreter 8, no. 4 (1928): 3-6. 
  59 
any remainder to unmarried children under twenty-one and wives of permanent residents (second 
preference)   
 However, restrictionists removed the most important part of the liberal proposal: 
distribution of visas across national quotas.   Reformers advocated for giving more preference to 
families and for distribution of visas across national quotas, but Albert Johnson and the House 
committee listened only to the former. 99  For the purpose of prompt admission, changing 
preferences solely within each country’s quotas did little, especially for countries with nominal 
quotas.  “It is of no relief to extend or add more classes of immigrants to the preferential class,” 
Representative Fiorello La Guardia (D - New York) expressed strong dissatisfaction insisted, 
“because the quota number from countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Russia, and 
Italy is so limited.” Samuel Dickstein (D - New York) commented that the bill was better than 
nothing but that “in reality you are not uniting the families at all” and that “to leave the 
impression in this House that you are giving something away is wrong.”100  Still, immigrant aid 
agencies reported that soon after the 1928 Act came to be known, their offices were filled with 
affidavits from husbands and fathers in order for their wives and children to be placed on the 
waiting list.101   
  Despite its limited nature, the 1928 Act had a more lasting significance.   The law spoke 
to the heightened value numerical immigration restriction had attached to permanent residency or 
admission to the U.S. as an immigrant.  Aside from citizens, previous laws that gave certain 
considerations to families spoke of various stages of alienage, for example from any foreigner, 
those who had filed the declaration of intention to naturalization, to those who had applied for 
                                                
 
99 Act of May 29, 1928 (45 stat. 654). The bill was sponsored by Thomas Jenkins (Ohio), an ardent 
supporter of the national origins quotas.   69 Cong. Rec. 9395 (statement of Albert Johnson). 
100 69 Cong. Rec. 2918 (1928) (Fiorello La Guardia); 69 Cong. Rec. 9391 (1928) (Samuel Dickstein). 
101 Hazel G. Omsbee, “Jenkins Says Reunite,” Women’s Press 23, no. 7 (July 1929): 473-474. 
  60 
naturalization. 102  But no immigration law after 1924 spoke of stage of alienage other than that 
of permanent resident.  As Adena Miller Rich of the Immigrants Protective League of Chicago 
wrote in 1940, “declaration of intention” (first paper) gradually became a “relic of the days 
before restriction of immigration.” 103    
Importance attached to the first paper reflected that admission to the U.S. in itself was not of 
high value during the era of open admission.  Return migration rate was high, and circular 
migration was also common.   As long as one passed the inspection each time, there was no legal 
barrier that would prevent migrants from leaving the U.S. and returning after certain period.   But 
the 1924 Act made admission to the U.S. in itself a privilege available only to a selected few.  
Leaving the U.S. for more than certain length led to loss of permanent resident / immigrant status, 
and meant being placed at the end of the waiting list to reenter the U.S. 104   Rich explained,  
 When there were no quotas and travel was open ... this “first paper” represented a 
 personal decision as to whether the alien expected to settle down and make the  United 
States his home. ... Now he makes that decision, if possible, before he leaves  the mother-
country and enters the United States accordingly – either as a  “temporary visitor” or as an 
“immigrant alien for permanent residence.” His very  choice of immigration status ... 
indicates his intention at the time of his visa  application ... Men and women who enter for 
“permanent residence” may well be  considered therefore to have made their declarations of 
intention. 105 
  
To what extent those holding immigrant visas would actually “settle down” was another matter, 
but Rich’s passage captured the characteristics of the post-1924 regime, where the rights in the 
U.S. were predetermined by the type of visa even before leaving the U.S.  And permanent 
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residency or being an immigrant was not only numerically reserved privilege, but also a racially 
reserved privilege, as the next chapter will discuss.  Various state laws still continued to 
distinguish between immigrants who had filed their intention and those who had not, but no 
immigration law passed after 1924 spoke of declarants or any other status of immigrants other 
than permanent resident or citizens.106 
 For another, instead of limiting eligibility to families of pre-1924 immigrants, who had 
been the focal point of call for reform, the 1928 Act recognized families of all permanent 
residents regardless of whether they had immigrated to the U.S. before of after quotas restriction.   
At a practical level, relief for families of pre-1924 immigrants alone came to have less saliency 
as four years had already passed since the law went into effect, and in another year all pre-1924 
immigrants fulfilled the five-year residency requirement for naturalization.   But more 
importantly, a cut-off date would make sudden enforcement of the 1924 Act grounds for 
considering families of pre-naturalization immigrants.   But the way it was written, the issue was 
no longer whether one could have expected the consequences of new law or not, but more as a 
general right accompanying permanent residency.    
 The arrival of the Great Depression in 1929 would also give new dimension to the 1928 
Act.  Status such as non-quota or preference family was primarily a matter of numerical 
preference, in other words who had priority over others in obtaining a quota number.  But under 
the Great Depression, visa issuance was no longer solely a matter of quota availability.   The 
State Department adopted a policy that presumed all prospective immigrants to be “likely to 
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become a public charge,” and refused a visa unless they could affirmatively prove otherwise, 
leaving many quota visas unissued.   
   
1.4 “New Immigration” and “Family Immigration”  
During the Great Depression, the distinction between “family immigration” and “new 
immigration” became the key determining factor for obtaining a visa.107  Family preference for 
numerical restriction increasingly became tied with qualitative restriction.  Qualifying for a 
family visa was originally an issue of numerical restriction, especially for  immigrants from 
Southern and Eastern Europe, but it became a crucial weapon to counter both legislative and 
administrative restriction.  After the onset of the Great Depression, family sponsorship became a 
crucial means for the State Department to refuse visas, and whether a family as defined by the 
1924 Act could convince the consulates of their financial capability to support the immigrant was 
critical.  And ironically, since visa issuance was no longer a matter of quota availability, family-
based admission also became crucial for immigrants from Northern and Western Europe as well 
for whom the issue was previously of little relevance.  
In the early days of the Great Depression, liberalization of the 1924 Act continued to be a 
significant agenda for liberals.   Some observed a “positive proof” that their appeals realized 
legislative reform.  Edith Terry Bremer of the International Institutes (Y.W.C.A) commented 
after the passage of the 1928 Act,  “There is much to be learned and taken to heart from this 
experience, we … with the cooperation of several other organizations … through letters, 
telegrams, petitions to Representatives and Senators, and by your local publicity has actually 
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passed a new law.”108 In 1930, Mary McDowell of the University of Chicago Settlement 
reminded the social workers gathered at the National Conference of Social Work that “Congress 
gave only partial relief through the Relatives’ Act passed in 1928” and that their next goal was to 
expand non-quota admission to other families such as parents, children, husbands and wives of 
permanent residents and citizens.109 
However, in the face of increasing pressure to further curtail immigration, a more urgent 
agenda was to protect existing rights and to prevent additional restrictions.  The naturalization 
fee was raised from five dollars to twenty dollars in 1929.  Various legislators sought for formal 
reduction of quotas or even suspension of immigration. Nativists such as the Allied Patriotic 
Societies and the Immigration Restriction League continued to lobby for further reduction of 
admission and restriction of noncitizen rights, distributing publications such as The Alien in Our 
Midst (1930) by Madison Grant, Harry Laughlin and others.  Moreover, Herbert Hoover’s 
presidency posed a huge obstacle for advocacy groups.   In September 1930, Hoover ordered the 
State Department to reduce immigration from Europe by applying a more rigid visa issuance 
standard, refusing visas on “likely to become a public charge” grounds under the 1917 Act.   
Administrative restriction cut visas by 90 percent, leaving many quotas unused.  The Secretary of 
Labor William Doak, appointed in December 1930, not only supported formal reduction of 
quotas by Congress, but launched a campaign to deport immigrants out of the U.S.  The two 
departments responsible for immigration administration were both staunchly restrictionist. 110 
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 Two months after the new visa policy went into effect, Albert Johnson and David Reed 
called for a more formal restriction, proposing to suspend immigration for a few years, with an 
exception of certain families who had already applied for a visa.111  This motion was similar to 
what Johnson had suggested after World War I: to suspend immigration except for certain 
families.   But the State Department raised strong objection.  Secretary of State Henry Stimson 
supported legislative restriction itself, as formal quotas reduction would relieve the consuls of the 
responsibility to reduce immigration by refusing visas when quotas were still available.   Like 
Senator Dillingham’s opposition to Johnson’s scheme, Stimson’s opposition was pointed to the 
idea that family-only admission would favor Southern and Eastern European immigrants.  Citing 
family visa applications statistics, he explained how family-based admission would bring about 
the “evil results” of undermining the national origins quotas system that aimed to make 
immigration “conform to the existing racial stocks of the country.”  Stimson insisted that the 
national origins quotas system was designed in order for immigration from Northern and 
Western Europe to outnumber that from Southern and Eastern Europe by “5 to 1,” while family-
only admission would upset the ratio to “1 to 13.” 112    
           Stimson reminded Congress that since 1924 immigrants from Northern and Western 
Europe had rarely sought family-based admission thanks to large quotas: “At the present moment 
any relative of a Nordic who wants to come in can come in, because no such number of relatives 
have applied.”  Therefore, the proposal to suspend immigration and to limit admission to family 
visa applicants on the waitlist would stop immigration from Northern and Western Europe, since 
there was no such waitlist.   On the other hand, Stimson believed that that it would not reduce 
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immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe, since a long waiting list filled the quotas for 
many years to come.  What must be kept in mind in any restrictive legislation, Stimson insisted, 
was how to maintain the “racial stock” according to the national origins formula.  Instead, he 
recommended uniform 90 percent quotas reduction.113 
Just as the 1921 Act paved the way for permanent restriction, a law initially claimed to be 
temporary was likely to take a more lasting turn.114  To counter both administrative and 
legislative restriction, liberals sought to take more coordinated action.  Most notable as the broad 
coalition of immigrant advocacy groups was the Joint Committee of Immigration Legislation 
formed in early 1930, renamed Joint Conference on Alien Legislation in 1939.  It would later 
become the basis of American Immigration Conference founded after World War II to abolish 
the national origins quotas. By 1934, the loose coalition included prominent organizations such 
as the American Civil Liberties Union, American Jewish Committee, American Jewish Congress, 
American Social Hygiene Association, B’nai B’rith, Federal Council of Churches, Foreign 
Language Information Service, Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society, Immigrant’s 
Protective League, International Migration Service, National Association of Travelers Aid 
Societies, National Catholic Welfare Council, National Council of Jewish Women, National 
Council on Naturalization and Citizenship, National Institute of Immigrant Welfare, National 
League for American Citizenship, YMCA, and the YWCA.115  Many of the organizations had 
already been cooperating in the late 1920s to expand family-based admission.   
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 The Joint Conference wrote to Stimson, “We believe it [restriction] should apply to new 
immigration, not to the families of men and women already resident in the United States.” They 
insisted that family unification held higher grounds than national origins:  “The integrity of the 
family and the sanctity of the home are principles basic to American life.  Separation of families 
is quite as inhumane, anti-social and contrary to American interest in the case of the naturalized 
citizen and resident alien as in the case of our native born people.”116 As Read Lewis of the 
Foreign Language Information Service stated at a hearing, anti-restrictionists framed the issue as 
a matter of “immigrant already here.”117  
 Although the 1928 Act seemed limiting in terms of speedy admission of families, they 
found the law crucial in their challenge against further restriction.  First, liberals emphasized the 
fact that since 1928 all the quotas were reserved for families of U.S. citizens and permanent 
residents, and argued that majority of the prospective immigrants waiting for a visa were families.  
Any restriction would adversely affect families, they argued.118  Secondly, liberals reasoned that 
by according preference status to families of permanent residents, the 1928 Act linked family 
unification to admission to the U.S. itself, with fuller rights after naturalization.    Admission of 
one’s families was part of the right included in permanent residency or admission to the U.S. as 
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an immigrant.  Formal reduction of quotas was equal to break the promise to immigrants and to 
prolong the problem of family separation. 119 
What deserves attention here is how migration from Southern and Eastern Europe was 
now seen primarily as that of family immigration joining their U.S. citizen and resident families.   
Quotas restriction made short-term and circular migration difficult, while family provisions 
favored women and children joining their husband/fathers, which prompted the long-term change 
in immigration pattern to settler immigration.  Thus, arguments made for expanding family-
based admission characterized future immigration as that of families of the U.S. citizens and 
permanent residents.  To be sure, Stimson and the reformers drew different conclusions from the 
same observation.   Stimson reasoned that because post-1924 immigration from Southern and 
Eastern Europe was that of families joining their relatives in the U.S., Congress should not attach 
importance to family ties, whereas liberals saw it as a reason for opposing to any further 
restriction.  Nevertheless, the views of “new immigration” as that of temporary migration, which 
had prevailed in the times of the Dillingham Commission, had receded by the 1930s. 
 
Family under Administrative Restriction 
           A change of leadership in the House immigration committee in December 1931 prevented 
a formal quota reduction by Congress.  Although the House passed the 90 percent quota 
reduction bill by a large majority, the 71st Congress adjourned before Senate took action.  And as 
a result of slight Democratic majority in the 72nd Congress, Samuel Dickstein (D - New York) 
replaced Albert Johnson as the chair of the House Immigration and Naturalization Committee.  A 
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first generation immigrant from what is now Lithuania and a former justice of the New York 
Supreme Court, Dickstein had been one of the most vocal opponents of the 1924 Act since he 
was first elected to Congress in 1923.  With the southern Democrats being staunchly 
restrictionist, change of the committee chair did not facilitate passage of more liberal bills, but 
Dickstein was more successful in blocking restrictive bills such as formal quota reduction from 
reaching the house floor.120  
           However, visa refusal by the Department of State was an entirely different problem from 
formal legislative restriction by Congress. After all, the Department of State had already 
curtailed immigration by 90 percent without Congressional restriction.  Since the 1924 Act went 
into effect, immigrant aid agencies had realized that while the new visa system reduced the 
chance of exclusion at the ports of entry, the foremost problem was lack of any formal 
mechanism to appeal a visa refusal.   For exclusion at the ports of entry, it was possible to make 
an appeal often with the aid of an immigrant aid agency or counsel.  The right to appeal to the 
Board of Special Inquiry was encoded in immigration law, and those with resource financial or 
otherwise could bring the case to federal court under habeus corpus proceedings, although the 
hurdle was higher.  But absence of any formal visa review system kept consuls out of reach, and 
keeping the forefront of immigration control far away from the U.S. soil was exactly what 
Congress in 1924 had expected of visa system.121   
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           Reformers argued that lack of review was especially problematic when it involved 
families of citizens and permanent residents.  The State Department firmly insisted that 
foreigners had no right to enter the U.S. and therefore were not entitled to make an appeal.  
Importantly, the opposition reasoned that family-based admission was less about a foreigner’s 
rights than about the rights of citizens and residents to be joined by their families.  A witness of 
the Y.W.C.A. made the case, “The applicant for a visa is the prospective immigrant …On the 
other hand Congress has granted that applicant the privilege of making an application because of 
her relationship to a citizen, or an alien of the United States.  In other words, Congress had 
granted the privilege to the citizen here to bring over his wife and children or parents.”  By 
pointing to the mechanism of family petitioning, liberals emphasized the notion that admission of 
families was primarily about the residents of the U.S.122    
            Intense oppositions induced the State Department to reconsider its visa policy to a limited 
degree.  To head off Dickstein’s efforts to introduce a bill for a visa review system, the State 
Department voluntarily relaxed its visa policies on families in order to diffuse criticisms and to 
avoid Congressional intervention that might impose a formal check on consular authorities.123  In 
November 1931, Acting Secretary of State Wilbur J. Carr instructed consuls to review “all the 
cases of non-quota, first preference, and second preference relatives who have been refused visas 
as aliens likely to become a public charge” since the enforcement of the new visa policy in 
September 1930.124  And another circular from July 1933 gave instructions on how to distinguish 
                                                
 
122 Review of the Action of Consular Officers in Refusing Immigration Visas: Hearing before the House 
Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 72nd Cong., 1932 (Aghavine Yeghenian, Y.W.C.A.) 
123 Zolberg, A Nation by Design, 269. 
124 Wilbur J. Carr, Acting Secretary of State, “Reconsideration by Consular Officers of Cases Involving 
Alien Relatives of American Citizens and of Legally Admitted Aliens,” November 30, 1931, diplomatic 
serial no. 2098, folder 15, box 13, Max Kohler Papers. 
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“members of an immediate family group,” “other relatives and aliens having close connections in 
the United States” and “other aliens.” 125   
 Invented primarily for Southern and Eastern European immigrants but now having 
significance for all immigrants from Europe, the State Department’s policy indicated how 
categories for family-based immigration, such as non-quota and preference status, imagined 
primarily as corollary to numerical restriction, also came to define the boundaries of family 
under administrative restriction.   For non-quota families, and first and second preference 
families, the department instructed consuls to apply three tests to decide whether the applicant 
met the likely to public charge test: the sponsoring family had to have (1) employment which is 
not likely to terminate (2) an income to provide for the alien relative (3) resources for support in 
the event of a temporary disability.  Those without any preference under the 1924 Act such as 
“adult children, sister, brother, nephew, niece, fiancée” had to meet much higher test to obtain a 
visa. And others were summarily excluded unless one had a “substantial personal resources … or 
definite prospect of employment.” 126  While the visa refusal rate for non-quota and preference 
relatives remained at a relatively lower rate,127 the presence of relatives who met the three 
criteria counted little unless such relation was recognized as “family” under the 1924 Act.   Since 
the 1917 Act was still in effect, the State Department could have used a much wider definition of 
“family” under family-based exemption from the literary test, but such was not the case. 
                                                
 
125 Wilbur J. Carr, Acting Secretary of State, “Public Charge Provision of the Law,” July 8, 1933, folder 
15, box 13, Max Kohler Papers. 
126 Wilbur J. Carr, Acting Secretary of State, “Reconsideration by Consular Officers of Cases Involving 
Alien Relatives of American Citizens and of Legally Admitted Aliens,” November 30, 1931, diplomatic 
serial no. 2098, folder 15, box 13, Max Kohler Papers. 
127Between October 1930 to March 1933, rejection rate for a non-quota family visa was 2.3 percent (542 
of the 23,516), with first preference families having a higher rejection rate of 15.5 percent (1,514 of the 
9,763) Review of Refusals of Visas by Consular Officers: Hearing before the House Committee on 
Immigration and Naturalization, 73rd Cong. 25-26 (1932) (A. Dona. Hodgson, Chief of Visa Division, 
Department of State). 
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 Also, on two levels, admission policies during the Great Depression further reinforced 
the view of immigration from Europe as that of families.  For one, in the face of criticism, 
consuls reconsidered its visa refusal policy in cases involving those petitioned by their families, 
thus making family ties as central to immigration during the Great Depression as during the 
1920s.  Another consequence was dissociation of family immigration from immigration of 
laborers.  As a matter of policy, those who could receive a visa were supposedly not seeking a 
job. While the most common grounds for visa refusal was “likely to become a public charge,” 
equally central to the visa refusal policy was to screen out immigrants who may compete with 
“American labor.”  First of all, pre-arranged employment was illegal under the “contract labor” 
clause, and hinting that a job was on offer was grounds for immediate visa refusal.  	  Limited 
admission of family and non-admission of labor put the two in a dichotomous relation, 
characterizing immigration from Europe as that of families and not that of labor. 
However, while the post-1924 reform movement saw limited but certain confirmation of 
family rights for European immigrants, the period confirmed that call for family unification only 
mattered if such family was white.  As the next chapter examines, the claims of citizens and 
permanent residents to family-based admission or for the right to live together was bound by race, 
reserved solely for persons defined as white.      
 
  
  72 
Tables and Figures for Chapter 1 
1-1: Legislations Regarding Family-based Admission, 1921-1928 




Emergency Quota Act 
of May 19, 1921 (42 
Stat. 5) 










Wife, parents, siblings, 
children under 18 (not of 
citizens), fiancées 
Preference 
Immigration Act of 
May 6, 1924 (43 Stat. 
153) 
Citizen Wife 
Unmarried children under 18 
 
(Only if they are not “aliens 
ineligible to citizenship.”) 
Non-quota 
Citizen-21 or over Husband 




Alien Veterans Act of 
May 26, 1926 (44 Stat. 
654) 
WWI veteran alien Spouse  
Unmarried children under 18 
Non-quota 
Act of May 29, 1928 
(45 Stat. 1009) 
Citizen Wife 
 







Husband married prior to 
1928/6/1 
 





Citizen-21 or over Parents 
 
Resident Alien Unmarried child under 21 
Wife (not husband) 
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Non-quota First Preference 
1925 29,000 25,002 (86%) 50,000 No data No data 
1926 23,856 18,659 (78%) 30,000 No data No data 
1927 34,169 27,263 (80%) 39,043 25,500 13,543 
1928 38,460 33,675 (88%) No data No data No data 
1929 40,774 36,032 (88%) No data No data No data 
1930 36,703 31,259 (85%) No data No data No data 
1931 22,444 19,376 (86%) No data 17,846 No data 
1932 14,295 10,839 (76%) 14,732 
Wives 6,798 
 Children128 3,752 
Pre-1932 
Husbands 422129 
Fathers 1,020  
Mothers 1,769  
Post-1932 
Husbands  971  
1933 13,302 9,455 (71%) 10,254 8,259 1,955 







1935 17,093 No data 16,107 
Wives  6,041 
Children  4,622 
Husbands   926 











1937 17,698 13,538 (77%) 16,695 
Wives 5,654 
Children 4,309 












Husbands 2,433  
                                                
 
128 Before the Act of May 29, 1928, only unmarried child under 18 qualified as non-quota family.  The 
1928 Act  expanded the range of non-quota child to unmarried child under 21. 
129 Initially the 1924 Act accorded only preference status to husbands of citizens.  The Act of May 19, 
1928 accorded non-quota status to husbands married before June 1, 1932, but left those married on or 
after the date in the preference category.  The Act of July 11, 1932 accorded non-quota status to husbands 
married before July 1, 1932, but only preference status to those married on or after July 1932.  
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1939 17,254 11,228 (65%) 13,228 
Wives 3,506 
Children 1,930 












United States Department of Labor, Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration 1925 
(Washington D.C.: G.P.O, 1925), 10; Annual Report 1926, 11-12; Annual Report 1927, 12;  Annual 
Report 1928, 20; Annual Report 1929, 23; Annual Report 1930, 26;  Annual Report 1932, 34; United 
States Department of Labor, Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor 1933  (Washington D.C.: G.P.O, 
1933), 63; Annual Report 1934, 70; Annual Report 1935, 94; Annual Report 1936, 103; Annual Report 
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Non-quota families Percentage 
non-quota 
families 
Wife Child131 Husband132 
 
Northern and Western Europe, in descending order of quotas 
Germany 51,227 244,448 242,363 926 387 57 0.6% 
Great Britain 34,007 162,836 148,660 2,094 498 146 1.7% 
Irish Free State 28,567 141,247 140,467 214 92 4 0.2% 
Sweden 9,561 44,833 44,276 150 86 10 0.5% 
Norway 6,453 31,042 30,218 317 65 9 1.3% 
France 3,954 18,713 17,730 338 164 10 2.7% 
Denmark 2,789 13,494 13,114 216 35 11 1.9% 
Switzerland 2,081 9,976 9,537 152 69 11 2.9% 
Netherlands 1,648 8,120 7,699 163 65 24 6.8% 
Finland 471 2,709 2,363 128 102 7 8.7% 
Luxemburg 100 515 487 10 5 0 2.9% 
 
Southern and Eastern Europe 
Poland 5,982 46,595 29,478 5,775 9,158 213 32.5% 
Italy 3,845 63,133 17,558 19,934 19,228 136 62.2% 
Czechoslovakia 3,073 19,202 14,668 1,858 2,137 110 21.4% 
Russia 2,248 15,592 10,234 1,592 2,205 58 24.7% 
Austria 785 5,142 4,213 324 401 19 14.5% 
Yugoslavia 671 6,443 3,048 1,764 1,383 27 49.2% 
Rumania 603 6,708 3,759 1,074 1,047 46 32.3% 
Portugal 503 2,757 2,418 157 86 7 9.1% 
Hungary 473 4,436 2,445 690 790 63 34.8% 
Lithuania 344 3,337 1,846 504 367 20 26.7% 
Danzig 228 1,090 1,065 13 10 1 2.2% 
Latvia 142 2,167 728 145 98 3 11.4% 
Spain 131 1,997 802 236 183 16 21.8% 
                                                
 
130 The number of all immigrants is not the sum of quota immigrants and non-quota families.; This table 
does not include other classes of non-quota immigrants such as professors, ministers, and students. Helen 
Eckerson, “Non-quota Immigration, Fiscal Years 1925-1944,” INS Monthly Review 3 (August 1945): 
185-190 includes a table on all non-quota immigrants but does not provide data specifically on non-quota 
families.   
131 Before the Act of May 29, 1928, only unmarried child under 18 qualified as non-quota family.  The 
1928 Act  raised the range of non-quota child to unmarried child under 21. 
132 Before the Act of May 29, 1928, only wives were included in non-quota families.  The 1928 Act 
extended non-quota status to husbands who were married prior to June 1, 1928. 
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Albania 100 1,539 472 357 257 1 40.0% 
Andora 100 27 17 8 3 0 40.7% 
Bulgaria 100 865 509 169 58 1 26.4% 
Estonia 100 702 612 38 12 0 5.6% 
Greece 100 6,782 737 4,193 1,262 17 80.7% 
Iceland 100 323 300 5 3 0 2.5% 
Lichtenstein 100 89 88 0 1 0 1.1% 
Monaco 100 41 35 1 3 1 12.2% 
Turkey 100 2,938 447 1,597 570 9 74.0% 
Source: United States Department of Labor, Annual Report of the Commissioner General of 
Immigration 1925 (Washington D.C.: G.P.O, 1925), 139-140; Annual Report 1926, 122-123; Annual 
Report 1927, 139-140; Annual Report 1928, 139-140; Annual Report 1929, 133-134. 
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Chapter 2: Families Ineligible to Citizenship, 1924-1934 
 
 On June 6, 1927, the Supreme Court upheld the deportation order of thirteen-year old 
Chin Bow as an “alien ineligible to citizenship” excludable under the Immigration Act of 1924.   
His father was Chin Dun, a Chinese-American U.S. citizen, and his grandfather Chin Tong, born 
in the U.S. in 1878, was one of the first generation of Chinese-Americans who acquired U.S. 
citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment.  His son Chin Dun was born in China in 1894. As 
nationality law since 1790 had recognized “derivative citizenship” of children born abroad to 
male U.S citizens, Chin Dun acquired U.S. citizenship from his father.  In 1922, Chin Dun 
moved to the U.S. at the age of twenty-eight, while his wife and a son born in 1914 remained in 
China.  And in 1924, when he sent for his ten-year-old Chin Bow, immigration officials at 
Seattle excluded his son.1 
Thirty years later, on November 18, 1957 the Supreme Court ruled that Lee You Fee was 
a U.S. citizen.  Like the case of Chin Bow, Lee You Fee’s father Lee Q. Pon was a Chinese-born 
U.S. citizen, who derived his citizenship from his U.S.-born father.  Lee Q. Pon moved to the 
U.S. in 1926, and his son was born in 1935 during his later visit to China.  Lee Q. Pon returned 
to Wisconsin, while the mother raised Lee You Fee in Hong Kong.  But in 1951, at the age of 
sixteen Lee You Fee lost his U.S. citizenship for not having taking residence in the U.S. before a 
certain age.  It took six years for the family to recover his citizenship.2  
Thirty years apart, both cases resulted from a renewed attempt after 1924 to further 
curtail immigration from China and to exclude persons of Asian descent regardless of their 
family ties to citizens.  While imposing quotas restriction on immigrants from Europe, the 1924 
Act racially excluded “aliens ineligible to citizenship,” euphemism for persons of Asian descent 
                                                
 
1 Weedin v. Chin Bow 274 U.S. 657 (1927) 
2 Lee You Fee v. Dulles, 236 F. (2d) 885, 355 U.S. 61 (1957) 
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who were barred from naturalization by a nationality law passed during the Reconstruction Era, 
which limited naturalization to “white” persons and persons of “African nativity and descent.”3  
And Chin Bow, which involved interpretation of nationality law, was part of a series of post-
1924 rulings and legislations that confirmed racial exclusion of “aliens ineligible to citizenship” 
as the foremost law of the land, firmly tying racial ineligibility to citizenship to exclusion of 
families.    
For several years after the passage of the 1924 Act, whether racial exclusion trumped any 
familial connections—including family members of citizens who were themselves citizen — was 
contested.  This chapter first examines a series of rulings and the challenge raised by Chinese 
Americans to amend the 1924 Act.  With all Asian aliens excluded from the U.S., the late 1920s 
and the 1930s saw further exclusionist attacks now directed against U.S. citizens of Asian 
descent. Barred from naturalization, persons of Asian descent could only acquire citizenship at 
birth either 1) as a U.S.-born citizen as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment (constitutional 
citizenship) or 2) by deriving citizenship from the U.S. citizen father under jus sanguinis rule as 
provided by nationality law (statutory citizenship).  Loss of U.S. citizenship by Lee Q. Pon was 
result of amendment made to the nationality act in 1934.   The latter half of the chapter examines 
attacks on jus sanguinis rule of citizenship.  Focusing on the so-called Equal Nationality Act of 
1934, it examines the idea of “equality” advanced by advocates for family of Southern and 
Eastern European immigrants, and the racial boundary of family. 
 
2.1 Ineligible to Citizenship but Admissible 
                                                
 
3 Naturalization Act of 1870 (16 Stat. 254);  Ozawa v. United States 260 U.S. 178 (1922);  
United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923) 
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 On July 11, 1924, eight days after the 1924 Act was enforced, immigration officials at 
San Francisco excluded Chinese passengers who arrived on steamship Lincoln, which had set 
sail for the U.S. before the new law went into effect.   Among the passengers excluded as “aliens 
ineligible to citizenship” was Cheung Sum Shee, a wife of a Chinese merchant residing in the 
U.S.  Also aboard was Chan Shee, wife of a U.S. citizen Chang Chan.    In the next two months, 
immigration officials at Seattle, San Francisco, Boston, and New York similarly excluded 
families of Chinese merchants and Chinese-Americans.4 
 The 1924 Act barred practically all “alien ineligible to citizenship” – persons of Asian 
descent – from becoming a permanent resident of the U.S. (Sec 13 c) In contemporary usage, 
permanent residency in the U.S. and eligibility to apply for naturalization are interchangeable 
terms.  A “permanent resident” status does not simply mean indefinite residence in the U.S. but 
also eligibility to apply for naturalization after fulfilling the minimum residency requirement.  
But historically they were distinct concepts.  It was not until the abolition of racial bar to 
naturalization in 1952 that all permanent residents became eligible for naturalization.  And what 
first coupled the two together in a more negative way was the 1924 exclusion of Asian 
immigrants, when Congress barred “aliens ineligible to citizenship” from taking permanent 
residence in the first place.  Thus, it was by denying permanent residency to “aliens [racially] 
ineligible to citizenship [through naturalization]” and by granting permanent residency only to 
persons racially eligible to naturalization (white immigrants) that Congress tied post-1924 
“permanent residency” with “eligibility to apply for naturalization.”    
                                                
 
4 List of Alien Chinese Wives of United States Citizens Arriving after July 1, 1924, Denied Admission 
under the Immigration Act of 1924, Temporarily Admitted by the Department of Labor, May 1926, folder 
55560/26, Entry 9, RG 85. 
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Under the 1924 Act, the only exception to this wholesale racial exclusion of Asian 
immigrants was “minister or professor, and his wife or unmarried children under 18” (4d – 
immigrant status with permanent residency).5 While there were other ways to enter the U.S. they 
were all temporary status: six classes of “non-immigrants” (section 3 temporary admission)6 and 
student (4e – categorized as immigrant but temporary admission).7  And status such as “student” 
had entirely different meaning before and after 1924.  Prior to 1924, student status and education 
in the U.S. accompanied permanent residency, but that was no longer the case.  Completion of 
studies terminated one’s residence in the U.S.8 
Before 1924, families of Chinese merchants such as Cheung Sum Shee and wives of U.S. 
citizens such as Chan Shee were among the few classes of Chinese not subjected to wholesale 
exclusion by the Chinese Exclusion Act,9 although they had to go through long and intensive 
examinations that covered family history, relationship, lives in China, which were incomparable 
                                                
 
5 For Europeans, the key difference between “non-immigrant” status and “immigrant” status was that the 
former lacked the right to naturalization (permanent residency), whereas the latter were eligible for 
naturalization. With regard to “aliens ineligible to citizenship,” nobody was eligible for naturalization 
regardless of one’s immigration status or the type of visa.  For Europeans, eligibility to naturalization was 
a matter of immigration status, but for Asian immigrants, ineligibility to naturalization did not have to do 
with immigration status but with “race” and naturalization law.   
   
6 Section 3 defined nonimmigrant as (1) a government official, his family, attendants, servants, and 
employees, (2) an alien visiting the United States temporarily as a tourist or temporarily for business or 
pleasure, (3) and alien in continuous transit through the United States, (4) an alien lawfully admitted to 
the United States who later goes in transit from one part of the United States to another through foreign 
contiguous territory, (5) a bona fide alien seaman and (6) an alien entitled to enter the United States solely 
to carry on trade under and in pursuance of the provisions of a present existing treaty of commerce and 
navigation.    
 
7 Under the 1924 Act, “student” was the only status that was classified as an “immigrant” but did not 
accompany permanent residency.  The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 reclassified “student” 
from “immigrant” to “nonimmigrant” status.    
8  Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration 1928, 15. 
9  For immigration of women before the 1882 Exclusion Act, George Anthony Peffer, “Forbidden 
Families: Emigration Experiences of Chinese Women under the Page Law, 1875-1882,” Journal of 
American Ethnic History 6 (1986): 28-46.  
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to examination of immigrants from Europe.10  Between 1910 and 1924, a total of 36,200 Chinese 
immigrated to the U.S., out of which 43 percent were wives and minor children of merchants and 
wives of U.S. citizens.11 However, the 1924 Act exempted merchants from racial exclusion as 
one class of “nonimmigrant,” but the law was silent on their wives and children.  Also, whereas 
the 1924 Act exempted “unmarried children under eighteen, and wife” of a citizen from quotas 
restriction of European immigrants (section 4a), the law spoke nothing of citizen’s family in 
relation to racial exclusion.  Once the 1924 Act went into effect, the Bureau of Immigration held 
all such relations no longer admissible.12   
 
Family Exclusion Clause 
 There was no doubt that the primary target of section 13 c, which excluded “aliens 
ineligible to citizenship,” was families of Japanese immigrants.13  The clause is often referred to 
as the “Japanese exclusion clause,” but it was specifically aimed at excluding family members, 
especially wives.  Since the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907, the Japanese government had only 
issued passports to wives, children and parents of U.S. residents, and set strict economic 
conditions for bringing one’s family members.  In 1920, the Japanese government stopped 
                                                
 
10 Erika Lee, At America’s Gates: Chinese Immigration during the Exclusion Era, 1882-1943 (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 116. 
11 The figure includes returning residents but does not include U.S. citizens (15,467).  The largest group 
was sons of merchants, 9,341 (10 percent of total and 11 percent of men); wife of U.S. citizen (2,848 – 3 
percent of total and 30 percent of woman), followed by wife of a merchant (2,756 – 2.9 percent of total 
and 28 percent of woman), and daughter of a merchant (522, 0.6 percent of total and 6 percent of woman).  
Erika Lee, At America’s Gates,” table 4. Chinese men Admitted, by Class, 1910 and 1924” and 98 and 
115. 
12 Bureau of Immigration Circular of Instruction no. 55266 quoted in Parker, “Aliens Ineligible to 
Citizenship,” 32; Sucheng Chan, “The Exclusion of Chinese Women, 1870-1943” in Entry Denied: 
Exclusion and the Chinese Community in America, 1882-1943, ed. Sucheng Chan (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press), 125-127; Candice Lewis Bredbenner, A Nationality of Her Own: Women, Marriage, 
and the Law of Citizenship (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 124-129. 
13 For Japanese exclusion, Roger Daniels, The Politics of Prejudice, the anti-Japanese Movement in 
California, and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962). 
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issuing passports to picture brides, but this did not satisfy the exclusionists such as Senator James 
D. Phelan of California (D), who was the principal advocate of terminating picture bride. Phelan 
saw the increase of the U.S.-born generation, with fuller rights denied to their parents, as a 
particular threat, and accused Japanese women of giving birth to children in the U.S. as well as 
of joining the labor force.14  The House report on the Johnson bill emphasized that the target of 
the “aliens ineligible to citizenship” clause was Japanese wives: “Under the agreement 
[Gentlemen’s Agreement] thousands of Japanese women have come in … Even the stoppage of 
picture brides did not put an end to this immigration, for it continued to come.”15   
During the Congressional debate and hearings on Japanese exclusion, exclusionists 
frequently used the term “family” but not in the context of whether or not family members 
should be exempted from restriction, or to refer to certain familial relations.  This was distinct 
from debate on European immigrants, where reference to family was about how or which 
familial relation mattered.   Nativists calling for exclusion of Japanese used the term “family” to 
depict the United States as an organic nation built through intermarriage of white persons, a 
“white Caucasian” nation.  Senator Phelan proclaimed, “We will give them [Japan] equality as a 
nation among nations in the family of nations” but “we cannot take them into our own family, 
because … they cannot by intermarriage become a homogeneous part.”  Thus, while Phelan 
recognized Japan as a sovereign state in “the family of nations,” he rejected Japanese as part of 
                                                
 
 
14 Yuji Ichioka, The Issei: The World of the First Generation Japanese Immigrants, 1885-1924 (New 
York: Free Press, 1988), 164-175; Catherine Y. Lee, “‘Where the Danger Lies’: Race, Gender, and 
Chinese and Japanese Exclusion in the United States, 1870-1924,” Sociological Forum 25, no. 2 (2010): 
248–271; Eithne Luibhéid, Entry Denied: Controlling Sexuality at the Border. (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2002), 63-75. 
15 Restriction of Immigration H.R. Rep. No. 68-350, at 8 (1924).  
  83 
the U.S. society, which he represented as a racial “family” formed through marriage among 
white persons.16  
Domestically, anti-miscegenation laws constructed the “white Caucasian” nation.  At a 
Senate hearing, V.S. McClatchy of Japanese Exclusion League of California declared that he was 
going to “use the term ‘assimilation’ throughout my talk in the sense of amalgamation.  There is 
no real assimilation unless it is amalgamation.” According to McClatchy, “The yellow and 
brown races do not intermarry with the white race” therefore were “unassimilable with the white 
race.” Although McClatchy spoke as if intermarriage was a proof of “assimilability” and 
moreover as if it was a matter of choice, he conveniently ignored that eleven states including his 
own state of California banned marriage between “white” persons and persons of Asian descent, 
with some states speaking of “Mongolians,” others using more specific terms such as “Chinese” 
and “Japanese.”  Inter-racial marriage was a legal impossibility in his state since 1880, when the 
state legislature expanded its anti-miscegenation law that had prohibited marriage between 
“whites” and “negroes” and “mulattoes” to include “Mongolians,” initially with Chinese in mind 
and later applied to Japanese.17   
Exclusionists repeated the idea that the U.S. was a “family” of the “Caucasian” race.   
Senator Samuel Shortridge (R-California) racially defined the “American citizen type” as 
                                                
 
16 Japanese Immigration Legislation: Hearing before the Senate Committee on Immigration. 68th Cong. 
10 (1924) (Senator James Phelan) 
17Japanese Immigration Legislation: Hearing before the Senate Committee on Immigration. 68th Cong. 4 
(1924) (V.S. McClatchy, Japanese Exclusion League); California did not repeal its anti-miscegenation 
law until 1959. For anti-miscegenation laws against Asian-Americans, Peggy Pascoe, What Comes 
Naturally: Miscegenation Law and the Making of Race in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2009), 85-93; For the list of terms used to label groups under anti-miscegenation laws, Deenesh Sohoni, 
“Unsuitable Suitors: Anti-Miscegenation Laws, Naturalization Laws, and the Construction of Asian 
Identities,” Law & Society Review 41, no. 3 (2007): 597; For discussion of how Chicago School 
sociologist measured “social distance” by sex and intermarriage, Henry Yu, Thinking Orientals: 
Migration, Contact and Exoticism in Modern America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 50-62. 
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“Caucasian or Aryan branch of the human family,” to which the Japanese did not belong.  
Drawing on the 1922 Supreme Court ruling Ozawa v. United States, which decided that Japanese 
were ineligible to naturalization because they were not “Caucasian” and therefore not “white,” 
the Attorney General of California claimed that the world was divided into “two great groups; on 
the one side is placed the peoples of Caucasian descent ...  on the other side is placed all the 
others, all races of color other than white.”18  As historian Mae Ngai has argued, the national 
origins quotas regime “divided Europe from the non-European world.”19  
While discussion centered on Japanese immigration, the undeniable overall purpose was 
complete exclusion of Asian immigrants, which began with Chinese exclusion in the late 
nineteenth century, exclusion of natives of “the Asiatic Barred Zone” that covered most of 
continental Asia and the Pacific (1917),20 Supreme Court rulings that reconfirmed racial bar to 
naturalization Ozawa v. United States (1922) on Japanese and United States v. Bhagat Singh 
Thind (1923) on Indian.21 Thind extended rule of racial ineligibility to citizenship to natives of all 
                                                
 
 18 Japanese Immigration Legislation: Hearing before the Senate Committee on Immigration. 68th Cong. 
98 (1924) (Senator Samuel Shortridge, CA); Takao Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922); Ian 
Haney-López, White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race (New York: New York University Press, 
2006), chapter 4; For a detailed analysis of the Ozawa case, Devon W. Carbado, “Yellow by Law,” 
California Law Review 97, no. 3 (2009): 633–692. 
19 Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 27. 
 
20 The Asia Pacific Triangle exclusion applied to “natives of islands not possessed by the United States 
adjacent to the Continent of Asia, situate south of the twentieth parallel latitude north, west of the one 
hundred and sixtieth meridian of longitude east from Greenwich, and north of the tenth parallel of latitude 
south, or who are natives of any country, province or dependency situate on the Continent of Asia west of 
the one hundred and tenth meridian of longitude east from Greenwich and east of the fiftieth meridian of 
longitude east from Greenwich and south of the fiftieth parallel of latitude north, except that portion of 
said territory situate between the fiftieth and the sixty-fourth meridians of longitude east from Greenwich 
and the twenty-fourth and thirty-eight parallels of latitude north.” Section 3.  Act of February 5, 1917 (39 
Stat. 874); “Except that portion ...” refers to Japan, which was not included in the zone because of the 
Gentlemen’s Agreement.  
 
21 Jeff H. Lesser, “Always ‘Outsiders’: Asians, Naturalization and the Supreme Court,” Amerasia Journal 
12, no. 1 (1985-1986): 83-100; For immigration from India, Gary R. Hess, “The ‘Hindu’ in America: 
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countries of 1917 barred zone.  While Congress discussed the 1924 bill, the Japanese 
government requested for quotas restriction instead of wholesale exclusion.  But to provide quota 
for Japan, exclusionists argued, was “to discriminate in favor of them [Japanese] as against the 
Chinese, the Hindus.” “The fairest” and “un-discriminatory” treatment of Japanese, the 
exclusionists insisted, was to subject them to wholesale exclusion just like other people in Asia.22  
Although Congress did not discuss extensively in 1924 about immigration from other parts of 
Asia, this was only because they had already been virtually excluded and because Japanese were 
considered to be the last remaining target.    
 
Merchant Families and Citizen’s Wives 
 Despite the unmistakable overall intention of Congress to complete the exclusion of 
Asian immigrants, when the Bureau of Immigration excluded families of Chinese merchants and 
Chinese-Americans in 1924, there were certain differences between admission of Japanese 
families and Chinese families that remained to be answered.  For one, admission of Chinese 
merchant families involved a treaty between China as well as a 1900 Supreme Court ruling 
United States v. Mrs. Gue Lim.  Amidst a series of Chinese exclusion laws excluded virtually all 
Chinese from entering the U.S., the Burlinghame Treaty as revised in 1880 entitled those with 
merchant status to enter and reside in the U.S.  The Supreme Court reasoned that wives of 
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Chinese merchants were entitled to enter the U.S. “by reason of the right of the husband.” 23  
Congress expressed its intent to abrogate Gentlemen’s Agreement with Japan, but did it intend to 
nullify the treaty with China and the Supreme Court ruling as well?    
 Secondly, other than merchant wives, Chinese wives admitted before 1924 were married 
to U.S. citizens.  This was different from the case of Japanese wives, since their husbands were 
first-generation immigrants without U.S. citizenship.  Just like Chinese immigrants, first-
generation Japanese immigrants were racially barred from naturalization.24 As more recent 
immigrants, the second generation with birthright citizenship was yet to come of marrying age, 
and pre-1924 admission of Japanese wives did not involve claims of U.S. citizens.25  Even before 
the Cable Act of 1922 abolished the practice of marital naturalization, marriage to a U.S. citizen 
did not make a Chinese wife a U.S. citizen, since marital naturalization only applied to women 
racially eligible to citizenship.26  It was not by virtue of her citizenship but more as the right of a 
male citizen that immigration authorities had admitted Chinese wives.  While there was no 
Supreme Court ruling on excludability of Chinese wives of U.S. citizens, after Gue Lim, the 
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immigration authorities inferred that if a non-citizen merchant was entitled to send for one’s 
family, so was a U.S. citizen.27   
 The post-1924 challenge against Japanese exclusion and Chinese exclusion also involved 
different claims.  As historian Izumi Hirobe discusses in his study of the movement to repeal the 
exclusion clause for Japanese, post-1924 opposition to Japanese exclusion led by business 
interests, missionaries, and intellectuals was a “pro-quota movement.”  The demand centered 
around securing a quota for Japan, nominal as it may be, and not around family-based exemption 
from racial exclusion.28  On the other hand, challenge to the exclusion clause with regard to 
Chinese had less to do with securing a quota for China, but was based on claims of families.  
What Chinese-Americans demanded was a return to the pre-1924 enforcement of the Chinese 
exclusion acts, which was less stringent than the 1924 Act.29   
The first phase of the struggle took place in court.  On habeas corpus proceedings, 
Chinese families appealed their cases in federal court, which resulted in two Supreme Court 
rulings both decided on May 25, 1925: Cheung Sum Shee v. Nagle on merchant families and 
Chang Chan v. Nagle on citizens’ wives.  
  
Foreign-born Children: Citizenship jus sanguinis   
 In 1924, concurrent with exclusion of Chinese wives of U.S. citizens, the immigration 
officials at Seattle excluded Chin Bow, a ten-year old son of a Chinese-American father Chin 
Dun.  One difference between Cheung Sum Shee v. Nagle and Chang Chan v. Nagle concerned 
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the status of children.  The question in Cheung Sum Shee was whether minor children and wives 
of Chinese treaty merchants were excludable under the 1924 Act.  The question in Chang Chan 
was excludability of wives of U.S. citizens, and did not involve children.  The legal status of a 
citizen’s child differed crucially from that of their mother or children of Chinese merchants, 
since a foreign-born child with a U.S. citizen father – but not the mother – acquired U.S. 
citizenship on jus sanguinis rule, which had been recognized since the first Nationality Act of 
1790.   However, as this section will discuss in more detail, in 1924 immigration officials argued 
that although Chin Dun was a U.S. citizen, he had not met certain conditions to transfer his U.S. 
citizenship to his son, which made Chin Bow an “alien ineligible to citizenship” excludable 
under the 1924 Act.  The challenge by the family resulted in the Supreme Court ruling Weedin v. 
Chin Bow (1927). 30   
By the 1920s, transnational family formation and the migration strategy often found 
among Chinese-American families included U.S. citizen husband/father living in the U.S. and 
the wife/mother in China, with the Chinese-born children – mostly sons – immigrating to the U.S. 
at a certain age.  The number of wife/mother moving to the U.S. to join her husband was 
increasing, but foreign-born children of U.S. citizens were the largest group of persons of 
Chinese descent admitted to the U.S.  Between 1908 and 1924, some 16,400 foreign-born 
children immigrated to the U.S., far outnumbering 2,800 wives of U.S. citizens. 31 (Table 2-1: 
U.S. Citizens of Chinese Descent and Chinese Wives of U.S. Citizens, 1906-1924 on page 125)  
Immigration of Chinese-born children of the first generation of U.S.-born Chinese-
Americans, who acquired U.S. citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment, was small until the 
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early twentieth-century.32  By the 1890s, U.S. citizenship was almost the only certain protection 
for persons of Chinese descent to leave and reenter the U.S.  In Chae Chan Ping v. United States 
(1889), the Supreme Court ruled that exclusion of Chinese laborers under the Scott Act of 1888 
would apply even to pre-restriction residents returning from a temporary visit abroad.33  In a 
similar vein, the immigration authorities sought to exclude U.S.-born citizens returning from 
visit abroad.  But United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898) affirmed that the Fourteenth 
Amendment accorded birthright citizenship to all U.S.-born persons irrespective of race, which 
included the right to move in and out of the U.S.34  At the turn of the century, U.S.-born citizens 
returning from a visit abroad or former citizens of Hawaii who acquired U.S. citizenship after 
annexation comprised most of the entry by U.S.-citizens of Chinese descent. 
 In 1908, the immigration bureau called attention to a new pattern, reporting arrival of 
some 1,100 Chinese-born children of U.S.-born fathers. 35 One reason for the emergence of the 
new pattern had to do with generation.  The first U.S. citizens of Chinese descent acquired 
birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment, and by the early twentieth century their 
Chinese-born children reached age to come to the U.S.  Another factor was the 1906 San 
Francisco earthquake and fire, which destroyed all birth records in the city.   Absence of birth 
records added to the prejudice of immigration officials that suspected all citizenship claims as 
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fraudulent.  But it also created an opportunity for Chinese residents to claim to be a U.S.-born 
citizen regardless of their actual place of birth, which not only enabled them to establish their 
lives in the U.S. more securely, but also allowed them to send for their wives (wives of non-
citizen Chinese laborers were excluded but wives of citizens were not) and their children.36  
Upon return from China, Chinese-American men with wives in China often reported birth of 
children while abroad.  Such reports were necessary to reserve a future slot for their children to 
be admitted to the U.S. as foreign-born citizens.  Reports of births of sons outnumbered those of 
daughters by more than ten times, which involved a strategy to secure a spot for other men 
(relatives or otherwise) to immigrate to the U.S. as the so-called “paper sons.”37 
As symbolized by the completion of San Francisco’s Angel Island inspection station in 
1910, the immigration bureau subjected both native-born citizens returning from abroad and 
foreign-born citizens newly coming to the U.S. to arduous investigation.38  Yet, in the exclusion 
of Chin Bow in 1924, what immigration officials at Seattle questioned was not whether Chin 
Bow was a true son of Chin Dun’s.  Instead, the bureau pointed to a clause in the nationality act, 
which stated that jus sanguinis citizenship “shall not descend to the children whose fathers never 
resided in the United States.”  The question raised in 1924 was whether the phrase “never resided” 
required a foreign-born citizen father to have resided in the U.S. before the birth of the child.  
This concerned third-generation citizenship derivation: the power of a foreign-born father who 
acquired his own U.S. citizenship at birth on jus sanguinis rule (second generation) from the 
U.S.-born father (first generation) to further pass on citizenship to one’s foreign-born child (third 
generation).   
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Chin Bow was a grandson of a U.S.-born citizen, and a son of a Chinese-born U.S. 
citizen.  His grandfather Chin Tong was born in the U.S. in 1878, one of the first generation born 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Chin Tong had a wife in China, and their son Chin Dun, who 
was born in China in 1894, acquired U.S. citizenship jus sanguinis.  Chin Dun lived in China 
until 1922, when he moved to the U.S. at the age of 28.  The same year, approximately 2,300 
Chinese-born U.S. citizens like Chin Dun immigrated to the U.S.  Before moving to the U.S., 
Chin Dun was already married and had a son born in 1914 (Chin Bow).  When Chin Dun sent for 
his ten-year-old son in 1924, the Bureau of Immigration asserted that because Chin Dun had 
“never resided” in the U.S. before his son was born, his son had not acquired U.S. citizenship at 
birth.  Therefore, the bureau insisted, Chin Bow was an “alien ineligible to citizenship” 
excludable under the 1924 Act. 39 
 At one level, as the Bureau of Immigration reported in its 1928 annual report, the case 
indicated that “the time has now been reached when the grandsons of Chinese born in the United 
States [under the Fourteenth Amendment] are old enough to apply … for admission as 
citizens.”40  However, Chin Bow was not the first of such case.  According to Warner Parker, the 
first chief law officer of the Bureau of Immigration from 1906 to 1919, prior to 1924 “it had 
been the custom of the immigration officials to admit … all children born abroad to American 
citizens … irrespective of whether the children were born prior to subsequent to the acquirement 
of such residence by the father.”  In other words, under pre-1924 policy, Chin Dun could first 
marry and have a child in China, then move to the U.S. and later send for his family.  But the 
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Department of Labor began to insist that such child was not a U.S. citizen and therefore 
inadmissible to the U.S.41  
Exclusion of Chin Bow was the most recent exclusionist move to further curtail Chinese 
immigration. Prior to 1924, in addition to subjecting Chinese claiming U.S. citizenship to 
arduous investigation, the Bureau of Immigration had challenged the foundation of jus sangunis 
citizenship.  For instance, in 1916, the Secretary of Labor issued a departmental order that 
foreign-born children of U.S.-born Chinese Americans were not U.S. citizens, but the 
Department of Justice objected that nationality law did not distinguish between U.S. citizen 
fathers based on their race. 42  While the immediate issue in Chin Bow was general rule on third-
generation citizenship derivation, it was part of a larger post-1924 attempt to complete exclusion 
of Asian immigrants by debasing jus sanguinis citizenship. 
 
District Court Rulings 
 
Both with regard to wives and children of Chinese-Americans, the district courts 
disagreed with the Department of Labor.  In October 1924, district courts in Seattle, Boston, and 
San Francisco ruled successively that Chinese wives of U.S. citizens, although ineligible to 
citizenship, should be admitted to the U.S.  Lower courts maintained that racial ineligibility to 
citizenship and exclusion of “aliens ineligible to citizenship” did not trump familial relations or 
the right of a U.S. citizen male to send for one’s family. 
The Department of Labor maintained that because the 1924 Act did not specifically 
exempt wife of a U.S. citizen from racial exclusion, the law “mandatorily excludes the wives of 
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United States citizens of the Chinese race if such wives are of a race or persons ineligible to 
citizenship.”  But the district courts disagreed with the Department of Labor.  The courts 
maintained that citizens’ rights and family relations to a U.S. citizen held higher grounds than 
racial exclusion.  The courts reasoned that in 1924 Congress “had only aliens in mind, and did 
not realize that the section as passed [section 13] diminished the rights of American citizens.” 
Furthermore, the courts reasoned that because Congress had specifically exempted “minor 
children under 18 and wife” of a citizen from quotas restriction of European immigrants, 
Congress must have “overlooked” that the law was not written in such a way as to exempt the 
same relations from racial exclusion.43    
 Shortly after, district courts in Seattle and San Francisco, both of which had previously 
ruled in favor of Chinese wives, delivered their opinions on children of foreign-born Chinese-
American fathers.  The immediate issue was whether jus sanguinis citizenship derivation by 
father who required pre-birth U.S. residence of the father.  On December 11, 1924, the court in 
San Francisco ruled that a child of a U.S. citizen father was a citizen regardless of whether the 
father had resided in the U.S. prior to the birth of the child.  Thus, the lower courts disagreed 
with the Department of Labor both with regard to wives and children.44   
While district court in San Francisco recognized third-generation citizenship derivation, 
whether such a child acquired U.S. citizenship at birth and whether a citizen’s child should be 
subjected to racial exclusion involved different questions.  An article that Warner Parker wrote 
shortly after the district court rulings speaks to this point.  Parker observed that “even if the 
[Labor] Department’s view that children born under such circumstances are not American 
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citizens should be judicially sustained [by the upper courts], it would seem to be doubtful that 
any court will hold that such children, although aliens, are inadmissible under the new act.”   
Parker held that the same principle governed wives and children of U.S. citizens.  Since before 
1924, admission of Chinese wives of U.S. citizens was not based on herself being a U.S. citizen 
(she was not) but because she was married to a U.S. citizen. And the three district courts 
sustained this understanding after 1924.  Likewise, Parker reasoned that a child of a U.S. citizen 
should be admissible by virtue of family ties even if one did not hold U.S. citizenship.   However, 
the Supreme Court would betray this observation. 45 
 
2.2 Ineligible to Citizenship therefore Inadmissible 
 
Supreme Court decisions from 1925 to 1927 firmly tied ineligibility to citizenship with 
physical exclusion from the U.S., and upheld racial exclusion as more important than family ties.  
The Court successively overturned the lower courts’ rulings on exclusion of Chinese wives, jus 
sanguinis citizenship and exclusion of children.   In May 1925, the court delivered its opinion on 
Cheung Sum Shee et al. v. Nagle and Chang Chan v. Nagle, while it took another two years for 
the case of Chin Bow to reach the Court. 
 In Cheung Sum Shee et al. v. Nagle, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of families of 
Chinese merchants.  The Court rejected the Bureau of Immigration’s claim that “neither the 
mercantile status of the husband and father, nor the applicant's relationship to him” mattered 
under the 1924 Act.  The Department of State strongly objected to this interpretation, and argued 
before the court that the 1924 Act should not disturb existing treaties.  First, the Court confirmed 
that there were certain exceptions to exclusion of “aliens ineligible to citizenship,” and 
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confirmed that a Chinese treaty merchant held nonimmigrant status to which racial exclusion did 
not apply.   Secondly, the court argued that although the 1924 Act did not specifically exempt 
families of Chinese merchant from racial exclusion, the law was not meant to disturb existing 
treaties.  The Burlinghame Treaty and U.S. v. Mrs. Gue Lim (1900) had entitled Chinese 
merchants to be joined by his families, and the Court ruled that this still held true after 1924. 46 
 
Chang Chan v. Nagle 
 However, in Chang Chan v. Nagle, the Court did not find any positive importance in 
family ties to a U.S. citizen, and upheld exclusion of Chinese wives of U.S. citizens.  
Significantly, the ruling showed that unlike wives of merchants, a wife of a citizen was 
excludable precisely because her husband was a U.S. citizen.   Court emphasized two key 
differences between families of Chinese merchants (noncitizens) and families of U.S. citizens.  
First, the treaty with China only protected families of Chinese treaty merchants.  But, admission 
of families of U.S. citizens was governed solely by U.S. immigration law (the 1924 Act).   The 
second difference was immigration status.   The Court ruled that “Chinese wives, coming here to 
join their (U.S. citizen) husbands, are immigrants” seeking for permanent residence and thus 
could not be exempted from racial exclusion as a “nonimmigrant.”  And most significantly, the 
Court ruled that because the wife of a citizen was an “immigrant” and because the 1924 Act did 
not specifically exempt Chinese wives from racial exclusion, race trumped any familial 
connections.47    
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Plaintiffs insisted that family-based non-quota status of an “unmarried child under 18 
years of age, or the wife, of a citizen” accorded to European immigrants (section 4 (a)) should 
apply to Chinese as well.  They asked whether the clause expressed a fundamental principle that 
family ties held higher grounds than immigration restriction.   But the Court flatly dismissed 
their claim, ruling that families of U.S. citizens were “subject to the positive inhibition against all 
aliens ineligible to citizenship.”  The foremost test was race of the immigrant not the rights of 
U.S. citizens to be joined by one’s families.  Family relation to a U.S. citizen or U.S. citizen’s 
rights to bring one’s families held higher grounds than quota restriction of European immigrants, 
but was secondary to racial exclusion of Asian immigrants.    
The 1925 Supreme Court ruling left the act of Congress as the only possibility for 
Chinese wives to immigrate to the U.S.   Citing the plenary power doctrine, the court stated that 
solution rested solely with Congress.48   
 
Weedin v. Chin Bow  
 In March 1927, Chin Bow’s case reached the Supreme Court.  The lower courts had ruled 
in favor of Chin Bow.  The district court discharged Chin Bow without deciding on the question 
of whether the phrase in nationality law that stated jus sangunis citizenship “shall not descend to 
the children whose fathers never resided in the United States,” required the father to have resided 
in the U.S. before having a child.   When the district court released Chin Bow, the lower courts 
had ruled that a Chinese wife of a U.S. citizen was admissible despite her ineligibility to 
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citizenship, dissociating racial eligibility to citizenship from excludability of families of U.S. 
citizens.  But by the time the appeals court considered the case, Chin Bow’s citizenship status 
and admissibility were more closely knit together by Chang Chan, which concluded that wives 
of U.S. citizens were subject to “positive inhibition against aliens ineligible to citizenship.”  Still, 
in late 1925, the appeals court ruled that pre-birth U.S. residence of the father was not necessary 
for Chin Bow to be a U.S. citizen on jus sanguinis rule and accordingly he should be admitted to 
the U.S. as a U.S. citizen.49 
However, on June 6, 1927, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ rulings and 
upheld the deportation order of Chin Bow.  First, the court ruled, his father needed to have 
resided in the U.S. in order to have the power to transfer his U.S. citizenship on jus sanguinis 
rule.  Because Chin Bow was already born before Chin Dun moved to the U.S., the Court 
concluded, Chin Dun did not acquire citizenship at birth.   Secondly, the Court ruled that so long 
as Chin Bow was an alien ineligible to citizenship, he should be deported from the U.S.50 The 
ruling had significance beyond interpretation of nationality act surrounding third generation 
citizenship derivation.  Whether Chin Bow was a U.S. citizen and whether a U.S. citizen’s child 
ineligible to citizenship should be excluded were not identical issues.  But, the Supreme Court 
ruled that being a child of a U.S. citizen alone did not override racial exclusion and decided that 
immigration by children of Asian descent was only possible by virtue of one’s own U.S. 
citizenship.  By successively upholding racial exclusion of wives and children of U.S. citizens, 
Chang Chan and Chin Bow firmly tied racial ineligibility to citizenship with inadmissibility of 
families, and solidified the idea that family ties were secondary to racial exclusion. 
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2.3 Reform or Further Restriction: 1930 Amendment to the 1924 Act 
 After the May 1925 Supreme Court ruling, an act of Congress was the only possibility 
left for Chinese wives to come to the U.S.  Chiu Shee, a wife of Ng Lim left Hong Kong on June 
21, 1924, ten days before the 1924 Act was enforced, and arrived in Boston on July 28, 1924, 
where she was denied admission. The Bureau of Immigration nevertheless granted temporary 
admission under bond, and while the family brought their case to the court, Chiu Shee gave birth 
to a child.  Whether she would be able to continue to reside in the U.S. with her husband and 
child depended solely on Congressional relief. 51 
With the court refusing to provide remedy, Chinese American organizations such as 
Chinese American Citizens Alliance – originally founded in 1895 as the United Parlors of the 
Native Sons of the Golden West – lobbied for legislative reform.52  The legislative demand by 
Chinese-American organizations was identical with what plaintiffs in Chang Chan argued: 
family-based exemption under section 4 (a) “unmarried children under 18 years of age, or the 
wife, of a citizen” should apply not only to European immigrants or to quota restriction, but to all 
persons irrespective of race and to racial exclusion.    
The association pointed to the December 1925 State of the Union Message, where 
Coolidge stated that “no alien inhabitant of another country, has any legal rights whatever under 
our Constitution and laws.  It is only through treaty or residence here that such rights accrue.  But 
we should not, however, be forgetful of the obligations of a common humanity.” The President’s 
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reference to “treaty” concerned the Burlinghame Treaty and Chung Shum Shee. Citing the 
President, the Chinese American Citizens Alliance asked, “Are we not forgetful in of the 
obligations of a common humanity in depriving those citizens of our country and whose wives 
are of a race ineligible to citizenship of the comfort and society of their wives?”53 
Chinese-American families appealed to Congress about hardships caused by the 1924 Act.  
Mrs. J.W. Hoy of San Francisco wrote how her brother Hong Sic Poy “became insane” as a 
result of separation from his wife.  Hong Sic Poy was born in 1900 in San Francisco, and married 
Leung Shee in China in 1919.  After three years in China, he returned to the U.S. planning to 
send for his wife once he had enough savings.  However, when he had “accumulated just about 
enough money to accomplish his purpose” the 1924 Act went into effect, barring Leung Shee 
from immigrating to the U.S.  According to his sister, “sick and sore at heart over the situation 
that confronted him after having faithfully saved all he could ... for the one purpose of bringing 
his wife ... he constantly brooded over his trouble, and the hardship he suffered in his separation 
from his wife was such that he finally lost his mind.”   His physician suggested that travelling to 
China to see his wife might be the solution, and accompanied by his brother, Hong Sic Poy set 
sail for China in 1928.54 
In the late 1920s, some Chinese wives managed to come to the U.S. as “nonimmigrants” 
but such status only allowed temporary residence.  For families, what was necessary was 
permanent residency not temporary admission. For example, in December 1926, Ralph Quau, his 
wife Yow Hye Kam, and their infant daughter arrived in San Francisco from Canton.  While 
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Ralph Quau and his daughter landed as U.S. citizens – Ralph Quau as U.S. born citizen and his 
daughter as a Chinese-born child of a U.S. citizen – Yow Hye Kam was admitted only as a 
traveler.  Ralph Quau was born in San Francisco in 1904.  His grandfathers on both sides 
immigrated to the U.S. in the 1870s as merchants, and both of his parents were born in San 
Francisco.   Ralph Quau made a visit to China in 1925 shortly before the 1924 Act was passed, 
and married Yow Hye Kam in Canton in February 1925, unaware that his wife was subject to 
exclusion under the 1924 Act.  In 1926, in preparing for his return to the U.S. he went to the 
consulate to secure a paper for his wife, but was informed that the 1924 Act barred Yow Hye 
Kam from immigrating to the U.S. and that the only option that consul could offer was a permit 
for a traveler (tourist).  After the original eight-month permit expired, the immigration authorities 
extended her bond for another six month, but without amendment to the 1924 Act she was 
required to depart from the U.S. leaving behind her husband and daughter.55 
While Chang Chan regarded families who had not already been married but also had set 
sail for the U.S. before the 1924 Act was enforced, for Chinese-American organizations 
unexpected consequences of the sudden enforcement of the new law was not the principal 
grounds of their claim.  They argued that there were three types of hardship suffered by Chinese-
American men as a result of 1924 exclusion of their wives.   First were married men who were 
unable to send for their wives in China.  Second were single men unable to find a wife in the U.S. 
because there were few Chinese women in the U.S. and because of anti-miscegenation law.   
Third were the most immediate cases of those who arrived in the U.S. shortly after the 
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enforcement of the 1924 Act and were facing deportation.   In other words, it was not a matter of 
whether one could have expected the consequences of the new law but as the rights of citizens.56    
They especially pointed to Cheung Sum Shee, and argued that it was anomalous that the 
“Chinese wife of an American citizen” was treated as “inferior to ... the alien Chinese wife of an 
alien Chinese merchant,” who could enter the U.S.57  Indeed, prior to 1924 it was because 
immigration officials held that citizens should enjoy the rights enjoyed by merchants that 
Chinese wives were able to enter the U.S.    By contrasting the right granted to a non-U.S. citizen 
and that denied to a U.S. citizen, Chinese-Americans highlighted the injustice of the 1924 Act.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, with regard to Southern and Eastern European immigrants, 
certain family unification rights granted to U.S. citizens became the grounds for reformers to 
demand rights for permanent residents as people who were on their path to citizenship.  In the 
case of Chinese or Asian families, with no rights recognized for U.S. citizens, U.S. citizens had 
to make an appeal by pointing to rights enjoyed by non-citizens. 
In lobbying for reform, Chinese-American organizations were more than aware that 
Congress was concerned not only about Chinese immigration but about Japanese immigration, 
and probably even more about the latter.  “The real question,” You Chung Hong of Chinese 
American Citizens Alliance stated at a 1928 House hearing, “is whether this proposed 
amendment would nullify the Japanese exclusion feature in the immigration act of 1924.”58  
Witnesses argued extensively that their proposal had little to do with Japanese immigration, 
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stressing that Japanese population in the U.S. was more balanced in terms of the number of men 
and women.  For instance, Kenneth Y. Fung of the San Francisco Lodge of the Chinese Citizens 
Alliance emphasized that the issue was wives of U.S. citizens, and therefore concerned only the 
U.S.-born generation (not first generation Japanese immigrants).  As of 1920, there were 15,000 
U.S.-born Japanese American men and 14,000 U.S.-born Japanese American women, Fung 
argued, and that U.S.-born Japanese Americans should have less difficulty in finding a spouse.59 	 
In fact, among the first-generation Japanese immigrants there were around 20,000 single men, 
for whom it was no longer possible to marry in Japan and bring their wives to the U.S.60   Yet, it 
was not that Chinese-American organizations pushed for a law solely for Chinese wives and 
Chinese Americans. The point of their argument was to make the case that in practice Chinese 
Americans were more likely to benefit from amendment to the exclusion clause for families of 
U.S. citizens.  Their demand was to make family-based exemption available regardless of race as 
a matter of right of U.S. citizens. 
 Also crucial in their appeal was the issue of interracial marriage.  By the late 1920s, 
eleven states (Arizona, California, Idaho, Missouri, Utah, Wyoming, Mississippi, Oregon, 
Nebraska, Texas, and Virginia) prohibited persons of Chinese descent from marrying white 
persons.  Chinese-American organizations also pointed to prevailing fears of intermarriage to 
enable immigration of Chinese wives.  If Congress did not amend the 1924 Act, the Chinese 
American Citizens Alliance argued, “the only solution of the problem” of Chinese American 
men not being able to find a wife might be the “marriage of the Chinese-American citizen 
resident here to a woman not of his own race,” since the number of women of Chinese descent in 
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the U.S. was much smaller than men.  Congress must consider whether it would not be 
“undesirable and inadvisable from the viewpoint of both white and Chinese,” if Chinese-
American men sought for “white” wives as a result of continued exclusion of Chinese wives.61  
And at the same time, they denounced the notion that “intermarriage” was related to 
“assimilation,” arguing how the scarcity of intermarriage had “nothing to do with assimilation by 
persons of the Chinese race of American customs and ideas, or with the question whether a 
Chinese child born and reared here become in every aspect a true American.”62 Thus, rejecting 
and exploiting the prevailing ideas about interracial marriage at the same time was an important 




Administrative Concerns of the Bureau of Immigration 
As Chinese-American organizations lobbied for legislative reform, the position of the 
Bureau of Immigration deserves attention.  Despite having won their case in Chang Chan, the 
bureau did not raise objections to amending the 1924 Act for Chinese wives.  While the bureau 
did not newly admit any Chinese wives, they refrained from deporting those who arrived in the 
U.S. shortly after the 1924 Act was enforced, and allowed temporary admission on bonds of five 
hundred to one thousand dollars.  After Chang Chan, the bureau extended their bond while 
Congress discussed relief bills.  As of June 1926, thirty-four Chinese wives waited in the U.S. for 
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Congressional relief: fourteen arrived at San Francisco, sixteen at Seattle, three in Boston, and 
one in New York.  And the bureau also made favorable recommendations to Congress that the 
1924 Act may be amended for Chinese wives.63 
However, the motive of the Bureau of Immigration was not entirely benign.  Their views 
on Chinese wives must be understood in relation to their strong objections to immigration of 
Chinese-born children, which far outnumbered immigration of wives.  After 1924, the bureau 
continued to cast deep suspicion on Chinese-born children and citizenship claims, especially 
pointing to the high proportion of sons.  For example, the 1925 annual report wrote that between 
April and June 1925, 256 married Chinese-American men returned from China to San Francisco.  
All except three hade wives in China, with a total of 719 children, out of whom 670 were sons 
(151 in the U.S. and 519 in China) and 49 were daughters (all in China).  The disproportion was 
most likely due to reporting birth of daughters as sons or reporting more children than were 
actually born.64  Importantly, unlike for wives, the bureau strongly objected to any revisions to 
the 1924 Act that may facilitate immigration of children.  
The immigration officials’ primary concern was the effect that continued exclusion of 
wives might have on immigration of paper sons.  The Chinese Division of the Bureau of 
Immigration advised Congress that the bureau “would rather that the Chinese American citizens 
could be permitted to have their wives in the United States, as then we would know who their 
children are, as well as the relative number of boys and girls in each family, and the genuineness 
of the relationship.”  Children of Chinese American fathers were U.S. citizens regardless of the 
                                                
 
63 Chan, “Exclusion of Chinese Women,” 126-127; Robe Carl White, Assistant Secretary, Department of 
Labor, to Albert Johnson, Chair of House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, “Date of 
Expiration of Bond in Cases of Alien Chinese Wives of United States Citizens Arriving after July 1, 
1924,” June 16, 1926; 55560/26; RG 85.   
64 Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration 1925, 22-23; Lee, At America’s Gates, 99-
100. 
  105 
place of birth.  As long as that was the case, immigration officials came to believe, it might be 
preferable if both parents lived in the U.S. and if the child was born in the U.S.   In the U.S., it 
would be more difficult to report the birth of a daughter as son, or to claim more children than 
were actually born.   As the 1928 annual report put it, “Since China is the birthplace of these 
applicants, it is difficult to determine the truth or falsity of asserted relationship.”    Although the 
bureau did not claim that “the proposed privilege permitting Chinese American citizens to bring 
in their alien wives will eliminate the fraud … in connection with their claims of large families 
of children which run almost exclusively to males,” the bureau at least expected “a beneficial 
effect.”  Admission of wives was merely a return to the pre-1924 policy. As the pre-1924 male-
predominant immigration indicated, return to the pre-1924 policy did not necessarily mean that 
families would decide to bear children in the U.S.   But it was certain that exclusion of wives 
would leave no other option than for families to bear children in China.   Therefore,  the bureau 
expected that admission of wives might give the U.S. government stronger control over Chinese 
immigration, and perhaps reduce citizenship claims by foreign-born Chinese. 65  
 Thus, while the Department of Labor won both Supreme Court cases on wives of 
Chinese-Americans (Chang Chan v. Nagle) and on children of Chinese-Americans (Weedin v. 
Chin Bow), the department showed a marked difference in its response.  While the department 
did not oppose amending the 1924 Act for Chinese wives, they were strongly against making any 
revisions to the law for children.  Whereas Chinese American organizations lobbied for the same 
family-based exemption as provided for European immigrants, the bureau insisted that Congress 
must not accept such demand because non-quota family for European immigrants included not 
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only wives but also children of U.S. citizens.  To exempt children from racial exclusion, the 
bureau emphasized, was to “overthrow the Chin Bow decision that we fought years to get” in 
order to reduce immigration of Chinese-born children of U.S. citizens.66 
 
 
1930 Amendment to the Immigration Act of 1924     
Five years after Chang Chan, on June 13, 1930, Congress made a limited amendment to 
the 1924 Act for Chinese wives of U.S. citizens, allowing “Chinese wife of an American citizen 
married prior to the approval of the Immigration Act of 1924 on May 26, 1924” to take 
permanent residence in the U.S.67  The amendment marked a certain achievement for Chinese 
Americans, and some 60 wives immigrated to the U.S. each year between 1931 and 1941.  
However, it was at best an exception to racial exclusion of “aliens ineligible to citizenship.”  The 
amendment was by no means a general rule exempting wives of U.S. citizens from racial 
exclusion.  Moreover, the way it was written actually reinforced the idea that racial exclusion 
superseded any familial relation. (For post-1930 immigration of Chinese wives, Table 2.2: U.S. 
Citizens of Chinese Descent and Chinese Wives of U.S. Citizens, 1925-1940 on page 138.) 
 On several levels, the 1930 Amendment was fundamentally different from what 
Chinese-Americans advocated for.   For one, Chinese-American organizations did not demand 
law exclusive to Chinese wives or for Chinese-American husbands that did not apply to other 
immigrants from Asia.  In fact, in appealing for reform, they did argue that exclusion of wives 
created more hardship for Chinese Americans than for Japanese immigrants.  But their legislative 
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demand was to accord the same family-based exemption to all families regardless of race.  
Secondly, Chinese-American organizations did not call for a relief measure with any cutoff date.   
Surely, Chang Chan involved those who had set sail for the U.S. before the 1924 Act went into 
effect and arrived after its enforcement, but unexpected nature of the new law was not the 
grounds for their demands.  And thirdly, their demand was the same family-based exemption as 
provided for European immigrants (Sec 4a), which included both unmarried children and wife, 
not just wives.    
For specific reasons, Congress defeated each demand.  First, Congress applied the 1930 
amendment exclusively to “Chinese wives” and to no other Asian immigrants such as Japanese 
wives.  Congress explicitly stated that the law was for Chinese wives only and that they would 
not “extend the same privilege to women of the Orient other than Chinese who, although wives 
of United States Citizens, are likewise barred from admission to the United States.”68 To exempt 
all families was to place family ties to a U.S. citizen on higher grounds than racial exclusion, and 
by specifically writing the law for Chinese wives and for U.S. citizens of Chinese descent, 
Congress in fact reinforced the notion that racial exclusion was the foremost law of the land. 
 Secondly, Congress opened the door only to Chinese wives married before the passage 
of the 1924 Act.   The immediate purpose of the 1930 law was to grant permanent residence to 
some thirty women who had arrived shortly after the enforcement of the 1924 Act and had been 
waiting for relief on bond.  Congress admitted no wives married after 1924 until 1943, when 
Congress repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act as a gesture to China as a wartime ally.   Even then, 
the quota system for Chinese was distinct from that for European immigrants.  For one, 
European immigrants was charged against the quotas of the country of birth, but “Chinese” quota 
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of 105 was a worldwide racial quota that included person born anywhere in the world whose 
either parent was Chinese.69  For another, whereas citizens’ wives from Europe were “non-quota 
family,” every Chinese wife was charged against the quota of 105.  It was only after World War 
II, when a large number of U.S. soldiers married women in China, Japan, Korea, and the 
Philippines that Congress allowed non-Chinese wives from Asia to immigrate to the U.S. under 
the special legislation of the War Brides Act and also accorded non-quota status to Chinese 
wives.70 
 Thirdly, Congress refused to exempt minor children from racial exclusion.  Congress 
only held wives to be an exception to the fundamental rule of exclusion of “aliens ineligible to 
citizenship.” The word “child” must not be included, the Bureau of Immigration insisted, if 
Congress were to exempt certain families of Chinese Americans.  In fact, the gap between 
treatment of “white” children of U.S. citizens and children of Asian-Americans widened further 
since 1924.  As discussed in the previous chapter, for European immigrants the 1928 amendment 
raised the age of eligibility of a non-quota child from eighteen to twenty-one.  By contrast, 
regardless of age, Congress excluded all Chinese children of U.S. citizens, unless the  child had 
acquired U.S. citizenship at birth on the jus sanguinis rule.      
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Taken together, Chang Chan (1925), Weedin v. Chin Bow (1927), and the 1930 
Amendment confirmed that familial relationship did not suffice for persons of Asian descent to 
enter the U.S.  Surely, Weedin v. Chin Bow did not deny U.S. citizenship jus sangunis entirely, 
and foreign-born sons and daughters of U.S. citizens of Chinese descent were still able to 
immigrate to the U.S.  But as the deportation of a non-citizen child of a U.S. citizen suggested, 
immigration to the U.S. was possible not because they were children of U.S. citizens but only by 
virtue of their own U.S. citizenship.  And as the next section examines, following Weedin v. Chin 
Bow, exclusionists would renew their attack on acquisition of citizenship by children of Chinese 
Americans. 
     
2.4 Racial Equality and Discrimination in Equal Nationality Act Debate 
  
 In its 1932 annual report, the Bureau of Immigration reported that since 1924 some 
5,800 Chinese-Americans (including the U.S.-born and the foreign-born) entered the U.S.  The 
bureau emphasized that those citizens claimed 11,878 sons and 944 daughters residing in China 
(total 15,580 sons and 1,048 daughters) who could come to the U.S. sometime in the future as 
foreign-born U.S. citizens.  Describing immigration of citizen-sons as “competition with the 
Anglo-Saxon race,” the bureau emphasized how “the endless chain of citizenship will be 
increased by their own children.”71 (Table 2.2 “U.S. Citizens of Chinese Descent and Chinese 
Wives of U.S. Citizens, 1925-1940” on page 126)   
 After Chin Bow, exclusionists such as the American Federation of Labor shifted their 
attention to nationality law.  Although immigration law could not exclude U.S. citizens, it was 
possible to raise the bar for children of Chinese Americans to acquire and to retain jus sanguinis 
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citizenship by rigid interpretation or revision of nationality law.  And Chin Bow held Chinese 
children of U.S. citizens to be excludable as long as the children were not themselves U.S. 
citizens.  Restriction of jus sanguinis citizenship only needed revision of nationality law, which 
was much easier than a Constitutional amendment to restrict jus soli citizenship.  Revision of 
nationality law would shift contestation at the ports of entry over “paper sons” to a whole 
different level.  Regarding exclusion of wives, the Court ruled in Chang Chan that “neither the 
citizenship of the alleged husband nor the relationship of the applicant to him has been 
investigated, for the reason that, even if it were conceded that both elements exist she would still 
be inadmissible.”72  If veracity of the alleged familial relationship was immaterial to admission – 
if foreign-born children no longer acquired citizenship and were subjected to wholesale 
exclusion – investigation of familial relationship would be entirely unnecessary.    
Exclusionist attempts in the 1930s to further curtail Asian immigration by targeting 
children of Asian Americans have not been fully examined.  For one, exclusionists did not fully 
achieve their objective of denying citizenship jus sanguinis to children of Asian-Americans.  
Instead, as this section will discuss, the amendments to nationality law were written in a 
language that was at surface race-neutral but in practice intended for Asian-Americans. 
Another reason is the significant liberalization of nationality law in 1934 in one aspect: 
equalization of nationality rights between men and women.  The Nationality Act of 1907 was 
based on the idea that nationality of the nuclear family should be based solely on the 
husband/father.  As discussed in the previous chapter, a foreign woman automatically became a 
U.S. citizen upon her marriage to a U.S. citizen husband (marital naturalization) or upon the 
naturalization of her husband.  Marital naturalization was coupled with marital expatriation, 
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which deprived women of her U.S. citizenship upon her marriage to a foreigner.   Abolition of 
both practices by the Cable Act of 1922 created households where the husband and wife held 
different nationalities, which underscored another inequality in nationality rights: citizenship of 
foreign-born children. As before, Congress allowed a foreign-born child to acquire U.S. 
citizenship on the  jus sanguinis rule only when the father was a U.S. citizen.73  After 1922, for 
organizations such as the National Women’s Party, women’s right to transfer one’s nationality to 
children was one of the next reform goals in immigration and nationality-related issues.  And the 
significant achievement in 1934 was that mothers became able to transfer one’s U.S. citizenship 
on jus sanguinis rule. 74          
 However, extension of equal citizenship privileges to women was perceived as a racial 
threat.75  Exclusionists were opposed to citizenship derivation by Chinese-American fathers in 
the first place and furthermore objected to extending the right to mothers.  The AFL pointed to 
Chinese immigration as the principal reason for their opposition to enabling mothers to transfer 
her citizenship:  “There are so many of those Chinese-born American citizens who were brought 
up in China ... This bill, by inserting into the law the words “or mother” leaves exactly the same 
opening for the female as at present exists for the male.”76  Yet, it is hardly surprising that 
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nativists exploited the racial threat, and what is more important is how those in support of 
“equalizing” nationality rights explicitly invoked the racial argument.   
 
Discrimination and Equality: “Discriminates against white American citizens” 
 
Most notable on this score was Samuel Dickstein, the House Immigration and 
Naturalization Committee chair, considered a pro-immigrant Congressman and advocate for 
Southern and Eastern European immigrants. However, in appealing for the need to amend 
nationality law, Dickstein characterized the “inequality of the present law” lay not merely in the 
fact that women could not pass on her U.S. citizenship, but as discrimination against a “white 
child.” And he explicitly resorted to racist argument comparing a child of a “Chinaman” and 
“British.”  During the House discussion, the first reason that he gave for revising the law was 
that white women were being denied the right enjoyed by Chinese-American men.      
To illustrate the inequality of the present law, let us consider on the one hand the case of 
children born out of the United States to a couple, the man being of Chinese ancestry but 
a native-born American citizen and the woman an alien ineligible to citizenship, and on 
the other hand the case of children born out of the Unites States of the union between a 
native-born white woman and a Britisher.  ...  In the case of the Chinaman the children 
arriving at the port of entry ... are admitted as American citizens, whereas the white child 
of the native-born American woman married to the Britisher is held back and is called an 
“alien.”77 
 
A majority of the women’s organizations did not resort to such a racial argument, but Dickstein 
was not an isolated case.  For example, at a 1933 House hearing, a witness from the Business 
Women’s Legislative Council of California emphasized the specific reason for women in 
California to feel the stigma of gender discrimination of not having the right to pass on their 
citizenship.    
We who live in California, and especially in Southern California, have ever with us the 
reminder of the law as regards Japanese and Chinese. ... We feel that this law 
                                                
 
77 78 Cong. Rec. 7329 (1934). 
  113 
discriminates against white American citizens in favor of yellow United States citizens in 
that a Chinese man can bring back his children, while a white woman, a citizen of this 
country, cannot bring back hers.  You are turning away a white child and letting in a 
yellow child.78 
 
It was not simply because women could not transfer her citizenship to her child while  
men could, but the issue was framed as “racial discrimination” that favored “yellow child” of a 
male citizen of Asian descent over a “white child” of a white female citizen.    Deep racism 
against Asian immigrants and Asian-Americans held even by “pro-immigrant” congressman 
such as Dickstein, who strongly opposed any restriction of Eastern and Southern European 
immigrants, encouraged exclusionists such as the AFL to take advantage of the movement to 
revise nationality law to realize their agenda of further restricting immigration from Asia.  
 
Formally Race-neutral but Intended for “Orientals”  
             The “equalization bill” reported out by the House Committee on Immigration and 
Naturalization included a clause that denied jus sanguinis citizenship to children of Asian-
Americans altogether. While appealing for the need to amend the nationality law to equalize 
nationality rights between men and women, Dickstein argued simultaneously that Congress 
should put “a stop to this endless chain” of Chinese immigration by denying jus sangunis 
citizenship to foreign-born children of Asian-American parents.79  Although the explicit racial 
ban was eventually removed from the bill, the legislative battle deserves attention for several 
reasons.  First, it reveals how the actual revisions made in 1934, written in a formally race-
neutral term, were actually intended to reinforce racial exclusion. Second, justification for the 
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explicit racial ban was deeply rooted in the ideas about what constituted racial discrimination, 
which in fact was modeled after how courts had upheld the constitutionality of anti-
miscegenation laws.  
The first 1934 amendment  to the Nationality Law concerned citizenship derivation by 
the third generation. Whereas previous nationality law stated that U.S. citizenship “shall not 
descend to [foreign-born] children whose fathers never resided in the United States,” the 1934 
Nationality Act required that “the citizen father or citizen mother” must have “resided in the 
United States previous to the birth of such child [emphasis added].”  The purpose of this 
amendment was to solidify the Supreme Court ruling Weedin v.Chin Bow (1927) that citizenship 
derivation on jus sanguinis rule required the parent’s residence in the U.S. prior to the birth of 
the child.80 
Secondly, Congress added an entirely new condition on citizenship acquired on jus 
sangunis rule, which applied to any foreign-born child regardless of whether the citizen parent 
was U.S.-born or foreign-born.  The 1934 Act introduced an unprecedented rule that a foreign-
born U.S. citizen would automatically lose one’s citizenship, unless one took up residence in the 
U.S. before a certain age.  Specifically, the law mandated five-year residence in the U.S. 
immediately before one’s eighteenth birthday to retain citizenship acquired on jus sangunis rule.   
In other words, if the parent did not bring the child to the U.S. or send for the child before 
reaching the age of thirteen, the child automatically lost his or her U.S. citizenship.  Subsequent 
nationality laws raised the retention deadline several times, but it remained part of nationality 
law until 1973.81    
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To consider these changes in relation to Chin Bow, the issue contested in the court was 
whether Chin Dun had the power to transfer his U.S. citizenship to his son Chin Bow, whether he 
had to move to the U.S. before his son was born.  What was not contested was Chin Dun’s own 
citizenship, which he derived from his U.S.-born father.  However, the new retention 
requirement questioned Chin Dun’s citizenship as well by pointing to the age that he first moved 
to the U.S., which was twenty-eight.  Under the new law, foreign-born citizen like Chin Dun 
would lose citizenship at thirteen unless they entered the U.S.  The 1934 Act was not retroactive 
and was not meant to deprive Chin Dun himself of his citizenship, but was applied to any 
foreign-born citizen after.  The two amendments were general rules on citizenship derivation that 
were formally race-neutral, but had a radically different meaning for children of European 
descent and children of Asian descent.   For the former, although whether one was a citizen at 
birth was a matter of immense importance, lack of U.S. citizenship at birth or loss of U.S. 
citizenship was still not equal to permanent bar from the U.S.   For one, citizen children from 
Europe qualified for non-quota status until twenty-one, and could become a naturalized U.S. 
citizen after arrival in the U.S.  Also, if born in a country with unfilled quotas, there was a fair 
chance to immigrate to the U.S. after reaching majority by applying for one’s own visa. Neither 
was it possible for children of Asian Americans, for whom lack or loss of U.S. citizenship meant 
permanent exclusion from the U.S. as an alien ineligible to citizenship with no means of 
becoming a citizen again.82 
Moreover, Congress conceded the main target to be Asian-Americans.   According to the 
House Committee, the current clause that “denies citizenship being derived by children born 
abroad whose citizen-father never had lived in the United States” was intended for “Orientals.”  
                                                
 
82 This retention deadline was raised to sixteen in 1940, and the first post-1934 Nationality Act generation 
reached their deadline in 1950. 
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The Committee argued, “The history of this clause of present law indicates a desire to prevent 
Orientals who had themselves acquired citizenship from citizen-fathers but who had never lived 
here, from transmitting citizenship to their children born abroad.”  In fact, the parent’s residency 
requirement had been part of law since the first Nationality Act of 1790 – although until 1934 it 
never stated when such residency must take place – and was originally not intended for Chinese 
immigrants.   But more important was how Congress in the 1930s understood the clause.  And 
most fundamentally, the Committee did “not believe citizenship should be derived by indirection 
through birth when the child would not be able to become a citizen through naturalization 
procedure.”  The real issue was not whether the parent was U.S.-born or foreign-born, where 
they grew up, or at what age they came to the U.S., but race.83  
 
Equality and Discrimination: “Not Discriminatory to Any Race” 
 
The House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization attempted to impose a more 
explicit racial ban on jus sanguinis citizenship, and reported an “equal nationality” bill that 1) 
enabled both fathers and mothers to transfer his or her U.S. citizenship to a foreign-born child 2) 
but only if their spouse was racially eligible for citizenship.84 This motion originated from the 
American Federation of Labor.  The basic position of the AFL was that “the real and proper way 
to equalize the status of men and women in immigration and their offspring” was not by granting 
women the same right as men but by depriving men of the right to transfer one’s citizenship and 
by “denying automatic citizenship to any children born in foreign countries, unless both the 
Father and the Mother are citizens of the United States.”  However, if revision was unavoidable, 
                                                
 
83 Memorandum for H.R. 7673, folder “H.R. 7673, 2 of 3,” box 71, 73A-D11, RG 233.  
84 Beatrice Loftus McKenzie, “American at birth: United States Birthright Citizenship in  Nation and 
Empire, 1866 -1934,” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oregon, 2006), 195-196. 
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the AFL insisted, there should be multiple safeguards especially in order to reduce the number of 
U.S. citizens of Asian descent. 85 
           One purpose of the “spouse must be eligible to citizenship” requirement was to minimize 
the number of children who would derive U.S. citizenship from Asian American mothers as a 
result of extending nationality right to women.86	  But the more obvious target was child of a 
Chinese-American father and a Chinese mother.  The number of Chinese-American women 
marrying outside the U.S. was much smaller than Chinese-American men, and it was an attempt 
to reduce both the Chinese population in the U.S. and U.S. citizens of Chinese descent. 87    
Despite the gradual increase of women - 66,856 men and 4,675 women in 1910 to 59,802 men to 
15,152 women in 1930 – the Chinese population was still overwhelmingly male, and the chance 
for Chinese-American men to find a Chinese spouse in the U.S. was small, which was the main 
point raised by Chinese American organizations that lobbied against the exclusion of wives.88  
New immigration of women was difficult for two reasons.  For one, the 1924 Act and Chang 
Chan (1925) barred immigration of wives except for those married before 1924 (1930 
Amendment).  For another, since Chinese-American fathers had rarely reported birth of 
daughters in the past, there were few spots reserved for women to immigrate as daughters of U.S. 
citizens.  These factors limited the number of future U.S.-born children.  And the proposal to 
restrict jus sanguinis citizenship would make any children born outside the U.S. an alien 
                                                
 
85 William C. Hushing, Legislative Representative, American Federation of Labor, to House Committee 
on Immigration and Naturalization, April 3, 1933,  folder “H.R. 3673, 5 of 6,” box 72, 73A-D11, RG 233. 
86 The Cable Act of 1922 abolished the practice of marital expatriation only for women married to a white 
husband but not for women married to a husband “ineligible to citizenship.”  It was not until 1931 that a 
woman could retain her U.S. citizenship after marriage to a husband who was racially ineligible to 
citizenship.   Gardner, The Qualities of a Citizen, 140-147. 
87 For marriage pattern of Chinese-American women, Huping Ling, “Family and Marriage of Late-
Nineteenth and Early-Twentieth Century Chinese Immigrant Women,” Journal of American Ethnic 
History 19, no. 2 (2000): 43–63. 
88 Lee, At America’s Gates, 114-116. 
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ineligible to citizenship, which would not only make him / her excludable under the 1924 Act 
and Weedin v. Chin Bow but stop U.S. citizenship descending to the next generation.     
Notably, the Committee described this exclusionist scheme as only a minor change from 
the existing nationality law.  According to the committee, the proposal that “denies derivation of 
citizenship from a citizen-parent when the other parent is an alien ineligible to citizenship” was 
“simply ... a provision stopping such citizenship derivation in the second generation, instead of in 
the third generation as in the case under the present provision of the law.”89  It should be noted 
here that the existing rule on third-generation citizenship derivation was written in a formally 
race neutral language, but the committee linked it to the notion that Asians were not part of the 
U.S. polity, and claimed that the proposal was only making more explicit reference to race.   
Revision of nationality law was the next step to complete exclusion of “aliens ineligible to 
citizenship” under the 1924 Act.   
 When this motion became known, Chinese-American organizations filed a strong protest.  
The Oakland Lodge of Chinese American Citizens Alliance questioned how the bill that 
“originated to establish equality between male and female citizens in the matter of equality” was 
transformed into a bill that would bring “injustice to American citizens of Chinese race.”90 The 
same was true of Japanese American organizations. The Seattle chapter of the Japanese 
American Citizens League, founded in 1929 as the U.S.-born second-generation came of age, 
protested that the “proposal would restrict consideration of American citizens of Japanese 
                                                
 
89 Memorandum for H.R. 7673, folder “H.R. 7673, 2 of 3,” box 71, 73A-D11, RG 233.  
90 Oakland Lodge of Chinese American Citizens Alliance, to Samuel Dickstein, April 14, 1934; folder 
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ancestry as equally franchised citizens of this country and rights of citizens should not be 
measured by reason of race.” 91    
  The justification offered by the House Committee Chair Samuel Dickstein, not only 
highlights the stark racial boundary drawn between white and non-white citizens and immigrants 
but also reveals the idea about what constituted racial discrimination.  During the 1924 debate, 
“anti-restrictionists” such as Adolph Sabath and Samuel Dickstein expressed wholehearted 
support for exclusion of Japanese immigrants and made it clear that they were only against 
restriction of Southern and Eastern European immigrants.  On two levels, Dickstein linked racial 
bar to naturalization, the 1924 exclusion, and racial restriction on jus sanguinis citizenship.  Most 
fundamentally, all three were based on the idea that persons of Asian descent were not part of the 
American society.  And even more revealing was the idea that none of this constituted racial 
discrimination.92                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
First, Dickstein praised the bill as a progress for all female citizens.  He emphasized that 
currently no woman had the right to transfer her citizenship on jus sanguinis rule, and despite the 
condition that her husband must be racially eligible to citizenship, it would be a “progressive step” 
from having no rights to having certain rights.93  Deeply flawed as it was, the argument that 
citizens would acquire new rights certainly did not apply to Asian-American men.  As the 
                                                
 
91 George Ishihara, Seattle Progressive Citizens League (Seattle chapter of the Japanese American 
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Chinese Y.W.C.A. of San Francisco wrote to Dickstein, “it does away the present rights of men 
citizens of Chinese descent and discriminates against women citizens of Chinese descent.”94  
Nevertheless, Dickstein insisted that deprivation of nationality rights from Asian-
American men would not constitute discrimination.  He insisted that a whether a law was 
restrictive and whether it was discriminatory were separate issues, and argued that the proposal 
was equal for both men and women and not discriminatory against any race.95   First, he depicted 
the bill was equal in terms of gender, because both male and female citizens had to meet the 
condition that their spouse must be eligible to citizenship.  It was “progressive” for women and 
“regressive” for men, the committee insisted, but nonetheless the equal condition applied to both 
men and women.  
The primary measure of racial discrimination, according to Dickstein, was whether the 
law referred to the race of a U.S. citizen.  Dickstein summarily considered racial discrimination 
against a foreign national as an acceptable exercise of the sovereignty of the United States.  He 
argued that neither the 1924 Act nor the proposed racial ban on jus sanguinis citizenship spoke 
of the race of a U.S. citizen.  As an immigration law, the 1924 Act excluded “aliens” not U.S. 
citizens.   Likewise, he argued, the proposed nationality bill spoke of the race of the non-citizen 
spouse/parent but not of the race of the U.S. citizen parent.96   Still, Dickstein conceded that 
exclusion of wives under the 1924 Act and the proposed restriction on citizenship derivation 
concerned citizen with a wife ineligible to citizenship.  The argument that neither had to do with 
U.S. citizens contradicted Dickstein’s own advocacy for Southern and Eastern European 
immigrants that admission of families was about the interests of U.S. citizens and residents rather 
                                                
 
94 Chinese Y.W.C.A.of San Francisco, Executive Committee, to Samuel Dickstein, April 12, 1934; folder 
“H.R. 7673, 2 of 3,” box 71, 73A-D11, RG 233. 
95 Memorandum for H.R. 7673, folder “H.R. 7673, 2 of 3,” box 71, 73A-D11, RG 233.  
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than about admission of foreigners.  What Dickstein ultimately drew on was the argument that 
restrictive legislation was not racially discriminatory as long as it formally applied to all citizens.  
Drawing an example of “a white man who may marry a Chinese girl in China,” Dickstein argued 
that both the 1924 Act and racial restriction on citizenship derivation applied to “white” citizens 
married to an “alien ineligible to citizenship,” and therefore was not discriminatory against 
citizens of Asian descent in particular.97   
In fact, this line of justification was grounded in how courts upheld the constitutionality 
of anti-miscegenation laws since the late 19th century.  For instance, in 1921, the Oregon 
Supreme Court ruled that prohibition of marriage between “white” persons and “Indians” was 
constitutional, because the law applied to “all persons, either white, negroes, Chinese, Kanaka, or 
Indian.”98 Although legally sustainable at the time, such logic conveniently ignored that the 
number of “a white man who may marry a Chinese girl in China” was incomparable to Chinese-
Americans with a wife in China, as well as the fact that the former was not the primary target.  
Together with the argument that one reason for equalizing nationality law was to end 
discrimination against “white women” with “white children” in favor of “yellow children,” in the 
name of equality Dickstein sought to deprive Asian-Americans of the right to transfer their U.S. 
citizenship.    
The House eventually defeated the explicit racial bar on jus sanguinis citizenship, but the 
opposition was grounded no less in racist ideas but in anxiety about inter-racial marriage.  The 
opposition argued that restriction of jus sangunis citizenship on top of the existing exclusion of 
Chinese wives would potentially Chinese-American men to seek for a non-Chinese wife in the 
U.S.  A Congressman from Oregon insisted, “We do not want him [a male Chinese or Japanese 
                                                
 
97 78 Cong. Rec. 7330 (1934); McKenzie, “American at Birth,” 199. 
98  Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883); Pascoe, What Comes Naturally, 108. 
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citizen] to marry an American woman” by denying jus sangunis citizenship in addition to 
excluding wives.  Here, the word “American woman” was synonymous with “white woman.”   
“A male Chinese or Japanese citizen in California who goes to China and there marries a native 
wife” was “exactly what we want him to do.” 99  As in California, it was not legally possible for 
Chinese or Japanese to marry “white” women in Oregon. Oregon’s marriage law defined anyone 
with one Chinese grandparent as “Chinese” and barred him / her from marrying a white 
person.100  Most recently, in 1933 California extended its longstanding bar since 1880 against 
marriage between “Mongolians” and white to include Filipinos by adding the word “Malay” 
after the court ruled that “Mongolians” did not include Filipinos.  Fear of marriage between 
Asian men and white women ran deeply, and it was not the immediate possibility but the 
potential challenge against such racial order.101  The idea that absolute exclusion may not be the 
best course to pursue was similar to how the Bureau of Immigration expected that admission of 
wives may reduce citizenship claims by foreign-born sons.  
The notion that one parent being an “alien ineligible to citizenship” would also make the 
child “alien ineligible to citizenship” did not find its way in nationality law.  But it was 
resurfaced in immigration law in the post-exclusion era.  Upon the repeal of Chinese exclusion in 
1943, Congress defined anyone with one Chinese parent as “Chinese.”  And regardless of which 
                                                
 
 99 78 Cong. Rec. 7349 (1934) 
100 Peggy Nagae, “Asian Women: Immigration and Citizenship in Oregon,” Oregon Historical Quarterly 
113 no. 3 (2012): 334–359. 
101Constantine Panunzio, “Intermarriage in Los Angeles, 1924-1933,” American Journal of Sociology 47, 
no. 5 (1942): 690–701; Pascoe, What Comes Naturally, 154-159; For representation of Filipinos in 
California as male-dominated group that poses threats to the racial order by dating “white girls,” Ngai, 
Impossible Subjects, 109-116; For animosity among Japanese immigrants against intermarriage with 
Filipinos, Eiichiro Azuma, Between Two Empires: Race, History, and Transnationalism in Japanese 
America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 188-193; For dating outside ethnic groups, Allison 
Varzally, “Romantic Crossings: Making Love, Family, and Non-Whiteness in California, 1925-1950.” 
Journal of American Ethnic History 23, no. 1 (2003): 3-54. 
  123 
part of the world one was born in, a “Chinese” immigrant was charged against the worldwide 
“Chinese” quota of mere 105.  When Congress subsequently abolished wholesale exclusion of 
other Asian immigrants, the same method of quota restriction was applied until 1965: a person 
whose either parent was of Asian descent was charged against the quotas against the country and 
region of ancestry (“Asia-Pacific Triangle”), regardless of one’s own place of birth.  
The 1957 Supreme Court case of Lee You Fee’s citizenship was a legacy of racial 
exclusion.  Lee You Fee was born in China in July 1935, and had been raised in Hong Kong 
since 1936.   His father Lee Q. Pon was a Chinese-born U.S. citizen, who derived his citizenship 
from his U.S.-born father.  Since Lee You Fee was born after the 1934 Nationality Act took 
effect, he was subjected to the retention deadline and lost his U.S. citizenship in 1951 at the age 
of sixteen.  Lew You Fee was now subjected to a racial quota of 105 established after the repeal 
of exclusion in 1943, against which all immigrants of Chinese descent regardless of which part 
of the world they were born in were charged.   When the retention deadline was later raised, the 
family brought the case to the federal court, but it took seven years for the family to recover Lee 
You Fee’s citizenship.102 
  In the late 1920s, unlike in the case of European immigrants, questions such as whether 
family rights should accompany “immigrant” or “permanent resident” status instead of formal 
citizenship did not arise at all, since after 1924 “immigrant” and “permanent resident” status 
itself was not available for persons of Asian descent, except for pre-1924 immigrants.  The 
struggle was whether U.S. citizenship mattered at all for the purpose of family immigration, with 
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Act went into effect, they had not when Congressional Committees first proposed to raise the maximum 
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acquisition of citizenship itself being challenged.   And the fact that criticizers of the national 
origins quotas system and advocate for Southern and Eastern Europeans such as Dickstein 
heartily supported exclusion of Asian immigrants, denying any racial discrimination, pointed to 
the deep racial boundary drawn between white families and non-white families.   In the case of 
immigrants from Europe, despite the hierarchization among them, the claims of citizens and 
residents could trump immigration restriction as a matter of sovereignty controlling entry of 
foreigners.  In the case of “aliens ineligible to citizenship,” any claim of citizens and residents 
was superseded by the notion that exclusion of families was a matter of restricting entry of 
“aliens.”      
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Tables and Figures for Chapter 2 










Wives of U.S. 
Citizens 
1906  No data 915 7 
1907  No data 929 23 
1908  “few” 1,220 37 
1909 1,417 1,113 2,530 98 
1910 1,328 781 2,109 110 
1911 1,412 173 1,585 80 
1912 1,396 258 1,654  88 
1913 1,553 495 2,048  126 
1914 1,373 725 2,098  122 
1915 1,196 794 1,990  106 
1916 1,202 818 2,020  108 
1917 1,184 905 2,089 115 
1918 735 331 1,066 132 
1919 756 260 1,016 91 
1920 1,038 843 1,881 141 
1921 1,426 2,067 3,493 290 
1922 1,938 2,292 4,230 396 
1923 2,539 2,399 4,938 387 
1924 2,795 2,136 4,931 396 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor, Annual Report of the Commissioner General of 
Immigration 1906-1907, table 2 “Chinese Seeking Admission to the United States”; Annual Report 1908, 
table 6 “Native-born Chinese”; Annual Report 1909 - 1912, table 3 “Chinese Claiming American 
Citizenship”; Annual Report Table 3 “Chinese Claiming American Citizenship by Birth, or to be the 
Wives or Children of American Citizens.”  
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2-2: U.S. Citizens of Chinese Descent and Chinese Wives of U.S. Citizens, 1925-1941  
Fiscal Year Returning Citizens 
(U.S.-born and 
Foreign-born living 




Arriving for the 
First Time)  
Total U.S. 
Citizens 
Wives of U.S. 
Citizens 
1925 No data No Data 3,023 Excluded 
1926 No data No Data 2,396 Excluded 
1927 No data No Data 3,176 Excluded 
1928 No data No Data 3,276 Excluded 
1929 No data No Data 3,534 Excluded 
1930 No data No Data 3,220 Excluded 
1931 No data No Data 3,584 19 
1932 2,384 868 3,252 99 
1933 2,054 731 2,785 43 
1934 2,421 476 2,897 19 
1935 2,651 643 3,294 41 
1936 2,437 874 3,311 38 
1937 2,366 1,132 3,498 55 
1938 3,606 1,790 5,396 82 
1939 2,301 2,027 4,328 112 
1940 1,316 2,035 3,351 99 
1941  1,211 1,436 2,647 66 
Source: United States Department of Labor, Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration 
1925 (Washington D.C.:G.P.O., 1925), 179; Annual Report 1926, 161; Annual Report 1927, 182; Annual 
Report 1928, 182; Annual Report 1929, 176; Annual Report 1930, 192; Annual Report 1931, 210; Annual 
Report 1932, 192;  
United States Department of Labor, Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor 1933 (Washington D.C.: 
G.P.O., 1925), 59; Annual Report 1934, 67; Annual Report 1935, 87; Annual Report 1936, 97; Annual 
Report 1937, 88; Annual Report 1938, 104; Annual Report 1939, 100; Annual Report 1940, 112;  
United States Department of Justice, Annual Report of the Attorney General 1941 (Washington 
D.C.:G.P.O., 1941), 233-234.  
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 Part II.  Families Formed in the U.S. 
 
 In January 1931, Secretary of Labor William Doak announced that as a partial solution to 
unemployment due to the worsening Great Depression, the Bureau of Immigration planned to 
deport 100,000 immigrants within the next couple of years.  Doak claimed that 400,000 
immigrants were residing unlawfully in the U.S., and that although 300,000 were no longer 
deportable due to statute of limitations, 100,000 were still deportable.  Voicing support for the 
plan, Washington Post wrote that “an emergency act excluding all immigration this year would 
not relieve the unemployment situation nearly so much as would deportation of all foreigners 
who are unlawfully in the United States.”103 
On February 15, in New York City, immigration and police officers raided the dance 
party of the Finnish Worker’s Education Association on Fifth Avenue, and questioned more than 
700 people gathered there.104 On February 26, in Los Angeles, immigration officers raided the 
La Placita and apprehended 400 Mexicans.105  Doak’s deportation drive across the continent 
invited very different responses.  The raid in Los Angeles was hailed by local officials, and 
prompted a repatriation campaign in various localities in the West and the Midwest targeting 
Mexican and Mexican American families.   On the other hand, deportation campaign in cities 
with large European immigrant population such as New York prompted a reform movement that 
questioned not only Doak’s deportation drive but the harshness of immigration law and 
deportation law.    
                                                
 
103 “400,000 Aliens in U.S. Illegally, Doak Estimates,” New York Herald Tribune, January 6, 1931. 
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The following two chapters examine how immigrants facing deportation made claims of 
family ties as a yoke to remain in the U.S.  Chapter 3 discusses Mexican American repatriation 
as a specifically family-targeted repatriation.   Looking also at nationality law, the chapter 
examines the consequence of Mexican American repatriation across generations, involving 
Mexican immigrants, their families born or formed in the U.S., and families formed in Mexico 
after repatriation, and their struggles to return to the U.S. in the 1940s and the 1950s. 
Chapter 4 examines the deportation reform movement that immigrant aid agencies based 
in New York and the Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins engaged in during the 1930s, which 
created a system that gave certain consideration to deportees with U.S. citizen and permanent 
resident families.   It will consider how the movement ultimately failed to question the 
foundation of numerical immigration restriction.  It will also discuss how Congress in the 1940s 
and the 1950s explicitly excluded Mexican immigrants from the system, refusing to recognize 
any family hardship of Mexican families, which was part of the attempt to recruit Mexican 
workers on temporary basis without permanent residency.
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Chapter 3: Mexican-American Repatriation: Across Generations 
 
 In September 1956, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) ruled that Alberto Martínez 
[pseudonym] should be deported to Mexico for having entered the U.S. without inspection or a 
visa.   Born in Huanuzco, Zacatecas in 1935, he first came to the U.S. with his parents in 1946 at 
the age of eleven. He was deported to Mexico six years later, but reentered the U.S. the 
following day and lived in the U.S. for another four years until he was apprehended again.  The 
question raised before the BIA in 1956 was whether he was actually a U.S. citizen.   His birth in 
Mexico was undisputed, and the issue was the birthplace of his mother.  While his father was 
Mexican, his mother claimed to be a U.S.-born citizen, in which case Alberto Martínez was also 
a U.S. citizen at birth and not subject to deportation.1    
Alberto Martínez’s mother was one of the Great Depression repatriates.  At the age of 
around ten, she left the U.S. with her parents and five younger siblings in 1931, the peak year of 
repatriation.   Between 1929 and 1940, half to one million persons of Mexican descent left the 
U.S. through federal deportation, voluntary departure, and repatriation. 2   Many were mixed 
status families, and Francisco E. Balderrama and Raymond Rodriguez estimate that as many as 
60 percent may have been U.S. citizens who accompanied their spouse or parents to Mexico.3   
The repatriation program of Mexican immigrants was specifically pointed to expel people 
of Mexican-descent who were not only legal residents but also families including U.S. citizens.  
Far from hardly making any effort to distinguish immigrants and U.S. citizens, the campaigns 
                                                
 
1 Matter of A-M-, 7 I&N Dec. 332 (BIA 1956). 
2 The figure of 500,000 –Abraham Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans in the Great Depression: 
Repatriation Pressures, 1929-1939 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1974), Camille Guerin-
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Labor, 1900-1939  (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1996), 8; Francisco E. Balderrama and 
Raymond Rodriguez estimates that at least 1,000,000 repatriated to Mexico.  Decade of Betrayal: 
Mexican Repatriation in the 1930s (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2006). 
3 Balderrama and Rodriguez, Decade of Betrayal, 266.  
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carried out by local governments often claimed that repatriation of families was the whole 
purpose.  Paying attention to nationality laws, this chapter will argue that repatriation was not 
only about the immediate generation that experienced the repatriation but also the future 
generation of derivative citizens born in Mexico.  The latter half of the chapter examines how the 
former repatriates and their families navigated through the web of immigration and nationality 
laws, as the U.S. government cast suspicion on their claims as illegitimate and often as 
unauthorized immigrants.   
 
3.1 Administrative Restriction to Repatriation 
 
In 1934, Cleofas Calleros, the director of the National Catholic Welfare Conference’s El 
Paso / Juarez office argued at a meeting of the Texas State Committee on Mexican Problems that 
the state should not repeat the mistake that Los Angeles and other counties in California had 
made in launching repatriation campaign for Mexicans and Mexican Americans because they 
“just wanted to get rid of person of Mexican descent regardless of their condition in life or 
anything else.”  Several cities and counties in Texas had already undertaken similar programs, 
and Calleros condemned that at the heart of the thinking that “it would be a good idea to 
repatriate Mexican descent persons back to Mexico” is a “race prejudice” in Texas that “prevails 
in every community referring to Mexicans as Mexicans and also referring to them as people of 
another color.”  Pointing to a series of Congressional hearings over the past decade to impose 
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quotas restriction on Mexico, he argued that the testimonies gave “a very clear picture of what 
most communities think of so called ‘Mexicans’ ...  as something to be exploited.”4 
The Immigration Act of 1924 categorically placed natives of independent countries of the 
Western Hemisphere outside the quotas restriction system.  This regional non-quota status 
continued until January 1, 1968, when the Immigration Act of 1965 imposed a prefixed 
numerical limitation on immigration from the Western Hemisphere for the first time.  Since there 
was no formal ceiling before 1968, absent was the system of numerical preference, family or 
otherwise.   It was not until 1976 when Congress imposed a numerical ceiling on all countries of 
the Western Hemisphere that family-based admission became operative in the Western 
Hemisphere. 
 However, lack of formal quota for Mexico was grounded in entirely different reasoning 
from why Congress accorded the largest share of quotas to immigrants from Britain. In the late 
1920s, various bills to impose a quota on Mexico were introduced, and six hearings were held 
between 1925 and 1930. 5  The most vocal proponent of  a Mexico quota was John C. Box (D-
Texas), congressman from eastern Texas.  He insisted on applying the 2 percent of 1890 census 
formula, which would have assigned the quota of only 1,500 to Mexico.  Box’s proposal had 
strong support of the Department of Labor, labor unions, and nativist organizations.6   
                                                
 
4 Neil Foley argues that in Texas, whiteness was defines as “not only black but also not Mexican.”  Neil 
Foley, The White Scourge: Mexicans, Blacks, and Poor Whites in Texas Cotton Culture, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1997), 5. 
 5 In 1930, the Senate passed a bill imposing a quota specifically on Mexico but not on other countries in 
the Western Hemisphere such as Canada.   The House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization also 
passed the bill, but Hoover and the Department of State intervened out of diplomatic concern.  Mark 
Reisler, By the Sweat of Their Brow: Mexican Immigrant Labor in the United States, 1900-1940 
(Westport, Conn: Greenwood, Press, 1976), 217-218; Lawrence A. Cardoso, Mexican Emigration to the 
United States, 1897-1931: Socio-economic Patterns (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1980), 141. 
6 Reisler, Sweat of their Brow, 202, 207. 
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 The attempt to impose quota on Mexico was persistent since before 1924.7   Unlike 
Japanese exclusion, nativist forces in the West were divided on the issue, since their states relied 
heavily on Mexican labor.  For example, the California State Grange insisted that the 
organization was not contradicting itself in demanding exclusion of Japanese immigrants on the 
one hand and advocating for the need for Mexican labor, because the former wanted to “become 
an independent land owner or merchant in competition with the American White,” among 
Mexicans “such trait has not yet been developed.”8  In 1924, pro-quota nativists such as Albert 
Johnson prioritized exclusion of Japanese immigrants, and placed restriction of Mexican 
immigrants as the next target, once Southern and Eastern European immigrants were restricted 
and Japanese immigrants were excluded.9   
  Quota restrictions on Europe made immigration from Mexico more notable in the late 
1920s.   In 1921, immigration from Mexico comprised 3.7 percent of total immigration to the 
U.S. (29,603 / 805,228), but the percentage rose to 19.9 percent in 1927 (Mexico 66,766 / total 
335,175).10  In 1926, the Bureau of Immigration, which advocated for placing Mexico on quotas 
base, created a new section titled “Mexican Immigration” in its annual report.  And the 1928 
report emphasized the growing importance of Western Hemisphere immigration: “If the 
expressions ‘Ellis Island’ and ‘Immigration’ were not synonymous, one could hardly think of the 
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one without thinking of the other … Ellis Island has lost its proud place in the general 
immigration scheme … A great change has been taking place along our borders; steadily are they 
approaching a place of first importance.11  Those emphasizing great increase in Mexican 
immigration often claimed that due to unauthorized immigration without a visa, the actual 
volume of immigration was larger than recorded by the immigration bureau.12 
     Arguments made both for and against quota restriction on Mexico displayed deep racism, 
both pointing to alleged “racial difference” of Mexicans as the reason why quota was either 
necessary or unnecessary. The Bureau of Immigration insisted that “permitting the unlimited 
flow of immigrants from this hemisphere” was not justified because the primary objective of 
1924 Act was obviously “to bring to our shores in reasonable numbers the races and peoples 
from which we are descendants.”   Entirely excluded from the collective “we” were not only 
immigrants from Mexico but people that had lived in the Southwest since before the region was 
seceded to the U.S. by the Mexican War.13  While all the independent countries of the Western 
Hemisphere were non-quota countries, the target was Mexico.   Few proposed that immigration 
from Canada should be restricted.     
    In Passing of the Great Race, Madison Grant pointed to Mexico as the archetype of “the 
Melting Pot” that he disdained: “the absorption of the blood of the original Spanish conquerors 
by the native Indian population has produced the racial mixture which we call Mexican and 
which is now engaged in demonstrating its incapacity.”14  In 1927, Grant and forty-four 
prominent scholars including the Harvard President Lawrence Lowell and University of 
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Michigan President Leon Little issued a joint statement urging Congress to impose an 
immigration ceiling on Mexico and the West Indies, arguing that they were not “white.”15  
    For the first time, the 1930 Census classified “Mexican” as a “race” separate from 
“white.”16 Although persons of Mexican descent had been eligible for naturalization since the 
Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, extreme nativists such as the California Joint Immigration 
Committee, the leading force behind Japanese exclusion, engaged in a campaign to make 
Mexicans racially ineligible to naturalization and to exclude them from the U.S., although this 
attempt did not succeed.17 
 The anti-quota camp also exploited “race” in several ways, and argued that “racial 
difference” was precisely why quota restriction was unnecessary.  Business such as farm 
organizations in the Southwest and the Midwest, railroad companies, as well as the Department 
of State were firmly against quota restriction.18  The strongest opposition arose from farming 
organizations, which feared that a formal quota would cut off supply of Mexican laborers.  
According to a survey in California, 67 percent of the farm owners responded that quota on 
Mexico would have a negative effect on farming, and half of 130 witnesses that testified at 1925-
1930 hearings represented agricultural organizations.19   Instead of denying the alleged racial 
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difference between “Mexican” and “white,” the most common argument made on behalf of 
business interest was that white workers were not physically suited to perform the type of labor 
done by Mexican workers, which “naturally” divided the labor market.20   
 Business interests coupled this argument with the claim that Mexicans were only 
temporarily in the U.S. and that their legal status as an “immigrant” was only a matter of 
classification under immigration law but not a social reality.21  Those opposed to quota 
restriction made a case that quota restriction was only necessary for those with the intention to 
settle in the U.S.   Moreover, anti-quota advocates often disposed of “race” as irrelevant insisting 
that racial composition of the U.S. would not be altered because Mexicans were not permanent 
members of the U.S.   For instance, John Nance Garner, a Texan Democrat and the Vice 
President of Franklin D. Roosevelt, insisted that “80%” of the Mexicans were temporary workers 
although their legal status was that of an immigrant / permanent resident.22   However, when the 
Depression struck, anti-quota advocates such as Senator Carl Hayden of Arizona, who had been 
arguing against quota restriction for the need of labor instead of recognizing Mexican 
immigrants as part of the American society, quickly reversed their position, now calling for 
deportation and repatriation of Mexican and Mexican American families.23 
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Great Depression 
In 1928, before the Great Depression struck, the State Department had started to curtail 
immigration from Mexico.   In lieu of quota restrictions applied to Europe, the Department of 
State devised a method of administrative restriction by rejecting immigrant visa applications on 
the grounds that the applicants were “likely to become a public charge.”   Out of diplomatic 
concerns, the Department of State was opposed to formal quota restriction, especially to the 
proposal to single out Mexico among countries of the Western Hemisphere, since immigration 
from other countries in the Western Hemisphere were not really an issue. The aim of 
administrative visa restriction was to show to Congress that immigration from Mexico could be 
regulated by means other than fixing a quota.  This policy was reinforced under the Great 
Depression, and as discussed in chapter 1, was extended to immigration from Europe.24 
Immediately after taking office in December 1930, Secretary of Labor William Doak 
declared that he would deport 100,000 immigrants in order to provide jobs for “Americans.”  
Raids and massive deportation shook Mexican communities. Deportation of Mexicans were 
supported by many organizations including the American Federation of Labor and patriotic 
organization such as the American Legion, which argued that deportation created more jobs for 
“real Americans.”25  The most infamous was the La Placita raid in Los Angeles on February 26, 
1931, where the immigration officials apprehended four hundred Mexicans.   Immigration agents 
gathered not only from Los Angeles but also from other districts, and the bureau publicized the 
raids beforehand in order to raise fear among Mexican immigrants as well as among Mexican-
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Americans.  More than apprehension, the primary purpose was to scare away both lawful and 
unlawful residents from the U.S. 
The Bureau of Immigration publicly acknowledged that formal status was of little 
concern, and that their primary interest was to pressure Mexican immigrants to leave the U.S. 
“voluntarily.” The basic position of the immigration bureau was that the more Mexicans left the 
U.S., the more jobs would be created for “Americans.”  Commissioner of Immigration Hurry E. 
Hull testified before Congress: “You go into a city and arrest 8 or 10 that are illegally there, and 
they immediately begin to pack up and get into cars and go out.  A good many of them probably 
could have stayed if they knew their situation, but the bulk of them are illegally here, and they 
are afraid of being arrested.”26 Whether “they could have stayed” had they fully understood or 
been informed of their rights was of little concern to the immigration bureau. 
As the next chapter discusses, this marked a contrast with deportation campaign against 
European immigrants.  Surely William Doak declared that he was “going after every evader of 
our alien laws, regardless of nationality, creed or color, because I hold to the belief that persons 
who have no right to be here should give their places to Americans.”27  The Department of Labor 
pointed to seamen jumping ship as the most common form of illegal entry by European nationals, 
claiming that some 180,000 had deserted the ships during the 1920s to evade quota restrictions.28  
But the Department of Labor or the Bureau of Immigration never associated any certain 
nationality from Europe with illegal entry.  Nor did the agency acknowledge that the officers 
were engaging in scare tactics to induce emigration regardless of whether they were entitled to 
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remain in the U.S., but emphasized that they were following legal procedures, aside from the 
point whether that was true.29 
In February 1931, in addition to deporting and making immigrants “voluntarily depart” 
from the U.S. the Department of Labor began to repatriate immigrants without any immigration 
offense.   The same month as the Placita Raid, Doak issued an order to repatriate Mexican 
immigrants under section 23 of the Immigration Act of 1917.  The section provided that the 
Commissioner General of Immigration may “enter into contract for the support and relief of such 
aliens as may fall into distress or need public aid, and to remove to their native country.”30   
Doak found this clause seriously limiting for his purpose of “relieving the various 
communities throughout the county of their care” and “removing them from the competition in 
the labor market.”  The 1917 Act limited repatriation to residents with less than three years in the 
U.S.   The act recognized the tie immigrants built with the U.S., but it was immigrants with long 
residence in U.S. that Doak wanted to remove.  Above all, short-term residents were not eligible 
for relief.   For example, California did not provide relief to those with less than three-year 
residence in the state.  Although it was legally possible for the federal government to repatriate 
such persons, neither were they on relief, so there were no “savings” to state or local 
governments. 31   When one county in California approached the Immigration Bureau to inquire 
whether 3,500 would be repatriable under the 1917 Act, the bureau found that only “one out of 
the 3,500” had been in the U.S. for less than three years.   In addition to urging Congress to think 
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of repatriation as an “investment” that would save federal relief spending in the long run, far 
from seeing length of residency and formation of families in the U.S. as ties that Mexican 
immigrants have built in the U.S.Doak insisted that “it was essential and proper” to remove the 
statute of limitations.32  
Deportation or federal repatriation composed only fraction of the campaign to remove 
Mexicans and Mexican-Americans.   More numerous were repatriation program by local 
governments and agencies.  As the Great Depression hit its lowest point in 1932, the number of 
cities engaging in repatriation campaign to send away Mexican families increased.  Campaigns 
took a more forceful turn to pressuring Mexicans to accept repatriation than to receive relief.33  
The most infamous was Los Angeles.  Los Angeles County repatriated 13,332 persons to Mexico 
between March 1931 and April 1934.  The Los Angeles Department of Charities described the 
“problem” for the county was that “We not only have had to take care of a great number of 
Mexican indigents, and not only had them competing with our own citizens for whatever jobs did 
appear, but they are continually increasing the size of their colony by their very rapid birth 
rate.”34  Such statement exemplified the double bind applied to Mexican immigrants and 
Mexican Americans, accusing the unemployed of receiving public relief and accusing the 
employed of competing for a job with “our own citizens.”  The distinction between “Mexican” 
and “our own citizens” did not refer to the actual citizenship status.  Local officials often spoke 
of how much relief fund they could save in the long run by paying for repatriation.  But as 
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historian Camille Guerin-Gonzales has shown, the amount of alleged savings cited by local 
officials included relief provided for U.S. citizens of Mexican descent.35 
Many cities followed suit, not only in the Southwest but in industrial cities in the 
Midwest such as Gary, Chicago, Detroit.  And like Los Angeles, they often first requested the 
Bureau of Immigration to deport Mexican immigrants.  For example, in East Chicago, Indiana, 
the American Legion took the lead in forming a repatriation committee in September 1931.   
Before doing so, the American Legion first contacted Secretary Doak to deport Mexican 
immigrants but the immigration bureau found few had any immigration offense.36  The Legion 
promoted a similar program in Gary, Indiana, setting up a committee specifically for the purpose 
of sending away Mexican immigrant families.37  In October 1931, the Detroit Department of 
Public Welfare set up a “Mexican Bureau,” with an instruction that “any Mexican applying for 
relief should be transferred to the Mexican Bureau for transport” to Mexico.38  
 
3.2 Family-Targeted Repatriation: Across Generations 
 Contemporaries were more than aware that what was called “repatriation” included a 
large number of U.S. citizens for whom the U.S. was the homeland.  Localities did not only 
direct its efforts at temporary immigrant workers but looked to settled immigrants and Mexican 
Americans. The INS and local officials were interested in removing mixed-status families with 
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U.S. citizens.  They believed that repatriation would not serve its purpose unless the entire family 
departed from the U.S., and the issue was how to ensure that immigrants would not leave their 
citizen families. 
Repatriation was not without critics.  For example, the National Catholic Welfare 
Conference’s Bureau of Immigration wrote to the Texas Relief Commission condemning that it 
was a “serious mistake” to send off “American citizens by simply giving them a ticket to go back 
to their former home in Mexico (a home which never existed)” as well as “many alien fathers 
and mothers who had several United States born children.”  And regardless of their citizenship 
status, the organization argued, “the idea of repatriating people just to get rid of them in that it 
might be cheaper to advance two or three months budget money to pay transportation to the 
border” was wrong.39  
But the nativists who boasted Mexican repatriation as a success did not hesitate to 
acknowledge that the “repatriates” included U.S. citizens, but moreover emphasized that was the 
whole point.  Speaking of “continually increasing the size of their colony by their very rapid 
birth rate,” Los Angeles county officials argued that the purpose of Mexican repatriation 
campaign was the removal of families.  For instance, at a 1933 Congressional hearing on Filipino 
repatriation program, the only other repatriation campaign targeting specific ethnic group, Rex 
Thomson of the Los Angeles Department of Charities emphasized that the purpose of Mexican 
repatriation was to remove families with U.S. born children.  Thomson appealed the efficiency of 
the county’s repatriation program that by paying “$15 [per person] to send a Mexican and his 
family of five, we were ridding ourselves of a cost of some $42.50 a month to keep them.”   
Thomson characterized the key difference between repatriation to Mexico and to the Philippines 
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was that the former consisted of families with U.S.-born children, whereas Filipinos in California 
were allegedly predominantly single men.   Neither was the reason against repatriation campaign, 
but his point was to emphasize the “cost-efficiency” of sending away Mexican and Mexican-
American families to relieve the county of relief load, and to request federal funding for Filipino 
repatriation, which he considered as a costly program involving repatriation of single men at a 
higher cost. 40 
Federal power to remove immigrants rapidly expanded in the 1930s.  On May 14, 1937, 
Congress made a crucial change to the Immigration Act of 1917.  The 1937 amendment allowed 
the INS to repatriate destitute immigrants “at any time after entry,” removing the three-year 
statute of limitations.  This amendment passed both houses in June 1936 but failed to become 
law because the 72nd Congress adjourned two days later.  By 1937 there were few recent 
immigrants because the State Department had refused them visas since 1929, and Congress 
maintained that statute of limitations was of “no practical benefit to the Government” and that 
removing it “relieves the overburdened taxpayers of this country of their continued support.”41  
Along with the Deportation Act of 1929, which held an immigrant was deportable at any time 
after their arrival unless they could prove that they were not liable to become a public charge 
                                                
 
40 To Return to Philippine Islands Unemployed Filipinos, Before the House Committee on Immigration 
and Naturalization, 72nd Cong. 46 (1933) (statement of Rex Thomson, Department of Charities, Los 
Angeles City);  Although the exclusionists insisted on removing 30,000 to 40,000 Filipinos. Filipinos 
have formed families in the U.S., and there was less reason to “return” to the Philippines. Secondly, even 
those who agreed to go to the Philippines could not afford to pay several hundred dollars for the passage 
of their families, since the Filipino Repatriation bill did not provide expenses for U.S. citizens.  The 
question of who was going to pay for the U.S. citizen families and on what grounds became a pressing 
issue. The INS entered into an arrangement with the Los Angeles County Welfare Department to pay for 
the passage of children of interracial unions to avoid leaving them in the United States.   Edward J. 
Shaughnessy, Deputy Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, to Samuel Dickstein, April 
7, 1936, in response to an inquiry whether two U.S.-born sons can be repatriated with their father, HR 
74A F16.3, box 350 (74th Congress), RG 233; Baldoz, The Third Asiatic Invasion, 192-193. 
41 Section 23, Immigration Act of 1917 (39 Stat. 874); To Provide for Removal at Government Expense of 
Certain Financially Distressed Aliens Who Apply for Permission to Their Native Country, H. Rept. No. 
74-120, at 1 (1935). 
  143 
before entry, the federal government acquired broad power to deport and repatriate immigrants 
with limited financial means. 
            Throughout the 1930s, albeit at a smaller scale than in the early 1930s, the INS 
maintained their interest in sending away Mexican-American families.  Encouraged by the 
passage of the Filipino Repatriation Act in 1935, nativists in California lobbied for federally-
funded repatriation program of Mexican immigrants. Soon after the Filipino repatriation work 
began, the INS district offices received requests to launch a similar federal program for Mexican 
immigrants.  INS district offices strongly supported this idea.  The INS San Francisco District 
director wrote to Washington “what a fine thing it would be for the service if we could put over a 
successful Mexican repatriation movement and relieve the state penal and other institutions, as 
well as welfare and charitable organizations, of a perplexing problem.”42  
Removal of statute of limitations to federally funded repatriation renewed the INS’s 
interest in repatriation of Mexican and Mexican American families.  An example of repatriation 
carried out under the new law is the repatriation of 1,283 Mexican and Mexican-Americans by 
the INS San Antonio District (May 1939 - March 1940), transporting them to Brownsville and 
Laredo on INS trucks.  Majority had lived in the U.S. for more than three years, and would not 
have been repatriable before 1937.43   
 Examination of citizenship status shows that almost all travelled in family groups: only 
48 of the 1,283 repatriates travelled alone, while others were families ranging from 2 to 24 
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including three generations.44  Many included both Mexican citizens and U.S. citizens, and in 
fact majority were U.S. citizens for whom the U.S. was the homeland, and Mexico was not the 
place of repatriation.  While 490 of the 1,283 repatriates were Mexican nationals, 793 or 62 
percent were U.S. citizens.45  Mexican citizens were mostly in their 30s and 40s.    Those with 
U.S. citizenship tended to be of young age, who accompanied their parents to Mexico.   All the 
children below 10, and 95 percent of the repatriates below 20 were U.S. citizens.  To put it 
another way, approximately half of the U.S. citizen “repatriates” were below 10 years of age, and 
84 percent were below 20.  In 30 percent of the married couples, either one was a U.S. citizen.  
(Table 3-1: Age and Nationality of Repatriate Families, INS San Antonio District, 1939-1940, 
and Table 3-2: Relations and Nationality of Repatriate Families, INS San Antonio District, 1939-
1940 on pages 164) 
Despite the predominance of mixed-status families, what the INS officials discussed was 
“a plan that will make the Mexicans stick, once they cross the border.”   They showed little 
concern about the fact that the family would not be able to return to the U.S. together.   
Theoretically, spouses and children with U.S. citizenship could return to the U.S. at any time, but 
the 1917 Act debarred spouse or parents who were Mexican nationals from returning to the U.S., 
which would have also made it difficult for the U.S. citizen family to return to the U.S. until they 
reached a certain age.46   
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Repatriates and their Foreign-born Children: Nationality Act of 1940 
 
 Congress members from the West were not satisfied with pressuring Mexican and 
Mexican-Americas out of the U.S.  Nativists believed that repatriation involved sending away 
immigrants from the U.S. and preventing return to the U.S.  One method was to ensure visa 
refusal based on the liable to become a public charge clause.  When inducing Mexican 
immigrants to sign up for the repatriation program, local officials told them that unlike 
deportation they were free to return to the United States.  However, officials marked their 
passports, sending a signal to the consuls that they should be refused a visa on LPC grounds if 
they were to apply for a visa in the future.47   
 But stamping a passport stopped short of a formal ban on reentry. A more formal ban on 
return was subsequently made into law, turning federally funded repatriation into formal 
banishment from the U.S.  First of such law was the Filipino Repatriation Act, which banned 
Filipinos from returning to the U.S.  Tydings-McDuffy Act imposed a quota of 100 on the 
Philippines, and immigration from the Philippines was all but closed.  But Congress feared the 
possibility of repatriates entering the continental U.S. as “returning residents.”  Nativists 
lobbying for Filipino repatriation opposed passing the repatriation bill without explicit 
prohibition on readmission to the U.S.48 Based on the Filipino Repatriation Act, Congress 
amended the general Immigration Act of 1917 in 1937 to erect a formal bar against reentry of  all 
federally-repatriated immigrants. 
   Nativists believed that such measures were still insufficient because they were not 
applicable to U.S. citizens.  As many immigrants left the U.S., nativists saw families including 
U.S. citizens as a particular problem, voicing anxiety that their possible return to the U.S. would 
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present an future “immigration problem.”  Moreover, looking further ahead, nativists saw it as a 
multi-generational issue not only having to do with U.S.-born citizens but also with their children 
born in the future.   As U.S. citizens, spouses that left the U.S. together, or children who grew up 
to be of age would also be able to pass on their citizenship to their Mexican-born children, who 
would be entitled to the rights citizenship endowed, including the right to come to the U.S.    
Nationality act debates during the 1930s were filled with concern about how to safeguard 
against immigrant families returning to the U.S. and derivation of U.S. citizenship by foreign-
born children of U.S. citizens who left the U.S. with their spouse or parents.  During the 1934 
Nationality Act debate, the Department of State argued that derivative citizenship was “an 
immigration problem, as well as a citizenship problem.”  The Department emphasized that a 
large number of immigrants had left the U.S. since the Depression --over 100,000 in fiscal year 
1931 --- calling attention to the fact that “many of them were accompanied by young children 
born in this country.”  Despite being born and raised in the U.S., the State Department insisted 
that people “taken from this country by their parents in infancy” were “aliens.”  They argued that 
enabling “alien citizens” to pass on citizenship allowed “large numbers of persons who are not 
only born abroad but are alien in all respects except in name to enter the United States free from 
the restrictions of the immigration law.”49  
           Congress members from border states associated the issue with Mexican repatriation.  
Representative William Traeger from Los Angeles reminded Congress not to forget “the 
situation in California in the past year or two” when “we have sent as many as 12,000 back to 
Mexico in one month.”  He emphasized that many were families with “children naturally, being 
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born on the soil of the United States or under its jurisdiction, became citizens of the United 
States” and that they “will remain in Mexico until there is some way of getting back into the 
United States.”  “Suppose the female of the family remains in Mexico long enough to raise her 
own family.  Then she is entitled to bring all of those back to the United States when they 
return.”50  Representative Martin Dies of Texas (D) argued that “the States that are on the border, 
California and Texas, are faced with that danger of having to let in every child that is born of 
aliens, because that child becomes an American citizen and is entitled to vote, and his children 
may go back and marry Mexicans.”51  Safeguarding citizenship did not mean protecting the 
citizenship rights of Mexican-Americans, but preventing their repatriation to the U.S. and their 
children from acquiring U.S. citizenship at birth. 
Anxiety about citizens living abroad heightened as the war approached.   Domestically, 
registration of foreigners (Alien Registration Act) marked foreigners in the U.S. as security 
concerns.52   “Citizens” abroad was another concern.  In 1940 Congress made a crucial revision 
to the nationality act, which critically affected repatriates and their families.53  The law had to do 
with the residency requirement of the parent in order to pass on one’s U.S. citizenship to the 
child.   The previous chapter discussed this residency requirement in relation to Chinese 
Americans.  Still, until 1940, the residency requirement was about third-generation citizenship 
derivation: the power of the foreign-born who acquired U.S. citizenship on jus sanguinis 
                                                
 
50 Relating to Naturalization and Citizenship Status of Children Whose Mothers Are Citizens of the 
United States: Hearing before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 73rd Cong. 
(1933) 41 (Representative William Traeger, R-CA) 
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United States: Hearing before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 73rd Cong. 
(1933) 42 (Representative Martins Dies, D-TX) 
52 Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation Nation: Outsiders in American History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2007), 190-195. 
53Sec. 201 (g), Nationality Act of 1940 (54 Stat. 1137)  
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principle to pass on one’s citizenship.  It did not concern U.S.-born citizens, since the fact of 
birth in the U.S. sufficed to fulfill the residency requirement, and unarguably so if they grew up 
in the U.S. 54  Marking a sharp change, the 1940 amendment imposed additional two-tiered 
condition on citizenship jus sanguinis.   First, it mandated the citizen-parent to have a minimum 
of ten-year residence in the U.S.   Moreover, five of the ten years had to be after one’s sixteenth 
birthday.  Taken together, although the minimum residence was ten years, in practice citizenship 
derivation was almost impossible unless one had lived in the U.S. until the age of twenty-one.  
Even if one had lived spent one’s entire life in the U.S., the 1940 Act made citizenship derivation 
impossible if one left the U.S. before turning 2155   
 To summarize, by 1940 three nationality laws governed citizenship of foreign-born 
children with a U.S. citizen parent.  First, a child born before May 24, 1934 (the 1934 Nationality 
Act) could only derive U.S. citizenship from the U.S. citizen father.  Second, those born between 
May 24, 1934 and January 13, 1941 could derive U.S. citizenship from either parent.   But unlike 
previously, failure to take residence in the U.S. before a certain age resulted in automatic loss of 
                                                
 
54 For those born before the Nationality Act of 1940, a few days in the U.S. sufficed to fulfill the 
residency requirement of the parent.  An example is a 1953 exclusion case regarding two children of a 
woman born in Mexico to a U.S. citizen father and a Mexican national mother.   Her husband was a 
Mexican citizen, and prior to giving birth in 1935 and 1937, she had visited the U.S. twice (two days for 
the first time and a few hours for the second time).   When the family sought for permanent admission to 
the U.S, the INS excluded the two children for lack of immigration visas.  The INS maintained that the 
mother had not resided in the U.S. prior to giving birth and that the children did not acquire U.S. 
citizenship at birth.  But the Board of Immigration Appeals ruled that the mother’s two visits to the U.S. 
satisfied the pre-birth residency requirement and that her children were U.S. citizens.  Matter of V-, 6 I & 
N Dec. 9 (BIA 1954). 
55 Sec. 201 (g), Nationality Act of 1940 (54 Stat. 1137); In addition to citizens who left the U.S. before 
reaching twenty-one, the act also made it impossible for citizen under twenty-one  to transfer their U.S. 
citizenship to their foreign-born child, for whom it was impossible to have five-year residence the U.S. 
after reaching sixteen. Unlike the retention requirement abolished in 1978, this is part of U.S. nationality 
law today.;   Since 1986, the citizen parent is required to have five-year physical presence prior to the 
child’s birth, at least two years of which must be after reaching 14.  8 U.S.C. 1401 (g) amended by Act of 
November 14, 1986 (100 stat. 3655)    
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U.S. citizenship (originally 5-year residence between 13 and 18, raised in 1940 to 5 years 
between 16 and 21).56  Thirdly, for those born after January 13, 1941, in addition to the 
aforementioned conditions, the citizen-parent was required to have more than ten-year residence 
in the U.S., including five years after reaching 16.  (Table 3-3: Citizenship Derivation Chart on 
page 165.) 
The impact of the 1940 Nationality Act has rarely been considered in relation to 
Mexican-American repatriation, because the peak of repatriation was over when the act was 
enforced.  But the 1940 revision was critical for Mexican-Americans who left the U.S. before 
reaching majority often with their parents.   For example, some 1,200 families repatriated by the 
INS San Antonio District in 1939 and 1940 included 798 U.S. citizens.  Pre-1940 nationality law 
would have allowed them all to pass their citizenship to children born in Mexico later.  However, 
under the 1940 nationality act 666 of the 798 U.S. citizens, who were younger than 21, did not 
meet the five-year residence after sixteen.  The 1940 act made it practically impossible for U.S.-
born citizens who left the U.S. before reaching majority to pass their citizenship to their children  
And what should be noted is that although the 1940 nationality act was enforced in January 1941, 
what mattered was not when the repatriates left the U.S. but when the child was born, thereby 
affecting all U.S. citizens living outside the U.S. thereafter and any child born abroad after 
January 1941 to citizens not fulfilling the parental residency requirements.   
 
3.3 Citizenship in Suspicion 
 After World War II, many former repatriates sought to return to the U.S., and they had to 
navigate their way through complex web of immigration and nationality laws.  In 1947, the 
                                                
 
56 Sec. 1, Nationality Act of 1934 (48 stat. 797); The deadline to come to the U.S. was raised several times 
until the act of October 10, 1978 (92 stat. 1046) repealed this retention requirement.   
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National Catholic Welfare Conference’s El Paso/Juarez office reported that it was “literally 
swamped with the problems of our citizens of Mexican ancestry, who had returned to Mexico 
either forcibly or by their own choice” during the Great Depression.57  From the 1940s to the 
mid-1960s, assisting the former repatriates was one of the principal concerns of the agency.   
Former repatriates sought certificates for themselves as well as for their children, attesting to 
their citizenship.  For families struggling to establish their member’s citizenship status, in 
addition to legal counsel, the NCWC through its extensive connections to Catholic parishes 
provided assistance in obtaining necessary documents such as birth certificates and baptismal 
certificates.   
Along with meeting various requirements of nationality law, the most fundamental 
challenge was how to prove U.S. citizenship either by birth or by derivation before U.S. officials 
such as consulates and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Cleofas Calleros reported in 
1946, “securing the necessary identifications, with proof of citizenship and repatriation of the 
parents back to Mexico was a difficult and time consuming operation.”58  An examination of 48 
families, sampled from the organization’s case record, show that these households included 350 
individuals, which included 161 U.S. citizens and 189 Mexican citizens.  In each case, it was 
necessary to establish who was born in the U.S., or whether one had acquired U.S. citizenship by 
derivation. (Table 3.4: Sampling of Case Files from National Catholic Welfare Conference El 
Paso /Juarez Office on page 183) 
                                                
 
57 Along with the New York office, the National Catholic Welfare Conference had maintained an 
immigration office in El Paso/Juarez since 1923.  National Catholic Welfare Conference, Bureau of 
Immigration, Annual Report 1946-1947, 40, folder 4626, box 148; Records of the National Catholic 
Welfare Conference, Center for Migration Studies, Staten Island, New York (hereafter NCWC Records, 
CMS).  
58 National Catholic Welfare Conference, Bureau of Immigration, Annual Report 1946-1947, 40, folder 
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To prove birth in the U.S. was a difficult task, especially for those born in the Southwest.  
As Adena Miller Rich of the Immigrant’s Protective League of Chicago observed in 1940, even 
more than naturalized citizens it was “the American-born man or woman ... who may have the 
greatest difficulty in proving his or her United States citizenship.”  For naturalized U.S. citizens, 
there was a crucial document to prove U.S. citizenship acquired through naturalization: 
certificate of naturalization.  But U.S.-born citizens lacked such uniform document.  “In fact, the 
American-born adult usually does not have such a certificate,” because birth registration and 
birth certificates were a relatively recent system.  It was not unusual for those born in the U.S. to 
be unable to secure any documentary evidence even if they had not left the country for one’s 
entire life, and much more so if they lived abroad.59    
As the National Catholic Welfare Conference’s El Paso / Juarez Office assisted their 
clients in establishing their citizenship or their family’s immigration status, it was not uncommon 
to encounter cases where a birth record could not be located.  Above all, birth registration was 
not completely carried out in the 1920s in the 1930s, and this was especially true in the 
Southwest.   While states and localities had laws of some kind to record births and deaths, 
standardization of the practice did not begin until the early twentieth-century.   It was in 1915 
that the federal government began collecting birth data from states.  A state that met the federal 
standard of registering at least 90 percent of each year’s birth was called a “birth registration 
area.”  As of 1918, only 19 states and District of Columbia were included in the birth registration 
area, but none of the western states such as California, Arizona, New Mexico, Arizona, and 
Texas had met the standard.   They were among the last of the states to fulfill the 90 percent 
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standard, with Texas being the last state in the country to meet it in 1933. 60  In 1940, it was 
estimated that 92.5 percent of the births in the U.S. were registered, but the rate in states of 
Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas was lower.61 
Especially in such cases, baptismal record became one of the most critical documents that 
established a person’s citizenship and immigration status.   In addition to families, the 
organization also received request from government agencies to secure a record.   Based on 
baptismal records, the National Catholic Welfare Conference assisted their clients to apply for a 
delayed birth certificate, a birth certificate obtained sometime after birth.   The process of filing a 
delayed birth certificate could take months if not more than a year.  The office sometimes urged 
parishes to locate baptismal records as soon as possible, emphasizing the importance of the 
documents for their clients. 
 
Citizenship in Suspicion  
 
Although claims to citizenship were not the most common method of unauthorized 
immigration at the U.S.-Mexico border, a rising concern since the late 1940s about unauthorized 
immigration added to the suspicion of the INS and consulates cast on  citizenship claims. 
Precisely because citizenship claims involved citizenship and immigration status of not only one 
individual but their families and descendants, government officials doubted citizenship claims.  
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The INS estimated that when one person established birth in the U.S. an average of four 
dependents would derive U.S. citizenship.  62 
The INS deeply suspected citizenship claims involving delayed birth certificates.  But 
application for a delayed birth certificate was by no means uncommon.  In Texas, between 1940 
and 1960, some 190,000 delayed birth certificates were issued to citizens of Mexican descent.  
But the immigration officials maintained that delayed birth certificates were “doubtfully reliable” 
proof of one’s birth in the U.S.63 For instance, between April 1953 and May 1954, in a Texas 
county, the INS decided to investigate one hundred and seventy persons of Mexican descent who 
obtained a delayed birth certificate in order to determine whether they were born in the U.S., 
although only seven persons were found to have falsely acquired the document.  Moreover, the 
court ruled that delayed birth certificates are not sufficient to establish birth in the U.S.64    
The Operation Wetback launched in July 1954 by the INS Commissioner Joseph M. 
Swing, a former army general, further added to the agency’s suspicion on citizenship claims.  
Between 1943 and 1964, the U.S. recruited a total of 4.6 million workers from Mexico under the 
Bracero program, which began in 1942 in response to wartime labor needs.  The wartime 
program, which was based on bilateral agreement with Mexico, ended on December 31, 1947, 
but demand for temporary crop workers survived the program, and was renewed in 1951.65  The 
Bracero program also stimulated unauthorized immigration.  For one, it induced people who 
could not qualify for the program to enter the U.S. without inspection.  Secondly, those admitted 
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as legal Bracero remained in the U.S. longer than original period of contract, which immediately 
made their stay illegal.  Deportations and voluntary departures grew rapidly from 29,000 in 1944 
to 565,000 in 1950. The INS highly publicized the quasi-military operation to apprehend 
unauthorized immigrants in order to scare off workers.  In fiscal years 1954 and 1955, the INS 
formally deported 34,500 Mexicans.  Over one million were recorded to have departed 
voluntarily after apprehension, and an unknown number of persons left the U.S. for fear of 
apprehension.66  The INS boasted the operation as an enormous success. At the same time, 
however, the INS believed that precisely because “undocumented” entry or stay became difficult, 
more immigrants were induced to obtain fraudulent documents in order to enter and reside in the 
U.S. more safely. 67   
The simple act of applying for a birth certificate could trigger an investigation by the INS.   
For example, in Cameron County, Texas, the INS and the county judge made an arrangement 
that the INS would interview all applicants for a delayed birth certificate.  As the INS believed 
that one of the most effective ways to investigate citizenship question was to call in the 
claimant’s family, citizenship investigation often involved interviewing the whole family.  
Citizenship claims and the approach of the immigration bureau displayed a long lasting legacy of 
racial exclusion and expulsion.  What the INS found particularly useful was the technique that 
the agency implemented through the “Chinese-Confession Program” launched in 1956.   
Following the Chinese Revolution in 1949, a large number of persons in Hong Kong applied for 
U.S. passports to flee from the communist takeover, claiming U.S. citizenship as foreign-born 
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children of Chinese-Americans.  As discussed in chapter 2, citizenship claims had been the 
central problem for immigration officials since the turn of the century.  In order to discover 
whose claims were fraudulent and to stem off immigration of paper families once and for all, the 
INS turned to the Chinese-Americans living in the U.S.  Urging them to disclose their “true” and 
“paper” family history, the Department of Justice offered legal permanent residence to those who 
“confessed.”  Unlike the Chinese-Confession Program, for Mexican-Americans the INS did not 
launch a large scale program directed at the entire community in a certain locality, but employed 
the method of questioning families that they found to be useful.68   
A Board of Immigration Appeals case from 1956 is illustrative of the difficulties that the 
repatriates experienced in establishing their citizenship status.  The case also shows how the 
hurdle was much higher for those claiming U.S. citizenship by derivation than for those claiming 
citizenship by birth in the U.S., or for the generation born in Mexico and those born in the U.S.  
In September 1956, the BIA ruled that twenty-year old Alberto Martínez [pseudonym] should be 
deported to Mexico for having entered the U.S. without inspection and an immigration visa.   
Born in Huanuzco, Zacatecas in 1935, Alberto Martínez first came to the U.S. with his parents in 
1946 at the age of 11.   Six years later, in 1952, he was deported to Mexico.   He reentered the 
U.S. the following day near and lived in the U.S. for another four years until he was apprehended 
again.   The question raised in 1956 was whether he was a Mexican national or whether he was 
in fact a U.S. citizen.   There was no question as to his birth in Mexico, but the issue was the 
birthplace of his parent.   Although his father was a Mexican national, there was a possibility that 
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his mother was a U.S.-born citizen.  If this was the case, Alberto Martínez was also a U.S. citizen 
at birth not subject to deportation.69     
The citizenship status of Laura Martínez [pseudonym], the mother of Alberto Martínez, 
had come into question two years earlier in her own deportation proceeding.   She was one of the 
Great Depression repatriates that went to Mexico with her parents in 1931.   Her parents came to 
the U.S. around 1919 or 1920 and lived in Midwestern states such as Colorado, Montana, Kansas, 
and Minnesota.   By the 1950s, her parents were already deceased, and Laura Martínez was the 
eldest of the six surviving siblings.   The issue in the 1950s was whether Laura Martínez was 
brought to the U.S. as a baby from Mexico or was born in the U.S.   Her younger siblings were 
all proved to be U.S.-born: one in Montana, and the other four in Minnesota.  With the parents 
deceased, her siblings could offer little information on Laura Martínez’s birthplace, since they 
were all born after Laura, and her relatives offered contradictory testimonies.   As for 
documentary evidence, the only available documents in the U.S. were her school records and 
Census records which indicated that she was a U.S.-born citizen.  The only document in Mexico 
was her marriage certificate, which did not indicate her place of birth.   Neither the family nor 
the U.S. government could locate her birth record or baptismal record either in the U.S. or in 
Mexico.70 
Although both Laura Martínez and Alberto Martínez’s citizenship and immigration status 
depended on whether Laura Martínez was born in the U.S., conflicting evidences and testimonies 
divided the fate of the two.  The INS could not prove that Laura Martínez was not a citizen.   At 
the same time, however, nor could the family positively prove that Laura Martínez was born in 
the U.S.  With both sides unable to provide affirmative evidence to prove their case, the 
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Department of Justice concluded that Laura was “not an alien.”71  But the decision that she was 
“not an alien” had different consequences for Laura Martínez and Alberto Martínez. The Board 
of Immigration Appeals ruled that the evidence that the family provided was sufficient in order 
for Laura Martínez to continue to reside in the U.S. but not for Alberto Martínez.   
 The Board of Immigration Appeals decided that in the two cases the burden of proof lay 
with different parties.  As for Laura Martínez, who claimed to birth on U.S. soil, the BIA 
maintained that the burden of proof was on the U.S. government to prove that she was an alien 
and that she did not hold U.S. citizenship.   And the evidence that the U.S. government provided 
was not strong enough to overturn the evidence provided by the family.  However, the case was 
different with regard to Alberto Martínez.  The BIA maintained that in order to establish 
derivative U.S. citizenship of foreign-born citizens, the burden of the proof was on the claimant 
to establish one’s parent’s birth in the U.S.   The BIA held that the U.S. government did not have 
to prove that Laura Martínez was an alien in order to deport Alberto Martínez.  Unable to 
establish her mother’s birth in the U.S., Alberto Martínez’s claim that he was a Mexican-born 
U.S. citizen was denied and he was deported as a Mexican national.72       
 
3.4 Reclaiming Citizenship 
 Securing proof of birth in the U.S. could be a difficult task in itself.   It was even more 
complicated when the family included children born in Mexico after the 1940 Nationality Act 
was enforced, because in order to determine the citizen of the child it did not suffice to prove that 
the parent was a U.S. citizen but also to establish how long they had lived in the U.S. and at what 
age the parents left the U.S.   For U.S. citizens who bore children in Mexico, the Nationality Act 
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of 1940 was a hard boundary of U.S. citizenship.  Unlike the pre-1940 Act generation, the post-
1940 Act generation could acquire U.S. citizenship only if the parent had lived in the U.S. for a 
certain number of years at a specific age   For Mexican-Americans who were taken to Mexico as 
minors, even if they fulfilled the ten-year minimum residency, the other requirement of having 
five-year residence after sixteen was a critical line that often divided the citizenship status of 
their families.   Depending on when the child were born and at which age the parent had left the 
U.S.,  citizenship were divided among siblings within the same family, or among children of 
repatriates who went to Mexico in the same year, or among children born in Mexico in the same 
year.     
For example, repatriates who left the U.S. as teens found that their children may not 
necessarily have the same citizenship status.  Among such cases were the García family and the 
Hernandez family [pseudonym], which sought for the assistance of the NCWS in the late 1940s.  
In the García family, the Colorado-born mother left the U.S. with her parents at the age of 15.  In 
the Hernandez family, the Texan-born father left the U.S. at the age of 12.    They both left the 
U.S. in 1931, at the peak of repatriation. And after marrying Mexican nationals, both sought to 
return to the U.S. with their spouse and Mexican-born children.73  
Although the parents left the U.S. in 1931 as teens, the citizenship status of their 
Mexican-born children was critically different, because the children were born under different 
nationality laws.  The three Mexican-born children of the García family were all U.S. citizens.  
They were all born in the 1930s, when the citizen parent was still not required U.S. residence at a 
specific age in order to pass on one’s U.S. citizenship.  By contrast, none of the Hernandez 
                                                
 
73 Case file, NCWC El Paso/Juarez Office, 1950, box 13, Calleros Papers;  Case file, NCWC El 
Paso/Juarez Office, 1949, box 26, NCWC Case Records, UTEP; Individual names and folder level are 
withheld for privacy, and all the names are pseudonym 
  159 
children were U.S. citizens, because they were all born after the 1940 Nationality Act was 
enforced.   Having been taken out of the U.S. at 12, the father did not fulfill the requirement to 
pass on his U.S. citizenship, five-year residence after his sixteenth birthday.22 
Whereas the dividing line between the García family and the Hernandez family lay in the 
year the children were born in Mexico, children born in the same year also held different 
citizenship status depending on how long their parents had lived in the U.S.   Among such cases 
were the González family and López family, who sought for the NCWC’s assistance in 1948.   In 
both families, the mother was a U.S.-citizen, while the father was a Mexican national.  Also in 
both households, the elder siblings were born in Mexico the 1930s and the youngest child was 
born in 1943. 
Yet, whereas all the González children held U.S. citizenship, the López children did not.  
In the López family, the elder siblings born in the 1930s held U.S. citizenship, but the youngest 
child did not acquire U.S. citizenship at birth.  The difference between the two families had to do 
with the age that the U.S. citizen mother had left the U.S.  In the González family, the mother 
born in Arizona in 1908 had already reached 21 when she went to Mexico during the Depression.  
In the López family, however, the mother had left the U.S. as a teenager, and the 1940 
Nationality Act did not allow her to transfer her U.S. citizenship to her child born in 1943.23 Thus, 
a few years’ difference of age either of the parent and the child divided citizenship status of 
families.  And as in the López family, citizenship status was often divided within the same 
family. 
As former repatriates and their families sought to reestablish their residence and their 
citizenship or immigration status, the years after 1950 were of particular importance for 
Mexican-born children of U.S. citizens.  This was because of the citizenship retention deadline.  
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The first-post 1934 Nationality Act generation reached their sixteenth birthday in 1950, 
compelling those born after May 24, 1934 to apply to retain their U.S. citizenship before the 
deadline.  As a result of the looming deadline, in 1949, for instance, the NCWC’s El Paso / 
Juarez office secured more than three thousand birth certificates and baptismal certificates of 
former repatriates so that they and their families could obtain U.S. passports to come to the 
U.S.74    
The year 1950 was important for foreign-born U.S. citizens who had to meet the deadline 
to retain their U.S. citizenship.  The most visible citizenship rush occurred in Hong Kong, where 
exile from the Chinese Revolution in 1949 coincided with the arrival of the first retention 
deadline in 1950, and 111,700 U.S. citizens of Chinese descent applied for U.S. passports to 
come to the U.S., creating a long backlog.75  Questions such as whether persons who had applied 
for a U.S. passport before reaching sixteen but passed the birthday by the time he landed on U.S. 
soil was raised in several board of immigration appeals ruling. 76                                                                                                            
 Not all those interested in repatriation could come to the U.S. before their sixteenth 
birthday, and after May 1950 those who could not meet the deadline began to lose their U.S. 
citizenship.   The mid-1950s also witnessed efforts to recover their U.S. citizenship.  A revision 
of both immigration and nationality laws, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, enacted 
two years after the first generation of post-1934 foreign-born children began to lose their U.S. 
citizenship, raised the retention deadline from sixteenth to twenty-third birthday 17 The issue after 
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75 For Cold War Chinese immigration, see Ngai, Impossible Subjects, chapter 6. 
76 Matter of L-B-D-,  4 I & N Dec. 639 (BIA 1952) 
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1952 was whether the new deadline applied retroactively to those who had already passed the old 
deadline.  This question did not arise when the 1940 Nationality Act raised the deadline of the 
1934 Act, because nobody had passed their thirteenth birthday.  Although foreign-born children 
of U.S. citizens appealed that they should be recognized as U.S. citizens as long as they came to 
the U.S. before their twenty-third birthday, the U.S. government including consulates, the INS, 
and the Board of Immigration Appeals maintained that the new deadline did not apply 
retroactively to those who did not meet the previous deadline and that it only applied to those 
who were below 16 years of age when the 1952 Act took effect.77 
In 1957 that the Department of Justice changed its interpretation of the new nationality 
law as a result of Lee You Fee v. Dulles, mentioned in the previous chapter.  Lee You Fee was 
born in China in July 1935, and had been raised in Hong Kong since 1936.   His father Lee Q. 
Pon was a Chinese-born U.S. citizen, who derived his citizenship from his U.S.-born father.  Lee 
Q. Pon moved to the U.S. in 1926, and during his visit to China a decade later married Lee You 
Fee’s mother.  In 1936, Lee Q. Pon returned to the U.S. and took residence in Wisconsin, while 
Lee You Fee and the mother remained in China.  Thus, Lee You Fee was born as a U.S. citizen.   
But when he reached sixteen in 1951, he was still in Hong Kong and lost his U.S. citizenship 
under the Nationality Act of 1940.  The family brought the case to the federal court, arguing that 
Lee You Fee should be able to recover one’s citizenship as long as he arrived in the U.S. before 
the new deadline, but lost the case in both in the district court and the court of appeals. However, 
after the Court of Appeals ruling, the Department of Justice granted err and the Supreme Court 
                                                
 
77 In an early 1953 case regarding a man born in Cayman Islands in 1935, the Board of Immigration 
Appeals ruled that foreign-born citizens who lost their U.S. citizenship by failing to come to the U.S. 
before reaching 16 could not recover one’s citizenship under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.  
Matter of B- , 5 I & N Dec. 291 (BIA 1953). 
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decided that Lee You Fee could retain his U.S. citizenship as long as he came to the U.S. before 
his twenty-third birthday.78      
The 1957 ruling provided an opportunity for those in a similar situation to recover their 
citizenship.  Such was the case for Jose Martínez [pseudonym], who was born in Mexico in April 
1935 to a father born in the U.S. in 1915 and a Mexican mother.   When he first moved to the 
U.S. in early 1952, he was admitted to the U.S. as a citizen and not as a Mexican national.  In 
1956, however, the INS discovered that Jose Martínez was already seventeen when he first came 
to the U.S.  The INS ordered departure from the U.S. on the grounds that he failed to retain his 
U.S. citizenship and thus required an immigrant visa.    Jose Martínez once again returned to the 
U.S. but this time not as a U.S. citizen but as an immigrant.    It was a year after he started living 
in the U.S. as a Mexican national that Lee You Fee v. Dulles was decided.   Having learned of the 
decision, he appealed to the Department of Justice that he should not have lost his U.S. 
citizenship.  The BIA acknowledged his claim, and since Jose Martínez had already lived in the 
U.S. for more than five years, he was finally able to obtain a certificate of U.S. citizenship.  Thus 
within the matter of six years, Jose Martínez lived in the U.S. first as a U.S. citizen, then as a 
Mexican national, before he was finally able to claim his U.S. citizenship in 1958.79  
 After reinterpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, the NCWC’s El 
Paso / Juarez Office also saw renewed attempts by those who were not able to meet the old 
deadline to retain one’s U.S. citizenship before the new deadline.   For some, the Lee You Fee v. 
Dulles came too late.  By the time of the ruling, some of the post-1934 Act generation had 
                                                
 
78 Lee You Fee v. Dulles, 236 F. (2d) 885, 355 U.S. 61 (1957); The Department of Justice acknowledged 
that although the first 1934 Act generation had passed the deadline when the Immigration and Nationality 
Act went into effect, they had not when Congressional Committees first proposed to raise the maximum 
age, and that the original intent of the Congress was to raise the deadline before the 1934 Act reached 
their sixteenth birthday.      
79 Matter of M – 7 I&N Dec. 646 (BIA 1958) 
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already passed their twenty-third birthday.  And those who were living outside the U.S., unlike in 
the case of Jose Martinez, even under the new extended deadline, they could no longer recover 
their citizenship.  
   In 1958, the National Catholic Welfare Conference was “still faced with problems of 
citizenship that involve hundreds of our clients and which dates back to the wholesale 
repatriation to Mexico during the 1930 depression period, when American citizen families of 
Mexican descent were removed mainly from the Southwest.”80 As the NCWC reported in 1961 
that the issue of citizenship of repatriate families seemed to “get more complicated as the 1929 - 
1939 generation gets older,” passage of time since the Great Depression, enforcement of the 
U.S.-Mexico border control thereafter, added to the difficulties of the repatriate families 
encountered in establishing their citizenship.   In the nativism of the 1930s and the racialized 
view of Mexican-Americans, Congress situated both Mexican-American repatriation and post-
1934 U.S. nationality laws regarding foreign-born children as solutions to an “immigration 
problem” of “aliens.”   For Mexican and Mexican-American repatriates and their families, 
legacies of racial policy haunted families for decades.   The issue of U.S. citizenship not only 
involved the generation that experienced repatriation first-hand but their children as well, deiding 




                                                
 
80 National Catholic Welfare Conference, Department of Immigration, Annual Report 1957-1958, 15, 
folder 4767, box 151, NCWC Records, CMS.  
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Tables and Figures for Chapter 3 
3-1: Age and Nationality of Repatriate Families, INS San Antonio District, 1939-1940 
Age  Mexican Percentage U.S. Citizen Percentage 
0-9 0 0.0 389 49.4 
10-19 33 6.7 268 34.0 
20-29 65 13.3 61 7.7 
30-39 135 27.6 16 2.0 
40-49 104 21.2 1 0.1 
50-59 77 15.7 1 0.1 
60+ 52 10.6 0 0 
Unknown 24 4.9 52 6.6 
Total 490 100 788 100  
Source: Author’s compilation from file 55957-456; RG85, NARA. 
 
3-2: Relations and Nationality of Repatriate Families, INS San Antonio District, 1939-1940 
 Mexican U.S. Citizen 
 Male Female TOTAL Male Female TOTAL 
Unaccompanied 33 3 36 0 0 0 
Head of 
Household 
199 8 207 7 0 7 
Spouse 0 146 146 0 54 54 
Sons and 
Daughters 
31 23 54 370 307 677 
Parents 0 11 11 0 0 0 
Grandparents 2 1 3 0 0 0 
Grandchildren 1 0 1 23 19 42 
Siblings 1 3 4 4 1 0 
Nephews and 
Nieces 
0 1 1 4 3 7 
Unknown 2 0 2 1 0 1 
TOTAL 269 196 465 409 384 788 
The INS recorded man as head of household unless the woman was widowed. Source: Author’s 
compilation from file 55957-456; RG85, NARA. 
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3-3: Citizenship Derivation Chart 
Date of birth Residency 
requirement for the 
parent (acquisition 
requirement)  
Residency requirement for the child (retention 
requirement)  
Before May 23, 
1934 
U.S. citizen father 
 
Residence in the 
U.S. of any length 




May 23, 1934 to  
January 12, 
1941 
U.S. citizen father 
or mother 
 
Residence in the 
U.S. of any length 
before the birth of 
the child  
 
5-year continuous 
residence in the 
U.S. from age 13 
to 18 
 








Move to the 



















before the birth of 
the child 
 
5 years must be 
after reaching 16 






Move to the 
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3-4: Sampling of Case File from National Catholic Welfare Conference, El Paso / Juarez Office 
 Both parents 
Mexican 
citizen 
One parent U.S. citizen TOTAL 
Number of Households 36 12 48 
Number of Individuals in 
the household 
278 72 350 
Number of U.S. Citizens 124 37 161 
Number of Mexican 
citizens 
154 35 189 
Source: Author’s compilation from casework files of the National Catholic Welfare Conference 
El Paso / Juarez Case.  The author went through every 5 boxes of 86 boxes. 
 
  167 
Chapter 4.  “Hardship” Cases and Mixed Status Families, 1929 - 1952  
 
 In 1934, a group of immigrant aid agencies and immigrant advocacy groups submitted a 
report to the Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins on immigration reform.  Including prominent 
lawyers such as Max Kohler and immigrant aid organizations such as the American Jewish 
Congress, Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, National Catholic Welfare Conference, the YWCA, 
and the Foreign Language Information Service, among others, the so-called Ellis Island 
Committee made recommendations on immigration legislation and administration of 
immigration policy.  A significant part of the report to called attention to noncitizens in the U.S. 
without formal permanent resident status: permanent residents who became deportable, 
nonimmigrants, and unauthorized immigrants.1   
This chapter first discusses the reform movement by immigrant advocacy groups and 
Frances Perkins, which sought to correct the problems of immigration law that Doak’s 
deportation campaign underscored. Yet, the interests of immigrant advocacy groups and the INS 
were not identical, and the reform movement that was initially about recognizing various social 
ties that immigrants of different legal status built in the U.S.  with the society developed into an 
effort for a stronger deportation policy that gave certain consideration to family-ties.   
Despite its limitations, for a decade, family-based suspension of deportation provided 
mixed status families an important path to permanent residency.  But after World War II, 
suspension of deportation became almost unattainable as staunch restrictionists took control of 
the immigration committees.  Moreover, concurrent with active recruitment of workers since 
World War II, Congress would specifically make the procedure inapplicable to Mexican families, 
recognizing no claims of families.  
                                                
 
1 Ellis Island Committee, Report of the Ellis Island Committee (New York: 1934), 101-102. 
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4.1 Non-immigrants and Illegal Immigrants.  
Deportation campaign in cities with large immigrant population from Europe met strong 
criticism.  The raid of the Finnish Worker’s Education Association in New York on Feb 15, 1931, 
one of the earliest raids by Secretary of Labor William Doak, was quickly condemned by Senator 
Robert E. Wagner (D-New York) as employing “Russian Czarist tactics.”2  In mid-1931, 
National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (Wickersham Commission) 
published a report that emphasized the “grave abuses and unnecessary hardships” that resulted 
from the deportation law itself, organizational structure of law enforcement agencies, and 
administration of the law. 3   Although Doak denied that the agency engaged in any 
unconstitutional activities, he was often compelled to defend the action of the agency.4 
 The Hoover administration’s immigration and deportation policy was a nightmare for 
immigrant advocacy groups such as the Joint Conference of Immigration Legislation.   As 
discussed in chapter 1, the executive order in September 1930 reduced visa issuance by 90 
percent.  The visa policy not only concerned new immigrants but U.S. residents without formal 
permanent residency.  The sharp divide between “immigrant” and all other status was 
characterized by how the 1924 Act allowed no other form of acquiring permanent residency than 
entry with an immigrant visa.  No lawful “non-immigrant” could obtain permanent residency 
after starting to live in the U.S.  Congress believed that granting permanent residency to people 
who initially entered the U.S. without an immigrant visa would undermine restriction system 
                                                
 
2 “Wagner Decries ‘Czarist Tactics’ in Alien Drive,” New York Herald Tribune, February 22, 1931. 
3 “Expert Declares Deportation of Aliens is Illegal,” New York Herald Tribune, April 17, 1931; National 
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on the Enforcement of the Deportation Laws 
of the United States (Washington D.C.: G.P.O, 1931), 177. 
4 “Doak Denies Blame in Deportations,” New York Times, August 9, 1931. 
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based on limiting the number of immigrant visas.  This was actually not a matter of whether the 
number of visas was limited or not, or whether somebody would be pushed back on the waiting 
list.  People who formed families in the U.S. were no exception.   For example, a nonimmigrant 
married to a U.S. citizen qualified for non-quota immigrant status, and theoretically there was no 
wait for a visa.  Granting permanent residency to such a person was not going to push back 
anybody on the quota waiting list.  Still, physical departure from the U.S. was mandatory in 
order to obtain a visa at a consulate.  For those without non-quota status, a nonimmigrant married 
to a permanent resident for example, there was no telling when the family could return to the U.S. 
For nonimmigrants wishing to become a permanent resident, the Great Depression added to the 
difficulty of financing a trip to a consulate, leaving the workplace and family until receiving a 
visa.    Moreover, there was no guarantee of return once stepping out of the U.S., and consuls 
were likely to refuse a visa on “liable to become a public charge” grounds.  Securing a visa did 
not guarantee readmission to the U.S., since factors such as illness during the voyage would be 
grounds for exclusion by the immigration bureau.   
Deportation involving mixed status families caused family separation, with some family 
members sent abroad, while others remaining in the U.S.   As historian Mae Ngai has shown, 
along with the creation of the Border Patrol in 1924, regime of deportation emerged to support 
immigration restriction.  The Deportation Act of 1929 made deportation equal to permanent 
banishment from the U.S. by forbidding readmission of deportees.  Congress relaxed this bar 
somewhat in 1932, but formal deportation still barred reentry for at least one year.  The law 
made reentry to the U.S. a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than two years or by 
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a fine of not more than $1,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment. 5  Voluntary departure 
instead of formal deportation did not make a large difference, since departure from the U.S. or 
loss of permanent resident status made former residents subject to visa refusal by the Department 
of State.  For example, a father/husband who voluntarily left the U.S., while his wife and 
children remained in the U.S., to show enough savings to support the family without working for 
a year in order to secure a visa to return to the U.S.6 
Taken together with the State Department’s visa refusal policy, the Labor Department’s 
deportation campaign highlighted the sharp line drawn between lawful permanent residents and 
all other noncitizens: those who had lost their permanent resident status for deportable offenses, 
lawful nonimmigrants, and those who entered the U.S. unlawfully.  Along with their struggle 
against the Department of State, immigrant aid agencies and advocacy groups working with 
European immigrants insisted on the need to create a mechanism that would allow noncitizens 
without formal permanent resident status, either lawful or unlawful, to obtain permanent 
residency without having to leave the U.S.7   
 
Frances Perkins and Ellis Island Committee 
                                                
 
5 Jane Perry Clark, Deportation of Aliens from the United States to Europe (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1931), 469; Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of 
Modern America  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 60, 82; Deportation Act of March 4, 
1929 (45 Stat. 1551).  
6 Ellis Island Committee, Report, 101-102. 
7 There was a difference of opinion on who should be vested with such power.  The Wickersham 
Commission proposed an independent body appointed by the President.  National Commission on Law 
Observance and Enforcement, Report on the Enforcement of the Deportation Laws (Washington D.C.: 
G.P.O, 1931), 178-179; Jane Perry Clark recommended that the Secretary of Labor should be vested with 
discretionary power. Jane Perry Clark, Deportation of Aliens from the United States to Europe (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1931) 485. 
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The appointment of Frances Perkins as the Secretary of Labor in March 1933 brought the 
immigration bureau closer to immigrant advocacy groups.  As Read Lewis of the Foreign 
Language Information Service described Perkins as a person who spoke “our language,” Perkins 
was more receptive to criticisms against the immigrant bureau than her predecessor.  Shortly 
after assuming office, Perkins held meetings with immigrant aid organizations in New York to 
seek their opinion.  Perkins requested immigrant aid agencies to prepare a formal report on the 
conditions at Ellis Island, to make recommendations on administration of the newly organized 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, and on general immigration policy.  The selection of the 
committee members showed that the new labor secretary’s interest primarily lay in immigrants 
from Europe and the conditions on Ellis Island, not the land borders.  Named the Ellis Island 
Committee, core members and cooperating organizations largely overlapped with the Joint 
Conference on Alien Legislation, which included organizations such as the American Jewish 
Congress, National Catholic Welfare Conference, YWCA, Hebrew Immigrants Aid Society, and 
the International Migration Service, which had been protesting against restriction of admission of 
immigrants and was planning to submit their own list of recommendations.8  Among the seven 
subcommittees was the Subcommittee on Treatment of Deportees, chaired by Columbia law 
professor Joseph Chamberlain and including Jane Perry Clark, known for her study Deportation 
of Aliens from the United States to Europe (1931), the most extensive study on deportation at the 
time. 9    While the Ellis Island Committee prepared its report, Perkins devised several 
                                                
 
8 The Bureau of Immigration and the Bureau of Naturalization merged into the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service in June 1933; Joint Conference on Alien Legislation, Minutes, March 31, 1933, 
folder 10, box 1, reel 136; Immigration and Refugee Services of America Records. 
; “Bulletin to the Members of the Committee on Ellis Island,” 1933, folder 1, box 11, Max Kohler Papers, 
American Jewish Historical Society.  
9 Jane Perry Clark, Deportation of Aliens from the United States to Europe (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1931) 
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administrative measures for immigrant families.  Her ultimate goal was to create a mechanism 
that would enable those without permanent residency, whether lawfully or unlawfully residing in 
the U.S., to become a permanent resident without having to leave the U.S.   But this was only 
possible by Congressional amendment to the 1924 Act.   
Perkins first looked at lawful nonimmigrants who had to leave the U.S. for an immigrant 
visa, and sought to enable their prompt return.  First, Perkins changed the system of family visa 
petitioning. Previously, the Department of Labor had required nonimmigrants wishing to become 
permanent residents to first leave the U.S., and next for sponsoring family member to file a 
family visa petition with the department.  Instead, Perkins allowed the sponsor to first file a 
petition, and permitted the beneficiary to remain in the U.S. until approval of the petition, 
thereby obviating the need to stay abroad both for petition approval and visa issuance.  Second, 
in September 1933, Perkins made an arrangement with Canada to enable U.S. residents to visit 
U.S. consulates in Canada instead of those in Europe to apply for a visa.  In order to convince 
Canadian authorities that the U.S. would not leave them stranded in Canada, the INS gave 
assurances of readmission even if the consuls denied a new visa.  In 1935, this agreement was 
made into a more formal process called pre-examination, where the INS examined the applicant 
prior to their departure to Canada to guarantee readmission to the U.S.10 
Next, Perkins looked at deportable immigrants, and proposed a system to cancel their 
deportation and to accord them formal permanent residency.  Deportation debarred reentry for at 
least one year, and voluntary departure did not preclude the possibility of visa refusal, which in 
fact was very high during the Great Depression. Once residents stepped out of the U.S. soil, the 
Department of Labor did not have any control over the State Department’s visa policy.   And 
                                                
 
10 U.S. Department of Labor, Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1934), 50, 
70; Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 84-85. 
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Perkins began to withhold executing deportation orders for certain immigrants until Congress 
passed a law to create some mechanism to grant permanent residency to deportable immigrants.  
By 1938, Perkins stayed 4,455 deportations.  Popularly called “hardship cases,” they became the 
focus of deportation reform debate .11 
            While Perkins devised several administrative measures, the Ellis Island Committee 
completed its report in 1934.  The report placed strong emphasis on “the right of husband and 
wife, parents and children to be united.”  With regard to admission, the committee recommended 
wider family-based exemption from quota restrictions, a less stringent application of “likely to 
become a public charge” clause for visa applications by families of citizens and permanent 
residents.  But in light of the Great Depression, they saw more possibility of reform for persons 
already living in the U.S. than for new immigrants.12  Pointing to nonimmigrants without 
permanent residency, the committee called for deportation reform.   In mid-1935, the 
recommendations of the Ellis Island Committee were incorporated into an INS-endorsed bill co-
sponsored by Representative John Kerr (D-North Carolina) and Senator Marcus Coolidge (D-
Massachusetts).    
 
4.2 Illegal Entry, Self-sustaining Family, and Criminality 
                                                
 
11 Adena Miller Rich, “Case Work in the Repatriation of Immigrants,” Social Service Review 10, no. 4 
(1936): 589-590.; Stay of deportation was grounded in Section 19 of the Immigration Act of 1917; 
Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor 1934, 53; “Memorandum for Guidance of Immigration and 
Naturalization Service in Disposition of Dies Bill Stayed Cases,” August 23, 1938; Gerald D. Reilley, 
Solicitor of Labor, memorandum to Frances Perkins, September 1, 1938; folder “Dies Bill,” box 2, 
Subject Files Relating to Immigration and Naturalization, 1933-1943; General Records of the Office of 
the Solicitor; RG 174. 
12 Ellis Island Committee, Report, 5, 132-133; Joint Conference on Immigration Legislation, Minutes, 
April 11, 1934; folder 2; box 223; reel 136; Immigration and Refugee Services of America Records. 
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Advocates for the hardship cases attempted to separate suspension of deportation from 
“new immigration” or “immigration policy.”  For William Doak, further reduction of quotas, 
higher bar to naturalization, deportation, and repatriation were all part of immigration policy to 
create jobs for “real American citizens.”  In challenging the visa refusal by the Department of 
State or the attempt to formally reduce quotas, the reformers reasoned that “family immigration” 
did not constitute new immigration but was about the rights and wellbeing of current residents in 
the U.S.   Likewise, reformers sought to separate suspension of deportation from immigration 
policy, reasoning immigration policy was about admission of people from outside the U.S.  
Suspension of deportation did not involve any physical admission to the U.S. but was a matter of 
recognizing people already in the U.S. as formal members by changing their legal status. 
In advocating for the hardship cases, the Ellis Island Committee and the INS both pointed 
to European immigrants with citizen or permanent resident families whose grounds for 
deportation was unlawful entry (often resulting from a technicality) as the most qualifying for 
relief.   What should be noted is that Asian immigrants were entirely out of scope of the reform 
campaign.   Reformers did not intend to question the racial boundary to permanent residency by 
wholesale exclusion of “aliens ineligible to citizenship” by the 1924 Act, and all deportation 
reform bills in the 1930s made a reservation that the proposal to grant permanent residency to a 
nonimmigrant or deportable immigrants did not apply to those racially ineligible to citizenship.    
Reformers stressed the need to think beyond legal status of individual immigrants.    
The committee especially called attention to “individual’s family responsibilities and the social 
and community hardship” resulting from deportation, and advocated for cases involving 
“extraordinary hardship, such as where deportation would involve disruption of a family, the 
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other members of which are entitled to remain in this country.” 13   Likewise, the INS 
Commissioner Daniel W. MacCormick (1933-1937) appealed for family hardship on various 
occasions.  On a 1935 CBS radio program, MacCormick described how “upon the success of 
their efforts depends the fate 2,600 aliens of good character whose deportation has been stayed in 
the past two years and—infinitely more important, the fate of their families in this country.”14  At 
hearings, he testified, “One thousand and eighty cases a year means 3 cases a day, and it means 
the separation of three families in every 24 hours, the mother, the father, and the children 
sometimes going to different countries.”15 
Citing various researches, reformers sought to draw attention to familial connections 
between non-citizens and citizens.  In 1936, the National Council on Naturalization and 
Citizenship conducted a survey on 4,866 non-citizens in fifty cities.  Including their families, the 
study involved 21,245 individuals.  The study showed that on average, for each non-citizen 
(including those without families), there were 1.41 U.S. citizen.  Some 75 percent of the non-
citizens were either married to a U.S. citizen or had a U.S.-born child with U.S.   When limited 
to noncitizens with families, the 4,169 households included a total of 20,548 individuals, out of 
which 61 percent were U.S. citizens, and each household included an average of 2.9 U.S. 
citizens.16  The National Council on Naturalization and Citizenship wrote, “The non-citizens in 
the United States are by no means hermetically isolated from our citizenship population … At 
                                                
 
13 Ellis Island Committee, Report, 77. 
14 Daniel W. MacCormack, “What is Our Alien Program Today,” Columbia Broadcasting System, 
Washington D.C.: WJSV, August 2, 1935, folder 112, box 8, United States Catholic Conference Records, 
Center for Migration Studies. 
15 Deportation of Criminals, Preservation of Family Units, Permit Noncriminal Aliens to Legalize their 
Status: Hearing before the Senate Immigration Committee 74th Cong. 21 (1936) (Daniel W. MacCormack, 
INS Commissioner ).  
16 The study covered 5,000 families. National Council on Naturalization and Citizenship, The Families of 
Aliens: A Study of Their Citizenship Status, 12-13.  
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the most vital social nexus, that is, in the family unit itself our alien population is related to our 
citizen population.”  Inseparable from deportation was the issue of “how many citizen spouses 
and children would they leave behind.”   Or, if noncitizens were “deprived of their jobs, how 
many citizen dependents would be thrown upon relief?”17 
Federal and local governments conducted similar studies on citizenship status of 
immigrant families.  Between 1935 and 1936, the INS studied the citizenship status of families 
of 10,000 immigrants who filed a declaration of intention to naturalize (first paper).  The survey 
showed that 63.5 percent of the declarants were married, and that 13.7 percent were married to a 
U.S. citizen.   It also indicated that 45.2 percent of all declarants had minor children in their 
household and that each declarant with a child had an average of 2.3 U.S.-born children.18  In 
New York, the Emergency Relief Bureau studied the citizenship status of 194,976 households on 
relief.  The study showed that 36,159 were households headed by non-U.S. citizens, and that 
such households included 51,501 U.S.-born children, or an average of 1.4 U.S.-born person per 
household.19  Pointing to various studies, the advocates for the hardship cases urged to consider 
the result that deportation of one immigrant might have on the citizen or permanent resident 
family members who were entitled to live in the U.S. 
 Family-oriented deportation reform shared several characteristics with arguments made 
for expansion of family-based admission.  One was its emphasis on the interest of citizens and 
                                                
 
17 National Council on Naturalization and Citizenship, The Families of Aliens: A Study of Their 
Citizenship Status (New York, 1937), 12-13, folder 141, box 11, United States Catholic Conference 
Records, Center for Migration Studies. 
18 The INS randomly selected 10,000 from the total of 92,123 applicants that filed a first paper between 
July 1935 and March 1936.  On average, each household had an average of 1.45 U.S.-born minor children. 
Cited in National Council on Naturalization and Citizenship, The Families of Aliens: A Study of Their 
Citizenship Status, 12-13. 
19 Cited in National Council on Naturalization and Citizenship, The Families of Aliens: A Study of Their 
Citizenship Status, 13-15. 
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permanent residents rather than on the prospective immigrant or the deportee.   Advocates for 
admission of families emphasized the rights of U.S. citizens and permanent residents to bring 
their family members to the U.S. than the right of foreigners to immigrate to the U.S. Similar 
argument was made for suspension of deportation, with primary emphasis on  the potential 
hardship to citizen and permanent resident families who would be left in the U.S. than on the 
hardship of deportees.  An example was the 1935 report that the INS prepared to explain to 
Congress about deportation cases that Perkins had stayed.  The report repeated that the purpose 
was “not to be lenient toward the alien subject to deportation but to protect the family unit.”  The 
concern of the INS was “not the hardship it works on him [alien] but the hardship it works on 
American citizens.”  The report explained how deportation of 2,862 immigrants would leave 
6,389 families in the U.S., including 4,665 citizens and 3,994 dependents.   Separation of 
families especially the plight of those in the U.S. was the main concern.20  
   In staying deportation, the INS prioritized not simply immigrants with a citizen or 
permanent resident family but those who did not rely on public relief and who provided financial 
support for the family. 21  The INS also invoked an economic argument emphasizing how 
suspension of deportation was not only “for the relief of the American citizen and legally 
resident members of the families of aliens of good character who are now subject to deportation” 
                                                
 
20 Report to Accompany List of Stayed Deportation Cases Called for in House Resolution 350. H.doc. No. 
74-392, at 2, 6 (1935); The report was prepared according to a House resolution that requested Perkins to 
continue to stay deportation until Congress discussed the Kerr-Coolidge bill. 
21 Report to Accompany List of Stayed Deportation Cases Called for in House Resolution 350 H.doc. No. 
74-392, at 2, 6 (1935); Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor 1936, 99; The INS maintained that the 
most qualifying were persons with no police record and no record of public relief (66 percent), those with 
a record of brief public relief but were no longer on relief (17 percent), and those who were on public 
relief but likely to be removed from relief once if they recovered from illness (13 percent). L. P. Winings, 
Acting Assistant, memorandum for Daniel W. MacCormack, November 27, 1935, file 55884/474, 
Accession 85-58A734, RG 85. 
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but also for the relief of the “American taxpayer.”22  In addition to the cost of deportation that the 
federal government had to cover, the INS argued that deportation of breadwinners actually 
imposed “on our States and communities of the burden of caring for a new group of dependents.” 
As opposed to William Doak’s reasoning that deportation would create jobs for “Americans” and 
also reduce the relief cost, Perkins reversed this argument and criticized the previous 
administration’s deportation campaign for separating families and adding to government relief. 23    
 Notably, the INS emphasized that in “overwhelming majority” of the hardship cases, the 
INS had decided to stay deportation precisely because the grounds for deportation were some 
form of irregular entry or visa overstay.  MacCormack argued against summary deportation 
because “illegal entry in itself is not a criterion of character,” and attributed the most common 
motive for unauthorized immigration to “a desire to join family or relatives, to find a refuge from 
oppression, to better oneself economically.”  “The mother who braves the hardship and danger 
frequently involved in an illegal entry for the purpose of rejoining her children cannot be held by 
that sole act to be a person of bad character.”24  This argument actually involved a profound 
question, since unauthorized immigration, which the INS described as the most qualifying for 
relief, was the most common grounds for deportation since 1924.  As historian Mae Ngai has 
shown, along with the creation of the Border Patrol in 1924, the 1924 Act situated entry without 
any inspection as the foremost challenge to the regime of immigration restriction, an offense 
deportable any time after entry without any statute of limitations. 25     If unauthorized entry was 
both the most common grounds for deportation and the reason for not deporting the immigrant 
                                                
 
22 Deportation of Criminals Pt.4, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Immigration, 74th Cong., 201-
203 (1936) (Daniel W. MacCormack, INS Commissioner). 
23 Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor 1935, 53. 
24 Report to Accompany List of Stayed Deportation Cases Called for in House Resolution 350. H.doc. No. 
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family, how could the two be reconciled?  The Ellis Island Committee and the INS had very 
different answers to this question, which also pointed to overlapping but ultimately distinct 
interests of the two.  
As much as Perkins was eager for reform, the interest of the INS as a law enforcement 
agency was not ultimately identical with that of immigrant advocacy groups.  The Ellis Island 
Committee portrayed immigrants facing deportation as established members of the society. The 
fact of unauthorized entry mattered less than long residence in the U.S., they argued, and that it 
made more sense to “accept a person already in the United States, already on the road to 
assimilation and of proved character, in place of a new and untried immigrant.”  In fact, along 
with their advocacy for creating a mechanism for lawful nonimmigrants to obtain permanent 
residency, the immigrant advocacy groups emphasized a greater importance in the ties that 
immigrants built through their lives in the U.S. than their formal immigration status.  Also, along 
with family connections, the Ellis Island Committee saw length of residence itself as an 
important tie developed between immigrant and the U.S. 26 
Most fundamentally, the Ellis Island Committee the committee saw deportation “years 
after entry” as unjust, and criticized the 1924 Act for removing statutes of limitations for 
deportation on various grounds.  The committee insisted on restoring general statutory limitation 
that the 1924 Act removed for various grounds for deportation.  Read Lewis of the Foreign 
Language Information Service argued that a statute of limitations was “an established principle 
of legal procedure in dealing with offenses” and that immigration law offense should be no 
exception.27 The committee especially pointed to deportation for unauthorized entry:  “Illegal 
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entry is not an offense which can be classified as malum in se.” Pointing out that absence of 
statute of limitation was “too harsh a penalty of an act which is not wrong in itself,” the 
reformers proposed to restore statutory limitation for irregular immigration as before 1924.   Pre-
1924 immigration laws embodied the idea that initial status or the method of entry mattered less 
than the life spent in the U.S., and included statutory limitation to deportation for entry without 
inspection: three-year residence before 1917, and five-year residence before 1924.   And as a 
way to reconcile statutory limitation with numerical immigration restriction, the committee 
suggested permanent residency granted through suspension of deportation against the quotas, 
since 90 percent of the quotas were being wasted due to visa refusal.28  While the Ellis Island 
Committee emphasized family connections as the most important factor in weighing against 
deportable offenses, it was not the only factor. 
On the other hand, the INS only supported discretionary suspension and not general 
statutory limitation. The former did not limit the power of the agency, since the decision was 
discretionary after all.  More broadly, along with its opposition to statutory limitation, the INS 
was reluctant to attach importance to the length of residence.   In fact, the majority of the 
                                                
 
28  Ellis Island Committee, Report, 88, 98, 135; Due to statute of limitations, in 1924, there were at least 
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deportation cases that the INS had stayed concerned long-term residents; 93 percent had more 
than five-year residence, and 59 percent had more than ten-year residence.   However, the INS 
stressed that the criteria was not the length of residence in itself but ties built over the period with 
a citizen or permanent resident family, and moreover about the rights of family members entitled 
to reside in the U.S.29  Whereas the Ellis Island Committee pointed to family ties as the most 
important factor to consider but not the only factor, the INS pointed to family ties almost 
exclusively.   Furthermore, whereas the Ellis Island Committee sought to place the hardship 
cases in the context of questioning the sharp line drawn between formal permanent resident 
status and other noncitizens, the INS positioned the issue as a minor aspect within its general 
deportation policy.  And with regard to how to weigh unauthorized entry against family ties, 
instead of fully elaborating on this point, MacCormack and the INS pursued a different line of 
argument that emphasized the existence of other immigrants who should be deported, compared 
with whom unauthorized entry was a light offense. 
 
Families and “Criminal Aliens” 
For the INS, the primary interest was in developing a stricter deportation policy and in 
removing “undesirable aliens” from the U.S., and the hardship cases was only a small part of that 
scheme.30 The INS’s call for a stronger deportation power was part of Roosevelt administration’s 
“war against crime,” which significantly expanded the power of federal law enforcement 
agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation. With the volume of immigration small, 
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inspection at ports of entry had become less important.  Instead, as Acting INS Commissioner 
Edward J. Shaughnessy wrote in 1937, the primary work of the INS shifted from “immigration 
control” to “alien policing.”31  And the agency’s sympathy for the hardship cases partly derived 
from the belief that the INS could end unauthorized entry, if they had stronger authority to 
apprehend and deport immigrants.  As MacCormack wrote to Perkins in late 1936, the INS 
intended to “clear up the situation of illegal entrant in this country at one stroke and make a fresh 
start from now on.”  Thus, the agency saw the issue of unauthorized immigration as more of a 
transitory problem rather than as a problem inherent in immigration restriction.32   
  The INS compared the hardship cases to those whom the agency called “criminal aliens.”  
The INS argued that stronger legal power would allow the agency to deport more “criminal 
aliens” and “persons who have entered or remained in the country illegally.” “As opposed to the 
inevitable large increase in the number of deportations made possible,” the INS argued, “the 
number of persons of good character permitted to remain in the country with a view to averting 
the separation of families is comparatively small.”  Furthermore, “this number should rapidly 
decrease as the old cases are cleared up and the proposed new authorities ... become effective.”33  
The INS particularly pointed to crimes involving “moral turpitude,” specifically to crimes 
involving narcotic laws and concealed weapons law.   Under the Immigration Act of 1917, 
deportation for a crime involving moral turpitude required a sentence to imprisonment for one 
year or more.  The INS insisted that this allowed people with multiple convictions to remain in 
the U.S. as long as each sentence was less than a year, and demanded Congress to lower the 
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hurdle for deportation.34  The INS also pointed out that in criminal offenses the judge could 
make a recommendation to the Secretary of Labor to prevent deportation.35  By comparison, the 
INS argued, deportation for immigration offenses was too harsh:  "There is no statute of the 
United States which offers so many loopholes for the escape of the criminal, while at the same 
time imposing such barbarous treatment upon the persons of good character.”36   
Immigrant advocacy groups primarily concerned about establishing a system to cancel 
deportation did not agree with the INS drawing comparison between immigrants of “good moral 
character” and “criminals.”  As the Immigrant’s Protective League of Chicago pointed out, 
emphasis on the non-deportability of “criminal aliens” could only add to the prejudice that 
immigrants had higher crime rate, and in the worst scenario Congress could pass only a harsher 
deportation law without giving consideration to the hardship portion.37   
 Framed within the overall goal of strengthening the agency’s power, the INS did not 
support proposals that worked against that goal.  One of the most significant criticisms of 
deportation proceedings was that the same officer served the function of a prosecutor, judge, and 
                                                
 
34 Under the Immigration Act of 1917, there were three classes of aliens that were deportable for crimes 
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jury. Often, the immigrant was brought in without any preliminary legal proceedings or warrant 
of arrest for an examination by an immigration inspector.  The same inspector applied for the 
warrant of arrest, examined the immigrant to apply for a deportation warrant, which was rarely 
overturned by higher authorities.38   The Ellis Island Committee, for example, suggested that 
administrative officials “exercising quasi-judicial power” should not be influenced by the 
enforcement policies of their superiors and “that all hearings on exclusion and deportation cases 
be held before quasi-judicial officers ... who shall perform no other duties.”39   But the INS 
called for a simpler process that would not only allow local officers instead of the central office 
in Washington DC to issue warrants of arrest, but to allow any INS employee to detain without a 
warrant any person suspected of being deportable.  Such power would enable deportation of 
20,000 criminals, the INS argued.40  
Overlapping but ultimately different interests of the immigrant advocacy groups and the 
INS became apparent when the INS endorsed a deportation bill introduced by Representative 
Martin Dies (D-Texas, 1931-1945), which included a clause on suspension.  Dies offered 
suspension of deportation only as a temporary relief for the maximum of 8,000 immigrants over 
the next four years.  While the INS endorsed the bill, since it at least covered the immediate 
cases stayed by Perkins, immigrant advocacy groups pointed out that expiration of temporary 
measure would only leave a much harsher deportation law, and that suspension of deportation 
should be permanently incorporated into law, not merely a temporary relief for the immediate 
cases stayed by Perkins.  “We hope that discretionary legislation will become permanent 
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legislation on our statute books,” Cecilia Razovsky of the National Council of Jewish Women 
stated at a Senate hearing.41 
It was much to the surprise of reformers that Dies included such clause in his deportation 
bill at all.  Dies was known as an ardent restrictionist among the Southern Democrats.  A vocal 
critic of Frances Perkins, Dies had earlier announced his plans to deport “6,000,000 aliens as a 
partial solution to the unemployment problem.”  He criticized proposals to expand family-based 
non-quota admission as an attempt to break down immigration restriction, opposed suspension of 
deportation, proposed to create a Bureau of Deportation, and demanded deportation of 
communists.42  His intention was to gather support from more moderate congress members to 
realize his own agenda to create a more stringent deportation law. 43  Still, the proposal to invest 
the Secretary of Labor with the authority to suspend deportation -- even for a few years -- met 
strong oppositions from restrictionists including various patriotic societies as well as the 
American Federation of Labor.  Thomas Jenkins (R-Ohio) insisted that Congress should not 
“surrender to the woman down in the Department of Labor or the man who may succeed her, or 
anybody else, our right to determine who should stay here.”44 Much of the opposition in 
Congress came from Southern Democrats and Republicans including Senator James J. Davis (R-
Pennsylvania), former Labor Secretary.  Although the House passed the Dies bill, it was blocked 
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by Senator Robert Reynolds (D-North Carolina) of the Senate Immigration Committee, who 
accused the measure as “an importation, not a deportation bill.”45   
  Failure to pass the Dies bill ended the period of brief cooperation between Dies and the 
Department of Labor, and Dies one again began to accuse Perkins of abusing her power as 
Secretary of Labor.   Deep antagonism of the restrictionists toward Perkins not only had to do 
with the hardship cases.  Added to the accusation that Perkins was harboring illegal immigrants 
was that she was soft on communists.  In June 1938, shortly before the 75th Congress closed, 
Dies was appointed to the chair of special investigative committee House Committee on Un-
American Activities, which would come into full force during the Cold War.  The foremost 
target was Harry Bridges, the leader of the International Longshoremen and Warehousemen 
Union affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, who led the longshoremen strike 
of 1934.  The case of Bridges was different from the hardship cases, because there was no 
deportation order standing against him in the first place, and Perkins saw no reason to press 
charges against him.  But Dies demanded immediate deportation of Bridges, threatening to 
impeach Perkins.46  
 With the attack against INS stepping up, the INS Commissioner James L. Houghteling 
(1937-1940) suggested an alternative strategy for hardship cases.  The commissioner advised 
Perkins that further stays of deportation orders would neither serve the interest of the INS nor 
that of the families.  Five years had elapsed since Perkins first started staying deportation orders, 
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but the absence of Congressional action perpetuated their ambiguous status.  Moreover, although 
the INS insisted that the Secretary of Labor had the power to decide when to execute deportation 
order, the hardship cases had become a weak point of the INS, accused of leniency.47    
 The INS was primarily concerned about immigrant families from Europe.  Since Perkins 
took office the INS had stayed 14 percent of all deportation and voluntary departure cases 
involving European immigrants.  Houghteling’s suggestion was to make Canadian pre-
examination, of which primary function was for lawful nonimmigrants to obtain a visa in Canada, 
applicable to deportable immigrants.48  This method of legalization became closely connected 
with family-based admission under the quotas system, since eligibility depended on having a 
non-quota or preference family status.  And the INS decided to enable deportable immigrants 
who would qualify for a family visa to voluntarily leave the U.S. for Canada and to readmit them.  
Also since the Canadian authorities only granted brief stay on the premise of prompt visa 
issuance, the system worked in favor of those without long wait for a visa such as immigrants 
from countries with large quotas.49    
However, termination of stays of deportation for the “hardship cases” increased the 
number of private bills, or bills written for individuals, as sympathetic Congress members sought 
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relief for families ordered to depart from the U.S.   Some five hundred private immigration bills 
were introduced in the first session of the 76th Congress.  Private immigration bill was an arena 
where various Congress members and the INS contested for power.  For example, House 
Immigration and Naturalization Committee Chair Samuel Dickstein sought to pass a law that 
would require the INS to stop deportation whenever a private relief bill was introduced, to which 
the ed for fear that it would interfere with the independency of the agency.   On one occasion, the 
House spent more than five hours to discuss four individual cases.  Although Congress realized 
that itsburden had increased, Congress was still unwilling to leave the matter with the agency, 
the reason not least being that Perkins oversaw the agency. 50 
 In the meantime, Congressional pressure on Perkins continued to increase.  In early 1940, 
J. Parnell Thomas (R-New Jersey) introduced an impeachment resolution, emphasizing how the 
number of deportations had dropped after Perkins took office.51  Congressional pressure 
compelled Perkins to hold several months of hearing on Harry Bridges, although she eventually 
decided to cancel proceedings.  In February 1940, shortly after her decision not to press charges 
against Bridges, Perkins gave a speech in titled “Deportation of Aliens” at the Commonwealth 
Club of San Francisco.  Her appearance gathered much attention from the audience expecting to 
hear about the case of Bridges.  Instead, Perkins discussed the hardships of family separation, 
and called for legislative reform.52 
In May 1940, the hardship cases took a new turn.  Under the Reorganization Act of 1940, 
the INS was transferred from the Department of Labor to the Department of Justice.  With the 
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war in Europe worsening, the reorganization was based on President Roosevelt’s request to 
coordinate security measures for potential “enemy aliens” residing in the U.S.   More broadly, it 
also showed how the function of the INS had gradually shifted to policing within its borders.  
Also important was antagonism toward Perkins.  According to Representative John Taber (R-
New York), Republicans supported reorganization less because they found the INS to be best 
placed in the Department of Justice than because they wished the INS to be removed from 
Perkins.  Taber insisted that the President did not have “the patriotism or the courage to remove 
the Secretary of Labor ... who for the last seven years has steadily and steadfastly failed and 
refused to enforce the immigration law,” and emphasized that the Attorney General should make 
the INS “about-face on the position that he has followed under Madame Perkins.”53  
Ironically, Congress agreed to take care of the hardship cases only after transfer of the 
INS from the Department of Labor and away from Perkins, who had advocated for the hardship 
cases.  Immediately after the INS was placed in the Department of Justice, the immigration 
committees reported out a broad deportation bill.  The bill significantly expanded the ideological 
grounds for deportation to include teaching, advocating, or joining an organization that taught or 
advocated the "over- throw by force and violence of the Government of the United States," as well as 
criminal grounds for deportation, but also included a clause on discretionary suspension of 
deportation in hardship cases. 54 
 
4.3 From Economic Detriment to Exceptional and Extremely Unusual Hardship 
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 Incorporated into the Alien Registration Act of 1940, Congress placed suspension of 
deportation as an exception to the regime of immigration restriction.  It did not countervene 
racial immigration restriction.  The 1940 Act confirmed that racial exclusion would apply to any 
form of permanent residency by stating that one is eligible for suspension of deportation only if 
one “is not racially inadmissible or ineligible to naturalization.”55 
In two ways, Congress made sure to reconfirm the principle of numerical immigration 
restriction.   For one, when the grounds for deportation was unauthorized immigration, the 1940 
Act charged permanent residency granted through suspension of deportation against the quotas.56  
Regardless of whether it was permanent residency acquired through an immigrant visa or 
through suspension of deportation, Congress remained firm on numerically limiting the number 
of new immigrants / permanent residents.  In fact, since quotas remained unused due to visa 
refusal during the 1930s, this appeared to be a reasonable solution to the reformers to reconcile 
unauthorized immigration with numerical immigration restriction.  However, deduction of quotas 
would create a problem once the quotas were filled again, giving rise to the charge that 
unauthorized immigration was equal to skipping the line while others waited for a visa, and to 
grant permanent residency to unauthorized immigrants would be unfair to others. 
And notably, for lawful nonimmigrants, Congress refused to create a mechanism for 
nonimmigrants without any deportable offenses to obtain permanent residency.  What the 
reformers initially called into question was the sharp distinction drawn between foreigners of 
various immigration status, but the hardship cases became tied to building the deportation regime.  
Ironically, it was only when one became deportable – by overstaying one’s stay permit for 
instance but not while the permit was still valid - that there was a possibility to obtain permanent 
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residency without having to leave the U.S.   Congress maintained that to open the front door for 
nonimmigrants to obtain permanent residency would undermine numerical immigration 
restriction based on limiting the number of visas.   It was not until 1952 that Congress would 
create such mechanism (“adjustment of status” from a nonimmigrant to a permanent resident).  
What cracked this rule was the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, which allowed 15,000 displaced 
persons residing in the U.S. as nonimmigrants to obtain permanent residency, although they were 
mortgaged against the future quotas of their countries of birth.57   
 The phrasing of the conditions on suspension of deportation reflected the arguments 
made for the hardship cases during the Great Depression: “serious economic detriment to a 
citizen or legally resident alien who is the spouse, parent, or minor child.”58   First, the primary 
justification for staying deportation was the possible hardship of the U.S. citizen or permanent 
resident family members that would remain in the U.S. or would have to make the decision of 
whether to accompany the deportee.   Thus, the 1940 Act only referred to the hardship of “citizen 
or legally resident alien” family member entitled to live in the U.S. and not to the deportable 
immigrant.  Second, the term “economic detriment” reflected how the INS emphasized that it 
was not in the economic interest of the U.S. government to deport breadwinners and to add to 
public relief by compelling families to rely on relief.   By contrast, factors such as length of 
residence, statute of limitations, hardship of the deportee himself lost saliency.   
 
Beyond Economic Detriment 
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Despite its limited nature, suspension of deportation procedure was a valuable path for 
mixed status families.  Between 1940 and 1952, the Department of Justice suspended some 
38,000 deportation cases.  Through suspensions granted and through the struggles of much larger 
number of immigrants who were denied relief, mixed status families questioned what exactly 
“serious economic detriment” of the family meant.  Especially important in their struggle was the 
five-member Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) established in 1940 within the Department of 
Justice.  During the 1940s, the BIA annually considered some 3,000 cases regarding various 
aspects of immigration, deportation, and nationality laws.  Although immigrants could also bring 
the case to the federal court through habeas corpus proceedings, they were very rare and much 
more difficult, and hearings by the BIA were often the last hope for immigrant families denied 
relief by the INS.59   
 At one level, the Board of Immigration Appeals sought to articulate “economic detriment” 
in strictly financial terms of lost wage income as a result of deportation, and resulting economic 
difficulty of the family remaining in the U.S.   The BIA pointed to factors such as overall income 
of the household, income of the deportee, how many family members relied on the income, or 
whether the family members in the U.S. supported the deportee, and the cost of maintaining two 
households.60  
 At another level, the Board of Immigration Appeals sought to apply “economic 
detriment” to wider circumstances of family hardship that were not necessarily limited to loss on 
income.   The BIA placed particular emphasis on motherhood.  For instance, in a case of a 
mother relying on public relief with five minor U.S.-born children, the BIA ruled that “economic 
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detriment” of the U.S. citizen children did not require the mother to have wage income.  
Although the family relied on public relief, the BIA decided that a mother’s care of her children 
in itself was “services of economic value to her minor children” and that loss of mother’s care by 
deportation can be considered as “serious economic detriment” to the children.61  On the other 
hand, in a 1949 case, the BIA also decided that even if the family had sufficient financial means 
to support the child by paying for “nurses, governesses or pediatricians,” it did not follow that 
deportation of the mother would cause no detriment to the child.  The BIA agreed with the plea 
that “love and care” of a mother cannot be replaced by any paid service.62  Thus, while 
interpreting family hardship in strictly financial terms at one level, the BIA went beyond literal 
reading of the law, shifting the procedure away from its Great Depression origins. 
 
From Economic Detriment to Exceptional and Extremely Unusual Hardship 
 However, staunch restrictionists and anti-communists that took control of the post-World 
War II immigration committees believed the rulings of the Board of Immigration Appeals had 
become too liberal.  The Cold War and the anti-Communist crusade brought forth the security-
centered aspect and much harsher part of deportation law.  Senator Patrick McCarran (D-
Nevada), Senator James Eastland (D-Mississippi), and Representative Francis Walter (R-
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Pennsylvania) among others pushed for a more stringent law with regard to exclusion and 
deportation of immigrants.   As chair of not only the Senate Judiciary Committee but also of the 
appropriations subcommittee that oversaw the budget of the INS, McCarran exercised strong 
influence on legislation and administration of immigration laws.  In addition to expanding the 
ideological grounds for deportation by the McCarran Internal Security Act of 1950, Congress 
passed a series of laws that left immigrants without sufficient protection and laws that made it 
extreme difficult for deportation to be cancelled, incorporated into the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter Act). 63 	  
  During the debate over the hardship cases in the 1930s, Congress was resistant to accord 
the INS with discretionary power to suspend deportation.  In 1948, Congress reduced the 
discretionary power of the INS in suspension of deportation procedures.  The 1940 Act had 
required the INS to regularly report to Congress all the cases recommended for suspension of 
deportation.  But the law did not require Congressional approval.  Permanent residency was 
granted unless Congress explicitly disapproved of the cases.  To exercise stronger Congressional 
control over the INS and administration of immigration and deportation law, Congress made 
affirmative approval by both houses a requisite to suspension of deportation.  Instead of tacit 
approval of permanent residency, lack of Congressional vote on the INS’s recommendation now 
meant execution of deportation order.  Prior to 1948, Congress rarely disapproved of the INS’s 
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use of discretion, but Congress rejected 14 percent of the 23,329 cases presented to it between 
1948 and 1952.64  
 Moreover, the Senate Judiciary Committee led by McCarran sought to rewrite the law 
entirely to nullify the BIA rulings on suspension of deportation, which they believed had become 
too inclusive.   McCarran insisted that the possibility of obtaining permanent residency through 
suspension of deportation provided an “incentive” for unauthorized immigration and was 
“threatening our entire immigration system.” 65  Immigrant advocacy groups strongly criticized 
the motion to raise the bar for deportable immigrants to acquire permanent residency.   Some 
argued that what was necessary was not more stringent law but to detach suspension of 
deportation from its Great Depression origins.   The Common Council for American Unity, for 
example, urged Congress to remove the word “economic,” because the phrasing calls for “proof 
that the serious detriment be ‘economic’ in character” despite the fact that deportation could 
cause “serious detriment ... although it is not economic in character.”66   The Association of 
Immigration and Nationality Lawyers protested that rewriting of the clause would “create more 
hardship cases than they will solve” and that “we should favor reuniting families – keeping them 
together rather and disrupting them.”67  Immigrant advocacy groups pointed out that Congress 
already had strong control over deportation cases under the 1948 Act, since the INS could not 
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suspend deportation without positive approval by both houses, and called for a more individual 
approach.  
   But Congress ignored all such appeals.   The immigration committees did not deny “in 
almost all cases of deportation, hardship and frequently unusual hardship is experienced by the 
alien or the members of his family who may be separated from the alien.”    However, such 
hardship was secondary to immigration control; “hardship or even unusual hardship to the alien 
or to his spouse, parent, or child is not sufficient” to warrant cancelling an order of deportation.68  
Hardship was inherent in deportation, and to take into consideration hardships of immigrant 
families would undermine the regime, they maintained.  While Congress stopped short of 
eliminating the procedure altogether, Congress imposed an “exceptional and extremely unusual 
hardship” test as the new requirement for suspension of deportation.  In addition, the law also 
limited eligibility to immigrants with continuous residence of five to ten years in the U.S., 
depending on the deportable offense.  Only immigrants that fulfilled both the family hardship 
and residency requirement could be considered for suspension of deportation.69 
   The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 nullified the decade of debate over what 
constituted family hardship (“economic detriment”) that warranted suspension of deportation.  
Between 1941 and 1952, the INS submitted an annual average of 3,500 cases for Congressional 
approval, the majority of which were approved.  But after 1952, both the number of cases 
recommended by the INS and the rate of Congressional approval dropped sharply.  In 1954, the 
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INS submitted only 293 cases, and Congress approved none.70  Compared with the “serious 
economic detriment” standard, few immigrants could meet the new “exceptional and extremely 
unusual hardship” test.   
 
4.4 Country Contiguous to the United States 
  In 1950, after reviewing the legislative process during the 1930s surrounding the 
hardship cases, the Senate immigration subcommittee concluded that “it does not appear that the 
law [regarding suspension of deportation] was prompted by any necessity to give relief to aliens 
who were nationals of territory adjacent to the United States.  The law was enacted principally 
for the benefit of Europeans.”  As difficult as the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” 
test was hard to meet, even more stringent of the INA of 1952 was categorical exclusion of 
immigrants from Mexico and the British West Indies from the procedure, from whence where 
the U.S. was actively recruiting temporary workers. 
The 1940 act was a law passed during the period of low immigration and low 
unauthorized immigration.  In 1940 deportations and voluntary departures combined totaled 
15,500.   Deportations and voluntary departures grew rapidly from 29,000 in 1944 to 565,000 in 
1950, a majority of which concerned Mexican immigrants.  Increase of unauthorized 
immigration was a direct companion to the active recruitment of temporary workers under the 
Bracero Program since 1943, initially in response to wartime labor needs, under which 4.6 
million workers were recruited until 1964. 71  Overstay or simply leaving the contracted 
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workplace immediately made their presence in the U.S. illegal and subjected them to deportation.   
Moreover, the prospect of employment but far fewer formal contracts than the number of 
applicants induced those who could not find a contract to cross the border without inspection.    
 Employers ran less risk from hiring unauthorized workers, since immigration law 
imposed no penalty on the employers for hiring of unauthorized immigrants.  While immigrants 
were constantly exposed to threat of apprehension, employers exploited this imbalance to keep 
workers on the farm only in so long as their labor was needed.  Selective law enforcement by the 
INS encouraged unauthorized immigration.  At budget hearings, Congress members speaking for 
the interest of business often pressured the INS not to deprive the employers of worker during 
the farm season.  The number of apprehensions tended to rise after harvest was over and when 
labor was no longer needed for the year. 72 
The INS enforced immigration law selectively to supply agribusiness with workers.  One 
method carried out alongside the Bracero Program was the so-called “drying out” process.  This 
process, strongly protested by the Mexican government, involved taking unauthorized workers to 
the border, making them cross over to Mexico temporarily, and returning them as formal 
braceros to the U.S. farms where they were formally employed and apprehended.  While 
frequency and scale of this operation varied, in certain years this was the most popular route for 
hiring Bracero workers.   For instance, in 1947, 20,000 Bracero workers arrived in the U.S. after 
formally signing a contract in Mexico.  Another 55,000 workers were contracted after first 
having worked in the U.S. without authorization, and then went through the “drying out” process.  
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In 1949, the latter outnumbered the former by 87,000 to 20,000.   The prospect of employment 
without having to go through recruitment centers encouraged more to take the risk of crossing 
the border. Importantly, this form of legalization appealed to employers because it only made an 
undocumented worker into a lawful yet temporary worker, firmly tied to a specific place of 
employment and to a specific employer.  These workers did not have any rights of collective 
bargaining, and leaving the workplace immediately made their presence in the U.S. unlawful.73 
 By contrast, the INS was reluctant to grant suspension of deportation for Mexican 
workers.  There was a critical difference between legalizations through “drying out” and 
“suspension of deportation.”  Legalization through “drying out” did not endow workers with 
rights attached to permanent residency or immigrant status.   Suspension of deportation provided 
formal permanent residency and rights accorded to a formal immigrant.  Notably, the INS argued 
that three factors obviated the need to suspend deportation for Mexican nationals: 1) 
geographical proximity 2) nonquota status of the natives of the Western Hemisphere and 
theoretically unlimited number of visas 3) option of voluntary departure.  First, the INS insisted 
that making a trip to Mexico involved less hardship than a trip to Europe, since Mexico was 
closer to the U.S.  Second, the INS argued that Mexican immigrants experienced shorter waits 
for a visa than European immigrants, because quota restriction did not apply to natives of the 
Western Hemisphere.  Therefore, the INS argued, voluntary departure, which did not preclude 
the possibility of return with an immigrant visa, did not cause hardship for Mexican families.74   
Because suspension of deportation was “discretionary” after all, Mexican immigrants had 
to take a risk in appealing for suspension of deportation.  Since only those formally charged with 
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deportation could apply for a suspension, appealing for suspension instead of accepting 
voluntary departure could result in formal deportation if their appeals were rejected.  
Nevertheless, mixed status families did not leave silently, but appealed for their families.   In the 
mid-1940s, the Board of Immigration Appeals disagreed with the INS on denying relief to 
Mexican immigrants for the reasons stated above.   For example, in 1946, the BIA heard the case 
of a 50-year old former Bracero worker with a U.S.-born wife and five U.S.-born children.   
Whereas the INS insisted on voluntary departure for his overstay, the BIA acknowledged that “if 
the alien were required to depart to Mexico and wait there for his visa application to be 
processed,” the family waiting for the father / husband’s return would suffer “serious hardship” 
and “real hardship.”  Even if absence from the U.S. was “for a temporary period of time,” the 
BIA ruled that it should not be the reason for having the father depart from the U.S. instead of 
having him stay in the U.S. to establish permanent residency.75  In another 1946 ruling 
concerning a former Bracero worker with a U.S. citizen wife and two children, the BIA pointed 
to the need to consider factors such as  “delay involved in the securement of a visa,” “loss of 
working time” and accordingly loss of income, how they would be “matter of grave 
consequences” to the family.76 
  However, the House and Senate immigration committees would soon insist on 
eliminating the procedure entirely for Mexican immigrants.   After reviewing the deportation 
reform campaign during the 1930s, the Senate immigration subcommittee insisted that “the law 
was prompted by any necessity to give relief to aliens who were nationals of territory adjacent to 
the United States.  The law was enacted principally for the benefit of Europeans.”   Indeed, 
deportation reform advanced by Frances Perkins was primarily concerned about immigrants 
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from Europe, but the law was formally applicable to all except “aliens ineligible to citizenship.”  
While raising the bar from “economic detriment” to “exceptional and extremely unusual 
hardship” for European immigrants, the immigration committees refused to recognize any family 
hardship at all when it came to Mexican immigrants.  
 The motion to penalize the workers heavily met significant opposition from President 
Harry Truman’s Commission on Migratory Labor, which was formed in June 1950 in response 
to the controversy over the Bracero Program.  In a report published in March 1951 after twelve 
hearings, the Commission recommended that the guest worker program should be based on 
intergovernmental agreement, and also that the federal government should exercise stronger 
oversight over working conditions instead of giving free range to the employers.77  Along with 
working conditions of guest workers and its effect on American workers, the issue of 
unauthorized immigration figured prominently in the report.  With regard to unauthorized 
immigration, the Commission suggested penalizing employers for hiring undocumented workers 
(employer sanctions).  The commission believed that employer sanctions would not only reduce 
unauthorized immigration but also alleviate substandard wages and working conditions resulting 
from the hiring of unauthorized workers with virtually no right to make any kind of protest. The 
commission also objected to the practice of contracting unauthorized workers as Bracero workers 
for the purpose of returning them to their employers.78 
Importantly, while the commission proposed stricter law enforcement, they noted that 
proposed changes should not “interfere with hardship cases as authorized by present immigration 
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laws,” in other words with suspension of deportation procedure under the 1940 Act.  Their 
opposition was directed only at “legalization for employment purposes,” that is the so-called 
drying out process of legalizing undocumented workers into Bracero workers who were tied to 
the employer with little bargaining rights.  Unlike the immigration committees, the Commission 
did not direct its criticism at immigrants who formed families in the U.S.79 However, after the 
renewal of the Bracero Program in 1951, the immigration committees pushed for a law that ran 
entirely contrary to the President’s Commission’s recommendation, providing employers with 
more protection while penalizing the immigrants more heavily than before.   
 On the one hand, catering to the interests of agribusiness, in the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952 Congress specifically provided that there shall be no penalty for 
“employment (including the usual and normal practices incident to employment)” of 
unauthorized immigrants.  This infamous clause was named Texas proviso after the agribusiness 
in Texas that powerfully lobbied for the clause, and would remain in place until 1986, protecting 
employers from persecution.80  Second, Congress made “a native of any country contiguous to 
the United States” (Mexico and Canada) and those of “any adjacent islands” (the West Indies) 
categorically ineligible for suspension of deportation, refusing to recognize any hardship for 
mixed status families from Mexico. 81  
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Statutory exclusion from suspension of deportation did not necessarily mean that 
migrants from Mexico were more likely to be formally deported.  As before, deportation required 
the INS to conduct formal investigation and to pay for transportation, which both the INS and 
Congress wanted to avoid.  Rather, elimination of suspension of deportation facilitated the INS 
to conduct investigation in a more casual manner and to induce voluntary departure, since the 
only consequence of refusing to depart from the U.S. was formal deportation.  A major criticism 
of the INS raised in the 1930s concerned abuses resulting from multiple roles played by the INS 
officer in deportation proceedings. The Administrative Procedures Act of 1946 required 
administrative hearings to be conducted by officers that were not primarily investigators and 
enforcement agents, but whether deportation hearing was governed by the law still remained to 
be contested in the late 1940s.  The question seemed to have been settled in 1950, when the 
Supreme Court ruled in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath that the law indeed applied to deportation 
proceedings.  The INS appealed to Congress that the Supreme Court ruling would require 
significant increase in the budget and taskforce of the INS, especially pointing to unauthorized 
immigration from Mexico.  In response, Congress exempted deportation procedure from the 
Administrative Procedures Act.82  Thus, coupled with the exemption of deportation hearing from 
the Administrative Procedures Act, which left immigrants without adequate protection in 
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deportation hearings, the INA of 1952 furthered the vulnerability of workers by assuring the 
employers of non-prosecution while leaving the apprehended immigrants with no other option 
than departure from the U.S., whether through voluntary departure or deportation.83   
   The Board of Immigration Appeal rulings after the passage of the INA reflected 
Congressional sentiment.  Earlier, the BIA had disagreed with how the INS invoked various 
factors to deny family hardship experienced by families of Mexican immigrants.   But this was 
no longer the case after 1952.   In a series of rulings between the passage of the INA in June 
1952 and its effective date in December 1952, the BIA followed the logic of the INA and pointed 
to theoretically unlimited availability of immigrant visas for Mexican nationals as a reason for 
not recognizing economic detriment to mixed status families including U.S. citizens.84  After the 
enforcement of the INA in December 1952, which formally made suspension of deportation 
unavailable to Mexican nationals, the BIA would repeatedly dismiss the claims of Mexican and 
Mexican American families, pointing to statutory exclusion from the procedure under the INA.85  
 Concurrent with the active recruitment of workers, the 1952 exclusion from suspension 
of deportation was a precursor to a series of measures aimed at preventing Mexican agricultural 
workers, whether legally or illegally in the U.S, from settling in the U.S.  In 1955, the INS and 
the Department of State would adopt an unofficial policy of refusing immigrant visas to 
agricultural workers in order to admit them only as braceros and not as formal immigrants.86 In 
1958, Congress extended categorical exclusion of “a native of any country contiguous to the 
United States or of any adjacent islands” to the “adjustment of status” procedure as well, banning 
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not only unauthorized immigrants but lawful braceros still under contract and other 
nonimmigrants from becoming a permanent resident.87  A relaxation of the condition for 
suspension of deportation in 1962, requiring “extreme hardship” for some offenses instead of the 
“exceptional and extremely unusual” test, would remain inapplicable to immigrants from Mexico 
and the West Indies.88  When Congress made adjustment of status or suspension of deportation 
applicable to immigrants from any part of the world in the 1970s, it was contingent upon formal 
numerical restriction on immigration from the Western Hemisphere.   
The formal justification for categorical exclusions of Mexican immigrants from 
acquisition of permanent residency based on family claims was that their “non-quota” immigrant 
status / theoretically unlimited access to visas would obviate the need for admission based on 
other grounds such as family.  As chapter 6 will discuss, coupled with the active recruitment of 
“workers,” absence of any form of family-based admission with regard to Mexico during the 
quotas era reinforced the view that immigration from Mexico was not grounded in family ties or 
based on claims of U.S. citizens and permanent residents, whereas immigration from the Eastern 
Hemisphere was.   
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Table for Chapter 4 
4-1: Suspension of Deportation, 1941-1952 
Year Deportation Voluntary Departure Suspension of 
Deportation 
1941 4,407 6,531 120 
1942 3,709 6,904 751 
1943 4,207 11,947 4,677 
1944 7,179 32,270 3,429 
1945 11,270 69,490 4,914  
1946 14,375 101,945 2,414 
1947 18,663 195,880 5,806 
1948 20,371 197,184 3,160 
1949 20,040 276,297 5,806 
1950 6,628 572,477 3,288 
1951 13,544 673,169 4,267 
1952 20,181 703,778 2,899 
Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Annual Report of the Attorney General (Washington D.C.; G.P.O, 
1941), 14-16; U.S. Department of Justice, INS Annual Report 1943 (Washington D.C.; G.P.O, 1943), 14-
16; INS Annual Report 1944, 18-20; INS Annual Report 1945, 18-19; INS Annual Report 1946, 21-23; 
INS Annual Report 1947, 18, 19; INS Annual Report 1948, 22, 29; INS Annual Report 1949, 17-18, 28; 
INS Annual Report 1950, 50-51; INS Annual Report 1951, 33, 57-58; INS Annual Report 1952, 29, 34-35.
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Part III. Dual-sided Reform   
 
   In September 1965, speaking against the bill that would become the Immigration Act of 
1965, Senator James Eastland (D – Mississippi), chair of the Judiciary Committee argued that 
“much of the criticism of the McCarran-Walter Act stems from the heavy oversubscription of 
this fourth preference class,” especially in Italy. Opposed to the abolition of the national origins 
quotas until the very last minute, Eastland insisted that “unfortunately” family-based admission 
had expanded in a way that he had not imagined when the Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1952 was passed.1  Senator Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina) of the immigration subcommittee 
and also a long-time supporter of the national origins quotas expressed a different view.  Having 
agreed to abolish the national origins quotas, Ervin wrote to Eastland that despite abolition of the 
quotas, family-based admission would ensure that the national origins system would in practice 
live on.2 
The 1952 Act included several reforms to the law.  The most significant was abolition of 
the racial bar to naturalization, which enabled people of Asian descent to become U.S. citizens 
and ended wholesale exclusion of Asian immigrants.  The law created a quota of 2,000 for an 
“Asia-Pacific Triangle,” which included twenty countries and colonies, and assigned a token 
quota of 100 to most countries with the exception of Japan (185).  However, unlike quotas for 
Europe where immigrants were charged against the place of birth regardless of nationality, the 
Asian country quotas and the Asia Pacific Triangle quota were racial quotas that applied not only 
to persons born in those countries but to all persons descended from the region.  The 1952 Act 
counted any individual with one or more Asian parent, regardless of their place of birth or 
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nationality, against both country quota and against the "Asian Pacific Triangle" quota. This was 
done to prevent unfettered Asian immigration from non-quota countries in the Western 
Hemisphere (eg Cuba) and from European colonies with large Asian populations such as Hong 
Kong.  Even if the country quotas were not filled, no quota visas were to be issued if the Asia 
Pacific Triangle quota had been exhausted. 3    
 With regard to Europe, McCarran-Walter Act maintained the national origins quotas 
with no change in the size of each country’s quota.4  Yet, the Senate committee which prepared 
the new omnibus law no longer spoke of “mixing the races.”  Its justification was that it was a 
“method of favoring ‘immigrants considered to be more readily assimilable because of the 
similarity of their cultural background to those of the principal proponents of our population,” 
reflecting that explicit hierarchization of European nationalities was no longer sustainable.5 
The most visible change was in the preference system.   The act accorded highest 
preference to highly skilled immigrants, and their spouse and children.  Second preference were 
for parents and adult unmarried sons and daughters of U.S. citizens (20 percent and any visas 
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longitude and by the parallel 25 south latitude.” The areas included were 1) Afghanistan 2) Bhutan 3) 
Burma 4) Cambodia 5) Ceylon, 6) China 7) Chinese 8) India 9) Indonesia 10) Japan 11) Korea 12) Laos 
13) Nauru (trust territory of Australia) 14) New Guinea (trust territory of Australia) 15) Pacific Islands 
(trust territory of the U.S.) 16) Pakistan 17) Philippines 18) Western Samoa (trust territory of New 
Zealand) 19) Thailand 20) Vietnam.    Japan was assigned a quota of 185, and Chinese (born anywhere in 
the world) were assigned a quota of 105.   Quotas for all others were 100.  
4 However, justification for the quotas showed a change.  In changing the definition, the 1952 law added 
that the quota shall be “the same number which was previously determined in establishing the national 
origins quotas,” and there was no recalculation of the quotas. 
5 Donald Reed Taft, International Migrations: The Immigrant in the Modern World (New York: Ronald 
Press Company, 1955), 416; Importantly, although the size of the quotas remained the same as before, the 
1952 Act also provided different justification for the calculation of the quotas.  The 1952 Act stated that 
each quota was “one sixth of 1 percent of the number of inhabitants in the continental United States in 
1920 attributable by national origin to that quota area.”  The pre-1952 quotas was calculated by applying 
the national origins ratio to the figure of 150,000, which was a sum of the 2 percent of the European-born 
population in 1890.  “One sixth of 1 percent of the number of inhabitants in the continental United States 
in 1920 attributable by national origin to that quota area” was a figure that only happened to be the closest 
to the original quotas.  Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 249-250. 
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unused by first preference), and fourth preference for adult married sons and daughters, and 
brothers and sisters regardless of age or marital status, if there were any visas that remained 
unused by the first three preferences. 
 Although the 1950s is often described as a period of little change in the national origins 
quotas, as Eastland spoke of the expansion of family-based admission, by 1959, the basic 
framework of what would be considered a “family” and how family relations would be classified 
in 1965 was determined.  With particular attention to the campaign by Italian American 
organizations, chapter 5 discusses their challenge to the nuclear family based model of family-
based admission and the lasting change in immigration law achieved by the movement.   6  7   
       Chapter 6 looks into the final phase of the abolition of the national origins quotas.    It 
will examine the dual aspects of family-based admission, seen by the defenders of the national 
origins quotas both as a threat to immigration restriction and at the same time as a means to 
preserve the national origins quotas.   While liberals saw family-based admission more as a 
matter of rights of citizens and residents, defenders of the national origins quotas associated 
family-based admission with ethnoracial similarity, which in fact displayed how the meaning of 
national origins and family had changed since the 1920s.  Next, it will examine how after 1965 
the notion that families should be treated “equally,” and family-unification as pillar of the 
                                                
 
6  The Immigration and Nationality Act exempted spouse and minor children of U.S. citizens from the 
quota restriction.  Within the quotas for each nationality, first preference (50 percent) was given to skilled 
immigrants, their accompanying spouse and minor children.   Second preference (30 percent) was given 
to parents of U.S. citizens.   Third preference (20 percent) was given to spouse and minor children of 
permanent residents.   Unused quotas were divided between fourth-preference relatives and non-
preference immigrants, 25 percent to the former and 75 percent to the latter.                  
7 Fourth-preference class was divided into 20 percent for unmarried adult sons and daughters of U.S. 
citizens (first preference), 10 percent for married sons and daughters (fourth-preference), and 24 percent 
for brothers and sisters regardless of marital status (fifth-preference).  See Appendix A 
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Chapter 5: Expanding the Boundary of Family, 1953-1959 
      
In October 1958, a woman in San Diego who sent for her son and his family in Italy 
wrote to the American Committee on Italian Migration (ACIM), an Italian-American lobbying 
and immigrant aid organization: “When I filed petition for my son about six years ago I was led 
to believe that it was a matter of few months until he could come here.  ...  He is partly employed 
in Italy and lives with his wife and children in one room.  I send him as much help as I can. ... I 
pray with all my heart that you may be able to help me, for he is my son and I suffer the pain and 
the worry of a mother.”1  
The letter entailed one of the most divisive issues in the late 1950s to the early 1960s 
about the boundaries of family-based immigration: the issue of so-called “fourth-preference 
relatives” of U.S. citizens, which included sons and daughters over twenty-one, married sons and 
daughters, and siblings regardless of age and marital status.  According to Representative Francis 
Walter (D-Pennsylvania), the author of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, such cases 
“most definitely does not belong in the notion of ‘family reunion.’”  They were “not belonging to 
families already established in the United State but, obviously constituting new family units.”2   
Edward Swanstrom, the Executive Director of the Catholic Relief Service responded, “You 
mentioned we would be bringing in new families and not simply uniting members of families 
who were separated.  This is true in a sense, but then they are all closely related to families that 
                                                
 
1 “Appeals for Help on 4th Preference Cases Increase Daily,” ACIM Dispatch 7 no. 7 (November 1958): 3. 
2 Francis Walter, letter to Edward E. Swanstrom, Executive Director of the Catholic Relief Service, 
September 18, 1961, folder “1962 Legislation—Correspondence with Walter,” box E85, American 
Committee on Italian Migration Records 001, Center for Migration Studies, Staten Island. (Hereafter, 
ACIM Records 001) 
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are already here.”3  The primary issue had to do with how marital status determined the boundary 
of family.      
 Scholarship often treats the various laws passed from 1952 to 1965 as piecemeal laws 
that fell short of eliminating the national origins quotas.   While this is true to a certain extent, 
this framing has obscured our understanding of family unification debates in the 1950s.   This 
chapter first examines the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 in the history of family unification.  The 
bulk of the literature on the Refugee Relief Program has been produced by scholars of refugee 
policy, and the act has rarely been examined in the context of family unification, save for studies 
on adaption.4    However, the family question was prominent in post-war refugee law and 
practice: 32 percent of 180,000 Refugee Relief Act immigrants were relatives of U.S. citizens 
and permanent residents.  Specifically, four out of sixteen admission categories were reserved for 
family-based admission.5  In all, some 46,000 Italians and 7,500 Greeks immigrated as relatives, 
and one quarter of all Refugee Relief Program immigrants were Italian relatives.   Second, it was 
the first post-1952 law that claimed family unification as one of its purposes, which set the 
precedent for four additional laws passed in 1957, 1959, 1961, and 1962. Third, it allowed family 
immigration in a manner that was not possible under general immigration law.       
 The latter half of the chapter looks into the Immigration Act of 1959, with particular 
attention to the campaign that the American Committee on Italian Migration (ACIM) launched to 
challenge the nuclear family model of family unification in order to enable immigration of adult 
                                                
 
3 Swanstrom to Walter, April 1, 1972, folder “1962 Legislation—Correspondence with Walter,” box E85, 
ACIM Records 001.  
4 For example, Gil Loescher and John A. Scanlan, Calculated Kindness: Refugees and America’s Half-
Open Door, 1945-Present (New York; Free Press, 1983);  Michael Gill Davis, “The Cold War, Refugees, 
and U.S. Immigration Policy, 1952-1965,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1996; Carl Bon 
Tempo, Americans at the Gate: The United States and Refugees during the Cold War (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2008)  
5 1) orphans 2) Italian 3) Greek and 4) Dutch relatives of U.S. citizens and permanent residents.   
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or married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens, and siblings (regardless of age or marital status) 
of U.S. citizens.6  Such relations were called “fourth-preference” relatives under the INA of 1952, 
and would receive 54 percent of all visas under the Immigration Act of 1965, which laid the 
grounds for further immigration of families after the 1970s.   Before 1965, admission of fourth-
preference relatives was most associated with immigration from Italy and Greece, where the 
backlog was the longest, but their struggles and debates have only started to gather scholar 
inquiry.   The 1965 Act was nicknamed the “brothers and sisters act” by some critics, since it 
reserved 24 percent of the visas for siblings, and a few studies discuss the matter in relation to 
brothers and sisters.7  However, the issue before 1965 had less to do with siblings than with how 
marital status determined the boundary of family.     Lastly, this chapter will discuss where the 
interests of expediting family immigration and the broader challenge to abolition of the quotas 
diverged. 
 
5.1. The Emergency Migration Program and the Refugee Relief Act 	  
                                                
 
6 Some 60,000 Italians immigrated to the U.S. under the Refugee Act of 1953.  Additional 48,000 Italians 
were admitted under the Act of September 11, 1957, Act of September 22, 1959, Act of September, 1961, 
and the Act of October 24,1962; INS Annual Report 1963, table 6F; INS Annual Report 1965, table 6D; 
INS Annual Report 1966, table 6E and 6F. 
7 For early study on immigration reform movement by Italian-Americans, Frank J. Cavaioli, "Chicago’s 
Italian Americans Rally for Immigration Reform." Italian Americana 6, no. 2 (September 1980): 142-156, 
and Cavaioli, "Italian Americans Slay the Immigration Dragon: The National Origins Quota System." 
Italian Americana 5 no. 1 (March 1979): 71-100.  The most recent and comprehensive study on and the 
American Committee on Italian Migration is Danielle Battisti, “Relatives, Refugees, and Reform: Italian 
Americans and Italian Immigration during the Cold War, 1945-1965,” Ph.D. Dissertation, State 
University of New York at Buffalo, 2010, and Battisti, “The American Committee on Italian Migration, 
Anti-Communism, and Immigration Reform,” Journal of American Ethnic History 31 no. 2 (2012): 11-40.  
Battisti does not discuss the issue of fourth-preference relatives; For a policy-elite focused study that 
discusses the issue of fourth-preference Italian backlog, see Philip Eric Wolgin, chapter 3 ““A Great Part 
of Our Moral and Spiritual Fiber”: The Development of Family Reunification in U.S. Immigration Policy, 
1948-1968,” In “Beyond National Origins: The Development of Modern Immigration Policy Making,” 
Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 2011, 56-93. Wolgin discusses the fourth-
preference issue solely in terms of brothers and sisters. 
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On December 4, 1953, four months after the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 was enacted, the 
U.S. Ambassador to Italy Clare Boothe Luce issued the first Refugee Relief Act visa in Naples to 
Michele Sannio, a 30-year old lithographer.   His parents Maria and Luciano Sannio lived in 
Newark, New Jersey, and Michele had not seen his father in twenty-one years.   On arriving at 
the Port of New York in late December, he was “greeted with unbounded joy” by his parents.8  
On January 2, 1954, a 12-year-old Stamatoula Roumania arrived at the New York International 
Airport as the first Refugee Relief Act immigrant from Greece.  The New York Times reported 
how the law realized the “Reuniting of a Family after 5 years.”  At a ceremony held at the airport, 
Stamatoula was met by her parents living in Denver, Colorado, representatives of Greek-
American associations, and various government officials including the INS Commissioner 
Argyle M. Mackey, who had flown to Athens a few days earlier to hand a visa himself to 
Stamatoula.   Her father had immigrated to the U.S. in 1948, and her mother joined him in mid-
1953 with a visa issued for a spouse of a permanent resident.  Stamatoula was supposed to come 
with her mother, but when they were about to leave for the U.S. she contracted an illness and 
was placed in the custody of her grandmother in Athens.   She had to forfeit her long-awaited 
visa, and was once again put at the end of the waiting list, but was saved by the Refugee Relief 
Act that provided visas to Greeks outside the national origins quotas restiction.9  
The majority of the immigrants that arrived in the initial years of the Refugee Relief 
Program were cases like Michele Sannio and Stamatoula Roumania, who received a visa based 
on their family relations to U.S. citizens and permanent residents and not on their refugee status.  
                                                
 
8 William F. Kelly, ‘The Need for a More Liberal Attitude on Migration,” ACIM Dispatch 3 no. 1 
(February 1954): 2; First Refugee Act Immigrant Thanks ACIM,” ACIM Dispatch 3, no. 2 (March 1954): 
1. 
9 “First Greek Lands under ’53 Law, Reuniting a Family after 5 Years.”  New York Times, January 3, 
1954. 
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The Refugee Relief Act provided sixteen classes of admission, four of which were based on 
family connections: 1) adopted orphans or orphans to be adopted, 2) Italian relatives of U.S. 
citizens and permanent residents, 3) Greek relatives of U.S. citizens and permanent residents, 
and 4) Dutch relatives of U.S. citizens and permanent residents. They were called “preference 
cases” or “relative preference cases” according to how the INA of 1952 defined family relations 
(second, third, and fourth preference were for family-based admission).   Sannio was an adult son 
of U.S. citizen (fourth-preference), and Roumania was a minor daughter of a permanent resident 
(third-preference). 10    
  
“Overpopulation” and Emergency Migration Program   
   Signed seven months after the enforcement of the INA of 1952, the Refugee Relief Act 
originated in the “Emergency Migration Program” proposed by President Harry Truman in 
March 1952 and revived by President Dwight Eisenhower in April 1953.   Truman and 
Eisenhower sought to address the two intertwined issues: residual refugees from the end of 
World War II and overpopulation in geopolitically important areas.  “Overpopulation” was not a 
tern that simply referred to population density as such.   It was more of a political vocabulary in 
which the main concerns lay in whether the country’s economy was strong enough to support the 
population, and if not, in the possibility of political unrest, and most importantly in whether 
economic and political instability might lay the grounds for the expansion of Communist 
influence.11    
                                                
 
10 This later became seventeen to include Hungarian refugees; Only relatives were admitted in the first 
year, and as of June 1955, 84 percent of the 21,000 visas had been issued to relatives. INS Annual Report 
1953, 14; Bon Tempo, Americans at the Gate, 56. 
11 INS Annual Report 1953, 14; Davis, “The Cold War, Refugees, and U.S. Immigration Policy,” 74-76; 
Bon Tempo, Americans at the Gate, 35. 
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            On March 24, 1952, three months before the expiration of the Displaced Persons Act of 
1948 (hereafter DP Act) and the INA of 1952 became law, Truman asked Congress to authorize 
a program to “aid in alleviating the problems created by communist tyranny and overpopulation 
in Western Europe.”  As Truman spoke of the need to “continue our participation in the 
international effort now being made to assist in the migration and resettlement ... from the 
overpopulated areas of Western Europe,” the administration had committed to the founding of 
the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM), which began operating a 
month before.12  Truman’s message placed foremost emphasis on how the weak economy and 
“overcrowded conditions” in certain countries posed a threat to the “free nations.”  Communism 
was both the reason and the possible result of the situation.    
Throughout the Soviet dominated area of central and eastern Europe, the communist 
regimes are increasing their repressive measures.  ... The people in all these groups come 
into areas where, for the most part, the local economy is unable to support the population 
already there. Western Germany, for example, is overcrowded with almost nine million 
people of German ethnic origin who were driven there from Eastern Europe after the war. 
Trieste, which is receiving many of those escaping from the satellites, is badly 
overcrowded. Italy is struggling with very serious problems of overpopulation and is 
urgently trying to resettle large numbers of its people overseas. Greece faces great 
difficulty in absorbing the refugees of Greek origin who are being driven out of the 
Balkan satellites by the communists. Thus, the brutal policies of Soviet tyranny are 
aggravating overcrowded conditions which are already a danger to the stability of these 
free nations.13  
                                                
 
12 The purpose of ICEM was to facilitate emigration from countries such as Italy, Greece, the Netherlands, 
Austria, and Germany, where “surplus” population was estimated to be three and a half million, to 
countries such as Australia, Canada, the U.S., and Latin American countries. Until October 1952, ICEM 
was called the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants. Edward Marks, 
“Internationally Assisted Migration: ICEM Rounds out Five Years of Resettlement,” International 
Organization 11 no. 3 (1957): 481-494; Emergency Immigration Program  6; Loescher and Scanlan, 
Calculated Kindness, 47.  
13 Harry S. Truman: "Special Message to the Congress on Aid for Refugees and Displaced Persons.," 
March 24, 1952. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14435; 
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 Truman’s emphasis on “Western Europe” had two meanings.   At one level, Western 
Europe in Cold War context was different from how Congress in the 1920s  that created the 
national origins quotas contrasted Western Europe with Southern and Eastern Europe.   As 
historian Carl Bon Tempo argues in his study on refugee policy, “ethnonational conception of 
national identity had lost ground to a political identity.”14 Truman’s reference to countries such 
as Italy and Greece, which had long been classified as Southern Europe and still was treated as 
such in the context of immigration policy, as part of Western Europe highlighted the division 
between the “free” West and the communist East in Cold War.   Immigration policy had to be 
formulated in such a way as to ensure that they would remain as part of the West.      
 At another level was the differentiation between Europe and Asia.  The proposal that 
emigration and moreover admission to the U.S. could be a solution to weak economy and 
political instability only applied to Europe.   The Truman administration and the liberals were 
very clear that they did not consider emigration or admission to the U.S. as a possible option for 
the overpopulation or refugee situation in Asia.  In June 1952, the same month that Congress 
passed the INA of 1952, betraying liberals’ hope for the abolition of the national origins quotas, 
Truman appointed the President’s Commission on Immigration and Naturalization to present 
alternative views of more liberal immigration policy.   Chair of the commission was the recently 
retired Solicitor General Philip Perlman, and the subchairman was Earl G. Harrison, the INS 
Commissioner under FDR administration (1941-1944) whose 1945 report on Jewish Displaced 
Persons formed the basis of the DP Act.  As chair of the National Committee on Immigration 
Policy formed in 1945, Harrison had also been part of private efforts to modify the national 
origins quotas system.  The commission called in witnesses that had been intentionally excluded 
                                                
 
14 Bon Tempo, Americans at the Gate, 43. 
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from the Congressional hearings for the INA of 1952 led by McCarran, such as voluntary 
agencies engaging in immigration and refugee aid.15 
 With regard to Asia, the President’s Commission and its 1953 report Whom We Shall 
Welcome were highly critical of the outright racial discrimination against Asian immigrants 
under the INA of 1952, where a person with one “Asian” parent was charged against the quotas 
of both the country of parent’s ancestry (100 for most countries) and of regional quotas for the 
“Asia Pacific Triangle” (2,000) regardless of where the immigrant himself /herself was born. 16  
Still, when it came to refugee and overpopulation, the Commission stressed that admission to the 
U.S. was not a possibility for Asia.   According to the Commission, the problems of refugee and 
overpopulation in Europe were not entirely divisible, and were “transitory problems” that could 
both be relieved somewhat by migration to the U.S. although not entirely.   By contrast, the 
report strongly emphasized that Commission did not see migration as any solution to problems in 
Asia.  
 The best scientific and professional advice available to the Commission is to the  effect 
that migration offers no solution to overpopulation on the Asiatic mainland.  No 
conceivable migratory movement could provide substantial relief for present  Asian surplus 
population ...On the other hand, for Western Germany, Greece, Italy,  the Netherlands, and 
perhaps Japan, the need is different.   Emigration can serve as  a safety valve for transitory 
problems of critical population pressures. 
 
The Commission offered similar views on refugees, arguing that admission to the U.S. was a 
partial solution to the situation in Europe but not to Asia.  
 In Europe, the problems of refugees, expellees, escapees, and displaced persons are 
 now finite.  In Europe, the problem of refugees, expellees, escapees, and displaced 
                                                
 
15 Loescher and Scanlan, Calculated Kindness, 4-6, 47; Roger Daniels, Guarding the Golden Door: 
American Immigration Policy and Immigrants since 1882 (New York: Hill and Wang, 2004), 117; For the 
list of witnesses, President’s Commission on Immigration and Naturalization, Whom We Shall Welcome, 
285-301. 
16 President’s Commission on Immigration and Naturalization, Whom We Shall Welcome, 52-54. 
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 persons are not finite.  With a coordinated international effort, in which the United 
 States would play its part, the end of these European refugee and related problems is 
 in sight.  Unfortunately the same cannot be said for the refugee situation in Asia ...  
 The problems of overpopulation and refugees in Asia are of vital importance to  world 
peace. Their solution, however, cannot – as it can be in Europe, find major  relief through 
migration.17  
Thus, proposal to admit certain number of immigrants from countries such as Italy and Greece 
stood on two grounds: redrawing the lines within Europe along the Cold War West/East line and 
by emphasizing the difference from Asia. 
           In offering admission outside the quotas system to immigrants from Europe, both Truman 
and Eisenhower placed similar emphasis on admitting nationals of strategically important areas 
in Europe as on admission of expellees and escapees.  Specifically, Truman requested non-quota 
admission of 300,000 persons over a three-year period: 21,000 religious and political refugees 
from communism in eastern Europe, 22,500 Greek nationals, 22,500 Dutch nationals, 108,000 
Italian nationals, and 117,000 Germans and persons of German ethnic origin.  Eisenhower 
proposed to admit 240,000 persons over a two-year period: 110,000 for German expellees, 
15,000 for escapees in NATO countries, Turkey, or in Trieste, 75,000 Italian national or those of 
Italian ethnic origin, 20,000 Greek national or those of Greek ethnic origin, and 20,000 Dutch 
national or those of Dutch ethnic origin.18   What should be noted here is that the original 
proposals did not place importance on refugee status.  Whereas the initial idea was to simply 
admit a certain number of Italian, Greek, and Dutch immigrants outside the quotas, Congress 
made refugee status and family connection as the two pre-requisites.  Some scholars have 
                                                
 
17 President’s Commission on Immigration and Naturalization, Whom We Shall Welcome, 64; Wolgin, 
“Beyond National Origins,” 147-148. 
18 Truman administration bill was introduced by Emanuel Celler (D-NY); Eisenhower administration bill 
was introduced by Senator Arthur Watkins (R-UT); Loescher and Scanlan, Calculated Kindness, 45; For 
discussion of “escapee” as a distinct Cold War construction  differentiated from refugees or immigrants, 
see Susan L. Carruthers, “Between Camps: Eastern Bloc ‘Escapees’ and Cold War Borderlands,” 
American Quarterly 57, no. 3 (2005): 911-942. 
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described the relatives clause as an anomaly of the Refugee Relief Act, but the original plan was 
titled the “Emergency Migration Act” and did not require refugee status of Italians, Greek, and 
Dutch. 19 
 Among the three countries of Italy, Greece, and Netherlands, the political situation in 
Italy posed particular concern to both administrations.    A high unemployment rate, with 2.5 
million unemployed, low wages, and the return of 500,000 colonists from the former Italian 
colonies in Africa were all perceived to be sources of political unrest.   The June 1953 election, 
in which the Communist Party carried 36 percent of the vote, only deepened the fear of 
Communist takeover.  In the case of Netherlands, the two main problems were high birth rates, 
and unemployment in agriculture.   As with Italy, another issue in the Netherlands was migration 
from the former colonies, where independence of the former Dutch colony Indonesia resulted in 
migration to Netherlands of the so-called Indo-Dutch population. 20 Nevertheless, the 
perseverance of the national origins quotas by the INA of 1952 not only made immigration to the 
U.S. a small possibility but only sent the message that the U.S. had no intention to open its own 
door. 
 Unlike Truman and the Democrats such as Senator Herbert Lehman (D-NY) and 
Representative Emanuel Celler (D-NY), Eisenhower administration and the Republicans did not 
insist on amending the national origins quotas.   In fact, prior to the passage of the INA of 1952, 
leading immigration reformers in Congress such as Lehman and Celler still stopped short of 
advocating for abolition of the quotas system altogether.  For example, the major counter-bill to 
McCarran-Walter bill proposed to raise the overall quotas, recalculate the quotas based on the 
most recent census of 1950, and to redistribute unused quotas from undersubscribed countries to 
                                                
 
19 Loescher and Scanlan, Calculated Kindness, 47. 
20 Davis, “The Cold War, Refugees, and U.S. Immigration Policy,” 74-76.  
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oversubscribed countries.21   Many reform bills until the early 1960s proposed increase in overall 
quotas, recalculation of quotas, and redistribution of quotas.   But after 1952 there also emerged 
a more frontal attack on the quotas system itself.   Since 1953, Lehman and Celler would 
introduce a series of bills to replace the national origins quotas with what President Truman’s 
Commission named “unified quota system” under which no country had a pre-fixed quota larger 
than others.22   On the other hand, Republicans remained silent about the national origins quotas 
during the debates about the refugee relief program.   In a manner somewhat similar to how the 
DP Act was passed by disassociating admission of displaced persons from the reevaluation of the 
quotas system, Eisenhower disassociated emergency migration program from the national origins 
quotas system for fear of being attacked as attempting to destroy the INA of 1952.   Republican 
Senators agreed to table any discussion of the quota system until the expiration of the Refugee 
Relief Act. 23    
            The proposal to admit non-refugees outside the quotas faced opposition from two entirely 
different standpoints.   One objection was that the scale of the program was far from adequate to 
address both the issue of refugees and overpopulation, especially with regard to the latter, and 
that if the Congress was willing to admit 240,000 persons outside the quotas the visas would be 
                                                
 
21 Daniel Tichenor, Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2002), 189-190; Aristide Zolberg, A Nation by Design: Immigrant Policy in the 
Fashioning of America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 314-315. 
22  During the discussion of the emergency migration program and the refugee relief act, Lehman was the 
only Senator who insisted on the floor that it “does not do the slightest thing to correct the deficiencies, 
the evils, and the defects of the McCarran-Walter Act.” 97 Cong. Rec. 10107 (1953); Instead of fixing the 
number of visas, they sought to maintain some flexibility in the allocation.   250,000 (maximum for one 
country 37,500),   Family max 50 percent (125,000) to families within the third degree of consanguinity, 
occupational max 20 percent (50,000), refugee asylum (maximum 20 percent), national interest 
(maximum 20 percent), and new seed migration  (maximum 20 percent).   Outside numerical restrictions 
were parents of U.S. citizens, as well as spouse and minor children.  Where the Lehman-Celler proposals 
crucially differed from the Truman Presidential Commission was that they proposed to cap immigration 
from the Western Hemisphere as well. 
23 Davis, “The Cold War, Refugees, and U.S. Immigration Policy,” 87; Tichenor, Dividing Lines, 183. 
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best put to use by reserving them all for refugees.   This was the position of Protestant 
organizations involved in refugee aid such as the National Council of the Churches, Church 
World Service, and the National Lutheran Council.   At hearings, they insisted on focusing on 
“people who have been uprooted from their homes by war and the aftermath of war.”   Instead of 
directly approaching the issue of overpopulation as such, they maintained that admission of 
refugees, expellees, and escapees would indirectly alleviate overpopulation.   For instance, with 
regard to Italy, they proposed that special visas be reserved for returnees from former Italian 
colonies in Ethiopia and northern Africa.   This diverged from the positions of Catholic and 
Jewish organizations.  Catholic organizations such as the National Catholic Welfare Conference 
viewed emergency migration program both as a means to aid refugees and as a means to enable 
immigration of co-religionists from countries where quotas were oversubscribed.  After the 
founding of Israel in 1948, Jewish organizations had less direct interest in bringing their co-
religionists to the U.S. than before, but neither did they insist on limiting the emergency 
migration to refugees.24     
           An entirely different kind of opposition came from restrictionist concerns about the 
“destruction of the national origins quotas system.”  Whereas the disagreement among refugee 
aid agencies concerned whom the program should prioritize, McCarran and Walter were against 
the President’s proposal as a whole and wished to kill the entire bill if possible.  The foremost 
opposition of the restrictionists was that the program would open the door to communists.   The 
portion to admit a certain number of Italian, Greek, and Dutch nationals invited additional 
                                                
 
24 Neuringer, American Jewry and United States Immigration Policy,370-371; Emergency Immigration 
Program: Hearing before the House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee no. 1, 83rd Cong. 110-124 
(1953) (Paul Empie, National Council of Churches and National Lutheran Council); Hearing on 
Emergency Migration of Escapees, Expellees, and Refugees: Hearing before the Senate Committee on 
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization, 83rd Cong., 102- 103 (Walter W. Van Kirk, 
National Council of the Churches of Christ I n the United States of America) 
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objections, since it practically meant raising the ceiling for countries where high demand of visas 
far exceeded the quotas.   Restrictionists feared it would “set a precedent for complete 
destruction of the national origins quota system” and the INA of 1952 that went into effect only a 
few months earlier.   If there were to be any temporary law, McCarran insisted on an all-refugee 
law and the Senate renamed “Emergency Migration Act” into “Refugee Relief Act.”  
Nevertheless, Senate did not entirely close the opportunity for Italians, Greeks, and Dutch.  In 
addition to reducing the number of visas, the Senate included refugee status as a requirement.25  
As Senator Arthur Watkins (R-Utah), sponsor of the administration bill, commented that “it was 
because we could not get the bill through ... that we had to take the refugee program,” supporters 
of the initial emergency migration program saw the refugee status requirement as a compromise 
for getting a bill passed.26    
            As a compromise, Congress established two admission classes for Italy, Greece, and 
Netherlands: refugees and relatives.   For Italians, 45,000 visas were allocated to refugees, and 
15,000 to relatives.   For Greeks and Dutch, 15,000 visas were allocated to refugees and 2,000 to 
relatives.  Originally, the relatives clause was based on the “preference system” that the 
emergency migration borrowed from the DP Act, which was the post-WWII act with the most 
extensive definition of relatives.  In addition to the primary criteria of defining “displaced 
persons,” the law included a secondary preference system, one of which covered “blood relatives 
of citizens or lawfully admitted alien residents of the United States, such relationship in either 
case being within the third degree of consanguinity computed according to the rules of the 
                                                
 
25 Emergency Migration Act of 1953. S. Rep. No. 83–629 (1953); 99 Cong. Rec. 10110-10111 (1953) 
(Senator Patrick McCarran); Bon Tempo, Americans at the Gate, 41. 
26 To Amend the Refugee Relief Act of 1953: Hearing on H.R. 8193 and S. 3005: Hearing before the 
Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary Committee, 84th Cong. 17, 25-26 (1954). 
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common law.” (section 6c) 27  In other words, it extended to relations such as nieces and nephews, 
uncles and aunts, and theoretically great-grandchildren and great-grandparents of both citizens 
and permanent residents.  This was a much wider conceptualization of relatives than the then-in-
effect 1924 Act, which only considered spouse (wife more than husband), minor children (non-
quota) parents of U.S. citizens (first preference), and spouse and minor children of permanent 
residents (second preference) as relatives for purposes of admission.28 Initially, Eisenhower’s 
emergency migration program drew on the DP Act, and gave preference to blood relatives within 
the third degree of consanguinity.  However, a temporary legislation prompting revision of 
general immigration law was what the restrictionists most wanted to avoid, and they sought to 
make the emergency migration program conform as much as possible to the INA of 1952.  
Congress narrowed the definition of relatives to match the three family-based preference classes 
under the INA of 1952:  parents of U.S. citizens (second preference), spouses and unmarried 
minor children of permanent residents (third preference), siblings of U.S. citizens, and married or 
adult sons and daughters of U.S. citizens (fourth preference).29 
However, despite the nativists’ intention, the Refugee Relief Act would fuel criticism 
against the INA of 1952.  Precisely because family-based admission under the two laws closely 
resembled each other, both in terms of the range of relatives and in the system of family 
petitioning, the Refugee Relief Act was characterized as a law to provide relief for relatives 
                                                
 
27 This does not suggest that the DP Act as a whole was liberal.  All persons admitted under the DP Act 
were charged against the future quotas. The most controversial preference was that for agricultural 
workers (section 6a), inserted in order to keep out Jewish immigrants. 
28 Although the definition of relatives under the Displaced Persons Act was never wholly incorporated 
into general immigration law, various bills in the 1950s referred to this definition.   For instance, Herbert 
Lehman (D-NY), Emanuel Celler (D-NY), and John F. Kennedy (D-MA) adopted this definition in their 
proposals to abolish the national origins quotas system.    
29 “For the Information of Our Reader,” ACIM Dispatch  3, no. 6 (October 1954): 3; “How American 
Citizens Can Help Others to New Lives in the United States,” ACIM Dispatch 3, no. 9 (December 1954): 
5; Box D1, ACIM 001  
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prevented from immigrating to the U.S. by the long backlog caused by the national origins 
quotas system.   And the amendment made to the original Refugee Relief Act in 1954 would 
further highlight the problem of family separation.  
(Table 5-1: Immigrants Admitted under the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 on page 259) 
 
National Origins Quotas and National Security: The 1954 Amendment to the Refugee Relief Act 
 
Despite its initial emphasis as an all-refugee law, on August 31, 1954, Congress amended 
the Refugee Relief Act and dropped the emphasis on refugee status.   Along with the identical 
definition of relatives, this blurred the line between admission of relatives under emergency 
legislation and general immigration law.  Whereas the original formula divided visas between 
relatives and refugees with emphasis on the former, the 1954 amendment made 60,000 Italian 
visas, 17,000 Greek visas, and 17,000 Dutch visas available for both refugees and relatives 
without any prefixed number for either.   This amendment was proposed at a very early stage of 
the Refugee Relief Program, and only six persons had arrived in the U.S. when House passed the 
amendment in March 1954.30          
         The Department of State’s Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, which was responsible 
for the administration of the Refugee Relief Program, divided the program into “two separate 
and distinctly different phases of the operations.”  The first phase was to issue 19,000 visas to 
Italian, Greek, and Dutch relatives of U.S. citizens and permanent residents.  Although all 
persons applying for a Refugee Relief Act visa were subject to rigid screening, admission of 
relatives was considered to proceed the fastest, since the procedure had much in common with 
                                                
 
30 “Refugee Program to be Stepped Up,” New York Times January 31, 1954. 
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the general system of family petitioning by U.S. citizens and permanent residents, a long-
established practice for family visas since 1924.31   
  Admission of 190,000 refugees, escapees, expellees, and orphans adopted by U.S. 
citizens was placed as the second phase of the Refugee Relief Program.  The law required 
refugees, escapees, and expellees to secure a job and housing assurances, and the Department of 
State decided to let the assurances accumulate before they sent staffs to various countries to 
administer the program.    Assurance was the first of the numerous hurdles.  The Refugee Relief 
Act required a concrete proof of job and housing as well as a proof that they would not displace a 
U.S. citizen from the job or housing.   Furthermore, the law accepted only assurances by 
individual U.S. citizens and not by organizations.  The DP Act had permitted both blanket 
assurances and assurances by organizations.  Voluntary agencies first had to find a U.S. citizen 
willing to sponsor a visa. Although certain number of refugees, escapees, and expellees had 
relatives and acquaintances in the U.S., this was a difficult condition to meet for those without. 32    
                                                
 
31 Another phase, which was in the jurisdiction of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, was to 
adjust the status of persons already in the U.S. who were in refugee status. First Semiannual Report of the 
Administrator of the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1954), 8-9; Third Semiannual 
Report of the Administrator of the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1955), 8; Since 
majority of Italian relatives was expected from Southern Italy, the first post of the entire Refugee Relief 
Program was established at Naples in December 1953.  Operation in Greece followed, with the first post 
established at Athens and then at Salokia.  As of April 1954, Italy and Greece were the only two countries 
where the Refugee Relief Program was launched.   Naples and Palermo posts administered three quarters 
of the Italian cases, and Naples became the largest post in the entire Refugee Relief Program. Three other 
posts were established in Genoa, Palermo, and Trieste. Senate Committee on Judiciary, Final Report of 
the Administrator of the Refugee Relief Act, 39-43; Bon Tempo, Americans at the Gate, 48. 
32 Despite liberals’ repeated protest, the individual U.S. citizen sponsor requirement was maintained 
throughout the Refugee Relief Program.  Since mid-1955, however, voluntary agencies were allowed to 
endorse and co-sign the assurance with the U.S. citizen individual, which made it easier to find a sponsor.   
Bon Tempo, Americans at the Gate, 45-48, 57; For assistance to Italian Americans, see Battisti, 
“Refugees, Relatives, and Reform,” 138-140, 150; To Amend the Refugee Relief Act of 1953: Hearing on 
H.R. 8193 and S. 3005: Hearing before the Immigration Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
83rd Cong. 14 (1954) (Scott McLeod, Administrator, Bureau of Inspection, Security and Consular Affairs, 
Department of State). 
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The immediate reason for the proposal to amend the Refugee Relief Act to expand 
family-based admission was that there were many more petitions filed for relatives than 
assurances filed for refugees.    It was evident from the beginning that relatives visas provided 
under the program would not even meet the existing demand under general immigration law.   
When the bill was enacted, family visa petitions by Italian Americans under the INA of 1952, 
many of which had been carried over from the preceding 1924 Act, had already exceeded 15,000 
provided by the Refugee Relief Act.  Passage of the Refugee Relief Act induced even more 
people to file a petition, given a hope that there might be an opening for their families under 
temporary law.  Particularly fast to accumulate were petitions for fourth-preference relatives who 
had little chance of immigration under the regular channel of the 1952 Act.  Italian fourth-
preference petitions (adult or married sons and daughters, and siblings) alone counted 32,000, 
and the demand was actually much higher, since this figure did not include the beneficiaries’ 
spouses and children.    By contrast, as of April 1954, 240 assurances for refugees had been filed 
in Italy, 1,800 in Greece, and 4 in Netherlands.    As the State Department acknowledged, this 
was not because few qualified but due to the high hurdles of the Refugee Relief Act. 33   
            For the supporters of the original emergency migration program such as Senator Watkins, 
the priority was to quickly admit as many people as possible.  Watkins maintained that refugee 
status was less important, since the original idea was simply to admit certain number of 
immigrants outside the quotas.  In January 1954, when Congress began to consider amending the 
Refugee Relief Act, only four persons had immigrated to the U.S.: three Italians and one 
Greek.34  Slow progress due to the various hurdles that restrictionists included and from 
                                                
 
33  INS Annual Report 1953, 19; INS Annual Report 1954, 16; “Facts Regarding in the RRP in Italy,” 
folder “Immigration and Citizenship Act of 1953 ,” box 493,  Emanuel Celler Papers, Library of Congress. 
34 “Refugee Program to be Stepped Up,” New York Times January 31, 1954. 
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administration of the program was a source of much frustration and criticism, and reallocation of 
visas was a welcomed change to expedite the program.   According to Watkins, of foremost 
importance was “propaganda purposes” against Communism, which was most undermined by 
the fact that the U.S. was actually admitting few persons despite having passed a special law.   
As long as the U.S. could “show the Italian people that you are willing to take them over here,” it 
was a secondary issue whether their status was refugees or relatives.35  
  McCarran and Walter’s withdrawal of opposition spoke to an exclusionary motive behind 
family-based admission.  As discussed earlier, one of the main reasons for the initial emphasis on 
refugee status was because McCarran and Walter saw admission of non-refugees as a threat to 
the national origins quotas, since non-quota admission of nationals from certain countries with 
small quotas in effect raised the ceiling under the INA of 1952.   However, equally if not more 
important than their concerns about the “destruction” of the national origins quotas was the fear 
of communist infiltration.  They suspected all refugees as possible communists.  After including 
various screening processes in the Refugee Relief Act, they sought to maintain control over the 
administration of the program. Their ally in the Department of State was Scott McLeod, a former 
FBI agent and the administrator of the Refugee Relief Program.   Liberals like Emanuel Celler 
fiercely condemned that rigorous screening prevented the program from achieving its purpose.  
And until Eisenhower demoted McLeod in mid-1955, the program progressed at a very slow 
pace. 36    
                                                
 
35 To Amend the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Hearing on H.R. 8193 and S. 3005: Hearing before the 
Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary Committee, 84th Cong. 17, 25-26 (1954) (Senator Arthur 
Watkins)  
36 Special Migration Act of 1953. H.R. Rep. No. 83-974, at 19-20; Bon Tempo, Americans at the Gate, 
41-47. 
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 From a security-centered perspective, the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs 
believed that admission based on family connections would lower the chance of communist 
infiltration.   The merit of emphasizing family connections was that “it is much easier to 
ascertain his background by inquiry than ... the refugee.”  The deputy administrator Robert C. 
Alexander argued likewise that emphasis on family ties could bring “a better type of immigrant, 
security wise.” Whereas at the core of family-based admission was the desires of American 
citizens and permanent residents to bring their families to the U.S., it was ultimately the idea that 
families were less likely to pose security threats that overrode the restrictionists’ concerns about 
the destruction of the national origins quotas.37  
 Anticommunism worked on several levels in favor of family-oriented admission from 
Italy, Greece, and Netherlands.  First was a foreign-policy concern of the administration that 
sought to prevent communist influence in strategically important NATO countries.  Secondly, 
once admission of refugees were approved, it was the restrictionist fear of communist infiltration 
and suspicion of refugees that formed a more family-oriented admission policy. 
As a result, on two levels, the 1954 Amendment tied the Refugee Relief Act more closely 
with family unification of Italian-Americans and Greek-Americans.  First was the composition of 
immigrants admitted under the program.   Majority were relatives; 46,308 Italians and 7,518 
Greeks immigrated as relatives, and 13,153 Italians and 9,198 Greeks immigrated as refugees.38   
In the case of Italy, it reversed the original formula for 45,000 visas for refugees and 15,000 for 
                                                
 
37 To Amend the Refugee Relief Act of 1953: Hearing on H.R. 8193 and S. 3005: Hearing before the 
Immigration Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong. 12, 29 (1954) (Robert C. 
Alexander, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State and Edward Maney, Director of 
the Visa Office, Department of Justice)  3-4, 14 
38 Demand for bringing relatives from Netherlands was small, and 13,989 Dutch came as refugees and 
930 as relatives, which was close to the original allocation of 15,000 visas for the former and 2,000 for 
the latter.   Bon Tempo, Americans at the Gate, 45-56.   
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relatives.  Italian relatives admitted under the program comprised one-quarter of all Refugee 
Relief Act immigrants, and one-sixth of Italian immigrants between 1952 and 1965.   
            Second had to do with the rhetoric surrounding the law and characterization of the 
program.  Although Congress dropped the emphasis on refugee status, the 1954 amendment was 
not a return to the original emergency migration plan, which simply proposed to admit a certain 
number of Italian, Greek, and Dutch nationals outside the quotas.   Notably, Walter explained to 
the House the purpose of the amendment was “to reunite the families of people who are living in 
this country but have relatives abroad.”39  As the Senate Judiciary Committee reported that “in 
the preference cases ... which have already been approved under the Italian, Greek, and Dutch 
quotas a large percentage of the cases are in the fourth-preference category,” the amendment was 
most expected to benefit fourth-preference relatives especially in Italy and Greece.  Walter 
considered that fourth-preference relatives would be preferable to admitting “strangers.”  This 
view that admission of persons related to U.S. citizens or residents were preferable to admitting 
those without necessary connections was a view lacking humanitarian concerns, since it lay 
emphasis on the interests of and connections with insiders.40    
What deserves attention here is the rhetorical shift in arguments advanced for the original 
emergency migration program and for the 1954 amendment.  The primary emphasis of the 
original proposal, which simply proposed to admit a certain number of immigrants, was on 
“overpopulation” or how the weak economy unable to support the population might lead to 
political unrest and communist expansion.    In the March 24, 1952 message, Truman did not 
mention uniting of families as the reason for special legislation at all.   Yet, the restrictionists, 
                                                
 
39 100 Cong. Rec. 3244 (1954) 
40 Ibid. Exclusionary aspect of the 1954 amendment can also been found in the fact that as a condition of 
making visas mutually available for refugees and relatives, McCarran insisted that a job and housing 
assurance should be required of both refugees and relatives.   
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who saw immigration policy as a matter of domestic policy, never supported the idea that 
problems of other countries should be a factor for the U.S. in determining its immigration policy.   
Second, when Congress established refugee class and relatives, family connection was more of a 
requirement for qualifying for a visa than the reason for a special legislation.   But as the 
Refugee Relief Act as amended was characterized as a law to promote reunion of families, 
“family reunification” attained a higher grounds as a reason for special legislation.  It also 
suggested that while the national origins quotas could not be overridden by proposals to admit 
nationals of certain countries with weak economies it could be challenged by demands for 
family-unification.           
  232 
5.2. Migration under the Refugee Relief Act and the Immigration and Nationality Act 
   
            
On October 31, 1954, two months after Congress amended the Refugee Relief Act, Ambassador 
Clare Boothe Luce issued the 10,000th Refugee Relief Act visa in Italy.   The recipients were 
Elisa Vittglio Rotondo (41), her husband Giovanni Rotondo (44) and their two daughters  Maria 
(12) and Giuseppina (8), from Cassino.   In December 1954, they arrived at New York on S.S. 
Independent.    Elisa’s brother Anthony Vittglio and her father Joseph Vittglio lived in Detroit.   
It had been more than thirty years since Elisa had last seen her father.  Anthony welcomed the 
Rotondos at the port and the Rotondos soon took residence in Detroit right next door to the 
Vittglios.  According to an Italian-American newsletter, “the reunion was a joyous occasion in 
the lives of both families.”41 As the 10,000th Italian recipient of the Refugee Relief Act visa, the 
Rotondos was a focus of much attention.    Images of Ambassador Luce handing the visa to the 
Rotondo s and the family arriving in New York together to be welcomed by Anthony 
Vettiglio were widely circulated through the Italian-American media.   These images represented 
                                                
 
41 “Ten Thousandth Visa Recipient Arrives with Family,” ACIM Dispatch 4, no. 1 (February 1955): 1-2. 
 
Elisa Rotondo, Dispatch 4 no. 1(February 
1955): 2. 
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(December 1954 to January 1955): 4. 
  233 
a crucial difference between the Refugee Relief Act and the INA of 1952 with regard to the 
boundary of family-based admission.    
 The significance of the Refugee Relief Act lay not only in that it was the first post-1952 
temporary  law that enabled those waiting for a family visa to immigrate to the U.S. outside the 
quotas but also in that it allowed the mode of  family immigration that was not possible under 
general immigration law.  This section discusses how the Displaced Persons Act, the Refugee 
Relief Act, and the INA of 1952 defined “relatives” and the different modes of immigration 
under each law.   Although the Refugee Relief Act conformed to the INA of 1952 in many ways, 
its nature as an emergency legislation made a difference that underscored the constraints 
imposed on family-sponsored migration under the INA of 1952.   Once the law expired, removal 
of such constraints would become one of the most heated issues in family unification debate in 
the late 1950s to the early 1960s. Most importantly, the issue not only had to do with the mode of 
immigration but with the boundaries of what constituted family under immigration law. 
  The Refugee Relief Act allowed all immigrants admitted under the program (refugees, 
escapees, expellees, and the relatives class) to immigrate together with “their spouses and their 
unmarried sons or daughters under twenty-one years of age, including stepsons or stepdaughters 
and sons or daughters adopted prior to July 1, 1953.”  The one condition was that they all applied 
for a visa and immigrated to the U.S. at the same time and not at a later date.  (section 3)   This 
was a feature inherited from the DP Act.42 As stated in the previous section, Congress made the 
range of relatives eligible for family sponsorship under the Refugee Relief Act conform to 
general immigration law instead of the DP Act.   But this family provision that the Refugee 
Relief Act inherited from the DP Act created a rarely-noted but crucial difference from the INA 
                                                
 
42 The DP Act provided that “the spouse and unmarried dependent child or children under twenty-one 
years of age” of a displaced person shall also be eligible for a visa. (section 2.c.3)    
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of 1952.   The Refugee Relief Act was the first post-1952 act to enable a U.S. citizen to sponsor 
a visa not only for a married immigrant but for their spouse and children as well.   Specifically, 
when a U.S. citizen sponsored a Refugee Relief Act visa for their parents (second preference 
under the INA of 1952), married sons and daughters, or married siblings (fourth preference), the 
visa covered beneficiaries’ spouse and unmarried minor children as well.  An example was the 
first Dutch to receive a Refugee Relief Act visa in May 1954: Jan Koetsier, a cattle-breeder, his 
wife and their six minor children.   The sponsor of the visa was Jan’s elder son Henry Koetsier 
living in Buena Park, California.43   An example of the latter was the Rotondos.  The principal 
beneficiary of the visa was Elisa, a fourth-preference relative of her brother Anthony and her 
father Joseph.  Her husband and the children derived their immigration status from Elisa.44     
Such family immigration was not possible under the INA of 1952.   Under general 
immigration law, simultaneous immigration of the nuclear family was a privilege reserved for 
certain classes of immigrants.     The INA of 1952 reserved simultaneous immigration of the 
nuclear family as a privilege for non-family-based immigrants: skill-based first-preference 
immigrants or non-preference immigrants.  Immigrants like Elisa Rotondo who had their visas 
sponsored by their parents or siblings (fourth-preference) had to leave the spouse and children 
abroad.  It was only after becoming a permanent resident of the U.S. that they could take steps to 
file a petition for their family.  Since families of permanent residents were subject to quota 
restriction, this meant a considerable period of time until they could join in the U.S.  This 
“perverse arrangement,” as Columbia Law Review article criticized, was by no means due to 
oversight of Congress nor was it a matter of technicality.  “The draftsmen of the McCarran-
                                                
 
43 “First Visas to Dutch by ’53 Act,” New York Times May 15, 1954. 
44 “Mrs Luce Gives Visa to Refugee,” New York Times October 31, 1954; “Mrs. Luce Issues 10,000th 
Visa under Refugee Act,” ACIM Dispatch 3, no. 9 (December 1954-January 1955): 4.  
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Walter Act knew how to keep family together when they wanted to.”45  It was precisely their 
status as family-sponsored immigrants that prohibited them from bringing their immediate 
family to the U.S.    
For example, an Italian-American in Davenport, California sponsored a visa for his 
parents in Genoa.   However, the INA of 1952 did not allow the two minor children of the 
parents to be included in the same visa, because they were siblings of the sponsoring U.S. citizen 
(fourth-preference) whereas parents of U.S. citizens belonged to a higher preference (second 
preference).  The advice of the American consulate was for the parents to leave their children in 
Italy and to send for them later after becoming permanent residents of the U.S.46   Another 
citizen in San Francisco petitioned for visas for her parents and her minor brother, a second 
preference petition for the former and fourth-preference petition for the latter.   With much 
longer backlog for the latter, there was no chance that a second-preference relative and a fourth-
preference relative could receive a visa at the same time.   Therefore, the only advice that an 
immigrant aid agency could give was that “parents place their son … with relatives or in an 
institution” and that “immediately after their arrival” they should file a third preference petition 
for their son.47  The age of the children was of particular importance in such cases.   A child of a 
permanent resident only qualified for preferential status while they were minors.   If the children 
reached twenty-one while waiting for a visa, they lost any preferential status.   Upon 
naturalization of the parents, they would once again qualify for a preferential status, but adult 
sons and daughters only qualified for a fourth-preference visa with a long backlog. 
                                                
 
45 Charles P. Schwartz Jr., “American Immigration Policy,” Columbia Law Review 55, no. 3 (March 
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46 Eugenio Renzo Di Tano, Davenport, California, letter to ACIM, October 20, 1958, folder “Fourth 
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47 Piera Cicco, San Francisco, California, letter to ACIM, October 16, 1958; Caesar Donanzan, letter to 
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  236 
This constraint was based on the idea that family-based admission should be confined 
within the family “unit” in order to prevent chain migration.   The fundamental unit was the 
nuclear family with a male breadwinner.  Thus, the 1924 Act had only allowed family-based 
admission to spouse (wife more privileged than husband) and unmarried minor children (non-
quota), along with parents (first preference).48  And while the INA of 1952 allowed U.S. citizens 
to send for married sons and daughters, or married brothers and sisters, the beneficiaries’ spouses 
and children were not seen as part of the family of the sponsoring U.S. citizen, but as sons and 
daughters-in law, grandchildren, siblings-in-law, nephews, and nieces, relations too distant to 
deserve consideration as family.   
This model of family-based admission did not recognize the multiplicity of family 
relationships.   The immigrant was compelled to choose which family mattered more than others.   
A price to pay for having one’s visa sponsored by relatives in the U.S. was to leave one’s own 
spouse or children in Europe.  On the other hand, in order to immigrate together with one’s 
spouse and children, one could not claim a visa based on relationship to families in the U.S.  The 
INA of 1952 recognized only one relationship at a time but not both, and demanded immigrants 
to make a choice of which relations mattered more than others.    
For immigrants from countries with undersubscribed quotas like Great Britain, such rules 
mattered little.  Regardless of whether they had relatives in the U.S. or not, majority came as 
non-preference immigrants without sponsorship.   It was the least time and cost-consuming way 
as long as there were abundant quotas, since there was no need to prove one’s skill (first-
preference) nor did their families in the U.S. have to take the trouble to file a petition on their 
behalf.   In fact, when immigrants from countries with abundant visas such as Great Britain 
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applied for family-based non-quota or preference visas, officials wondered why they took such 
“entirely unnecessary” trouble and speculated that it was probably due to lack of understanding 
of immigration law. 49      
  Thus, the Refugee Relief Act was the first legislation without such constraints and 
enabled U.S. citizens to formally sponsor married immigrants and their families.   While this was 
also possible under the DP Act, the primary criteria of admission under the DP Act was that they 
were displaced persons.   But the Refugee Relief Act was different in that it was partly claimed 
to be a law for promoting family reunion.  This was a privilege momentarily available under the 
Refugee Relief Act, and once the law expired, admission of married relatives would become one 
of the most heated issues in family unification debate in the late 1950s to the early 1960s. (Table 
5-3: Immigration Pattern of Fourth-Preference Relatives under the Refugee Relief Act and the 
Immigration and Nationality Act on page 261) 
 
5.3. Fourth Preference Relatives and the Immigration Act of 1959 
 In early 1958, the American Committee on Italian Migration declared that the fourth-
preference under the INA of 1952 was “a farce” since “it permits them [U.S. citizens] to file 
applications and petitions, which, in most cases, are approved and then put at the bottom of a 
long list, for which there will never be any visas.”50  Situating abolition of the national origins 
quotas as its long term goal, the organization resolved that its immediate goal was to tackle the 
plight of fourth-preference relatives.   After the Refugee Relief Act visas were exhausted, the 
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chance of fourth-preference relatives to immigrate to the U.S. became extremely small.   First of 
all, even with the 1954 Amendment, the Refugee Relief Act visas were far from sufficient to 
meet the existing demand at the time, and new applications continued to grow.   By June 1959, 
waiting list for a fourth-preference visa reached 65,000 in Italy, not including theirs spouse and 
children, 4,500 in Greece, 3,200 in Poland, 2,500 in Portugal, and 1,700 in Yugoslavia.   
However, in the previous two years, fewer than 300 were able to obtain a visa in Italy.  The 
annual quota for Italy was 5,666, and fourth-preference relatives could obtain a visa only if the 
first three preferences did not use all the quotas.51    
  Between 1957 and 1962, Congress passed four bills that allowed immigrants waiting for 
a preference visa over a certain period to immigrate to the U.S. outside the quotas.  As temporary 
legislation for non-quota admission, the scale was much smaller than the Refugee Relief Act; a 
total of some 82,000 preference families immigrated between 1957 and 1966 outside the quotas.  
These laws did not name immigrants from specific countries, but granted non-quota status by 
preference category and by registration date, in other words according to how long they had been 
waiting for a visa.  The largest beneficiaries were immigrants from Italy, which received 48,000 
visas, followed by those from Portugal (7,100) and Greece (6,800).  (Table 5-4: Legislation 
Regarding Family-based Admission, 1957-1962 on page 262; Table 5-5: Non-quota Admission 
of Preference Families on page 263)  
          The peak of Italian immigration to the U.S. between 1952 and 1965 was during the 
Refugee Relief Act.52  On one hand, in the late 1950s, as historian Danielle Battisti argues, 
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International Migration Review 1, no.3 (1967): 10-24. 
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political conditions had become less favorable than in 1953 for Italians to gain admission to the 
U.S.    The economies of Germany and Austria were recovering, which decreased the urgency of 
programs such as “emergency migration program.”   Although the economy of southern Italy 
was weak, the possibility of the Communist Party taking control had diminished.   Since the 
issue of “overpopulation” that had been emphasized in the early 1950s was not solely a matter of 
weak economy and unemployment but whether economic and political unrest would create an 
opening for communist influence, the White House felt less need for a special legislation.  It was 
even more difficult to gain admission as refugees, since refugees became more tightly associated 
with those fleeing from “Communist, Communist-dominated, or Communist-occupied area” 
such as Hungarians, and even they could not gain permanent residency for several years after 
being paroled into the U.S.53 
         On the other hand, a more favorable condition was the heightened pressure to amend or 
abolish the national origins quotas altogether.   For example, the American Immigration 
Conference, an umbrella association established in 1953 by some 60 ethnic and religious 
organizations in order to reform the 1952 Act, completed a 40-point reform proposal in 1955 that 
outlined their goals, the first of which was that “the national origins quotas system be abolished 
and that it be replaced by a humane and rational immigration plan free from racial, ethnic and 
religious discrimination.”54  With the merger of AFL-CIO in 1955, organized labor also joined 
force for abolition of the national origins quotas.55  
                                                
 
53 Battisti,“The American Committee on Italian Migration, Anti-Communism, and Immigration Reform,” 
29-31; Bon Tempo, Americans at the Gate, 60-85, 97-105. 
54 American Immigration Conference, “Recommendations for Amending Certain Provisions of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act,” September 1955, box 8, American Immigration and Citizenship 
Conference Records, Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota at Minneapolis. 
55 Tichenor, Dividing Lines, 203-207. 
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         In Congress, at the forefront of attack against the national origins quota system were 
Senator Herbert Lehman (D-NY) and Representative Emanuel Celler (D-NY).   Since 1953, the 
two had introduced a series of bills to abolish the quotas system.    Republicans also became 
more openly critical of the national origins quotas. During the debates about the refugee relief 
program, Republicans remained silent about the national origins quotas.    Eisenhower separated 
emergency migration program from the issue of the quotas system in order not to invite the 
criticism that the program was an attempt to undermine the INA of 1952, and Republicans had 
agreed not to discuss the quotas system while the Refugee Relief Act was in effect.   But in early 
1956, for the first time Eisenhower publicly proposed to modify the national origins quotas 
system, although his proposal was not abolition of the national origins quotas but 1) an increase 
of the overall quotas and 2) redistribution of unused quotas by Great Britain and Ireland. 56   
 
Background of ACIM and the Immigration Act of 1957 
   Since its founding in early 1952, the American Committee on Italian Migration upheld 
abolition of the national origins quotas system as its long-term goal.   With an acute demand for 
Italian immigration to the U.S., they engaged in a dual strategy to call for the abolition of the 
national origins quotas and to lobby for temporary legislation as well.  Established a few months 
before the Immigration and Nationality Act became law, when the retention of the national 
origins quotas was almost certain, the organization supported President Truman’s emergency 
migration program.  Through providing aid to Italians and Italian-Americans during the Refugee 
Relief Act, ACIM expanded its network from some 15 chapters around New York to over 120 
chapters by 1958. 
                                                
 
56 Hutchinson, Legislative History, 325-326; Zolberg, Nation by Design, 323. 
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After the expiration of the Refugee Relief Act, the organization first focused on the 
reunification of families of Refugee Relief Act immigrants.   As discussed earlier, all Refugee 
Relief Act immigrants were entitled to immigrate together with spouse and children.  But 
whether it was legally possible for families to immigrate together and whether various 
circumstances allowed them to do so was a different matter.   A considerable number of Refugee 
Relief Act immigrants did not or could not immigrate to the U.S. with their spouse and children, 
but applied individually for a visa with the intention to first find employment in the U.S. and 
then to send for their families.   The Refugee Relief Act visa was available to the entire family 
only when they immigrated to the U.S. together and not at a later date. Once the law expired, 
separation of Refugee Relief Act immigrants and their families became an acute issue.   Since 
they were yet to fulfill the five-year residency requirement for naturalization, these immigrants 
had to petition for their families under the third-preference for families of permanent residents, 
and that waiting list grew rapidly.  In Italy, by 1957 approximately 18,000 immediate family 
members were waiting for a third-preference visa. 57  
         The argument that families of Refugee Relief Act immigrants deserved special 
consideration particularly appealed to Congress.    For example, Representative David Dennison 
(R-OH) argued:  “In many cases the head of the family had come to this country before the 
others to prepare the way for his loved ones, not realizing that the law would expire before the 
                                                
 
57 Another issue was the so-called “pipeline cases,” who were at various stages of visa and investigative 
processing were closed, when the number of available Refugee Relief Act visas were exhausted.  
Department of State accepted significantly more assurances than the available number of visas because 
they were uncertain whether Congress would extend the program. While visas remained unused in 
Germany and Austria, the expiration of the Refugee Relief Act left 59,000 prospective immigrants in 
pipeline status, including 22,000 Italian relatives and refugees, 10,500 Greek relatives and refugees, 9,900 
Asian refugees, 9,000 escapees, and 5,700 Chinese nationals.   Battisti, “The American Committee on 
Italian Migration, Anti-Communism, and Immigration Reform,” 27-29; Senate Committee on Judiciary, 
Final Report of the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, 41, 54, 141. 
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families were joined. … In my district there are a particularly large number of people from 
Greece and Italy who were caught by the expiration of this act. … But in the midst of all the 
blessings they enjoy as Americans, there is always the heartache in being separated from their 
loved ones.” 58    In the Act of September 11, 1957, Congress agreed to clear the backlog in the 
first three preference classes by allowing all first-preference (skill-based immigrants), second-
preference (parents of U.S. citizens), and third-preference immigrants (spouse and minor 
children of permanent residents) for whom petition had been approved before July 1, 1957 to 
immigrate outside the quotas.59 
 
Fourth-Preference Campaign 
            However, the 1957 Act entirely neglected the last category of family-preference 
immigrants, those with the longest waiting list: the fourth preference, including adult sons and 
daughters of U.S. citizens, married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens, and siblings of U.S. 
citizens.  The ACIM highlighted the issue of fourth-preference relatives as the second phase of 
their campaign.   In light of the economic recession, instead of pushing for immediate legislation, 
ACIM devoted the year 1958 to bringing to the attention of Congress and the public the hardship 
of fourth-preference families through their newsletter ACIM Dispatch, press interviews, radio 
talks and speaking tours throughout the country organized by ACIM chapters in cities such as 
                                                
 
58 103 Cong. Rec. 16307 (1957) 
59 Expected number of immigrants was as follows, Italy, 21,308; Greece 3,588; Poland 1,118; Chinese 
634; Japan, 592; Turkey, 599; Hungary, 554; and Spain, 363. 103 Cong. Rec. 15487 (1957); Section 12, 
Act of September 11, 1957. 
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Cleveland, Camden, St. Louis, Kansas, Omaha, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle, 
and Portland.60   
 The organization made use of every opportunity to make both political and emotional 
appeal. 61   In the mid-term election, ACIM made sure to emphasize the political influence of 
Italian American voters.   On Columbus Day 1958, Representative Kenneth Keating of New 
York, ranking Republican on the House Judiciary Committee running for the Senate, arranged a 
meeting in New York City between President Eisenhower and ACIM leaders.  At the meeting, 
they stressed that “Italian voting population in New York State is the largest of all the nationality 
groups” and that “championing this cause [fourth-preference legislation] publicly will have a 
very beneficial effect on the chances of any candidate running for reelection.”62 
Of particular importance was a campaign that the organization launched in October 1958 
to gather detailed information about the situation of fourth preference relatives and their families.  
Through local chapters, newspapers such as Gazzetta del Massachusetts, Il Corriere de Popolo, 
Il Crociato, La Voce del Popolo, radio programs, ACIM requested Italian-Americans who had 
filed fourth-preference petitions to write to the ACIM headquarters in New York including 
information such as when their petitions were approved, availability of housing and employment 
for the prospective immigrant, current employment status or specialty of the prospective 
                                                
 
60  ACIM Board of Directors, Minutes, April 29, 1959, folder “Board of Directors,” box E61, ACIM 
Records. 
61 For instance, at an awards dinner that the organization held in early 1958 in Illinois for senators Everett 
M. Dirksen (R) and Paul H. Douglas (D), the Italian ambassador appealed that “the case for the reunion of 
families does not reflect only an Italian interest, but also, and mainly one that affects the American 
national interest.” “Address by H.E. Manlio Brosio,” ACIM Dispatch 7, no. 2 (Feb 1958): 2-3. 
62 Memorandum, circa October 1958, folder “Congressional Correspondence,” box E35, ACIM Records.  
“Eisenhower Favors Solution of ‘Fourth Preference’ Problem,” ACIM Dispatch 7, no. 7 (November 
1958): 1 and 4. 
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immigrant, whether they were sending remittances to Italy, and the last time families had met 
one another.   
“The interest in the announcement,” as the Italian language radio station WOV’s director 
wrote, proved to be “very strong.”  Letters kept coming in, and it did not take long for the 
organization to decide that they had gathered enough evidence to prove their point to Congress.  
ACIM reported that they were “flooded” with letters and that “letters pouring in reflect pathetic 
plight of broken families.”63  Within a month ACIM received replies from over twenty states, 
from overseas including Canada and Italy, with 90 percent arriving from seven states with large 
Italian-American population: New York, California, Illinois, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, 
Connecticut, and Massachusetts.64    Since some had filed petitions for more than one relative, by 
the time some 1,000 Italian-Americans wrote to ACIM about their families, the organization had 
gathered information about 1,200 fourth-preference cases.   Since the Italian backlog for fourth-
preference was some 60,000, the letters comprise 2 percent of all Italians waiting for a fourth-
preference visa at the same time.65 
In order to emphasize the separation of Italian-Americans from their families, the 
organization quickly published the letters in their newsletter for distribution to Congress 
                                                
 
63 “ACIM Flooded with Requests to Help Resolve 4th Preference Problem,” Dispatch 7, no. 6 (October 
1958): 1 and 4; Arnold Hartley, Director of Programs, WOV, letter to Caesar Donanzan, October 6, 1958, 
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folder “Fourth Preference Appeal Replies 3,” box E55, ACIM Records. 
64 The following statistics is based on the author’s analysis of letters filed at the Center of Migration 
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65 The largest number of petitions filed by an individual concerned two sons and three daughters.  Folder 
“Fourth-preference replies, Italian,” box E54, ACIM Records.  Individual names are withheld in this 
article for privacy reasons. 
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members, and other immigrant advocacy groups.   A woman in East Chicago wrote about her 
sister, “I filed a petition for my sister in August, 1953.   She is alone in Italy and I am alone here.  
Our parents are dead and we have no relatives. .... I hope that you will do everything you can to 
help her join me here.  I cry every night from loneliness.”   A mother in Detroit who sent for her 
daughter wrote, ‘Why are we permitted to file applications for our loved ones only to discover 
that it is useless? ... I am a widow.  She is my only child, I send her the means to carry on and 
keep telling her to hope and pray that someday we will be together again.  I suffer loneliness and 
a longing to see her.  Is there any hope?”66 
 
Challenging the Boundary of Family 
  Fourth-preference appeals sent to ACIM included significantly more requests to send for 
one’s brothers and sisters than for sons and daughters.   Out of the 1,236 fourth-preference cases, 
75 percent concerned admission of brothers and sisters, while 25 percent pertained to sons and 
daughters.   Further breakdown by sex shows that 41 percent were for brothers, 34 percent for 
sisters, 12 percent for sons, and 13 percent for daughters.  Thus, 53 percent of the fourth-
preference cases sent to ACIM concerned male relatives, while 47 percent concerned female 
relatives.   The letters also suggest that at least a quarter of fourth-preference relatives had 
spouses and children, who were not recognized by the INA. 67 
(Table 5-6: ACIM Fourth Preference Files on page 264) 
 Realizing non-quota admission for fourth-preference relatives was in itself a difficult 
task.  Many of the sponsors assumed that once visas were granted to their sons and daughters or 
                                                
 
66 “Appeals for Help on 4th Preference Cases Increase Daily,” ACIM Dispatch 7, no. 7 (November 1958): 
3. 
67 Author’s analysis of fourth preference files, boxes E54, E55, and E63, ACIM Records. 
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their brothers and sisters, they would be able to come to the U.S. together with their spouse and 
children.  But this was not possible under the 1952 Act.  Fourth-preference families were bound 
by the rule that family-sponsored immigrants may not bring their immediate families.    
  For example, a naturalized citizen in Detroit wrote to ACIM that he sought to send for 
his daughter, her husband and child from Sicily.  They had registered on the consular waiting list 
on the same day, but there was little chance of immigrating together to the U.S.    The U.S. 
citizen father could petition for his daughter, but not for his son-in-law or grandchild.   The only 
option for the daughter was to come to the U.S. first, and later sponsor a visa for husband and 
son (third preference before naturalization and non-quota after naturalization).68  Under the 
Refugee Relief Act, ACIM recommended entire family to apply for a refugee visa instead of 
applying individually, otherwise there was no knowing when the following families would be 
able to come to the U.S. 69  Under general immigration law, however, they were mandated to 
immigrate separately.  
  Surely, after immigrating to the U.S. fourth-preference immigrants could send for their 
family as permanent residents or as naturalized citizens.  But the purpose of the 1957 Act that 
ACIM had campaigned for was to realize prompt immigration of family of permanent residents.   
In October 1958, just when ACIM launched its fourth-preference letter campaign, the 20,000th 
visa for Italians had been issued under the 1957Act.   As an example of a “family now happily 
resettled in America,” ACIM Dispatch reported the reunion of the Mallimo family.   In June 1956, 
Pasquale Mallimo immigrated to the U.S. with a Refugee Relief Act visa sponsored by one of his 
brothers in the U.S.   His wife and their seven children could not come together to the U.S. at the 
                                                
 
68 Joseph B. Kyle, American Consul in Palermo, Italy, letter to Representative Louis C. Rabaut, July 24, 
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time, and Pasquale worked as a construction laborer on Long Island for two years to save the 
$1,200 needed to send for the family.   Although the quota for Italy was full, the 1957 Act that 
accorded non-quota admission to spouse and children of permanent residents enabled his wife 
and children to come to the U.S. two years later.70  In the case of the Mallimos, financial 
conditions not legal barriers led the family to immigrate step by step.   But under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, the only option for families like the Mallimo’s was to 
immigrate to the U.S. separately.         
           The 1957 amendment to the INA of 1952 regarding skill-based first-preference 
immigrants further underscored the constraints imposed on family-sponsored immigrants.   
Previously, spouse and minor children of skill-based immigrant were accorded first-preference 
status but only when they immigrated together.  This alone already pointed to the 
disadvantageous position of family-sponsored immigrants who did not have this option and were 
mandated to leave their spouse and minor children and to send for them later.   
Still, if the spouse and minor children of a skill-based immigrant was to follow later to the U.S., 
the INA of 1952 provided that they shall be treated on the same basis as families of any other 
permanent resident.  The 1957 amendment accorded first-preference status to spouse and 
children of skill-based immigrants regardless of when they applied for a visa, and provided that 
they no longer had to wait for a visa in the same line as other immediate families of permanent 
residents.  With permanent residents that were admitted on the basis of their skills and profession 
placed on a more privileged position than other permanent residents, the 1957 Act widened the 
gap between treatment of skill-based immigrants and those of family-sponsored immigrants.71 
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A mere backlog clearance without challenging the model of family-based admission 
would replicate the problems.   In their meetings with Senator John F. Kennedy, the INS 
Commissioner Joseph Swing, Senator James Eastland, chair of the Senate Sub-Committee on 
Immigration and Naturalization, and Francis Walter among others, Juvenal Marchisio and Caesar 
Donanzan, president and the executive secretary of ACIM emphasized that Congress was by no 
means making a major amendment to the Immigration and Nationality act, but needed “to simply 
amend this provision [1957 Act] to include Fourth Preference Cases.”   At the same time, they 
emphasized that Congress should not only clear the backlog for fourth-preference relatives but 
also recognize a fundamental flaw in immigration law that separated families.   The organization 
proposed that Congress should reconsider the model of family-based admission and not only 
admit married sons, daughters, brothers and sisters of citizens (as principal beneficiaries) but 
extend the scope to their spouses and children (derivative beneficiaries).72    
The organization pointed to the two precedents: the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 and the 
Immigration Act of 1957.   First, the Refugee Relief Act, which was the first opportunity for a 
significant number of fourth-preference immigrants to arrive in the U.S., allowed simultaneous 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
considered a case where the wife arrived six weeks after the husband.  The husband was a German 
immigrant who was admitted to the U.S. as a skill-based first preference immigrant, and the wife was also 
issued a first-preference visa on the same day as an “accompanying” spouse.   When the wife arrived in 
the U.S. six weeks after her husband, the INS maintained that her visa was not valid, since she was not 
physically “accompanying” her husband.  The Board of Immigration Appeals ruled in favor of the couple 
that the term should not be taken literally.  In the matter of M-, 0300/462538 5 I&N 722; In 1957, the 
privilege was extended from “accompanying” to “following to join” family. Congress still distinguished 
“existing families” or “pre-existing families,” who were already married before moving to the U.S. from 
families formed after immigration to the U.S.  If they were already married before one spouse immigrated 
to the U.S., the other spouse was considered to be a “spouse following to join” the first preference 
immigrant.  But if the marriage took place after moving to the U.S., the spouse was not considered to be 
“a spouse following to join” but as a spouse of a permanent resident alien.  In the Matter of G-, Int. Dec. 
936, File A-11523922, Exclusion Proceedings Decided by the Board June 24, 1958 quoted in La Gazzetta 
Legale Italo-Americana 38, no. 4 (April 1959): 81-84. 
72 “Congressional Sentiment Favors ACIM Fourth Preference Goal,” ACIM Dispatch 7, no. 3 (March-
April 1959): 1-3.  
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immigration of the nuclear family.   Second, one of the proclaimed purposes of the 1957 Act, 
which cleared backlogs for first to third preferences, was reunification of permanent residents 
with their spouse and children (third-preference).  ACIM explained that once admitted to the U.S. 
and obtaining permanent resident status fourth preference relatives would now be able to send 
for their spouse and children, which would make the third preference waiting list even longer.  
Admission of fourth preference relatives without considering their spouses and children would 
only repeat the problem that Congress previously agreed to ameliorate.   
          ACIM’s proposal had strong support of Kenneth B. Keating, now a Senator, and Italian-
American Congress members such as John O. Pastore from Rhode Island, the first Italian-
American Senator, and Representative Peter Rodino from New Jersey, who would become the 
chair of the House Judiciary Committee in 1973.  As expected, the foremost obstacle was Francis 
Walter, who insisted that “amendment proposed by the Committee on Italian Migration” was 
“excessive and not serve the best economic and social interests of the United States at this 
time.”73   
         Walter expressed particular concern about the multiplier effect of admitting married 
immigrants.  The official fourth-preference waiting list contained little information about the 
spouses and children of married applicants, precisely because the latter did not qualify for a visa.  
Walter instead relied on the State Department’s “multiplication index” to estimate the family 
implications of fourth preference immigration. The index was an estimate of how many 
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immigrants were likely to follow one immigrant from particular countries.  Walter insisted that 
Italian immigration would increase at a higher rate than other nationalities.   The index for Italian 
immigration was 2.7., and Walter maintained that non-quota admission of 60,000 Italians on the 
fourth-preference waiting list would lead to future immigration of 150,000, including their 
spouses and children, which was roughly equal to the annual quota for the entire Eastern 
Hemisphere.74 
         Some Congress members advised ACIM that appealing for “only unmarried Italians in this 
category” might raise the chance of achieving fourth-preference legislation, but the organization 
did not choose to pursue this course. 75  First, they maintained that the nuclear family was not the 
only family relationship that mattered, and insisted that marital status should not be the grounds 
for denying relief.   Second, they demanded that Congress should recognize how the 
conventional model of family-based admission dividing family relations into units actually 
separated families.   Caesar Donanzan emphasized to various Congress members such as 
Emanuel Celler, “There is no doubt that some of these 84,952 applicants [fourth-preference 
backlog for all nationalities] ... are married and have children.  We have advocated ... that in 
order not to create a future problem of separated families, they be permitted to bring spouses and 
children with them. ... We believe that it is in the American national interest that these people be 
                                                
 
74 The average “multiplication index” was 2.1.  Francis Walter, letter to Caesar Donanzan, July 17, 1959, 
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admitted and, furthermore, we believe that our government has a moral responsibility to act 
favorably upon the petitions since it has accepted and approved them.”76 
      
Family Reclassified: Immigration Act of 1959 
The fourth-preference campaign by ACIM bore fruit as the Act of September 22, 1959.      
In face of heightened pressure for elimination of the national origins quotas, it was difficult for 
Walter to entirely dismiss the demand.   In fact, Walter accepted the proposal to change the 
preference classes rather than clear backlogs.  Walter agreed to reclassify and to expand the 
range of relatives in several ways.   First Walter agreed that the INA of 1952 should be amended 
since “unmarried adult children, although not minors, still belong to the family unit.”  Walter 
also agreed that Congress should “permit the immigrant who is classified in the fourth preference 
category to bring with him his spouse and his minor children” for the purpose of “avoiding the 
immigration of family unit in two steps.”77   On the other hand, he decided to offer little in terms 
of reducing existing backlogs, insisting on limiting eligibility to those who had already been 
waiting for a visa before the 1952 Act went into effect.78     
The Act of 1959 was a mixed success.  As a temporary legislation for backlog clearance, 
the law was limited.   For example, the 1957 Act had eliminated all the backlogs for the first 
three-preference classes by allowing non-quota admission for skilled-based immigrants and their 
families, parents of U.S. citizens, and spouse and minor children of permanent residents who had 
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applied for a visa before July 1, 1957.   By contrast, the 1959 Act only provided non-quota visas 
for those registered before December 31, 1953.    Although the cut-off date was a year later than 
the original date insisted by Walter and was expected to benefit some 57,000 immigrants 
including 30,000 Italians, it left a six-year backlog untouched.79  
 The most importance change was reclassification of “family” in U.S. immigration law in 
a lasting way.   First, with regard to parent-child relation, the 1959 Act came to place less 
emphasis on age, although adult children still did not enjoy the same status as minors.   The 1959 
Act expanded the preference categories for unmarried sons and daughters of citizens and 
permanent residents.   The second preference previously reserved for parents now included 
unmarried adult sons and daughters of citizens.  They would receive 20 percent of the visas in 
1965.   The third preference for families of permanent residents, previously limited to spouse and 
unmarried minor children was now expanded to include adult sons and daughters, who 
previously did not receive any consideration.   Families of permanent residents would receive 20 
percent of the visas in 1965.   
ACIM’s challenge to the idea that nuclear family is the sole basis of family-based 
admission successfully extended the scope of family-based admission.   Fourth preference now 
included married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens, along with their spouses and children.    It 
also included siblings of U.S. citizens, along with their spouses and children if the siblings were 
married.  In all, married children and siblings would receive 34 percent of all visas under the 
1965 Act.   In 1965, when the national origins quotas were abolished, Congress would reserve 10 
                                                
 
79 The Walter Bill passed by the House reserved relief for applicants before the McCarran-Walter Act 
went into effect , but Senate extended the cutoff date by one year.  “Eisenhower Signs Bill to Reunite 
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percent of the visas for married sons and daughters and their spouse and children, and 24 percent 
for siblings and their spouse and children.80       
(Table 5-7: Reclassification of Preference Families, 1952-1959 on page 265) 
 
5.4. Limits of Family-focused Reform 
 For the next few years, ACIM lobbied to reduce the growing backlog for fourth-
preference relatives.  As a temporary legislation, the 1959 Act left a 6–year backlog in fourth-
preference category, and it took another three years until Congress reduced fourth-preference 
backlog by a mere three months, while the Italian fourth-preference waiting list continued to 
grow.   One reason for rapid growth of the waiting list was new applications.  Another was 
because the 1959 Act made wider range of families eligible for a family visa.  Pre-1959 fourth-
preference waiting list did not include the spouse and children of fourth-preference relatives, 
since they did not qualify for any preferential status.  Now they could be officially registered as 
fourth-preference relatives.   For instance, according to a 1962 statistics, in 1954, 15,279 married 
sons, daughters, and brothers and sisters (both single and married) newly registered on consular 
waiting list.   And the number of their spouses and children was estimated to be 36,000.   In 1955, 
17,600 Italians registered as the principal beneficiary.   The number of spouse and children were 
estimated to be 30,000.    By 1962, the Italian fourth-preference waiting list reached 140,000.   
But in several ways, 1959 had marked a turning point in the movements to reform the national 
origins quotas and for the movement to expand family-based admission.81  (Table 5-8: Estimate 
of Italian Fourth Preference families in 1962 on page 266) 
                                                
 
80 Section 3, Immigration Act of September 22, 1959 (73 Stat. 644) 
81 Immigration Act of 1961 Senator Pastore (D-RI) introduced a bill provided non-quota status for fourth 
preference relatives registered on a consular waiting list prior to December 31, 1954 (S.3361).   Originally, 
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Restrictionist Opposition to Family-focused Reform       
  The significant growth of waiting list made the restrictionists more reluctant to pass 
further emergency legislations.   The 1959 amendment to the INA of 1952 was precisely the 
reason for not enacting further legislation for fourth-preference relatives.    In 1961, Congress 
passed another temporary legislation to provide non-quota visas for second and third preference 
relatives (now parents and unmarried sons and daughters of U.S. citizens, and spouse and 
unmarried sons and daughters of U.S. citizens), but refused to include fourth-preference 
relatives.82   In a letter to Edward Stanstrom, Executive Director for the Catholic Relief Service 
and board member of ACIM, Francis Walter wrote:  
Whenever we speak about “reuniting of families” we must remember that since the 1959 
amendment we can bring only second and third preference categories within the true 
meaning of that formula; fourth preference category, however, most definitely does not 
belong in the notion of “family reunion.” 83  [emphasis in original letter] 
 
According to Walter, there were two reasons why immigration of post-1959 fourth-
preference relatives did not constitute “family reunion.”  First, the fourth preference category no 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
the bill was expected to benefit 65,000 fourth preference relatives, including 52,000 Italians, 3,000 
Greeks, and 2,500 Portuguese among others.   The Senate moved back the cutoff date to March 1954 in 
order to reduce the number of prospective immigrants to 16,000; It also accorded non-quota status to first 
preference immigrant, their spouse and children. Hutchinson, 355-356; Facilitating the Entry of Alien 
Skilled Specialists and Certain Relatives of U.S. Citizens, and for Other Purposes, S. Rept. 87-2276 
(1961) at 2, 5. 
82 The 1959 Act had an unintended effect of increasing the waiting period for others.   Inclusion of 
unmarried adult sons and daughters of citizens and permanent residents to second and third preference 
waiting list, pushed back parents of citizens and some spouses and minor children of permanent residents 
on the waiting list, since some of the newly-included adult sons and daughters had an earlier priority date. 
In September 1961, while Congress was about to pass the 1961 Act for second and third preference 
families, ACIM requested Congress to include fourth preference relatives as well.   “Third Preference 
Quota Dilemma,” ACIM Dispatch 9, no. 6 (September 1960): 1. 
83 Francis Walter, letter to Edward E. Swantrom, Executive Director of the Catholic Relief Service, 
September 18, 1961; Same letter sent to Luigi Antonini, President of United Italian American Labor 
Council, January 22, 1962, folder “1962 Legislation—Correspondence with Walter,” box E85, ACIM 
Records. 
  255 
longer included unmarried adult sons and daughters of U.S. citizens, who were reclassified to the 
higher second-preference category.    Walter’s second reason was that the fourth-preference 
included certain new relations, namely the spouse and children of married sons and daughters or 
married siblings, which to his mind constituted “new” family units. 
Referring to the granting of second preference status to unmarried sons and daughters of 
U.S. citizens and third preference status to unmarried sons and daughters of permanent residents, 
Walter wrote:  
Our motivation was, of course, the recognition that unmarried child, although not a minor, 
is a part and parcel of the family unit created by his father and mother.  He or she 
obviously remains an integral part of that family, regardless of age, until he or she 
marries, thus creating a new family unit.84 [emphasis in original] 
 
As long as the sons and daughters were unmarried, Walter maintained, they could be considered 
as part of the nuclear family, although they were given less consideration than unmarried and 
minor children. 
        However, Walter maintained that post-1959 fourth preference relatives involved “an 
entirely different situation.”  Walter stated the key amendment that the ACIM pushed for was 
precisely why fourth-preference relatives no longer deserved special consideration.  He insisted 
that the concept of “family union” only applied to the immediate nuclear family, not to members 
of that family who had their own spouse and children.  In fact, it was even more so than before 
1959 because post-1959 fourth preference category included spouse and minor children of 
married sons and daughters and the siblings of citizens as well:   
We have amended at the same time the fourth preference provisions allocating 
immigrants visas under that portion of the quotas to brothers and sisters (together with 
                                                
 
84 Francis Walter, letter to Edward E. Swantrom, Executive Director of the Catholic Relief Service, 
September 18, 1961; Same letter sent to Luigi Antonini, President of United Italian American Labor 
Council, January 22, 1962, folder “1962 Legislation—Correspondence with Walter,” box E85, ACIM 
Records. 
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their spouses and children) of United States citizens and to married  sons and daughters 
(again including their spouses and children) of such citizens. ... we recognized ... that the 
new family units created by the primary beneficiaries of fourth preference status deserve 
some preferential statement although less favorable than those who belong to separated 
family units.  
 
We would be bringing … persons not belong to families already established in the United 
States but, obviously, constituting new family units 85  [emphasis and parenthesis in 
original] 
 
Walter emphasized that this was his “basic position” that would be “important for future actions.” 
Walter’s position made prospect of further temporary legislation small. 
   
Liberal Withdrawal from Family-focused Reform         
Whereas Walter’s opposition was based on his belief that family-based admission had 
become too expansive, reformers aiming to abolish the national origins quotas gradually 
withdrew their support from family-focused legislation, though for different reasons.  They did 
not oppose admitting fourth-preference relatives.   Rather, within the broad context of 
immigration reform, not all had a direct interest in the admission of relatives.  For example, after 
the passage of the 1957 Act, the American Jewish Congress commented that it had cleared visa 
backlog for “all preference categories for all national quotas,” although the law did not touch the 
longest fourth-preference backlog.86    
But more importantly, liberals came to doubt whether a series of temporary legislations 
would add up to the abolition of the quotas system.  On the contrary, they increasingly believed 
that backlog clearance would forestall comprehensive reform.   The divide became apparent by 
1962 when Senator Philip Hart (D-MI) introduced a bill in March 1962 that proposed to replace 
                                                
 
85 Ibid.  
86 American Jewish Congress, Commission on Law and Social Action, “Kennedy Immigration Act: A 
Summary and Analysis,” 4; box 479, Emanuel Celler Papers. 
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the national origins quota with quotas calculated on different basis such as population of the 
country and proportion of recent immigration to the U.S.   Although President Kennedy was 
silent on immigration reform, Hart bill was based on a 1959 bill that Kennedy had introduced as 
a Senator.87   While ACIM expressed support for the Hart bill, the organization maintained that 
since Hart bill is “an omnibus bill and necessarily requires long and extensive study, it is 
unlikely that its passage can be effected during this session.”  Instead, the organization requested 
Congress members to first pass a temporary law to admit Italian families outside the quotas.88   
The observation that a bill that directly attacked the quotas system was unlikely to pass 
was probably true as long as Francis Walter was in control.  Indeed, President Kennedy remained 
silent on immigration reform until Walter’s death in 1963, partly because he sought to avoid 
confrontation with Walter.89  Nevertheless, the responses to the ACIM’s request for further 
family-focused legislation were half-hearted at best.  Senator Kenneth Keating replied, “While I 
do not feel that piece-meal immigration legislation is an answer to the long term changes needed 
in our immigration policy, I assure you that I will support legislation designed to provide some 
relief to the many thousands of families separated.”90  Senator Hart expressed clear objections, 
stating that “continuation of the piecemeal approach to immigration problems will indefinitely 
delay genuine immigration reform.”    Abolition of the national origins quotas required “the 
                                                
 
87 Wagner, “The Lingering Death of the National Origins Quotas System,” 368-369. 
88 For those waiting for more than eight years.  Juvenal Marchisio, letter to Philip A. Hart, April 17, 1962, 
folder “Legislation 1962, Correspondence with Walter,” box E85, ACIM Records.   
89 Wagner, “The Lingering Death of the National Origins Quotas System,” 310-311. 
90 Kenneth Keating to Caesar Donanzan, June 26, 1962, “Legislation: Replies from Senator of June 19, 
1962 letter,” box E86, ACIM Records. 
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unified support of those who believe in and equitable and humane immigration policy” and that 
the “pursuit of additional temporary measures most certainly will delay its enactment.”91 
After the death of Francis Walter in 1963, the challenge to the national origins quota 
system entered its final stage.   The question of who should be considered as families drew on 
the developments up to 1959.  Along with their expectation that abolition of the national origins 
quotas would not significantly alter the volume of immigration, liberals maintained that abolition 
of the quotas would eliminate the backlog in various European countries.   But the question of 
how central family relation should be in the overall plan to replace the national origins quota 
system remained.    
  
                                                
 
91 Philip A. Hart, letter to Edward E. Swanstrom and Juvenal Marchisio, April 18, 1962, folder 
“Legislation 1962, Correspondence with Walter,” box E85, ACIM Records. 
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Tables and Figures for Chapter 5 
5-1: Immigrants Admitted under the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 
 
Source: INS Annual Report 1958, table 6B 
 
Class of Admission Total Admitted Percentage
German expellees in Western Germany, 
Berlin, or Austria 37,192 20.4%
Escapees in Western Germany, Berlin, or 
Austria 27,631 15.1%
Escapees in NATO countries or in Turkey, 
Sweden, Iran or Trieste 9,867 5.4%
Polish veteran refugees in U.K. 1,996 1.1%
Italian refugees 13,153 7.2%
Italian relatives of U.S. citizens and LPRs 46,308 25.4%
Greek refugees 9,198 5.0%
Greek relatives of U.S. citizens and LPRs 7,518 4.1%
Dutch refugees 13,839 7.6%
Dutch relatives of U.S. citizens and LPRs 930 0.5%
Non-Asian Far East Refugees 888 0.5%
Asian Far East refugees 2,996 1.6%
Chinese refugees 1,997 1.1%
Palestine refugee in the Near East 1,939 1.1%
Orphans under 10 3,727 2.0%
Adjustment of Status 3,443 1.9%
TOTAL 182,622 100.0%
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5-3: Immigration Pattern of Fourth-Preference under Refugee Relief Act and the Immigration 
and Nationality Act 
Admission of Married Sibling under the Refugee Relief Act, and the Immigration and 
Nationality Act amended in 1959 
Step Visa 
Sponsor 
Relatives in Foreign Country, Preference Category 
Non-
quota 










   A – Sibling 
of X 
B and C – 
Spouse and 
Child of A 
 
Step 2  
 
A, B, and C all receive a fourth-preference visa and immigrate to the U.S. 
 
Admission of Married Sibling under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 1952-1959 
Step Visa 
Sponsor 
Relatives in Foreign Country, Preference Category 





   A – 
Sibling of 
X 
B and C – 
Spouse and 








Step 2  
 
A receives a fourth-preference visa and immigrates to the U.S.  Since B and C 
do not have any preferential status, they cannot receive a visa at the same time. 













A becomes a naturalized U.S. citizen (at least 5 years after step 2) 
Step 5 A =  
U.S. Citizen 
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Admission of Married Son or Daughter under the Refugee Relief Act, and the Immigration and 
Nationality Act amended in 1959 
Step Visa 
Sponsor 
Relatives in Foreign Country, Preference Category 
Non-
quota 










   A – Son or 
Daughter of 
X 
B and C – 
Spouse and 
Child of A 
 
Step 2  
 
A, B, and C all receive a fourth-preference visa and immigrate to the U.S. 
 
 
Admission of Married Son or Daughter under the Immigration and Nationality Act 
Step  
 
Visa Sponsor Relatives in Foreign Country, Preference Category 






   A – Son or 
Daughter 
of X  
B and C – 
Spouse and 








Step 2  
 
A receives a fourth-preference visa and immigrates to the U.S.  Since B and C do 
not have any preferential status, they cannot receive a visa at the same time. 






  B and C- 
Spouse and 




A becomes a naturalized U.S. citizen (at least 5 years after step2) 
Step 5 A =  
U.S. Citizen 
B and C- 
Spouse and 
Child of A 
    
 
5-4: Legislations Regarding Family-based Admission, 1957-1962 
Legislation Permanent or 
temporary 













Sec. Temporary Admitted Citizens Parents (2nd Petition approved 
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316 
 
6 legislation outside 
the quotas 




















Citizens Unmarried sons 




























Citizens Parents, unmarried 
sons and daughters 
(2nd)  
Priority date earlier 
than Dec. 31, 1953 
and petition 




and daughters (3rd) 
Citizens Brothers, sisters, 






























Citizens Parents, unmarried 
sons and daughters 
(2nd)   
Petition filed prior 


















Priority date earlier 
than March 31, 
1954 and petition 
filed prior to Jan. 1, 
1962. 
       
















All Countries  25,022 29,337 16,130 11,483 81,972 
 
Top ten  
Italy 5,666 17,883 16,934 7,407 5,793 48,017 
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Portugal 438 181 2,164 633 1,906 7,109 
Greece 308 1,889 4,389 1,208 1,513 6,758 
China 100 306 2,148 1,386 73 2,102 
Yugoslavia 942 421 337 377 134 1,771 
Philippines 100 116 839 890 203 1,490 
Poland 6,488 713 281 525 21 1,404 
Japan 185 343 145 298 48 1,115 
Spain 250 181 426 135 222 1,074 
Jordan 200 177 536 174 314 938 
Source: INS Annual Report 1963, table 6F; Annual Report 1965, table 6D; INS Annual Report 1966, 
Tables 6E and 6F. 
5-6: ACIM Fourth Preference Files  
(Sample Size 1,236) 




 32 percent 25 percent 10 percent 10 percent 77 percent 
With spouse 
and children 
9 percent 9 percent 2 percent 4 percent 23 percent 
Total 41 percent 34 percent 12 percent 14 percent 100 percent 
Source: Author’s analysis of fourth-preference letters, box E54, E55, D63, ACIM Records, 
Center for Migration Studies, Staten Island 
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5-7: Reclassification of Preference Families, 1952-1959 
Preference 
 
1952  1957 1959 
Non-quota 
 
Spouse and minor 
children 
Spouse and minor 
children 











Spouse and children, 
accompanying and 
following to join 
Skilled immigrant 
 
Spouse and children, 
accompanying and 





Parents Parents Parents 
 
Unmarried sons and 




25 percent  
 
Spouse and minor 
children 
Spouse and minor 
children 
Spouse and unmarried 
children  
Fourth –  
(Citizen’s family) 
  
No guaranteed quota 
Sons and daughters over 
21 
 
Married sons and 
daughters 
 
Brothers and sisters 
Sons and daughters over 
21 
 
Married sons and 
daughters 
 
Brothers and sisters 
Married sons and 
daughters, their 




Brothers and sisters, their 




All others All others All others 
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Derivative beneficiary TOTAL 
 Siblings 
 




Spouse, children  
-Unregistered  
1954 15,279 17,032 19,075 51,386 
1955 17,599 3,158 23,300 59,761 
Source: “Memorandum on Italian Registrations,” August 7, 1962, folder “Legislation, 
Correspondence with Walter,” box E85, ACIM Records. 
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Chapter 6: Family Preference, Equality and Uniformity, 1960-1978 
 
 In the 1960s immigration debate, the key difference between the reformers and the 
defenders of the national origins quotas was the former’s emphasis on “quota system” whereas 
the latter highlighted the “non-quota system.”  As the reformers stepped up their attack on the 
national origins quotas, the opposition sought to redirect the debate by arguing that quotas and 
nonquota admission should be abolished as a set, both as an invention of the 1920s.  The first 
form of nonquota admission was immigration from the Western Hemisphere, especially from 
Mexico.   Second was non-quota family admission from the Eastern Hemisphere.   Third was 
temporary legislation and Presidential parole, primarily for refugees.  
 Family-based admission was a double-edged sword for the defenders of the national 
origins quotas.  At the very core, they saw demands for family unification, especially non-quota 
family admission through regular or temporary law as the principal reason why immigration no 
longer conformed strictly to the national origins quotas ratio.  At the same time, however, 
supporters of the national origins quota found merits in family-based admission.  Once the 
restrictionists accepted the abolition of the quota system, they saw family-based admission as a 
way to protect “national origins.”  This exclusive aspect of family-based admission was coupled 
with a more liberal understanding of family-based admission as rights of citizens and residents, 
and practical demands for family immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe in the 
Immigration Act of 1965. 
In the last part of the chapter, I will examine how family-unification as the principle of 
U.S. immigration policy and the notion that family should be the basis of admission was 
exploited to impose not only numerical restriction but also a uniform ceiling on the Western 
Hemisphere, and examine how “equality” translated into a “uniform” form of restriction. 
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6.1 “Naturally-Operating National Origins”   
Despite a pre-election campaign for immigration reform, and despite being known for his 
Nation of Immigrants (1958), President John F. Kennedy remained silent on immigration reform 
for two years, much to the disappointment of the reformers.   Higher on Kennedy’s agenda were 
issues such as civil rights legislation, and the President sought to avoid confrontation with the 
powerful Francis Walter and James Eastland, chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee.   It was 
two months after Walter’s death in May 1963 that Kennedy sent a special message to Congress 
calling for immigration reform, which was coupled with a bill sponsored by Philip Hart and 
Emanuel Celler, proposing gradual abolition of the national origins quotas over a five-year 
period (S.1932 / H.R. 7700).1  Assassinated in November that year, Kennedy did not live to see 
any progress in the bill, but it provided a momentum as well as a basis framework for reform by 
Lyndon Johnson.   
As Kennedy’s A Nation of Immigrants emphasized, it was not that “one side wanted to go 
back to the policy of our founding fathers, of unrestricted immigration, and the other side wanted 
to stop all further immigration.”   Some “limitation upon immigration” was the basic starting 
point.   Whether to return to “open immigration” was entirely beside the point by the 1960s, and 
the difference in opinions was not “even over the number of immigrants to be admitted, but over 
the test for admission.”2    
Hart-Celler bill included several major proposals.  As for the Eastern Hemisphere, of 
utmost importance was abolition of the national origins quotas.   Second was abolition of racial 
                                                
 
 1 Edward P. Hutchinson, Legislative History of American Immigration Policy, 1798-1965 (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981), 359-361; Stephen Thomas Wagner, “The Lingering Death of the 
National Origins Quotas System: A Political History of United States Immigration Policy, 1952-
1965,”PhD diss., (Harvard University, 1986), 310-311; Daniel J. Tichenor, Dividing Lines  : The Politics 
of Immigration Control in America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 208-209. 
2 John F. Kennedy, A Nation of Immigrants (Revised and Enlarged Edition, 1964), 48. 
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quota of Asia-Pacific Triangle, and to count all immigrants by the country of their own birth and 
not by the region of ancestry.  Having abolished country quotas and combining them to a 
hemispherical ceiling, the bill proposed to use the existing four-point preference system to 
distribute visas within the hemispherical ceiling instead of solely within the country quotas.  The 
two suggested changes to the preference system were to add parents of permanent residents in 
the fourth-preference category and to exempt parents of U.S. citizens (second preference) from 
numerical restriction.3  
Another concerned countries in the Western Hemisphere that had achieved independence 
since 1952: Jamaica (1962) and Trinidad and Tobago (1962).   In order to restrict non-white 
immigrants, the INA of 1952 had imposed a quota of 100 on all colonies denying access to the 
quotas of the mother countries, particularly with an intention of blocking British colonies from 
using the quota of 65,000 for Great Britain.  As stated in chapter four, recruitment of agricultural 
workers from the West Indies by expanding “non-immigrant” categories on the one hand and 
restricting “immigrants / permanent residents” was the most explicit view of non-white 
immigrants as a source of labor but not as permanent members.  And even after independence, 
Congress continued to subject Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago to the quota of 100 instead of 
placing them outside the quotas system like any other independent countries of the Western 
Hemisphere.4   
 At the same time, as Kennedy’s A Nation of Immigrants emphasized, the difference of 
opinion was not “over the number of immigrants to be admitted, but over the test for 
                                                
 
3 S.1932 / H.R. 7700 
4 Martin Ira Glassner, “The Foreign Relations of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, 1960-1965.”  
Caribbean Studies 10, No. 3 (1970): 116-153. 
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admission.”5   And the bill was modest with regard to total expected immigration.  In the Eastern 
Hemisphere, there would no longer be any quotas that would be wasted, and all the visas were 
expected to be fully used (165,000).  The number of exempted families was expected to increase 
by some 12,000: parents newly exempted (5,000), and families from countries where there was 
currently no need to seek for a family-based non-quota status because of large quotas (7,000).  
Increase of immigration from the Western Hemisphere was estimated at 13,000: immigrants 
from Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago (7,000), and immigrants of Asian descent formerly 
charged against the Asia-Pacific Triangle despite being natives of the Western Hemisphere 
(6,000).  (Table 6-1: Hart-Celler Bill on page 316)  
 However, defenders of the national origins quotas such as James Eastland (D - 
Mississippi), chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, as well as Michael Feighan (D - Ohio), 
new chair of the House Immigration Subcommittee, were yet to lower their guard.  No less 
adamant than Walter, Feighan insisted that redistribution of unused quotas was the best he could 
accept.6   Feighan refused to acknowledge any problem with the criteria used for deciding the 
quotas.  Instead, he insisted that quota was only a “theoretical ceiling” and that admission outside 
the quotas demonstrated benevolence of the U.S.  For instance, with regard to immigration from 
Asia, he emphasized that non-quota family immigration pierced the ceiling of 100, and 
highlighted non-quota immigration as “the ample evidence that the charges of prejudice against 
all Orientals are invalid.”7 But although the size of immigration was not the point, Feighan spoke 
                                                
 
5 Kennedy, A Nation of Immigrants (Revised and Enlarged Edition, 1964), 48. 
 6 “Reopening the Door,” New York Times, January 18, 1965; Betty K. Koed, “The Politics of Reform: 
Policymakers and the Immigration Act of 1965.” PhD diss. (University of California, Santa Barbara, 
1999), 160. 
7 Michael Feighan, “Some Insights on Immigration,” Speech before American Coalition of Patriotic 
Societies, February 4, 1965, folder 841, box 89, ACIM Records.   
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nothing of how the Asia Pacific Triangle constituted a racial quota where one was charged not 
against the country of one’s own birth but against the region of ancestry. 
At the same time, it was difficult for politicians in the urban north to continue to entirely 
ignore the demands of Southern and Eastern European immigrants and their descendants, who 
had acquired more political power by the 1960s.   In the case of Feighan, his constituents in 
Cleveland included immigrants from Italy, Poland, and Hungary and their descendants.   In the 
1964 election, his rival in the primary race as well as local media criticized Feighan’s 
unwillingness to tackle immigration reform, which was speculated to be the main reason Feighan 
finally held a hearing until only a few months before the end of the 88th Congress.8 After the 
hearing, Feighan simply replaced the Hart-Celler bill with his own bill to redistribute unused 
quotas.9   
 It was not until early 1965 that the restrictionists loosened their grip on the national 
origins quotas.  After Johnson succeeded to Kennedy in November 1964, among the immigration 
reformers, expectation on the new President was much lower than on Kennedy.  As a Senator, 
Johnson had voted for the INA of 1952 to maintain the national origins quotas, and it was 
uncertain whether he would actively show support for immigration reform.  Yet, after solid 
Democratic victory in the 1964 election, which lessened the weight of the Southern Democrats in 
                                                
 
8 “President Nudges Feighan to Immigration Bill,” Cleveland Press, June 24, 1964; “Feighan Upsets 
Administration,” Plain Dealer, August 12, 1964; Koed, “Politics of Reform,” 160-174. 
9 Immigration: Hearing before the House Committee on Judiciary, 88th Cong. (1964) 
H.R. 12305 (Feighan); American Immigration and Citizenship Conference, News 10 no. 5 (October 3, 
1964); Wagner, Lingering Death, 397-402. 
 “Immigration: Quotas vs. Quality,” Reporter, January 14, 1965: 30-31. 
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the party, Johnson began to step up both symbolic and legislative attacks on the national origins 
quotas.10 
  First, on January 7, Johnson announced his plan to incorporate Ellis Island, which lay 
decaying since the INS facilities closed in 1954, into the Statue of Liberty National Monument.  
Six days later, Johnson sent a special message to Congress calling for abolition of the national 
origins quotas.11  In May 1965, in his proclamation to designate the Ellis Island as national 
monument, Johnson praised “16 million immigrants” who arrived between “1892 and 1930” for 
making the U.S. “not merely a nation, but nation of nations,” and urged Congress to “draw on 
the lessons of Ellis Island” and to do away with the “outdated national origins quota system.”12   
 The celebration of Ellis Island indicated the transformation of ethno-racial boundaries 
among European immigrants since the 1920s as well as the meanings attached to the Statue of 
Liberty and Ellis Island.  First of all, as historian John Higham argued, the Statue of Liberty 
originally was not intended as a symbol of welcome for immigrants.   Designated as national 
monument by Calvin Coolidge in 1924, the very year the Immigration Act of 1924 was passed, it 
was understood as the symbol of republicanism.   It was only after the closing of mass migration 
from Europe that the statue changed its meaning as a “symbol of the migrations.”13  Likewise, 
Johnson’s portrayal of the Ellis Island was highly romanticized in light of the fact that the island 
                                                
 
10 David M. Reimers, Still the Golden Door: The Third World Comes to America, 2nd ed. (New York: 
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had primarily served as an inspection and detention center not a welcome center.   But as 
historian Oscar Handlin compared Ellis Island to Plymouth Rock and called for the need to 
preserve the island as part of national heritage, the gesture was symbolic.  Ellis Island inspection 
center was established in 1892 in reponse to immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe.  In 
1924, the reason why Albert Johnson insisted on using the 1890 census as the basis of the quotas 
was to disregard the Ellis Island immigrants altogether.  Celebration of the Ellis Island marked a 
direct contrast with the 1924 Act and was an appeal to the descendants of Ellis Island 
immigrants.14  At the same time, “nation of immigrants” of the 1960s was a selective narrative 
encompassing immigrants from Europe but not others such as Asian immigrants, who were not 
merely restricted but excluded by the 1924 Act.   It was not until three decades later in 1996 that 
Angel Island in San Francisco, where inspection center was completed in 1910, achieved 
national historic landmark status.15 
 
Impenetrable Ceiling 
 In the face of heightened pressure from the reform camp, defenders of the national 
origins quotas took two positions.   One was refusal to make any compromise.  In the Senate, 
Judiciary Committee Chair James Eastland would continue to oppose abolition of the national 
origins quotas until the last minute, voting against the Immigration Act of 1965.   Another path 
chosen by Feighan was to take the offensive rather than being on the losing end and to push for a 
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counterproposal with minimal concessions.  This was similar to the response of the restrictionists 
in the early 1950s, which raised alarm by the passage of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 as a 
sign of liberalization.   In order to prevent the Truman administration from opening the gate 
further, McCarran and Walter decided to push for an omnibus bill of their own design (INA of 
1952) that would preserve the national origins quotas system.16  Shortly after Johnson’s special 
message in January, Feighan’s aides advised him that immigration reform seemed inevitable and 
that resisting any change would cost him politically because it would “look as though he favored 
discrimination against Non-Anglo-Saxon Americans [emphasis in original].”  Furthermore, 
refusal to take part in the debate would allow liberals such as Emanuel Celler to design the new 
system.  As Feighan put it, “The only sensible means of avoiding being run over by a steamroller” 
was to push one’s own “positive program for revision of the present immigration laws.”17 
In February 1965, at the annual meeting of the American Coalition of Allied Patriotic 
Societies, one of the most vocal supporters of the quotas system, Feighan announced his 
intention to replace the national origins quotas with an alternative system of immigrant selection.  
Feighan explained that the reason was not because there was anything wrong with the principle 
of the national origins quotas but because the current system was not restrictive enough, and 
emphasized the need to build a stronger system of “selective admission.”18  Although Feighan 
spoke of “failure” of the quota system, what he meant was that actual immigration no longer 
conformed neatly to the national origins ratio. 
Scholarship often describes that the main difference between the administration proposal 
(Hart- Celler, S. 500- H.R.2580) and Feighan (H.R. 8662 introduced on June 1) concerning 
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immigration from the Eastern Hemisphere lay in the preference system.  Whereas the original 
bill retained the four-point preference system of the INA of 1952 with some modifications, the 
latter forwarded a seven-point preference system with more visas reserved for family-based 
admission.  While this is true, this description misses the duality of the restrictionist views of 
family-based admission both as a reason for the erosion of the quotas system and at the same 
time as a means to keep the spirit of the national origins quotas alive.  As this chapter will 
discuss, the idea that family-based admission was related to the national origins quotas pointed to 
different understanding of the national origins from the 1920s, as ethno-racial categorization of 
European immigrants had changed. 
Before loosening their firm grip on the quota system, its defenders pointed to non-quota 
admission – family or otherwise - to depict the quota as only a theoretical ceiling.  They denied 
the need to eliminate the entire quota system, arguing that U.S. immigration policy as a whole 
was not restrictive, if taken together with non-quota admission.  However, when upholding non-
quota admission no longer served the purpose of defending the quotas system, Feighan reversed 
his argument to claim that the weakness of the quota system lay in lack of “fixed ceiling on the 
number of immigrants we will admit from each such country,” in other words non-quota 
admission.19  Central to the call for a firmer ceiling was to subject all families to a firm 
impenetrable worldwide ceiling.20  Not since 1921 when Senator William Dillingham proposed 
the quotas as an absolute ceiling had a major politician suggested an impenetrable ceiling, and it 
was only within the ceiling that Feighan proposed to reserve majority of the visas for family-
based admission. 
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Most fundamentally, restrictionists concluded that the Congress in the 1920s had erred by 
creating a non-quota class for European immigrants, which provided grounds for further 
demands to apply the provision to an ever wider range of immigrants, family or otherwise.  In a 
1963 book written to defend the national origins quotas, a former Missouri Congressman Marion 
T. Bennett wrote how political pressures for admission of family members were especially strong, 
and “it can be safely concluded that immigration restrictions as to relatives will continue to be 
modified or disappear.”  The ultimate result, Bennett lamented, was “greatly increased 
immigration and further dilution of the national origins quota system.”21  Two years later, 
Bennett wrote to Feighan that the national origins quotas had been “rendered unworkable by the 
numerous exceptions made to it by Congress and by non-quota immigration generally.”22  
Feighan found fault not only with the system but with the word “non-quota,” which came to be 
seen as antithesis to the national origins quotas.  “Public attacks against the quota system,” 
Feighan argued, “have been used to generate pressure for ... creating non-quota status for various 
new classes of aliens.”  The new system had to make it “impossible to create a new whipping 
boy to increase immigration in the future” by eliminating non-quota admission altogether.23   
Feighan aimed to eliminate all non-quota admission from the Eastern Hemisphere and the 
Western Hemisphere.   For the Eastern Hemisphere, Feighan argued that since the quotas and the 
family-based exemption from quota restriction were a set, “when we repeal the national origins 
quota system ... we must repeal those exceptions” as well.  However, this argument conveniently 
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ignored that no one was proposing to abolish numerical restriction and that the contested issue 
was only the quotas as a method of restriction.  As Kennedy’s The Nation of Immigrants 
emphasized, it was not “as if one side wanted to go back to the policy of our founding fathers, or 
unrestricted immigration.”  Surely, return to pre-1921 policy of numerically unlimited admission 
would have obviated the need for non-quota exemption, but nobody made such proposals.  
Exemption of families had not only to do with quotas but more fundamentally with numerical 
immigration restriction. 24 Characteristic of the call for simultaneous elimination of quotas and 
non-quota admission from both hemispheres was the argument that the two were invented as a 
set, and that abolition of the quotas should necessarily accompany elimination of the other.  But 
this argument pointed to only one aspect of the quota system while ignoring others.    
Avoiding the impression of being anti-family, which would be read as a move against 
Southern and Eastern European immigrants, was also important.  Feighan proposed to first issue 
visas to immediate families (children, spouse, and parents), deduct the number from the annual 
ceiling, and to distribute the remainder to various countries according to the preference system.  
By counting close relatives against the overall ceiling but not against the country ceiling, 
Feighan ranked family lower than the principle of numerical restriction but higher than the 
country ceiling.   Central to this scheme was a direct trade-off between the number of visas 
issued for close relatives and those for others, which would leave the total ceiling unaffected by 
any future increase of family immigration.  the focal point of rallying cry for reform.  “Especially 
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pleased” with this idea, Marion T Bennett wrote that “the time has certainly arrived when the 
best interests of the United States require a firm, numerical immigration ceiling.”25   
 In Feighan’s proposal, one can find the seed of more recent form of immigration 
restriction. In 1990, Congress agreed to deduct the number of visas issued to immediate families 
from the annual ceiling, although the complex formula still holds the ceiling penetrable to a 
degree.26  However, this scheme met strong oppositions from the liberals in the 1960s.  First was 
the objection that as a matter of principle certain family relations held higher grounds than 
numerical restriction, and therefore should not be counted against the ceiling.  Second was the 
administrative concern that the scheme was too complicated to enforce, because the number of 
visas would fluctuate every year depending on how many immediate relatives applied for a visa.  
The Department of State preferred to issue a fixed number of visas for each class of 
immigrants.27  There were also objections that immediate relatives might exhaust the ceiling, 
leaving only a few visas for others, but a large increase of family immigration was not expected 
at the time, at least not to the level of what would actually happen in the 1970s.28   (Table 6-2: 
Feighan Bill on page 317)  
 
Naturally Operating National Origins   
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While family-based admission in the form of non-quota admission posed a threat not only 
in that potential increases of family migration were unforeseeable but also in that it could lead to 
expansion of non-quota admission to wider range of relatives or others.   At the same time, 
however, Feighan believed that family-based admission would serve another purpose: to keep 
the main source of immigration to Europe. 
As historian David Reimers and others have pointed out, with regard to future sources of 
immigration, the Immigration Act of 1965 was not intended to invite immigration from Asia or 
Africa. Congress believed that immigration after abolition of the quotas system would come 
from Europe.29  Ethno-racial concerns about the source of immigration still ran deeply, but such 
concerns were less about immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe, for whom quotas 
restriction was invented.  For example, when Emanuel Celler’s staff examined the letters of 
objections to the Hart-Celler bill, concerns about “ethnic or racial impairment” resulting from 
abolition of the national origins quotas were “chiefly expressions of prejudice against African 
and Asian immigrants” and not against immigrants from Europe.30 But, despite the differences in 
its design, few believed that their own bill would open the door to large-scale immigration from 
areas other than Europe.  For instance, under the Hart-Celler bill retaining the 1952 preference 
system with higher priority on occupation-based admission, the INS estimated that beneficiaries 
were most likely to be Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Greece, and Poland.  China was the only 
country in Asia that ranked among the top ten countries of anticipated immigration.31  Celler 
believed future immigration was “likely to be more than 80% European.”32   
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The difference over the weight given to family preferences was not so much in the 
estimation that future immigration would be from Europe, but in what was supposed to be the 
primary purpose of future immigration policy and family-based admission.  It was not the 
primary purpose of Hart / Celler to limit future immigration to Europe, or on the other side of the 
coin, to keep out immigration from Asia or Africa.   The immediate objective was abolition of 
the national origins quotas, and what they thought would naturally follow was more of a 
redistribution of visas from Northern and Western Europe, where the quotas had remained 
unused for many years, to Southern and Eastern Europe.  In fact, Celler did not think that criteria 
of visa distribution would make any material change in immigration from Asia or Africa.  He 
stated bluntly on the House floor that “there is no danger whatsoever of an influx from the 
countries of Asia and Africa” because “few of the people from these areas can even pay the cost 
of the ticket to come here.”  With visible backlog in countries in Southern and Eastern Europe, it 
was expected that at least in the short run, family-based admission was expected to allow more 
immigrants to come from Southern and Eastern Europe. But that was not the primary purpose of 
family-based admission.   Liberals saw family-based admission more in terms of individual 
rights of citizens and permanent residents.33  
  By contrast, nativists in the 1960s placed keeping the source of future immigration 
Europe as the main purpose of immigration policy, not simply the natural outcome after the 
abolition of the quotas system.  More fundamentally, the main criteria of immigrant selection 
was “similar background,” which they defined as being European.  Senator Sam Ervin (D-North 
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Carolina), chair of the Senate immigration subcommittee, insisted that the INA of 1952 was 
based upon the theory that it was desirable to maintain the ethnic origin of American citizens as 
they were in 1924, which he wholeheartedly supported.34 And in so far as the restrictionists 
upheld ethno-racial similarity as central to immigration policy, they had much in common with 
the nativists in the 1920s.  However, there was an importance difference in the idea of similarity.  
What characterized the restrictionist thinking of the 1960s was the view that “national origins” 
were related to “families,” which was very different from the understandings of national origins 
in the 1920s.  
 A day after House passed the Hart-Celler bill as amended by Feighan, with 74 percent of 
the visas reserved for family-based admission, Ervin wrote to Senator James O. Eastland, chair 
of the Senate Judiciary Committee, how he believed the new law would keep the essence of the 
national origins quotas:    
The theory of the much maligned national origins quota system seemed to me sound.  
That system assumes that all men are created equal and that the various nationalities have 
made contributions to the development of the United States according to their number 
residing here.  The system also, logically, I think, assumes that those people can be best 
assimilated into our society who have relatives, friends or others of similar background 
already here.  Therefore, under the system quotas are granted to countries in proportion to 
the number of persons of the various national origins who make up the population of this 
country.  I see nothing unjust in such a system ...35 
 
It goes without saying that the national origins quotas had little to do with the idea that “all men 
are created equal.”  What is notable here is the idea that saw a “logical” connection between 
national origins and admission of relatives, and that preference for relatives reflected the national 
origins quotas scheme.  In a similar vein, six months after the passage of the 1965 Act, the 
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America Legion declared that the new law “preserved the national-origins base of immigration to 
the United States.”  The Legion proclaimed that “the quota system was ‘struck down,’ the 
national origins system wasn’t” and highly praised Feighan for devising “a naturally-operating 
national origins system” without relying on formal quotas.  The Legion explained that “nobody 
is quite so apt to be of the same national origin of our present citizens as are member of their 
immediate families, and the great bulk of immigration henceforth will not merely be from the 
same parent countries as our present citizens, but will be their close relatives.”36    
 This was a fundamentally different understanding of the national origins quotas and 
family immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe from the 1920s.  While both insisted on 
“similar background” as the principal criteria of selection, the 1920s concept of similarity 
embedded in the quotas had little to do with having immediate relatives in the U.S. or the idea 
“those people can be best assimilated into our society who have relatives, friends.”  It is true that 
within a given European country, Congress favored an immigrant with a family over those 
without, but the quota system itself did not link similarity with having close relatives and friends 
in the U.S.  In fact, as discussed in the first chapter, the quotas system was designed specifically 
for the purpose of minimizing the importance of ties to relatives and families.  Representative 
Albert Johnson’s proposal after World War I was to limit immigration to relatives of U.S. 
citizens and those who had declared their intention to become a U.S. citizen.  The objection of 
Senator William Dillingham was that family-based admission would favor Southern and Eastern 
European immigrants, and quota scheme was advanced as a direct counter-proposal to family-
centered admission. The quota system was a counter proposal to family-based admission, which 
privileged the ethnoracial origin of individuals above all else. 
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Among the three quota systems enforced in 1921, 1924, and 1929, it was the Emergency 
Quota Act of 1921 that came closest to favoring ties with relatives and friends in the U.S.  The 
1921 quota was based on the “foreign-born population” or the number of first-generation 
immigrants from each European country in the most recent census.  And it was precisely because 
this favored immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe whose “relatives and friends” had 
recently immigrated to the U.S. that nativists pushed for a different quota formula.   First, instead 
of using the most recent census, the 1924 Act used the 1890 census to disregard immigration for 
the past thirty years.  The purpose of the 1924 Act was to minimize the importance of family ties, 
and to enable immigrants from countries who had fewer families and relatives.  The national 
origins quotas as finalized in 1929 had even less to do with familial connections.  The national 
origins quotas went back to the 1790 census and calculated how many descended from the 
“native” population in 1790, assuming that English in 1790 and a British national in the 1920s 
shared a quality that made them better Americans.37  Reformers in the 1920s who pushed for 
expanding family-based admission surely did not intend to promote the national origins quotas.  
It was an appeal for families separated by the quota system not the idea of maintaining the ethno-
racial status quo of the American society.  
But conflation of the national origins and family-centered admission in 1965 was less of 
an intentional misrepresentation than a different categorization of European ethnic groups 
developed over the decades.  The southern and eastern European immigrants who had been 
considered as the “degraded races of Europe” and were the objects of restriction in the 1920s had 
become accepted as white-ethnic Americans by the 1960s.38 The views of future President 
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Gerald R. Ford (R- Michigan), the House minority leader at the time, expressed the inclusive and 
exclusive aspect of family-based admission associated with ethno-racial grouping.  Ford called 
family-focused admission from the Eastern Hemisphere a “blood relationship argument.”  
According to Ford, it was in countries such as “Poland, in France, in Italy, in England, in 
Germany, in Scandinavia, in all of the western European countries” that “Americans” have 
“extremely close and broad ties on the basis of blood.”  Immigrants from countries such as 
Poland and Italy, once the target of restriction, were now categorized as European related by 
“blood” to Americans.39 
Notably, Ford turned this family preference as “blood relationship” argument, which was 
at one level inclusive for Euro-Americans, against immigrants from the Western Hemisphere.  
According to Ford, what would follow from placing “blood relationship = family” at the core of 
immigration policy was restriction of immigrants from the Western Hemisphere, whom he 
argued were not related to Americans.40  This was a crude display of more exclusive aspect of 
family-based admission.   Still, in the 1960s reference to “blood” was not the dominant discourse.  
Rather, attack on non-quota admission used the language of “discrimination.”  Whereas 
conflation of the national origins and family-centered admission was less of an intentional 
misrepresentation than a different categorization of European ethnic groups, attack on non-quota 
admission from the Western Hemisphere by restrictionists was based on intentional distortion of 
the quota systems. 
 
6.2 “Accident of the Place of Birth” 
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 Attack on non-quota admission from the Western Hemisphere by restrictionists such as 
Feighan and Eastland distorted the historical context of the quota system on several levels.   First 
was the characterization of absence of formal ceiling on the Western Hemisphere as “historical 
companions” to the quota system, and the argument that Congress should do away entirely with 
the invention of the 1920s.   In fact, it was the quota restriction and  “non-quota” as a term that 
were invented in the 1920s, but the term “non-quota” was only applied to the continuing policy 
of numerically unlimited admission from the Western Hemisphere.41 
  Secondly, nativists spoke as if the ceiling of 150,000 for the Eastern Hemisphere was the 
absolute annual maximum that Congress in the 1920s intended to admit from around the world, 
and spoke of how total immigration including the Western Hemisphere has doubled quota 
immigration from the Eastern Hemisphere.  However, neither the figure of 150,000 nor the 
national origins ratio of distribution had to do with the Western Hemisphere, or for that matter 
any other parts of the world other than Europe.  First of all, the figure of 150,000 was based on a 
calculation of 2 percent of the European-born immigrants in 1890.  Secondly, the national origins 
ratio applied to that figure was about how many people in 1920 descended from Europe.  Neither 
considered how many people had immigrated from or originated from the Western Hemisphere, 
for instance from former territories of Mexico such as California, Arizona, New Mexico, and 
Texas, nor subsequent immigration.42  
Most fundamentally misplaced was the argument that quotas imposed on the Eastern 
Hemisphere and the non-quota status of the Western Hemisphere constituted “discrimination 
based upon accident of country of birth.”  Feighan argued that eliminating national origins 
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quotas did away with only half of discrimination based on “country of birth,” because half of all 
immigration to the U.S. was non-quota immigration from the Western Hemisphere.  He argued 
that non-quota status for natives of the Western Hemisphere expressed the idea that they were 
“considered superior to and therefore preferable to people born in Europe or elsewhere in the 
world” and made a case that Congress “should remove all discrimination based upon accident of 
country of birth.” 43  
This neglected the historical context of non-quota admission from the Western Hemisphere.  
Non-quota status of the Western Hemisphere was not based on the same logic that resulted in 
Britain receiving the largest quota.   
  As the Department of State and the Department of Justice, both against the Western 
Hemisphere ceiling, pointed out that absence of formal ceiling on the natives of the Western 
hemisphere was distinct from quotas ranging widely in size accorded to countries in the Eastern 
Hemisphere, and to coin both policies as “discrimination” distorted history. Attorney General 
Nicholas Katzenbach argued that to apply the label of “discrimination” to both the national 
origins quotas and non-quota status for the Western Hemisphere was “to twist the word,” as the 
latter “did not involve discrimination in the same sense at all as the national origins system.”  
“The initial national origins system quota law was heavily Anglo-Saxon and Northern European 
oriented.  It discriminated against Italians, Greeks, other countries of Southern Europe and the 
Asiatic counties.”  On the other hand, non-quota status for the Western Hemisphere was “never 
intended to be discriminatory against anyone.”44 The Secretary of State Dean Rusk argued that 
the word “discrimination” had several meanings, and explained that the reason why the national 
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origins quotas were perceived to be discriminatory was not because of the size of the quotas or 
because possibility of immigration to the U.S. was different according to the country of birth.   It 
was because they were created from the idea that some were inherently superior to others “based 
on race, religion, ancestry, or ethnic origin.”  Rusk explained that although it was true that the 
U.S. made a “distinction” between the Western hemisphere and other parts of the world, it was 
not an “unfair, unjustified, or offensive distinctions drawn among people,” as it was “simply a 
recognition of Western Hemisphere solidarity which had been and is the firm policy of the 
United States.”45  To be sure, this reasoning was only partly true.  While foreign relations had 
played an important role, equally crucial were factors such as business interests which looked at 
Mexico as an easy access to labor.   Nevertheless, absence of a formal quota on the Western 
Hemisphere was not based on the same logic that resulted in Britain receiving the largest quota.46  
However, as Mae Ngai argues, the attack on the Western Hemisphere exemption on 
grounds of fairness and equal treatment between countries and regardless of place of birth also 
had saliency because of the civil rights era focus on formal equality.47  Moreover, as the next 
section examines, the claim that families of U.S. citizens and residents should be treated equally 
would reinforce the claim that  the Western Hemisphere immigrants should be restricted in the 
same way as in the Eastern Hemisphere. 
 
Western Hemisphere Immigration as Labor Immigration 
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Intervention of the White House as well as management by Chair of the House Judiciary 
Committee Emanuel Celler prevented the House from imposing a Western Hemisphere ceiling.  
Celler succeeded in voting down the proposal both in the Judiciary committee and on the House 
floor.48  However, as an alternative to restriction by a numerical ceiling, Feighan insisted on 
restriction by a stricter labor certification procedure for Western Hemisphere immigrants than for 
immigrants from the Eastern Hemisphere, which he hoped to have the effect of reducing 
immigration from the Western Hemisphere even without formal ceiling.49 
The labor certification was a new feature of the 1965 law that reflected the demand of 
organized labor above all.  The demands of organized labor, which were both inclusive and 
exclusive, left several marks on the 1965 Act.  Since the merger of the AFL-CIO in 1955, 
organized labor had been instrumental in lobbying for abolition of the national origins quotas.50  
Along with calling for the abolition of the national origins quotas, the AFL-CIO in fact suggested 
that the ceiling could be much higher than 165,000 proposed by Kennedy/Johnson/Hart-Celler.   
At the same time, organized labor was insistent on establishing a stronger control over labor 
immigration.  Their strongest opposition was directed at the Bracero Program, which was 
terminated in 1964, and hiring of farm workers on temporary basis.  At the same time, organized 
labor insisted on raising the bar for an occupation-based immigrant visa as well.  Under the INA 
of 1952, all applicants for an occupation visa had been required to first secure a job offer from 
the prospective employer.   The AFL-CIO demanded that in addition applicants should be 
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required to prove through affirmative approval of the Labor Secretary that American labor was 
unavailable in the 1) occupation in the 2) locality where the immigrant was planning to work.51   
Feighan found in labor certification a tool to reduce immigration from the Western 
Hemisphere without relying on a formal ceiling.  Importantly, at the core was the view of 
immigration from Mexico primarily as recruitment or restriction of labor force.   Feighan 
maintained that “this new system of preferences together with the new labor controls on non-
preference immigrants is expected to maintain to a large extent the traditional patterns of 
immigration to the United States. (European.) [parenthesis in original]”52   
In all, for the Eastern Hemisphere, the House agreed to reserve 74 percent of all visas for 
family-sponsored immigrants, and exempted all family-sponsored immigrants from securing a 
labor certification.  The House also exempted refugees (6 percent) from labor certification.  By 
contrast, for the Western Hemisphere, the House required labor certification of all immigrants 
except for spouse, minor children, and parents of citizens and permanent residents, arguing that 
no family-based “preference system” existed for the Western Hemisphere.  Here it is important 
to distinguish two meanings of the term “preference,” confounded both intentionally and 
unintentionally at the time.  One meaning is priority in distributing numerically limited visas, 
which may be called “family-based numerical preference.” Another is exemption from labor 
certification based on family ties, which may be called “family-based labor clearance.”   The 
term was used interchangeably with regard to the Eastern Hemisphere immigrants, because those 
                                                
 
51 The AFL-CIO had less to say about how many visas should be issued on the basis of occupations, and 
agreed to keeping the 1952 preference system reserving half of the visas for occupation-based immigrants.  
What the AFL-CIO demanded was to require this for applicants for an occupation-based immigrant visa.   
But as it turned out, since Congress reserved 74 percent of the ceiling for family-sponsored visas and 
another 6 percent for refugees, along with exemption of immediate relatives, labor certification applied to 
less than 20 percent of the Eastern Hemisphere immigrants. 
52 Reimers, Still the Golden Door, 72; “Major Accomplishments of the Subcommittee Substitute Bill,” 
July 26, 1965; folder “1965 Immigration Bill”; box 27; Michael Feighan Papers. 
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who qualified for a family visa were exempted from labor clearance as well.  Labor certification 
introduced in 1965 and family-based clearance conformed to the pre-existing family-based 
numerical preference, which had evolved through four decades of numerical restriction since 
1921.   But restriction was enforced in the opposite order for the Eastern and the Western 
Hemisphere.  For the Western Hemisphere, the first requirement for admission was the labor 
certification imposed upon all prospective immigrants.  No numerical preference existed, since 
there was never a firm ceiling.  The argument that the Western Hemisphere immigrants, who did 
not have any numerical preference, did not need family-based labor clearance was an intentional 
confusion of the two meanings.  Surely, without a ceiling, family-based numerical preference 
was unnecessary.  But, labor certification was qualitative restriction, a different matter from 
numerical ceiling. 
  Several Congress members pointed out that absence of a numerical ceiling did not justify 
narrower family-based labor clearance for the Western Hemisphere, because the two were 
different forms of restriction, and that it was an exploitation of non-quota status of Western 
Hemisphere immigrants.  Representative George Edward Brown Jr. (D-California) pointed out 
that narrower family-based labor clearance would mean that “citizens and permanent resident 
aliens who have relatives in the Western Hemisphere are denied the opportunity” to send for 
one’s family members.   Another member argued that absence of a ceiling “does not satisfy the 
citizen who tries unsuccessfully to bring his brother or his unmarried daughter to this country, 
[who failed to meet the labor clearance] only to be told that he cannot do so because he is a 
native of the Western Hemisphere.”  Nevertheless, House ignored such voices.53 
                                                
 
53 111 Cong. Rec. 21797 (1965) (Representative George Edward Brown Jr., D-California); 111 Cong. Rec. 
21800 (1965) (Representative Florence Price, R-Pennsylvania). 
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Moreover, the Senate Immigration and Naturalization Subcommittee chair Sam Ervin 
(North Carolina) insisted that labor certification, which was more or less a form of administrative 
restriction, was not sufficient as a safeguard.54  When the committee refused to abolish the 
national origins quotas without a ceiling on the Western Hemisphere, the White House and the 
liberals including Edward Kennedy and Philip Hart agreed to a ceiling of 120,000 on two 
conditions.  The first was to organize a Congressional Select Commission to discuss the issue 
further until July 1, 1968, when the quotas for the Eastern Hemisphere were to be abolished 
entirely after a three-year transition period.    The second was to subject immigration from the 
Western Hemisphere to a hemispherical ceiling but not to a country ceiling, which was mostly in 
deference to Canada, as Canadian immigrants had averaged annually 37,000.  This compromise 
was somewhat similar to how Congress passed the 1924 Act by postponing the national origins 
quotas until a few years later.  In the late 1920s, serious disagreement over the national origins 
quotas postponed its enforcement twice.  But this time, although the Congressional Select 
Commission and the House voted for postponement, lack of Senate action put the first formal 
ceiling on the Western Hemisphere into effect in 1968. 55    The House originally advanced 
stricter labor certification for the Western Hemisphere as an alternative to a numerical ceiling.   
However, imposition of rigid labor certification in combination with a numerical ceiling 
multiplied the impact of the first formal numerical restriction on immigration from the Western 
Hemisphere.    
                                                
 
54 Senator Sam Ervin, to Senator James O. Eastland, August 24, 1965; untitled folder; box 36; Michael 
Feighan Papers.  
55  United States. Select Commission Western Hemisphere Immigration, Report (Washington, D.C.: 
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Academy of Political and Social Science 367 (September 1966): 137–149; William G. Hartley, “United 
States Immigration Policy: The Case of the Western Hemisphere,” World Affairs 135, no. 1 (1972): 54–
70; Koed, “Politics of Reform,” 264-266. 
  292 
 
6.3 Post-1965 Immigration Pattern  
In all, the Immigration and Nationality Act as amended in 1965 set up two systems for 
the Eastern Hemisphere and the Western Hemisphere, but these did not actually correspond to 
the respective levels of immigration.  The Immigration Act of 1965 was passed in the period of 
low immigration from Europe and Asia.  But for the Western Hemisphere, above all for Mexico, 
it was enforced during a time of high immigration, especially considering migration under the 
Bracero Program until 1964.   
First, the 1965 Act provided three paths to permanent residency for natives of the Eastern 
Hemisphere.  The first method was an immigrant visa.  Another was adjustment of status from a 
non-immigrant to a permanent resident.  Third was suspension of deportation, although this was 
extremely difficult.  For natives of the Western Hemisphere, the immigrant visa was the only 
path to permanent residency.56  
Second, with regard to numerical limitations, for both the Eastern and the Western 
Hemisphere, Congress exempted spouse, children, and parents of U.S. citizens over 21.  The 
hemispherical ceiling for the Eastern Hemisphere was 170,000, distributed according to the 
seven-point preference system, with a per-country ceiling of 20,000.  The range of families that 
qualified for a visa drew on the amendments made to the INA of 1952 by 1959.   The ceiling for 
the Western Hemisphere was 120,000, distributed on first-come, first-served basis without any 
country ceiling.   
                                                
 
56 As discussed in chapter 4, in 1958 Congress barred nonimmigrants from Mexico and the West Indies 
from adjustment of status.  (sec. 245, INA).   The 1965 Act extended this bar to “a native of any country 
of the Western Hemisphere or of any adjacent island” from adjustment of status. Sec. 13 b, Immigration 
Act of 1965; Hutchinson, Legislative History, 373; Zolberg, A Nation by Design, 332. 
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 Third difference concerned labor certification.  For both hemispheres, family-based labor 
clearance applied to spouse and minor children of citizens and permanent residents, as well as 
parents of citizens over 21.   In addition, however, for the Western Hemisphere, family-based 
labor clearance was provided for parents of U.S. citizens under 21 and parents of permanent 
residents.  For the Eastern Hemisphere, family-based labor clearance was provided for adult or 
married sons and daughters (first and fourth numerical preference), as well as siblings regardless 
of marital status or age (fifth numerical preference) of U.S. citizens.  In other words, the law 
imposed labor certifications on most adults of working age from the Western Hemisphere (save 
for spouses), while exempting from labor certification virtually all adults coming under family 
preference categories from Europe, which comprised 74 percent of all visas.    
(Table 6-3: 1965 System: Eastern Hemisphere and the Western Hemisphere, page 318) 
For prospective immigrants, family sponsorship thus became more critical than ever, as 
intense competition for a visa began.   Soon after the enforcement of the 1965 Act, visa 
applications for “immediate relatives” (spouse, minor children, and parents of a U.S. citizen) 
rose sharply for three reasons.   First, more immigrants qualified for the status, as parents of U.S. 
citizens newly acquired exempt status.   Second, the 1965 Act mandated “immediate relatives” to 
apply for a visa as such instead of applying for other types of visa such as occupation-based visa 
or non-preference visas that were limited in numbers.  Before 1965, whether to apply for a 
family visa was a matter of convenience not a requirement.  For example, a British spouse of a 
U.S. citizen rarely applied for a non-quota visa based on family petitioning, because a quota visa 
was easier to obtain.  The change of rules was to leave numerically limited visas for those who 
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had no other option.57 Third, the increase indicated the intensified competition for a visa, with no 
visas reserved for any particular nationality as the quotas system had done, and with all 
competing for a visa not within one’s country of birth but under a hemispherical and later 
worldwide ceiling.   Even if the 1965 Act had not mandated qualifying immigrants to apply for 
immediate relatives status, there was no longer a reason why a person who could be exempted 
from both numerical restriction and labor clearance by virtue of one’s familial relationship would 
want to compete with all other visa applicants from all other countries.58   
Thus, the most visible change in application for immediate relatives status occurred in 
countries where there was previously minimal limitation, either because of large quotas or 
because visas were unlimited.  Before 1965, less than 1 percent of British immigrants applied for 
non-quota family status, but immediate relatives comprised 23 percent in 1976.   The same was 
true of natives from the Western Hemisphere, who were previously categorically exempted from 
numerical restriction and not by virtue of familial relations.  Between 1969 and 1976, some 
143,000 Mexicans and 31,000 Canadians immigrated outside the hemispherical ceiling, as 
immediate families of U.S. citizens.59  (Table 6-4: Immediate Relatives by Country of Birth, 
1966-1976 on page 320) 
 Under intense competition for a visa, post-1965 immigration followed the expected 
pattern to a certain extent.  The practical purpose of the abolition of the quotas was to facilitate 
immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe.  As discussed in chapter 5, Italy, Greece, and 
                                                
 
57 Raymond Farrell, “The Role of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the Administration of 
Current Immigration Law,” International Migration Review 4, no. 3 (1970): 16–30. 
58 Raymond Farrell, “The Role of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the Administration of 
Current Immigration Law,” International Migration Review 4, no. 3 (1970): 16–30. 
59 From 1969 to 1976 transitional quarter, 37,217 wives, 52,316 husbands, 48,179 children, and 4,982 
parents were admitted as immediate relatives from Mexico. INS Annual Report, 1966-1976, table 9.; 
Western Hemisphere Immigration, Hearing before Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and 
International Law  94th Cong. 370 (1975)  
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Portugal in particular had a long backlog in the family preference categories under the INA of 
1952, especially in the former fourth-preference category including married sons and daughters 
or siblings of U.S. citizens.  Since they had long been registered on the waiting list, they were the 
first to receive a visa after the removal of quota restriction.   Between 1965 and 1971, 
immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe rose by 75.6 percent from 40,106 to 70,444, and 
majority of the visas were family-sponsored. 60  
 Congress expected that immigration from Northern and Western Europe would remain 
more or less at the same level as before, and that the visas that had been wasted each year by 
countries such as Britain and Ireland would be distributed to Southern and Eastern Europe.  
However, between 1965 and 1971, immigration from Northern and Western Europe sharply 
dropped by 64.5 percent from 73,318 to 26,062.  By contrast, immigration from Asia rose 
dramatically by 400.2 percent from 20,683 to 103,461, outnumbering immigration from entire 
Europe (96,502) by 1971.61 
What deserves attention here is the dual meanings behind the country ceiling of 20,000 
for the Eastern Hemisphere.   For one, the purpose of a country ceiling was to prevent just a few 
countries from exhausting the hemispherical ceiling.  Also, as Mae Ngai argues, the ceiling of 
exactly the same size for every country reflected how liberals understood equality in terms of 
formalistic equality without regard to factors such as demand for migration to the U.S.62 For 
another, there was also a more specific reason that the size of the ceiling was 20,000, and not any 
other number.  It was because Congress took into account immigration from Great Britain and 
Germany, which had averaged some 20,000 since the 1950s.  In other words, 20,000 was sort of 
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a new “quota” for Britain and Germany, which Congress believed to be sufficient -- combined 
with immediate relatives exemption -- to ensure the same level of immigration even after the 
abolition of the national origins quotas.   But this turned out to be a serious underestimation of 
the intense competition for a visa throughout much of the world after the abolition of the quotas 
system.  The ceiling did not operate in the same way as guaranteed national quotas, which could 
not be used by immigrants from other countries, and immigration from neither Britain nor 
Germany ever reached 20,000 after 1965.63 
Prior to 1965, the quota of 100 on countries in Asia had virtually limited immigration 
from the region to spouse and minor children of U.S. citizens, who could immigrate outside 
quota restriction as non-quota family.  Thus, family members that qualified for non-quota status 
accounted for over 80 percent of all immigration from Asia.64  However, by 1971, immediate 
relatives composed only 30 percent of immigrants from Asia. More numerous were immigrants 
who qualified for a preference within the ceiling.  Preference immigrants from Asia outnumbered 
those from Europe by 74,700 to 72,600.65    
Initial characteristics of post-1965 immigration from Asia was the high percentage of 
occupation-based immigrants.  In 1969, some 44 percent of occupation-based admission was 
from Asia, and 24.5 percent from Europe.   The largest number was from the Philippines, while 
                                                
 
63 Michael Feighan, “Major Accomplishments of the Subcommittee Substitute Bill (H.R. 2580, as 
amended)” July 26, 1965, folder “1965 Immigration Bill,” box 27, Michael Feighan Papers. 
64 From 1953 to 1965, non-quota families comprised 83 percent of all Japanese immigrants (quota 185), 
and 85 percent of all Filipino immigrants (quota 100).  Women comprised  85 percent (50,727) of 
Japanese immigrants and 68 percent (20,600) of Filipino immigrants.    
65 INS Annual Report 1971, 4; For an overview of post-1965 immigration from Asia, Bill Ong Hing, 
Making and Remaking Asian America through Immigration Policy, 1850-1990 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1993), chapter 3. 
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country with the highest percentage of professional immigrants was India.66   A related feature 
was that many of the new permanent residents from Asia had been living in the U.S. since before 
1965 as nonimmigrants such as students or exchange scholars, and had their status adjusted to 
permanent residents.67 From 1966 to 1971, approximately 132,000 nonimmigrants from Asia 
adjusted their status either by forming a family or by finding a job in the U.S., a significantly 
higher number than those from Europe (99,000).  Before 1965, the Asia-Pacific Triangle and the 
quota of 100 did not apply to entry of nonimmigrants, but it had prevented Asian nonimmigrants 
from becoming permanent residents, since any form of permanent residency (immigrant visa, 
adjustment of status, suspension of deportation) counted against the quota.  But elimination of 
the Asia Pacific Triangle and the quotas opened this path.  Occupation-based permanent 
residency required employer sponsorship as well a labor clearance, which was difficult without 
prior contact with the employer.  Therefore, it worked more in favor of U.S. residents than for 
those newly applying for a visa from outside the U.S.68   
In the following years, to first arrive in the U.S. as a non-immigrant and then to acquire 
permanent residency would become a more popular route to permanent residency than applying 
                                                
 
 66 INS Annual Report 1969, 5; Charles Keely, “Measuring the Effect of Labor Certification.” 
International Migration Review 4, no. 2 (1970): 87–92; Immigration from the Philippines was 
characterized by medical profession.   For post-WWII recruitment of Filipino nurses as exchange visitors, 
Catherine Ceniza Choy, Empire of Care: Nursing and Migration in Filipino American History (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2003), chapter 3 and chapter 4. 
67 Paul Ritterband, “Law, Policy, and Behavior: Educational Exchange Policy and Student Migration,” 
American Journal of Sociology 76, no. 1 (1970): 71–82; George B. Baldwin, “Brain Drain or Overflow?” 
Foreign Affairs 48, no. 2 (1970): 358–372. 
68 Between 1962 and 1964, 30 percent of the immigrants admitted as natural scientists and engineers were 
from United Kingdom and Germany.  Thomas Mills, “Scientific Personell and the Professions,” Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 367 (September 1966): 37. 
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for an immigrant visa, marking a striking contrast between 1924 and 1952 when entry with an 
immigrant visa was the only path to permanent residency.69 
By 1971, the top country of origin in the Eastern Hemisphere had become the Philippines, 
followed by Italy, China, Greece, India, Korea, Portugal, Great Britain, Yugoslavia, and 
Germany.70 And once the first post-1965 permanent residents became U.S. citizens with broader 
rights to send for families, the number of family-sponsored immigrants from Asia would 
gradually rise.  A large portion of the ceiling reserved for family-based visas, which were 
originally meant for Southern and Eastern European immigrants and to reserve the future source 
of immigration to Europe, would begin to function for family immigration from Asia.71 
 Importantly, along with the decline of immigration from Northern and Western Europe, 
the country ceiling of 20,000 applied to the Eastern Hemisphere bore different meanings.  As 
stated earlier, the figure originally had two purposes.  One was to prevent a few countries from 
exhausting the annual ceiling of 170,000, and another was to allow the same level of 
immigration as before from Britain and Germany.  But in the absence of a formal quota system, 
the ceiling failed to achieve the latter purpose.  Dissociated from pre-1965 immigration from 
Britain and Germany, what then remained was 20,000 as a flat ceiling not to be exceeded by any 
country.  As the next section examines, those not satisfied with a hemispherical ceiling on the 
Western Hemisphere would point this figure particularly at Mexico, where annual immigration 
averaged some 35,000, and insisted on extending the country ceiling to the Western Hemisphere.   
                                                
 
69 Present government statistics no longer refers to “immigrants,” which connotes new arrival, but refers 
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of Immigration Statistics 2005 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O. 2005) 
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6.4 Family Preference, Equality and Uniformity 
 On January 1, 1977, Congress capped immigration from any one country in the world at 
20,000 by extending the country ceiling system to countries in the Western Hemisphere.   The 
House report accompanying the bill argued that the 1965 Act “endorsed the principles of equity 
and family reunification as the basis of our immigration policy” and that the purpose of the new 
law was to complete “the unfinished business” of extending “these principles to the natives of 
the Western Hemisphere.”72  However, as sociologist Charles Keely questioned at a 1975 
hearing, “equality of treatment was used as a legitimating concept to justify getting rid of 
national origins as a major selection criterion,” but whether “the ethical imperative of equal 
treatment” should be “translated into a 20,000 per country limit despite the size of the country 
and all other considerations” was another matter.  With regard to Mexico, the new country 
ceiling of 20,000 was lower than the current level of immigration.73  This section examines how 
the call for “family reunification” was central in the translation of “equal treatment” to a uniform 
ceiling, how Congress successively extended restriction in the name of equity and family 
unification.  And the call for family-based labor clearance became intertwined with family-based 
numerical preference, which also assumed imposition of a numerical ceiling. 
 Restriction on the Western Hemisphere was enforced in four steps, marking the onset on 
an “Era of Both Qualitative and Quantitative Restrictions on Both Hemispheres.” 74 The first was 
the labor certification enforced on December 1, 1965.  Thereafter, except for spouse, minor 
children, and parents of citizens and permanent residents, all immigrants from the Western 
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Hemisphere were required to secure a labor certification before applying for a visa.   Within a 
year, immigration dropped from 174,000 to 122,000.  Second was the hemispherical ceiling of 
120,000 enforced on July 1, 1968.75  Visa applications exhausted the ceiling within a few months, 
and the backlog grew from nine months in 1969 to twenty-eight months in 1975, with 290,000 
registered on the waiting list.76  Thirdly, on January 1 1977, within the hemispherical ceiling of 
120,000, a uniform country ceiling of 20,000 went into effect.  Lastly, on January 1, 1979, the 
two hemispherical ceilings were combined into a worldwide ceiling of 290,000.77   
Enforcement of the 1965 Act soon gave rise to call for a “preference system” for the 
Western Hemisphere, which referred to both “labor certification” (family-based labor clearance) 
and to family-based numerical preference (priority within the ceiling).  After 1965, there was a 
broader agreement on uniform application of labor certification (and family-based labor 
clearance) across both hemispheres.  More controversial was the issue of backlog and numerical 
preference, because at the core of the problem was the ceiling on the Western Hemisphere that 
brought about the need for such preference in the first place.  For example, the Congressional 
Select Commission on Western Hemisphere recommended uniform labor certification system for 
both hemispheres but advised against hasty enforcement of a ceiling on the Western 
Hemisphere.78   The distinction between the two preference systems and examination of how the 
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two merged is crucial in understanding how the call for equality, especially that for families, 
eventually translated into uniformity after 1976: the same labor certification, the same numerical 
preference, but also the same size of ceiling for every country. 
 
Family-based Labor Clearance and Family-based Numerical Preference 
 With increasing competition for a visa, immediate family status (spouse, children, and 
parents of U.S. citizens) that provided both 1) numerical exemption and 2) labor clearance 
became of utmost value.   Majority of Western Hemisphere immigrants were immediate families 
of U.S. citizens, followed by spouse, children, and parents of permanent residents.  Family 
members of permanent residents were not given any numerical preference unlike in the Eastern 
Hemisphere, but were exempted from labor certification.  On the other side of the coin, 
predominance of preferred families indicated the difficulty in applying for a visa for those 
without any preferential status, either in the form of exemption from either numerical restriction 
or from labor certification.   Only 8,900 immigrants with labor certification immigrated in 
1973.79 
 In passing the 1965 Act, Congress assigned the Department of Labor to implement the 
details of the labor certification procedure.  The Department of Labor sought to meet two 
demands.    On the one hand, organized labor was insistent on a rigid labor certification, and was 
especially opposed to providing visas for temporary work such as farm labor.  On the other hand, 
Johnson/Hart/Celler had found occupation-based admission of immigrants under the INA of 
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1952 too limiting, especially in that highly skilled immigrant visa (first preference under the 
1952 Act) required a pre-arranged job offer and visa sponsorship by the prospective employer in 
the U.S., which was obviously difficult to find for people without previous residence in the 
U.S.80 
 To cater to both demands, the Department of Labor devised an elaborate system of labor 
certification.  On the one hand, the new law lowered the hurdle for certain professions to apply 
for an immigrant visa.  First, professionals such as physicians, engineers, chemists, 
mathematicians were no longer required to secure a job offer or sponsorship by the employer, 
previously mandated by the INA of 1952.  They were also exempted from individual labor 
certification introduced by the 1965.  Next in line to the most preferred occupations, the 
Department of Labor created another list of occupations that needed to clear an individual labor 
certification but did not need to secure a job offer.81 
 More restrictive was the other half of the certification, which had a serious adverse effect 
on immigrants who could have applied for a visa before 1965.   Of particular impact was the list 
of occupations categorically ineligible for an occupation-based immigrant visa.   If one’s 
occupation was listed among the so-called “non-certified occupations,” there was no chance of 
immigration unless one qualified for a family-based visa.  Importantly, farmworkers were made 
categorically ineligible for an immigrant visa, which along with the termination of the Bracero 
Program significantly narrowed the possibility of agricultural migration on either temporary or 
permanent basis.   Secondly, those with an occupation not on either the preferred or the 
noncertified list was first required a job offer, next to go through a long labor certification 
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process beginning with the local employment service office to the regional Manpower 
Administration to prove that there was a shortage of such job in the county on intended residence, 
and lastly to have one’s prospective employer petition for a visa with the INS.   But it was 
undoubtedly hard for those without prior contact in the U.S. to find an employer willing to offer 
a job and to sponsor a visa.82      
 However, while the rigid procedure discouraged or even made it impossible for those 
without necessary occupational qualifications or family connections to obtain a visa, the system 
turned out to have little control over whether, where, and in what occupations people who were 
actually able to obtain an immigrant visa or permanent residency would work.83 First of all, a 
majority of the new permanent residents did not go through labor certification procedure.  This 
was because Congress reserved 74 percent of the Eastern Hemisphere ceiling for family-
sponsored visas and another 6 percent for refugees, to whom certification did not apply.  
Immediate relatives admitted outside the ceiling were also exempted. Labor certification applied 
to less than 20 percent of the Eastern Hemisphere immigrants.   Moreover, visa category was 
only a criteria for initial admission, and regardless of their visa type, most immigrants intended 
to work when they came to the U.S.  In fact, in 1970, 63 percent of the new permanent residents 
reported an occupation, but 16 percent had gone through labor certification procedure.  And after 
two years in the U.S., another 15 percent reported to have found a job.84   
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Prior to the passage of the 1965 Act, a figure often cited by advocates for elimination of 
the national origins quotas including the AFL-CIO was that “only one-fourth to one-third of the 
immigrants ... were jobseekers.”  This calculation was premised on the idea that in family-based 
immigration, the male head of household was the wage earner and the other members were 
dependents who would not seek for a job.   However, although it was true that immigrants that 
applied for a visa based on their occupational qualifications were more likely to join the labor 
force, it certainly did not follow that others such as those with family visas would not.  Precisely 
because the 1965 Act reserved large proportion of visas for family-based admission to which the 
labor certification did not apply, it turned out that majority of immigrants with occupations did 
not have to obtain a certification to begin with.85    
 Secondly, many immigrants changed and found jobs after arriving in the U.S.  A 1973 
study by the Department of Labor showed that 56.7 percent of occupation-based immigrants 
changed occupations (not jobs within the same occupation) within two years in the U.S.   In 
order to obtain a labor certification, the 1965 Act required applicants to show unavailability of 
“American labor” in the specific locality of intended residence.  But not surprisingly many 
immigrants changed residences after arriving in the U.S.  After two years, less than one-third of 
occupation-based immigrants remained both in the occupation and in the county of residence 
stated at the time of visa application.   Despite the high requirements for obtaining a labor 
certification, it was obviously not serving its proclaimed purpose of regulating occupations and 
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the locality new immigrants would work in.  As the AFL-CIO acknowledged, to deny the right to 
change occupations or residence to permanent residents was equal to “indentured servitude.”86 
  Thus, the most basic question raised against the labor certification was whether such 
procedure was necessary at all either hemispheres.  The system surely had an effect of 
discouraging immigration of people who neither held preferred occupations nor the necessary 
family ties, but it had less to do with regulating the jobs of immigrants who were actually able to 
obtain a visa.  Religious organizations and refugee aid organizations suggested abolition of labor 
certification altogether.   Nevertheless, the AFL-CIO strongly opposed elimination of the 
certificate system, and upheld the certification as indispensable to the 1965 Act.87  
 Another criticism was directed at disparate treatment of immigrants from the two 
hemispheres, in other words narrower family-based clearance for immigrants from the Western 
Hemisphere.  In the Eastern Hemisphere, 80 percent of the immigrants with a preference visa (74 
percent for family, and 6 percent for refugees) did not have to secure a labor certification.  In the 
Western Hemisphere, all immigrants except for spouse, minor children, and parents of U.S. 
citizens and permanent residents had to do so.  As it was pointed out during the Congressional 
debate in 1965, different systems of numerical restriction did not justify discrepancies in family-
based labor clearance.   Representative Bernice Frederic Sisk (D-California), for instance, argued 
that narrower family-based labor clearance for the Western Hemisphere was tantamount to 
“saying that we do not consider family relationships as important to persons who happen to be 
born in Canada or Mexico” than to those from the Eastern Hemisphere.  Sisk argued that it 
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would be unfair to characterize admission from the Eastern Hemisphere as family unification and 
then to say that the United States did not want people from the Western Hemisphere “unless they 
do possess needed skills.”88   However, such liberal call for a uniform application of family-
based labor clearance became susceptible to the restrictionist agenda, which held the proposal 
hostage to numerical ceiling across both hemispheres.    
In 1968, three years after the introduction of labor certification, Congress imposed a 
ceiling of 120,000 on the Western Hemisphere, and visa backlog began to grow rapidly.   Along 
with the backlog emerged calls for two kinds of preference systems for the Western Hemisphere.  
One was to exempt the same range of family members from labor certification in both 
hemispheres.   Another was to set certain priorities within the hemispherical ceiling, family or 
otherwise.   However, the fundamental issue with regard to the growing backlog was not lack of 
preference system but the overall ceiling.  It was the imposition of a previously non-existing 
ceiling that created a backlog.  Without reconsideration of the ceiling itself, introducing 
preferences to an oversubscribed ceiling would just make the wait shorter for some but longer for 
others.  After 1965, few no longer objected to any ceiling on the entire Western Hemisphere.  
Still, there were calls for reconsideration for the size of the ceiling, especially its applicability to 
Mexico and Canada. 
In Congress, the most vocal critic of increasing restriction on immigration from the 
Western Hemisphere was Representative Henry B. González (D), the only Mexican-American 
member of the House in the late 1960s.  González’s parents came to the U.S. during the Mexican 
Revolution, and he was the first Mexican-American Congressman elected from Texas (1961 - 
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1999).  González had been a vehement critic of the Bracero Program, insisting on admission of 
Mexicans as formal immigrants and permanent residents instead of as temporary workers with 
fewer rights and without paths to citizenship.89  He voted against the 1965 Act for the reason that 
it was a restrictive law imposing an unprecedented ceiling on the Western Hemisphere, sharply 
questioning Emanuel Celler why Congress was “erecting a wall, rather than reducing wall, which 
we originally intended to do.”90  While the 1965 Act was hailed as a “liberal” bill, González did 
not see it that way.  After the imposition of a hemispherical ceiling in 1968, González objected to 
the motion to introduce a country ceiling on the Western Hemisphere, especially to a ceiling on 
Mexico in the form of the same size of ceiling for every country.  He questioned whether a flat 
ceiling for countries varying widely in size, population, and demand for visas, from “Iceland 
with a population of 210,000” to “Brazil ... for its population of 100 million” was truly “equal.”  
González saw flat ceiling as not only “wholly unrealistic” but as “a rank discrimination against a 
country such as Mexico,” which ignored the “basic relationship that were inextricably linked in 
the historic development of our country, particularly the Southwest.”91 
 The fact that González was the first Mexican-American Congress member from Texas, 
and the only Mexican-American member of the House in the late-1960s indicated that the 
political power of Mexican Americans was still weak.  Still, González was not alone in his 
objections to uniform country ceiling.  So was Peter Rodino (D-New Jersey), who became the 
Chair of the House Judiciary Committee in 1973, when Emanuel Celler lost his seat in Congress 
that he had held since 1923.  On one hand, Rodino called for a worldwide ceiling instead of 
maintaining the two separate hemispherical ceilings, thus reinforcing numerical restriction.  
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However, importantly, Rodino was against treating Mexico and Canada on the same basis with 
other countries, emphasizing the need to recognize not simply the “extensive common borders” 
shared with the two countries, but also the “cultural, social, and economic ties” that had 
historically been developed.  He was especially against the proposal to impose a ceiling of 
20,000, which was below the current level of immigration.  For Mexico and Canada, Rodino 
proposed return to pre-1968 numerically unlimited admission, and if not, at least a larger ceiling 
than other countries.92    
 This proposal to reconsider the ceiling on Mexico also displayed different thinking on 
unauthorized immigration, which once again began to gather attention since 1965.  Rodino’s 
proposal to exempt Mexico from the hemispherical ceiling was coupled with another bill of his 
on unauthorized immigration.  Controversy about unauthorized immigration was a critical 
difference between the debate on Western Hemisphere ceiling in 1965 and afterwards.  Since the 
Operation Wetback in 1954, the INS had assured Congress that the border was under control, 
and in 1965 there was hardly any discussion on unauthorized immigration or what effect the 
Western Hemisphere ceiling might have on unauthorized immigration.  Relative inattention to 
unauthorized immigration since the late 1950s to the early 1960s was not simply due to strict law 
enforcement, but also because it was combined with expansion of the Bracero Program and 
admission of more Mexicans as legal workers.  In the late 1950s, an average of some 400,000 
braceros were admitted each year.  But successive narrowing of the front door by termination of 
the Bracero Program (1964), introduction of the labor certification (1965) that made 
farmworkers among others ineligible for an immigrant visa, and hemispherical ceiling (1968) led 
to a surge in unauthorized immigration.  Apprehension by the INS skyrocketed from 110,000 in 
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1965 to 766,600 in 1975.   Partly because the INS concentrated its force on the Southern border, 
apprehension of Mexican immigrants sharply rose from 55,000 to 680,000.  Regardless of 
whether voluntary departure or formal deportation followed, apprehension by the INS had 
entirely different meaning before and after 1968, as the growing visa backlog now prevented 
return to the U.S. with a visa, even if one was granted voluntary departure.93   
Specifically, Rodino believed in penalties for employers that hired undocumented 
workers (employer sanctions) as the key deterrent, and aimed to abolish the so-called “Texas 
Proviso” under the INA of 1952, which specifically exempted employers from being persecuted 
for hiring of undocumented workers.94  Employer sanctions were supported by Nixon, Ford, and 
Reagan administrations, and eventually became law in 1986 as part of the Immigration Reform 
and Control Act, but it was in fact a highly controversial measure that met opposition not only 
from business but also from Mexican-American civil rights organizations that it would lead to 
employment discrimination.95  Yet, the main point here is that taken together with the proposal to 
lift the ceiling from Mexico, Rodino’s bills embodied a different thinking than a more single-
sided approach that separated legal admission from unauthorized immigration, approaching the 
former by a ceiling that had little relation to the demand and approaching the latter focusing 
solely with more stringent legislation and law enforcement.  However, the debate on Western 
Hemisphere ceiling was ultimately won by the position that equality meant “uniform preference 
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system and per country limitation.”  What also prevailed was the view that unauthorized 
immigration should be treated strictly as a matter of law enforcement, although it was evident by 
the 1970s that a country ceiling on Mexico would increase unauthorized immigration.   
 
Equality, Family, and Uniformity 
Those insistent on further restriction of Mexican immigration advanced the position that 
equal preference system between the two hemispheres would require not only 1) the same 
family-based labor clearance, 2) the same seven-point numerical preference system, but also 3) a 
uniform country ceiling for all countries 4) as well as a worldwide ceiling instead of two separate 
hemispherical ceilings.  Representative of this view was Joshua Eilberg (D-Pennsylvania), the 
chair of the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law of the House 
Judiciary Committee.  As originally introduced, Rodino’s bill had proposed to 1) introduce a 
numerical preference system to the Western Hemisphere but 2) to exempt Mexico and Canada 
from any numerical restriction.  But the subcommittee rewrote it into an entirely different bill 
that introduced 1) a numerical preference system to the Western Hemisphere but also imposed 2) 
a uniform ceiling on all countries, including Mexico and Canada.96 
 At one level, arguments made for a flat ceiling revealed the view of Mexican immigrants 
as exploitable labor rather than as permanent members of the society.  Eilberg insisted that 
reduction of immigrant visas was reasonable because formal immigrant status and the right of 
permanent residency or to naturalization were of less importance to Mexicans, who Eilberg 
claimed did not intend to settle in the U.S.   The House report on bill emphasized the “lowest 
naturalization rates” among Mexican immigrants, and insisted that whether as legal immigrants 
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or unauthorized workers “a large number have no intention of moving here permanently.”  The 
report argued that reduction of immigrant visas could be counterbalanced by an increase of 
temporary worker visa for Mexican nationals, specifically the H-2 visa that had been used to 
recruit agricultural workers from the West Indies since 1952.   Just as H-2 visas for temporary 
workers were invented in 1952 as a set with colonial quota of 100 for “immigrants” from the 
West Indies, the proposal was equal to saying that Mexican nationals were more wanted for their 
labor  than as  immigrants.97  Moreover, as Representative González shot back at Eilberg, such 
view was indeed reminiscent of “committee hearings back in the 1920’s” that “Mexican was 
unassimilable and therefore his entry should be restricted and prohibited.”98 
  Yet, unlike in the 1920s, when “race” was the primary language used both by the 
proponents for and opponents to quotas restriction on Mexico, few explicitly linked 
naturalization rates to “racial unassimilability.”   What figured more prominently was the 
language of “equality” and “family.”  In striking similarity with Michael Feighan, who described 
non-quota status of Western Hemisphere immigrants as discrimination against the Eastern 
Hemisphere, Eilberg characterized absence of a country ceiling in the Western Hemisphere as 
“the last vestige of national origins discrimination,” although neither pre-1968 non-quota status 
for the Western Hemisphere nor the separate hemispherical ceiling had to do with national 
origins quotas.  Nevertheless, Eilberg insisted that “special treatment for our contiguous 
neighbors – no matter what justification is presented” was discriminatory.  This idea that the 
Western Hemisphere immigrants were given “special treatment,” special in the sense of unfair, 
was reinforced by the 1965 renaming of Western Hemisphere immigrants from “non-quota 
immigrants” to “special immigrants.”   This was a required change since “quota” no longer 
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existed, thereby making the term “non-quota” meaningless.  However, choice of the word 
“special” was what Feighan had insisted on, with the intention to connote the impression that the 
Western Hemisphere immigrants were given treatment unfair to immigrants from other parts of 
the world.99  
Utterly ignored was the fact that a uniform country ceiling was lower than the current 
level of immigration. As discussed in the previous section, 20,000 was a figure that corresponded 
with the pre-1965 level of immigration from Britain and Germany, expected to minimize the 
impact of abolition of quota system.   Although proponents for uniform ceiling on all countries 
around the world upheld the 20,000 ceiling as a matter of formality, it masked how Congress 
decided the number not out of some abstract formulation but in consideration of immigration 
from the most preferred countries.  However, the figure was applied to the Western Hemisphere 
entirely out of context of ongoing immigration. 
The language of “family unification” was also exploited to serve a more restrictive aim. 
Combined with the argument that absence of a country ceiling constituted discrimination against 
the Eastern Hemisphere was the argument that uniform “family preference” system applied to 
the two hemispheres and to all countries in the world would promote unification of families from 
the Western Hemisphere.   Instead of entirely rejecting a more liberal call for “family preference,” 
for instance the criticism that family-based labor certification was much narrower for the 
Western Hemisphere than for the Eastern Hemisphere, those insistent on a ceiling took the 
position that the proper way to realize “equality” and to extend “family preference” to the 
Western Hemisphere was to apply to every country 1) the same family-based labor clearance, 2) 
the same numerical preference system, 3) a flat country ceiling 4) under a worldwide ceiling.   
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However, as Representative William Edwards (D – California) pointed out in his opposition to a 
uniform ceiling, although the proclaimed purpose of the preference system was family 
unification, “numerical preference” was a matter of whom to prioritize within a fixed ceiling. To 
impose a ceiling much smaller than current demand “actually works against the goal of reunion 
of Mexican Families.” 100                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 The Act of October 26, 1976 (90 Stat. 2703) created a uniform system for both 
hemispheres.  It finally enabled nonimmigrants from the Western Hemisphere to adjust their 
status to permanent resident, lifting the ban that had been put in place in 1958.   It also applied 
the same family-based labor clearance and the seven-point numerical preference system to both 
hemispheres.  Here, as in the Eastern Hemisphere, family-based labor clearance was accorded to 
those who qualified for a family-based visa (numerical preference), and the two meanings 
of ”family preference” merged.   However, coupled with the preference system was a flat ceiling 
of 20,000 for every country.101  In 1978, the two hemispherical ceilings would be combined into 
a global ceiling of 290,000. 
 Notable was the justification given by Congress for the 1976 Act. The House Committee 
report on the bill characterized the 1965 Act as a law that “endorsed the principles of equity and 
family reunification as the basis of our immigration policy for the Eastern Hemisphere” and that 
the purpose of the 1976 Act was “to extend these principles to the natives of the Western 
Hemisphere.”  However, while claiming to promote family reunification by giving preferences to 
families, the bill was actually going to adversely affect immigration from Mexico in particular.102   
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  In explaining how the new law would benefit immigrants from the Western Hemisphere, 
the report conveniently avoided mentioning Mexico.   As an example, the report compared “the 
22-year old British citizen daughter of a U.S. citizen or the Spanish wife of a permanent resident 
alien” to “the 22-year old Brazilian daughter of a U.S. citizen or the Canadian wife of a 
permanent resident alien,” who did not have family-based labor clearance and numerical 
preference enjoyed by the former.  Surely, for an adult daughter of a U.S. citizen in Brazil, where 
less than 20,000 had applied for a visa, family-preference (labor clearance and numerical 
preference) meant higher chance of immigration to the U.S.103 However, utterly missing was 
reference to Mexico, where the backlog of over 150,000 was significantly in excess of the new 
country ceiling.  Ironically, extension of family-based labor clearance, which in itself originated 
from a more liberal criticism of disparate treatment between families in the two hemispheres 
(treating immigration from Europe as that of families and immigration from the Western 
Hemisphere as that of labor), also added to the backlog.  Enabling wider range of families to 
apply for a visa meant that even if the ceiling on the Western Hemisphere was maintained at the 
same level the waiting list would become longer.   But to impose a country ceiling that was only 
a fraction of the size of the existing backlog multiplied the waiting period in Mexico by several 
times.   
 Passed during the period of low immigration from Europe and Asia, and during a time of 
high immigration from Mexico, the Immigration Act of 1965 and its “family-preference,” in 
practice and as a “principle,” worked in different ways.  As unexpected as the consequences 
were, family-preference increased immigration from Asia in unprecedented volume.   However, 
the call for equal treatment of families or the claim that family should be the primary criteria of 
                                                
 
103 U.S. Congressional Research Service, Illegal Aliens: Analysis and Background  (1977), 76-89. 
  315 
admission worked for a more restrictive purpose with regard to immigration from the Western 
Hemisphere.  The first formal system of “family preference” for immigrants from Mexico 
indicated increased restriction. 
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Tables and Figures for Chapter 6 
6-1: Hart-Celler Bill (88th Congress) 
 INA as amended in 1959 Hart - Celler bill  






 Guaranteed Quota system 
 
Guaranteed minimum =  200  




Spouse and minor children of U.S. 
citizens 
Spouse, minor children,  
 
Parents of U.S. citizens 
 
  
Preference System  











Spouse and children, 
accompanying and following to join 
Skilled immigrant 
 
Spouse and children, 








Unmarried sons and daughters over 21 
 
25 percent 









Spouse and unmarried children of LPR, 
accompanying and following to join 
 
25 percent 
4 Brothers and sisters, married sons and 





No reserved quota, 50 percent of any 
remainder 
Brothers and sisters, married sons and 
daughters + their spouse and children, 
accompanying  
 
Parents of LPR 
 





No reserved quota, 50 percent of any 




6-2: Feighan Bill (89th Congress - H.R. 8662) 
Order of 
Preference 
Class Number of Visas 
 
X = 325,000 (worldwide ceiling) 
or 225,000 (Eastern Hemisphere) 
1 Spouse, unmarried Sons and 
Daughters, Parents of Citizens 
No limitation (theoretical maximum X) 
2 Special Ability 10 percent of (X - 1st preference) 
3 Spouse, unmarried Sons and 
Daughters, Parents of Permanent 
Residents 
20 percent of (X - 1st preference) 
4 Married Sons and Daughters 20 percent of (X - 1st preference) 
5 Brothers and Sisters 20 percent of (X - 1st preference) 
6 Skilled and Unskilled 20 percent of (X - 1st preference) 
7 Refugees 10 percent of (X - 1st preference) 
None Others  Any remainder 
Source: Memo, 1965, folder “Presidential Conference,” box 36, Michael Feighan Papers; 
American Immigration and Citizenship Conference, AICC News 11 no. 3 (June 30, 1965).   
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6-3: 1965 System: Eastern Hemisphere and the Western Hemisphere 
I: Paths to Permanent Residency 
 Eastern Hemisphere 
 
Western Hemisphere 
Paths to  
permanent residency 
1: Immigrant visa 
2: Adjustment of status  
3: Suspension of deportation 
Immigrant visa 
 
II: Numerical Limitation 





Spouse, minor child, parents of 
U.S. Citizens 









Visa Distribution Preference System First come, first served 
1: Adult but unmarried 
sons and daughters of 
U.S. citizen  
58,000 
2: Spouses, minor 
children of permanent 
residents 
58,000 
3:Professional +  their 
spouse and minor 
children 
29,000 
4: Married sons and 
daughters of citizens + 




5: Siblings (regardless of 
age or marital status) of 
citizens + their spouse 
and minor children 
69,600 
6: Skilled and unskilled 
workers +  
29,000 
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III: Family-based Exemption from Labor Certification  
Hemispherical Applicability U.S. Citizen or Permanent 
Resident 
Relationship 
Eastern and Western 
Hemisphere 
Citizen Spouse and minor children 
 





Spouse and minor children 
Eastern Hemisphere only Citizen adult but unmarried son and 
daughters  
 
married sons and daughters  
+ their spouse and minor 
children 
 
siblings (regardless of age or 
marital status) + their spouse 
and minor children 
 
Western Hemisphere only 
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6-4: Immediate Relatives by Country of Birth, 1966-1976 Transitional Quarter 
 Wives Husbands Children Parents % of Total Total 
All Countries 364,700 191,104 192,617 117,011 20.1% 865,432 
Mexico (1969-
) 
37,217 52,316 48,179 4,982 29.7% 142,694 
Philippines 39,521 6,639 21,991 22,844 31.8% 90,995 
Germany 35,526 2,671 14,504 2,707 50.8% 55,408 
Korea 25,926 1,105 20,692 4,745 29.8% 52,468 
Italy 12,594 10,597 6,423 14,023 19.2% 43,637 
U.K. 22,674 7,287 5,988 4,251 23.4% 40,210 
China, 
Taiwan 
13,325 3,173 2,984 14,537 18.7% 34,019 
Canada 
(1969-) 
14,970 7,484 7,550 951 34.3% 30,955 
Japan 20,600 1,893 3,357 1,402 55.0% 26,712 
Greece 7,388 8,902 1,991 6,973 17.7% 25,254 
Source: INS Annual Report, 1966-1976, table 9. 
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Epilogue 
 
   In 1978, Congress ended the three-tiered immigration restriction since 1921 by combining 
the two hemispherical ceilings into a worldwide ceiling of 290,000.   Along with a uniform 
country ceiling of 20,000 enforced two years earlier, it marked the beginning of formally neutral 
but global restriction.  The Immigration Act of 1924, which permanently established immigration 
restriction and closed the era of open immigration, had displayed three features with regard to 
families.   The very definition of “family” for immigration purposes, and how family claims have 
been weighed in setting conditions of admission, acquisition or denial of permanent residency 
marked the boundaries of membership and belonging in American polity. 
   For Europe, the key feature of the 1924 system was exemption of the nuclear family of 
U.S. citizen.  At surface, the 1924 Act was generous to nuclear family member in exempting 
them from quotas, but quotas restriction narrowed the diverse pattern of family migration that 
was possible before 1921 in the age of open migration.  National origins quotas system 
originated as a direct antithesis to family-based admission, to minimize the importance of family 
ties as criteria of admission.   Throughout the quotas era, family-based admission from Europe 
was associated with immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe, as large quotas ensured 
immigration of families from Northern and Western Europe even without special consideration 
for families.  The demand to expand non-quota admission continued to meet intense oppositions, 
and it was only won by struggles of Southern and Eastern European families.   
    With regard to Asia and the Western Hemisphere, the Immigration Act of 1924 included 
no family-based admission system, but for different reasons.  Deprival of family rights from U.S. 
citizens of Asian descent was central to exclusion of Asian immigrants as “aliens ineligible to 
citizenship.”  Racial exclusion of “aliens” superseded any claims of citizens.   In the 1920s 
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immigration debate, the concept of family was invoked in two ways: to refer to individual family 
relations and to the national, or “Caucasian,” family.   Naturalization laws and anti-
miscegenation laws defined the latter “family.”  It was only for those within the latter “family” 
that Congress recognized the question of which family relations mattered.    The issue of 
citizenship had very different meanings for European immigrants and Asian-Americans.  The 
former brought forth questions such as why formal citizenship and naturalization should be tied 
to bringing of the family.  For the latter, the struggle was over whether citizenship mattered at all 
and over guarding their own citizenship acquired at birth.    
   For immigrants from the Western Hemisphere, the initial reason for the absence of a 
family-based admission system was due to the absence of a formal ceiling.   Numerical 
preference, family or otherwise, is a product of numerical ceiling on immigration.   However, the 
non-quota status of Mexican immigrants, which was tied to theoretically unlimited admission, 
was also tied to non-recognition of family in peculiar ways.   First of all, among the main reasons 
raised in the 1920s against formal ceiling was non-recognition of Mexican immigrants as settlers, 
or as those joining or immigrating with their family.  This view of Mexican immigrants as 
temporary members in American society came into full force during the Great Depression 
against Mexican and Mexican-American families. 
      Decline of hierarchization among European immigrants, redrawing of Western Europe / 
Eastern Europe in the Cold War context eroded the strict national origins ratio of immigration as 
well as the nuclear family model of family-based admission, enabling relations such as siblings 
and adult or married children of U.S. citizens to qualify for a family visa by the 1950s.   By the 
1960s, regrouping of “European” also created a very different understanding of national origins 
quotas and its relation to family-based admission, which initially were in opposition to one 
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another.  Along with a more liberal view of family-based admission as rights of citizens and 
residents, a more exclusive view of family-based admission as a different form of “national 
origins” that sought to keep the source of immigration Europe emerged. 
   The elaborate system of “family preferences” for the Eastern Hemisphere in a way 
characterized immigration from the Eastern Hemisphere (Europe) as that of family reuniting in 
the U.S. and as admission based on claims of citizens and permanent residents.  By contrast, the 
absence and denial of family-based admission system for Mexico reinforced the view of 
Mexican immigration as that not grounded in rights of U.S. citizens and residents.  Conversely, 
immigration authorities and lawmakers posited theoretically unlimited availability of visas as the 
reason for not recognizing family claims as the grounds of admission from Mexico  (suspension 
of deportation, adjustment of status, or labor certification).  Concurrent recruitment of Mexican 
workers as temporary workers without any family rights, which far outnumbered those admitted 
as immigrants, both reflected and reinforced the view of Mexican immigration as that of 
temporary labor.   As the strict labor certification suggested, Congress abolished non-quota 
admission from the Western Hemisphere with little consideration for families.  The eventual 
introduction of the “family preference” system to the Western Hemisphere was contingent with 
the first formal ceiling, which in fact amounted to restriction rather than facilitation of family 
immigration from Mexico. 
     In the post-national-origins-quota era of formally race-neutral and sex-neutral 
immigration policy, exemption of close relatives of U.S. citizens from numerical restriction has 
been the basic line.   Few contemporaries deny family reunification in principle, so far as legal 
entrants are concerned.  In the 1970s, as the shift from recruitment of “guest workers” to family 
reunification in Europe or the signing of the Helsinki Accords of 1975 exemplify, immigration 
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policies of liberal democracies showed certain convergence in recognizing the obligations to 
admit the immediate family of citizens and long-term residents.1  But the end of the three-tiered 
restriction regime in the U.S. was not a return to open immigration.   Global competition for 
visas created long backlogs, and family-based admission continued to be a contested field. 
      By the mid-1970s, several consequences of the 1965 Act had become evident.  First was 
the dramatic change in the sources of immigration to the U.S.  Although family-based admission 
was expected to most benefit European immigrants, in 1971 immigration from Asia (103,461) 
surpassed that from Europe (96,502), and by 1977 the former rose to 157,759, while the latter 
dropped further to 70,010.   Family-based admission played a crucial role in this trend.  In the 
immediate years after 1965, aside from spouses of U.S. citizens, many of whom were married to 
American soldiers stationed abroad, majority of immigrants from Asia acquired permanent 
residency based on their professions.   Many received higher education in the U.S. and changed 
their status from a nonimmigrant to a permanent resident.  Fulfillment of the five-year residency 
requirement for naturalization now allowed more post-1965 permanent residents to exercise their 
rights as citizens to send for wider range of family members, both within and outside the ceiling.  
Immediate family exemption pierced the 20,000 ceiling in several countries such as the 
Philippines and Korea, as well as the total hemispherical ceiling of 170,000 by some 50,000.2  
     In the Western Hemisphere, before 1976, despite the hemispherical ceiling and strict 
labor certification, lack of a country ceiling allowed Mexican immigrants access to one third of 
                                                
 
1 Helsinki Final Act was signed by 33 European nations, the U.S., and Canada.  Basket III concerns 
family ties and family reunification.  Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, U.S. 
Immigration Policy and the National Interest (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1981), 112. 
2 David Reimers, Still the Golden Door: The Third World Comes to America (New York: Columbia 
University, 1992), 94-96; From Asia, the top country of origin was the Philippines (39,111), followed by 
Korea (30,917), China and Taiwan (19,754), and India (18,613). From Europe, the top country of origin 
was the United Kingdom (12,477). INS Yearbook 1977, 5. 
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all the visas available in the Western Hemisphere.   This was no longer the case after 1976 and 
much less after 1978.  While family preferences (both numerical preference and exemption from 
labor certification) made more prospective immigrants eligible for a visa, the country ceiling and 
global ceiling elongated the wait.   In 1980, over one million applicants worldwide were 
registered on the waiting list for 270,000 visas.  The backlog was particularly long in categories 
such as the second preference for spouse and unmarried children of permanent residents 
(176,000 applicants for 70,000 visas), and the fifth preference for siblings of U.S. citizens 
(508,000 applicants for 64,800 visas).    In Mexico, families of permanent residents alone 
oversubscribed the country ceiling by 4 years.  Surely, immediate relatives exemption enabled 
more than 20,000 immigrants to come from Mexico, but the backlog for families subject to the 
ceiling continued to grow.3   
     One of the outcomes was irregular immigration, which had become one of the central 
immigration issues by the mid-1970s.   In 1977, for the first time since the 1954 Operation 
Wetback, the INS apprehended more than one million deportable immigrants, out of which 90 
percent were from Mexico.  Existence of a ceiling critically changed the consequences of 
voluntary departure, the most popular method after apprehension along the U.S.-Mexico border.   
Voluntary departure in the absence of a ceiling at least left the chance of return to the U.S. with a 
visa, but imposition of a ceiling made it impossible to return to the U.S. without being placed at 
the end of the waiting list.  It was clear that imposition of a worldwide ceiling on top of the 
                                                
 
3 The Refugee Act of 1980 removed refugees from the ceiling, who were previously allocated 20,000 
visas under the ceiling of 290,000. Thus, the overall ceiling was lowered to 270,000.; Select Commission 
on Immigration and Refugee Policy, U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest: Staff Report, 
377; Reimers, Still the Golden Door, 132. 
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country ceiling would not only extend visa backlog but also stimulate unauthorized immigration.   
Nevertheless, Congress chose to treat the issue strictly as a matter of law enforcement. 4  
    The Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (SCIRP), created as part of 
the 1978 Act suggested a multifaceted approach that did not rely solely on border enforcement 
but recognized the various ties that undocumented immigrants developed with the society.  The 
two most significant proposals, eventually incorporated into the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), were granting of permanent residency to undocumented 
immigrants and employer sanctions.   The latter met strong oppositions from civil rights 
organizations such as the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education fund, since there was 
a well-grounded fear of employment discrimination, but it was passed as part of the compromise 
to grant permanent residency to undocumented immigrants.   Contestations over the cutoff-date 
for regularization brought to light how just like documented immigrants many undocumented 
immigrants preceded their families to prepare for their spouse and children to join later.   Strict 
enforcement of the cutoff date could separate family members depending on whether they 
arrived before or after the deadline, and in case the latter was ordered to leave the U.S. a long 
visa backlog prevent the families’ return to the U.S.   Thus, Congress agreed to allow immigrants 
who had lived in the U.S. since before January 1982 as well as their spouse and minor children 
who had arrived later to both remain in the U.S.5 
      Passage of the IRCA, which enabled some 2.7 million undocumented immigrants to 
become permanent residents, brought the attention back to regular immigration that continued to 
                                                
 
4 INS Yearbook 1977, 14; David G. Gutiérrez, Walls and Mirrors: Mexican Americans, Mexican 
Immigrants, and the Politics of Ethnicity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 179-205. 
5 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) 100 Stat. 3445; Antonio Hernandez (Mexican 
American Legal Defense and Education Fund), “Immigration Reform: Employer Sanctions and 
Legalization,” In Defense of the Alien 6 (1983): 99–107; Reimers, Still the Goldern Door, 241-247, 249. 
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grow.  In 1990, aside from 880,000 IRCA immigrants, some 600,000 persons became permanent 
residents.   Majority was from Latin America and Asia, and the 1990 Census recorded more 
foreign-born population from Latin America (8.4 million) and Asia (5.0 million) than from 
Europe (4.4 million).   Between 1981 and 1990, family-sponsored immigration averaged some 
436,000, with 216,000 visas reserved for preference relatives, and some 220,000 immediate 
relatives admitted outside the ceiling.   Family-sponsored immigrants comprised 68.9% of all 
new permanent residents exclusive of IRCA legalization.  With family-exemption piercing the 
ceiling, various bills to place a firm impenetrable ceiling on annual immigration were submitted.  
At the same time, in the face of continuously growing backlog, immigrant groups demanded 
expansion of family-based admission either by raising the ceiling or by placing more families 
outside the ceiling altogether. 6 
     One of the characteristics of the debate in the 1980s was increasing delineation of 
family-based admission from employment-based admission, a trend that would become more 
notable in the 1990s.  With regard to legal immigration, the SCIRP argued that the seven-point 
preference system established in 1965 resulted in “mixing of family and independent worker 
(nonfamily) groups” and confused “the two main goals of immigration – family reunification and 
bringing in persons with needed skills.”  The commission proposed to distinguish between the 
two by creating two distinct ceilings, one for family-based admission and another for 
employment-based admission, setting up preferences within each ceiling, and by providing more 
visas for both purposes.7  Importantly, the aim of the SCIRP was to counter a more restrictive 
                                                
 
6 INS Yearbook 1985, 4; INS Yearbook 1994, 30; Reimers, Still the Golden Door, 253-263; Edward J. W. 
and John S. W. Park, Probationary Americans: Contemporary Immigration Policies and the Shaping of 
Asian American Communities (New York: Routledge, 2005), 18. 
7 Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, U.S. Immigration Policy and the National 
Interest, 111. 
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view of family-based admission.   Business interests insisted on recruiting immigrants with 
specific skills, and on placing more emphasis on employment and education as the primary 
criteria for admission to the U.S.   Notably, those in support of a firm ceiling insisted on 
removing certain family preferences in order to reallocate visas to immigrants with specific skills, 
which was coupled with the idea that family-sponsored immigrants were less likely to be of 
valuable labor force.  As serious disagreements began to emerge over how much priority should 
be placed on family as the admission criteria, the SCIRP sought to avoid placing family-based 
admission and employment-admission in dichotomous relations, where the increase of one would 
result in reduction of the other.   The SCIRP not only opposed eliminating any family preference, 
but also proposed to expand family-based admission by increasing the number of family visas, 
and by placing wider range of families outside the ceiling.8   
      The resulting Immigration Act of 1990 changed the preference system in several 
significant ways.   First, Congress replaced the seven-point preference system under a singular 
ceiling of 270,000 with two separate ceilings, one for family-based immigrants (480,000) and 
another for employment-based immigrants (140,000).  In addition, Congress created a new 
category of  “diversity visa” (50,000) for those without the necessary familial connections or 
jobs, a measure originally intended for immigrants from countries in Europe such as Ireland that 
had lost their quotas.  In all, the 1990 Act capped annual immigrants visas at approximately 
                                                
 
8 Daniel J. Tichenor, Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002), 269; Reimers, Still the Golden Door, 253-263; For an example of 
kinship as “nepotism” argument, Vernon M. Briggs Jr., “Report of the Select Commission on 
Immigration and Refugee Policy: A Critique,” Texas Business Review 56 no. 1 (1982): 11-15; Some 
argued that priority on family-sponsored admission led to a decline in skill of immigrants.  Barry 
Chiswick, “Mexican immigrants: The Economic Dimension,” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 487 (1986): 92-113; George Borjas, Friends or Strangers: The Impact of 
Immigration on the U.S. Economy (New York: Basic Books, 1990).  For a counter-argument, Guillermina 
Jasso and Mark. R. Rosenzweig, “Do Immigrants Screened for Skills Do Better than Family 
Reunification Immigrants?” International Migration Review 29 no.1 (1995): 85-111. 
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675,000. 9 At one level, the 1990 Act emphasized the uniting of the nuclear family, and doubled 
the number of visas for spouse and children of permanent residents (58,000 to a minimum of 
114,200), and placed them outside the country ceiling.  At the same time, Congress was deeply 
anxious about the increase in family-based immigration, and provided that all family-based 
immigrants including immediate family of U.S. citizens would be counted against the ceiling 
thereafter.  In comparison with the pre-1990 level of family-based immigration of some 436,000, 
the new ceiling was at one level an expansion of family-based admission, but the very creation of 
a ceiling reaffirmed numerical restriction as the fundamental principle of immigration policy.10 
 Importantly, as originally intended by the SCIRP, separation of the two ceilings for 
family-based admission and employ-based admission was expected to protect family-based 
admission.  Yet, the clear delineation of the two in a way reinforced the view of family-based 
immigrants as non-workers, not simply as a difference in the criteria of initial admission.  In the 
1990s, influential Congress members, business and economists increasingly insisted on 
prioritizing skill/education/employment than certain family relations.  The U.S. Commission on 
Immigration Reform (USCIR), established by the Immigration Act of 1990, upheld family 
reunification, labor recruitment, and admission of refugees as the three main pillars of U.S. 
immigration policy, but their recommendations differed significantly from the SCIRP.   First, 
                                                
 
9 Family-based preferences include four categories. First preference- Unmarried sons and daughters of 
U.S. citizens (23,400); Second preference - Spouses and children of permanent residents (at least 
114,200); Third preference – Married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens (23,400); Fourth preference – 
Siblings of U.S. citizens (65,000).   Employment-based preferences include five categories. First 
Preference – Priority workers (37,520); Second Preference – Professionals with advanced degrees or 
immigrants with exceptional ability (37,520); Third Preference – Skilled workers, professionals, unskilled 
workers (37,520); Fourth Preference – Special immigrants (9,940); Fifth Preference – Employment 
creation (investors) (9,940). Ruth Ellen Wasem, Numerical Limits on Employment-Based Immigration: 
Analysis of the Per-Country Ceilings. CRS Report R42048 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 
Congressional Research Service, December 6, 2011), 3-6. 
10 INS Yearbook 1994, 32; Aristede Zolberg, A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning 
of America (New York: Russell Sage, 2006), 376-384. 
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whereas the SCIRP sought to differentiate between family and labor as criteria for admission, the 
USCIR depicted family-sponsored immigrants as distinct from labor immigrants.   Second, while 
both the SCIRP and the USCIR spoke of immigration policy in terms of national interest, the 
former saw national interest in recognizing “the broader concept of family held by many 
nationalities,” which were not necessarily confined to the nuclear family.   By contrast, the 
USCIR spoke of national interest more in terms of recruiting labor force, and insisted on shifting 
the priorities “away from the extended family and toward the nuclear family” and on removing 
preference for adult unmarried children, and siblings, whom the commission believed to serve 
“lesser national interest” as their ages tended to be high due to the long waiting period for a visa.   
Thus, the USCIR found direct conflict between admission of certain family members and 
employment-based admission.11  
	       The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) 
reduced the family rights of immigrant families both on the admission side and on the removal 
side.   Eventually, Congress did not narrow the definition of family for admission purposes, but 
adapted another economy-oriented method of restriction proposed by the USCIR.  Emphasizing 
personal “responsibility” of immigrant families, the IIRIRA required citizens and permanent 
residents to be above a specific income level in order to sponsor family visas, and mandated a 
legally-binding affidavit of support from sponsors, which were enforceable until the 
naturalization of the beneficiary or for ten years.   Although some were recovered later, Congress 
coupled this measure with a removal of public safety net from nearly all newcomers.  Thus, 
although the 1996 Act maintained both the definition of family and the number of family visas, 
                                                
 
11 Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, U.S. Immigration Policy and the National 
Interest, 111; U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, Becoming an American: Immigration and 
Immigrant Policy (Washington D.C.; GPO, 1997), xvii. 
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critics have pointed out that raising of the financial bar for sponsoring family visas amounted to 
de facto limitation on family unification rights of families with lesser financial means.12                                                                                                                                                                                
 Legal scholars have observed that in deportation cases, even the most-privileged 
relations on the admission side such as spouses and minor children matter little under the 
IIRIRA.13  After the IRCA, Congress devoted less effort to implementing measures to recognize 
ties that immigrants of various status developed with the society than to law enforcement, by 
increasing the budget of the immigration agency or by according the INS with stronger 
deportation power.   The IIRIRIA expanded the grounds for deportation, where deportation was 
mandatory, with no chance of cancellation of removal.  The trend began with the Anti-drug 
Abuse Act of 1988, which defined crimes such as murder, kidnapping, and weapons possession 
as an “aggravated felony” with mandatory deportation and little prospect of readmission to the 
U.S.   The range of offenses classified as “aggravated felony” was expanded to include much 
wider range of offenses such as shoplifting.   Equities that courts had weighed against 
deportation such as existence of family, length of residence in the U.S., and good character carry 
little weight in case of mandatory deportation.14  In mixed-status families including minor U.S.-
born children, criticism has amounted that deportation of parents amount to the removal of 
children who are U.S. citizens but that it is becoming more difficult to avoid deportation on the 
grounds of the child’s interest.15 
                                                
 
12 The sponsor must maintain the beneficiary at an income level of 125 percent of the federal poverty line. 
Park and Park, Probationary Americans, 70-73; Zolberg, A Nation by Design, 410-412. 
13 Nora V. Demleitner, “How Much Do Western Democracies Value Family and Marriage?: Immigration 
Law’s Conflicted Answers,” Hofstra Law Review 32 (2003-2004): 298-299. 
14 Nancy Morawetz, “Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of 
Proposed Reforms,” Harvard Law Review 113 (1999-2000): 1937, 1951-1954. 
15 David B. Thronson, “Choiceless Choices: Deportation and the Parent-Child Relationship,” Nevada Law 
Journal 6 (2006): 1189; Hiroshi Motomura, “We Asked for Workers, but Families Came: Time, Law, and 
the Family in Immigration and Citizenship,” Virginia Journal of Social Policy and Law 14 no.1 (2006): 
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  Despite the resemblance in the volume of immigration, today’s families immigrate to 
the U.S. under legal conditions that those before the imposition of numerical restriction in the 
1920s did not experience.  In 2011, 1.06 million persons became permanent residents of the U.S.   
Some 688,000 were family-sponsored, with 453,000 immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, 
followed by 109,000 spouse and minor children of permanent residents, who can immigrate to 
the U.S. after a relatively short wait.   At the same time, a one-year difference in age compels 
adult children of U.S. citizens to wait for a visa for over twenty years.16   According to a 2008 
study, some 8.8 people were estimated to belong to mixed-status families consisting of both 
unauthorized immigrants and U.S. citizens and permanent residents.   Half were U.S.-born 
children with birthright citizenship, born to 3.8 million parents with deep ties with American 
society but without formal permanent residency.17   “Preserving the integrity of the family" or 
“preservation of the family unit”18 is commonly believed to be the principle of U.S. immigration 
policy, and is central to the idea of the U.S. as a settler immigrant nation and as a “nation of 
immigrants.”  But it was also the norm of immigration restriction that gave rise to issues such as 
“family unification” and created “mixed-status families,” and its practice continue to be 
contested today as part of the ongoing struggles of immigrants families.  
                                                                                                                                                       
 
103-118; Jacqueline Bhaba, “Arendt’s Children: Do Today’s Migrant Children Have a Right to Have 
Rights?” Human Rights Quarterly 31 (2009): 447; “Forced Apart: Families Separated and Immigrants 
Harmed by United States Deportation Policy,” Human Rights Watch 19 no. 3 (2007). 
16 2011 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 18. 
17 Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States 
(Washington D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2009), 7-8. 
18 The former quotation is from Truman’s Veto Message of McCarran-Walter Bill on June 25, 1952. 
President’s Commission on Immigration and Naturalization, Whom We Shall Welcome (Washington: 
G.P.O, 1952), 276; The latter quotation is from the House Report accompanying the vetoed bill. Revising 
the Laws Relating to Immigration, Naturalization, and Nationality H.R. Rep. 1365 at 29 (1952).   
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Appendix A: Terminology 
 
family-based admission: This dissertation will use the term to refer to admission to the U.S. by 
virtue of one’s family relation to a U.S. citizen or resident as defined by immigration law.  It 
does not refer generally to immigration of family members but only when the government 
recognizes such family relation as the principal ground for admission.  For instance, if a person 
with a family in the U.S. applies for a visa based on one’s occupation, such admission will be 
described as occupation-based. 
 
non-immigrant: A legal status first created by the Immigration Act of 1924.  A foreigner 
admitted to the U.S. as a non-immigrant neither has the right to reside in the U.S. indefinitely nor 
the right to naturalization.  Initially, there was no firm numerical ceiling on annual admission of 
non-immigrants, although certain classes of nonimmigrants are also placed under a ceiling today. 
 
immigrant: Since 1924, any foreigner that is not listed as “non-immigrant” must apply for 
admission as an “immigrant.”  The central feature of post-1924 immigration regulation is 1) the 
distinction between non-immigrant and immigrant, and 2) the numerical limitation on the annual 
number of immigrants.  
 
migrant: In order to differentiate between colloquial usage of the term “immigrant” and 
“immigrant” as a legal status since 1924, this dissertation will use the term “migrant” as a 
general term to include any foreign-born person residing in the U.S.  A migrant would include 
any status under immigration law, and those without any formal immigration status. 
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permanent resident alien / lawful permanent resident: In contemporary usage, holding an 
“immigrant” status and being a permanent resident are interchangeable, and permanent residency 
includes the right to naturalization.  Until 1952, permanent residency and eligibility for 
naturalization were separate concepts, as persons of Asian descent were barred from 
naturalization despite their permanent residency.   
 
alien ineligible to citizenship:  Until 1952, acquisition of U.S. citizenship through naturalization 
was limited to “white” persons and persons of “African nativity and descent” by the 
Naturalization Act of 1870.   Without referring to a specific country or nationality, the 
Immigration Act of 1924 excluded “aliens ineligible to citizenship,” euphemism for people of 
Asian descent, from immigrating to the U.S. or from acquiring permanent residency. 
 
declarant: Before 1952, naturalization was a two-step process.  The first step was to file a 
“declaration of intention to naturalization” at least three years before applying for final 
naturalization.  The declaration of intention was also called the “first paper.”  A person with the 
first paper acquired the status of a “declarant,” and gained rights closer to citizens under federal 
and state laws than foreigners without first papers.    
 
adjustment of status: To change one’s status from one immigration status to another (particularly 
from a non-immigrant to an immigrant / permanent resident) without having to leave the U.S.  
The term is also used when an unauthorized immigrant, thereby having no formal legal status 
under immigration law, acquires formal immigration status. 
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quota: Annual ceiling on the number of immigrants admitted from each country.  The size of the 
quota was different according to the country of birth.  The quota system was in effect since 1921 
until 1968.  Between 1921 and 1943, quotas only applied to immigrants born in Europe.   For 
one, persons of Asian descent were summarily excluded, and Congress assigned no quota for 
countries in Asia until repeal of Chinese exclusion in 1943.   For another, until 1968, natives of 
the independent countries of the Western Hemisphere were not subjected to a firm prefixed 
ceiling, and were placed outside the quotas system. 
 
non-quota immigrant: A term used between 1924 and 1968 to refer to an immigrant exempted 
from quota restrictions.  The difference between a “non-immigrant” and a “non-quota immigrant,” 
both exempted from quota restrictions, was that the latter were admitted for permanent residence.  
The term referred to immigrants from the Eastern Hemisphere exempted from quota restrictions 
based on profession or as family of U.S. citizens.  The term also referred to all immigrants from 
the Western Hemisphere, categorically outside the quotas system. 
 
non-quota family / immediate relative: Immigrants exempted from numerical restriction based on 
their familial relation with a U.S. citizen.  Under the quotas system, such families were called 
non-quota family (subcategory of non-quota immigrant).  After the abolition of the quotas 
system by the Immigration Act of 1965, such relations have been called “immediate relatives.”   
 
preference family: Immigrants given priority over others in the issuance of numerically limited 
immigrant visas, based on their family relations with a U.S. citizen or with a permanent resident.  
 
petitioner/ sponsor, beneficiary: A family visa (non-quota family / immediate relative, 
preference family) does not allow direct application by the prospective immigrant but requires 
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petition and sponsorship by the family in the U.S.  This expresses the notion that family-based 
admission is about the rights and privileges of U.S. citizens and residents than about admission 
of foreigners.  The recipient is called the “beneficiary” that receives a visa by virtue of one’s 
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